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In 2001 David Garland published his work on what he called “The Culture of Crime Control” 
relating to the systems of criminal justice in the U.K. and U.S.A.  He argues that criminal 
justice in these large jurisdictions has, in the thirty years prior to 2001, become more 
authoritarian, punitive and coercive.  He uses twelve benchmarks or what he calls “the Indices 
of Change” to make out his case.   The author is a retired member of An Garda Síochána with 
in excess of thirty three years Garda experience.  This thesis will use this experience to explore 
transformation in An Garda Síochána in the last half century since the late 1960s to 2018 to 
establish if Garland’s theory has any relevance to that transformation.  It will be contended that 
the evidence presented here is compelling proof that Garland’s theory is authenticated in what 
occurred in Irish policing in the period under review.  This thesis specifically examines six of 
Garland’s “indices of change” to demonstrate how relevant they are in explaining 
transformation in An Garda Síochána and policing generally in the Republic of Ireland.  That 
is not to suggest that Garland’s remaining six indices are not relevant.  They are, but they 
impact on Irish policing in a more indirect way and are more relevant to other agencies in the 
criminal justice system.  It will be maintained Garland’s indices can be used to describe how 
An Garda Síochána has become scandal ridden and never more so than in the most recent 
decades.  However, it will also be asserted that Garland’s theory can be the template for the 
Garda organisation to extricate itself from scandal and implement measures and procedures 
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What does appear to be clear today is the old adage that it is better that 10 guilty persons 
should go free than for one innocent person to be convicted seems to have very few 
adherents now.1 
 
The Culture of Control 
 
This thesis is about An Garda Síochána (AGS) an organisation that the writer has been proud 
to serve for in excess of thirty years.  It is about the changes that have occurred in the 
organisation during that period and beyond.  As a disciplined force, AGS has always adapted 
to changes.  As with all change, the practices and procedures that come with it take time to 
become embedded or normalised within the group.  In the last half century there has been a 
high velocity of transformation from without and within AGS that arguably has not necessarily 
been to its own benefit or to the advantage of policing in general.  For the purposes of this 
thesis these reforms are examined in the context of what David Garland has referred to as the 
“Culture of Control”.2  This work demonstrates Garland’s theory is very relevant in explaining 
what occurred in AGS over the last 50 years. 
 
In 2001 David Garland published his seminal work on the subject.3  In the preface he sets out 
his stall, as it were, in the first sentence when he states that “(t)his book is about the culture of 
crime control and criminal justice in Britain and America”.4  This thesis will explore whether 
Garland’s work has any relevance or application to AGS.  Garland examines “the dramatic 
developments that have occurred in our social response to crime during the last thirty years and 
about the social culture and political forces that gave rise to them”.5  This thesis will look at 
the evidence of similar developments in this jurisdiction commencing almost three decades 
prior to Garland’s publication and concluding almost two decades thereafter.  The writer uses 
                                               
1  S. Kilcommins, “Risk in Irish Society: Moving to a Crime Control Model of Criminal Justice”.  Conference  
    Paper [2005] Irish Probation Journal Vol.2 Issue 1 accessed at www.probation.ie at 8.30 pm on 25th July   
    2018. 
2   D. Garland, The Culture of Control, Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford O.U.P. 2001). 
    [hereinafter Garland] 
3   D. Garland supra at note 2. 
4   Ibid at Preface. 






his own Garda knowledge and experience to set out the case that what Garland says transpired 
in Britain and America has also materialised in this jurisdiction in relation to AGS.  The writer 
asserts that Garland’s theory insofar as Irish policing is concerned continues to be alive and 
very real. 
 
At the outset Garland introduces us to his work by setting out “A History of the Present”.6   He 
states that “(w)e quickly grow used to the way things are.  Today more than ever it is easy to 
live in the immediacy of the present and lose all sense of the historical processes out of which 
our current arrangements have emerged”.7  It is contended that this is correct.  AGS has 
embraced so much change in the last half century that anyone who has served at the “coal face” 
during that period might have taken this change for granted.  It is suggested that it is only when 
one stops to take account of this transformation does one realise how AGS has morphed over 
the decades.  This thesis will focus on some of the internal and external influences that have 
prompted this evolution. 
 
Specifically, Garland refers to what he calls the “Indices of Change”8 that is “the signs of 
movement and visible landmarks of the emerging new terrain”.9  Six of the twelve ‘indices of 
change’ will be explored in the context of AGS and they are as follows:10 
 
1) The Return of the Victim. 
2) Above All the Public Must be Protected 
3) The Expanding Infrastructure of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. 
4) Civil Society and the Commercialization of Crime Control 
5) New Management Styles and Working Practices 
6) A Perpetual State of Crisis. 
 
These six indices are selected for thorough examination because it is contended that they have 
a specific applicability when it comes to explaining transformation in AGS and policing over 
the last fifty years in this jurisdiction.   It is not being argued here that these indices in isolation 
were the genesis of changes in policing but when examined fully and in their totality, it will be 
demonstrated that they have substantial relevance in how the Gardaí go about their duties and 
in delimiting Garda discretion.   
                                               
6    Ibid at p.1. 
7    Ibid at p.1. 
8    Ibid at p.6. 
9    Ibid at p.6. 





Similarly, it must be acknowledged that six remaining indices as set out by Garland are also 
relevant to the remodelling of AGS specifically and policing generally and are clearly 
connected to the indices under examination in this work.  These other indices11 highlighted by 
Garland are: 
 
1) The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal 
2) The Emergence of Punitive Sanctions and Expressive Justice 
3) Changes in the Emotional Tone of Crime Policy 
4) Politicization and the New Populism 
5) The Re-Invention of Prison. 
6) The Transformation of Criminological Thought 
 
 
While six indices have been selected for examination in this dissertation, it is impossible to 
carry out such examination completely disregarding the remaining six indices.  Therefore, they 
too must be considered, and each chapter will demonstrate how each of the indices under 




Garland in explaining his theory says that his “concern is to understand the historical conditions 
of existence upon which contemporary practices depend, particularly those that seem most 
puzzling and unsettling”.12  He says that his study “thus tackles a problem that is at once 
historical, penological and sociological,”13 It is these key themes which underpin the analysis 
in an Irish context also. 
 
Historical - Garland argues that there has been a movement away from the assumptions that 
were the bedrock of criminal justice governance since circa the 1980s:  “the central agencies 
of the modern criminal justice state have undergone quite radical shifts in their working 
practices and organisational missions”.14  Therefore, in this thesis the history of AGS from the 
late1960s to the present day will be analysed to demonstrate the validity of Garland’s theory in 
explaining what happened to AGS in the period under review.  The scandals that have rocked 
                                               
11   Ibid at pp. 8-20. 
12   Ibid at p.2. 
13   Ibid at p.3. 




and tainted the organisation will be considered together with how the Gardaí managed 
themselves over the period.  In addition, how the Gardaí dealt with and investigated crime will 
be reviewed together with how the Gardaí engaged with victims of crime.  Similarly, how the 
Gardaí reacted to or perhaps did not react to different crises over the decades will also be 
explored. 
 
Penological – Garland asserts that since the 1980s: 
 
(p)olicy development appears highly volatile with an unprecedented amount of 
legislative activity, much dissension in the ranks of particular groups and a good deal 
of conflict between experts and politicians.  The battle line of debate seems blurred and 
rapidly changing.  No one is quite sure what is radical and what is reactionary.15   
 
Here again it will be argued in this work that there is compelling evidence in the period of 
review in Ireland to support Garland’s theory.  Evidence of the massive empowerment of 
Gardaí in the last half century will be explored in this context.   The gradual acceleration in the 
powers given to Gardaí expand beyond the investigation of serious crime into other areas such 
as road traffic enforcement, public order and non-violent theft. Not only was there an increase 
in Garda empowerment but there were also increases in the number of crimes and offences on 
the Irish Statue Book together with an increase in penalties and sanctions. Traditional due 
process rights were gradually being pared back in response to criminal activity and the public’s 
perception of it.  
 
Sociological – Garland argues that:   
 
Todays reconfigured field of crime control is the result of political choices and 
administrative decisions – but these choices and decisions are grounded in new 
structure of social relations and coloured by a new pattern of cultural sensibilities.16 
 
Since the foundation of the State members of AGS had massive discretion and there were a lot 
more Garda stations than there are now.  Crisis and scandal forced change both in and on AGS 
and were essentially the cause of the erosion of traditional Garda discretion.  Similarly, 
administrative matters like budgets came to the fore and acutely influenced the decision making 
of Garda management in how crime was investigated, and policing was organised. The fear of 
                                               
15   Ibid at p.4. 




crime became an issue and crime came to have an inflated media profile. Consequently, the 
public wanted their Gardaí to deal with and face down criminal activity.  Politicians not wanting 
to appear soft on crime and lose votes chose to, mass empower the Gardaí. Notwithstanding 
consistently high public support and trust, AGS is now the most accountable organisation in 
the State with layer upon layer of oversight.  In this thesis it will be argued that there is 
substantial evidence in what occurred to AGS to support Garland’s view when he states:   
 
The remodelling of an established institutional field, the emergence of different 
objectives and priorities and the appearance of new ideas about the nature of crime and 
of criminals also suggests shifts in the cultural underpinning of these institutions.17   
 
Therefore, this historical, penological and sociological study in what occurred within and 
without AGS in the past fifty years will be set out over six chapters.    Each chapter examines 
a Garland index that has been selected for review for the purpose of this exercise.  However, 
as highlighted earlier, Garland’s remaining six indices will also permeate and be relevant to 




This thesis employs several methodologies to answer the research question which has been 
posed, namely the extent to which Garland’s culture of control thesis can be utilised to 
document changes in the practices and operation of AGS.   In first applying historical analysis, 
a vast number of secondary sources were consulted including newspaper articles, reports, 
academic journal articles and books.   The reports include material emanating from AGS itself 
and from sources that were tasked with carrying out the miscellany of investigations into the 
organisation in the past number of decades. 
 
A doctrinal legal methodology will also be employed to catalogue the common law, legislative 
and constitutional constructions that have been formulated around Garda operations.  It will 
also detail how these laws have changed over time.  There were in excess of one hundred pieces 
of legislation scrutinised to demonstrate and analyse expanding Garda empowerment which 
continues to this date.  In addition, the decisions of the judiciary in the Ireland’s highest courts 
                                               




are examined both to show not only the trammelling of Garda discretion and empowerment but 
also the endorsement of Garda power.   
 
Other supporting methodology will be employed to counteract any lacuna arising from a 
doctrinal approach.  In particular a socio-legal methodology will be engaged to enrich the 
doctrinal analysis.  It seeks to understand the legal provisions in a broader social and 
institutional context.  This is achieved in practical terms, using Garda operational reports, 
parliamentary debates, academic and media commentaries and so on which reveal the practices 
beyond legal rules.  Of course, Garland’s culture of control thesis will provide an excellent 
conceptual framework for this socio-legal consideration, which comprise historical, 
penological and sociological considerations. 
 
Therefore, in Chapter 1 “The Return of the Victim”18 as a driver of change will be scrutinised, 
and it will be shown that Garland’s theory is authenticated in what occurred in AGS in how it 
dealt with victims of crime in the period under review.  Garland argues that the crime victim is 
now front and centre of criminal justice policy, while in the  past the interests of the victim 
were “subsumed under the general public interest and certainly not counter-posed over the 
interests of the offender”.19  Garland notes that “all this has now changed”20 and that “the new 
political imperative is that victims must be protected”21  and that the “symbolic figure of the 
victim has taken on a life of its own”.22  The historic interaction of victims and Gardaí over 
five decades will be traced and it will be demonstrated how due process, the rules of evidence 
and the absence of a legal duty of care for crime victims impugned upon how victims were 
treated by Gardaí.  The chapter also sets out how AGS endeavoured to improve the quality of 
their interaction with those injured by crime through their Victims Charter23 and Service 
Policy24.  It also looks at how Gardaí and D.P.P. have adapted to the new E.U. Directive25 and 
its supporting legislation26 in this jurisdiction. Especially so in respect of prosecutorial 
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decisions.  The Gardaí have also been scandalised because of the poor and inadequate responses 
to victims of crime and these matters are highlighted by means of the findings of the Guerin27 
and O’Higgins28 Reports.  It will be argued that what occurred in AGS as it applies to this 
Garland index is cogent evidence in support of his theory. 
 
In Chapter 2 the index which Garland styles “Above all the Public Must be Protected”29 is 
considered and it is argued that this project strongly validates his theory when tested against 
Garda and legislative history.  Garland notes that “protecting the public has become the 
dominant theme in penal policy”30  and that “(t)oday there is a new and urgent emphasis on the 
need for security, the containment of danger, the identification and management of any kind of 
risk”.31  In order to verify Garland’s theory and its applicability to AGS, events in Garda history 
are traced from the late 1960s to the current time.  These events are placed side by side with 
the miscellany of criminal justice legislation and Garda empowerment that took place during 
the period and analysed in tandem with Garland’s theory.  Again, it will be argued that the ideal 
of public protection is strongly relevant and valid when it comes to explaining what happened 
in policing in Ireland and to AGS over a fifty-year period. 
 
What Garland refers to as “The Expanding Infrastructure of Crime Prevention and Community 
Safety”32 is put under the spotlight in Chapter 3 and what he says is cross referenced with what 
occurred in the Garda organisation over the decades but in particular the 1980s.  When the 
heroin epidemic and the illicit drug scene generally came to the fore in the mid-1980s the Garda 
hierarchy began to consider that AGS was losing the hearts, minds and goodwill of the public 
in light of the Gardaí’s perceived inability to deal with the problem.  They felt they had to re-
assert themselves and win back public support or at least reassure the public that they were up 
to the job.  AGS embraced community policing and all its derivative activities.33   AGS sent its 
members out into neighbourhoods and parishes of the nation on a form of a charm offensive to 
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reassure a worried and sceptical public.  There were similar policing parallels in New York.  
Garland would refer to such interactions between the Gardaí and the public as “preventable 
partnerships”34 which he described as “low key efforts to build up internal controls of 
neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to police themselves”.35 It will be contended 
here that there is ample evidence under this index to support the application of his theory in 
this jurisdiction.  The chapter explores the rhetoric of different senior officers over the years 
and notes evidence to support Garland’s theory. 
 
Chapter 4 will explore the relationship between “Civil Society and the Commercialization of 
Crime Control”36 and the evidence of what occurred in policing in this jurisdiction will be 
tested against Garland’s theory.  He argues that “policing has become a mixed economy of 
public and private provision as more and more routine security functions are undertaken by 
private police”.37  In this chapter it will be demonstrated that the Gardaí have ceded ground to 
private security interests.  Given limited resources the Gardaí cannot be everywhere, and the 
vacuum has been filled by private security.  The public and private police generally work well 
together but Garda rosters, budgets and station closures have diminished the visibility of AGS 
members and meanwhile private security has thrived.   In addition, the public have become 
more affluent and Garda priorities had to change.  This chapter sifts through evidence and finds 
ample proof of Garland’s viewpoint. 
 
In Chapter 5 the Garland index of change, “New Management Styles and Working Practices”38 
is probed to ascertain its relevance to AGS.  Garland argues that there is now “a new and all-
pervasive managerialism that affects every aspect of criminal justice”39 and that “across the 
system as a whole, new forms of system monitoring, information technology and financial 
auditing have extended centralised control over a process that was previously less co-ordinated 
and highly resistant to policy management”.40  It will be submitted in this chapter that 
management and supervision within AGS has impacted the force in line with  Garland’s theory 
under this index.  The management structure in AGS remained more or less the same from the 
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formation of AGS in 1922 until it began to change in the mid-1990s in response to the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI) which was set up by Government directive to ensure value for 
money.  The Gardaí would have to manage themselves and educate themselves in the ways of 
the private sector.  AGS would now operate like a business and it will be argued in this chapter 
that many of the difficulties that have befallen AGS since the mid-1990s can be traced back to 
the mid-1990s period and what emanated from the SMI.  The advent of managerialism to AGS 
will be traced here through following criteria: 
 
1) Language Change 
2) Economy and Efficiency 
3) Strategic Planning 
4) Staffing Resources 
5) Resources 
6) Performance Measurement and Counting 
 
It is submitted that when Garda practice and procedure is reviewed under all these headings it 
will produce compelling evidence of what Garland has to say under this index. 
 
The final Garland index examined in this study is what he calls “A Perpetual State of Crisis”.41  
In this chapter Garda history will be analysed and cross referenced with periods in the last half 
century when the organisation was faced with crisis.  Anyone who has served in AGS will 
know that crises in any section of their organisation will have a ripple and often turbulent effect 
on the whole organisation.  It is submitted that it is the nature of Garda work that mistakes and 
errors can always be amplified.  It is also the nature of police work that when things go wrong 
then they can do so catastrophically with the loss of life, the infliction of severe injury and the 
premature termination of careers of capable and dedicated police officers.   This it is submitted 
is consistent with Garland’s theory.  He argues that for “the last two decades”42 there has been 
“an unmistakable malaise”43 in the criminal justice system.  He says that it is referred to as a 
“crisis”44 but considers the term “inappropriate”45 because it has “endured for several 
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decades”.46  Since the 1980s AGS has been battered by scandal and crisis.  The 1970s also 
brought its share of trouble for AGS.  In this chapter crises and scandal in AGS will be vetted 







Crises have always forced change in AGS and the transformation always impacted on Garda 
morale.   In any event it will be contended that what is set out in the chapter will strongly 
uphold the validity of Garland’s thesis. 
 
It will also be argued here that the evidence as set out in each of the chapters is also indicative 
of the Garland indices that are not explored in depth in this study.  The mass empowerment of 
Gardaí and the increase in the number of criminal offences and penalties as set out under the 
“Protection of the Public”47 index in Chapter 2 is surely also evidence of what Garland refers 
to as “the Decline in the Rehabilitative Ideal”48 and “The Re-Emergence of Punitive 
Sanctions and Expressive Justice”.49  As noted by Garland “the rehabilitative possibilities of 
criminal justice measures are routinely subordinated to other penal goals particularly 
retribution, incapacitation and the management of risk”.50  Similarly, what Garland says about 
the “re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expressive justice”51 is evinced by what he 
asserts in respect of “The Return of the Victim”52 which is studied here in Chapter 1.  He 
states: “The feelings of the victim or the victim’s family, or a fearful outraged public are now 
routinely invoked in support of new laws and penal policies”.53 Specifically, he asserts that:   
 
Punishment – in the sense of expressive punishment conveying public sentiment – is 
once again a respectable openly embraced, penal purpose and has come into effect not 
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Simply put, “the return” of the victim and public protection has caused the “re-emergence” of 
strict laws, penalties and the enhancement of Garda powers.  This nexus between Garland’s 
different indices can also be seen elsewhere.  In respect of “Changes in the Emotional Tone 
of Crime Policy”.55  He says here that: 
 
Fear of crime has come to be regarded as a problem in and of itself quite distinct from 
actual crime and victimization and distinctive policies have been developed that aim to 
reduce fear levels rather than reduce crime.56 
 
It is submitted that it is interlocked with Garland’s theory on “crime prevention and 
community safety”57 which is detailed in Chapter 3 and looks at how Gardaí went about 
assuaging public fears during the drugs epidemic in the mid-1980s.  These changes in 
emotional tone are also relevant in Chapter 5 which highlights how the Gardaí managed 
themselves, measured performance and handled crime statistics during the period. The fear of 
crime is also arguably relevant to the commercialisation of crime in Chapter 4 where the private 
police blossomed as the public police became more embattled. 
 
Garland argues in respect of his index on “Politicization and the New Populism”58 that: “A 
highly charged political discourse now surrounds all crime control issues so that every decision 
is taken in the glare of publicity and political contention and every mistake becomes a 
scandal.”59 It is submitted all this is also evidence of the “perpetual crisis”60 which is dealt 
with in Chapter 6.  The AGS has almost been immersed in a perpetuity of crises in the last 
fifty-years which has changed how the Gardaí have carried out duties and how government 
have legislated on criminal justice matters and again it is argued here that these relate back to 
the “protection of the public”61 and Garda “management styles and practices.”62 
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Garland also looks at what he calls the “Re-Invention of the Prison”.63  He states that: 
 
For most of the post war period imprisonment rates in America and Britain decreased 
in relation to the numbers of crime recorded and offenders convicted … In the last 
twenty-five years this long-term tendency has been reversed … the reversal of this trend 
was followed by the steepest and most sustained increase in the rate of imprisonment 
that has been recorded since the birth of the modern prison in the nineteenth century.64  
 
Similarly, in Ireland the prison population increased substantially over seven decades.  Before 
1970 the daily average number of prisoners stood less than 800.65  In 1957 it was 395.66  By 
1975 the average increased to 1,00067 and by 1989 it doubled again to more than 2,000.68  By 
2001 it was 3,11269 and in 2010 it stood at 4,290.70  Prison incarcerations peaked in 2011 and 
2012 with the figures standing at 4,390 and 4,318 respectively.71   In 2013 there was a decrease 
to 4,158 and the downward trend continued in 2014 with the figures standing at 3,915.   
Similarly, the average daily incarcerations fell in the three-year period from 2015 to 2017 with 
the figures recorded at 3,722, 3,718 and 3,680 respectively.72    The figure on the 1st January 
2019 stood at 3,904.73  Therefore between 1970 and 2011 there was a 400% increase in the 
daily average prison population.74   These figures support the Garland thesis in respect of this 
index but reflect changes that were taking place in criminal justice legislation under other 
indices.  He argues under this index that there was “a transformation of criminological 
thought”.75   He argues that “control theories began from a much darker vision of the human 
condition.  They assume that individuals will be strongly attracted to self-serving, anti-social 
and criminal conduct unless inhibited from doing so by robust and effective controls”.76   Hence 
the public appeal for imprisonment strong penalties and increased sanction. 
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Clearly it can be seen that each of the Garland indices “piggy back” on the other and while the 
focus and scope of this study are the selected indices – simply because they can easily be 
applied directly to AGS – the remaining six indices are also relevant to policing in Ireland.  
While this study strongly argues that Garland’s theory is substantially all fours with what 
happened in AGS in the last half century there are a few inconsistencies that merit highlighting. 
 
Shortcomings in Garland’s Theory? 
 
At the very outset of Garland’s seminal publication in 2001 he comes clean in respect of his 
theory on “crime control”.77 He readily acknowledges that his theory is only a theory and it 
will not cover or apply to every single nuance of human behaviour.   He states that: 
 
In our attempts to make sense of social life there is an unavoidable tension between 
broad generalization and the specification of empirical particulars.   The standard 
response to any wide-ranging social or historical interpretation is to point to specific 
facts that don’t fit, the variation that has been missed or the further details that are 
needed to complete the picture.  ‘It’s more complicated than that! Or ‘they do it 
differently in Minnesota!’ (or for that matter, Manchester or Midlothian) are the 
inevitable critical complaints and in their own terms these criticisms are always well 
taken.78   
 
The “specific facts that don’t fit”79 or “the variation that has been missed”80 require 
consideration, but in the end, it will be contended that shortcomings in Garland’s theory are 
not significant enough to make a difference to the authenticity or indeed legitimacy of what he 
asserts in respect changes in Irish policing and the Irish Police force over the last five decades. 
 
It is true that AGS has benefitted from mass empowerment in the period under review.  The 
right to silence has been eroded81, interviews are being video/audio recorded.82  New offences 
have been created to make it easier to bring persons to book for gangland and other serious 
crime and information technology has been so enhanced that Gardaí if necessary, can pinpoint 
a person’s movements by what they call “pinging” a person’s mobile phone.  AGS can hardly 
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keep abreast of their new powers of stop, search and seizure.  The PULSE system has also 
assisted in police accountability and its investigative prowess. It contains massive amounts of 
information.  Everything must be recorded on the system under pain of strong penalty and/or 
scandal if it is not.  All these matters are highlighted in the chapters that follow.   One could 
also be forgiven for thinking that on the face of it, AGS was part of the apparatus of an 
authoritarian state.   Not so.  It has been stated already in this study and will be stated again 
that AGS is one of the most accountable organisations in this jurisdiction.  Its members were 
essentially accountable by means of the organisation’s own disciplinary regulations, civil and 
criminal law and judicial review. Since the mid-1980s its members are now also more 
accountable via G.S.O.C.83(previously the Garda Complaints Board),84 the itinerant Minister 
for Justice of the day,85 Dáil Éireann by means of Dáil Committees and the various forms of 
Commissions of Inquiry not to mention the Policing Authority86 and the Commission set up to 
examine the future of Policing in Ireland.87  The evidence that Gardaí glean in investigations 
must be submitted for consideration and direction to the independent office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions.  In the event of investigations progressing to prosecution then the Gardaí 
must submit their efforts to due process.  These are very onerous responsibilities that the 
members of AGS choose to take on every day.  The media is also quick to spotlight and 
highlight Garda issues.  This creates a pressure environment in which to work.  It might be said 
that being a member of AGS is like being in a goldfish bowl looking out at everyone else 
looking in.88  It is submitted that this level of accountability strongly pushes back on Garland’s 
crime control theory.  The police are themselves being robustly controlled.  
 
Garland underlines the “Return of the Victim”89 to the centre stage of the criminal justice 
system.  “Putting the Victim First”90 has been called “the devil’s greatest trick”.91  The victim 
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must first go through the trauma of making a complaint to Gardaí.  Time will pass as Gardaí 
will gather evidence and prepare their file.  The D.P.P. will give directions to prosecute or not.  
If there are no proceedings directed for whatever reason the victim will be at least disappointed.  
If criminal proceedings are directed, then the case will go to court and take its place on a court 
list.  More time will pass.  Adjournments may come and go, and a hearing day eventually 
arrives.   Maybe the case will get heard.  Maybe.  The Court might not get to hear it due to the 
previous workload on the day’s list.  Maybe a crucial witness would be unexpectedly 
unavailable.  Another adjournment.  More delay.  The victim may be disheartened.  Eventually 
the case goes ahead.  A juror might take ill or there might be another issue with the jury.  Maybe 
something might be said in court that would be in breach of due process.  Mistrial declared.  
Case put back.  The victim goes home again.  Eventually the victim gives his or her evidence.  
Legal argument takes place.  A due process rule might be breached, or the Judge directs that 
the case cannot go before a jury.  Case dismissed.  The accused is free to go.  Let’s say the jury 
gets to determine the matter.  It possibly deliberates for hours, maybe days.  The jury decides 
not guilty.  The victim feels that he or she was not believed. Maybe the jury cannot decide. 
“Hung jury.” The case goes back and the D.P.P. must decide on retrial.   Maybe, the jury will 
return a verdict of guilty.  It has now been a long time since the victim made the complaint to 
the Gardaí.  The victim awaits sentencing of the accused.  Maybe the victim will be pleased 
with the sentence handed down to the accused by the court.  Maybe not.  Either way they will 
go home.  Perhaps on the way they will recall the words of defence counsel seeking to appeal 
some aspect of the case.  Some Garda will have to tell the victim it might all have to be gone 
over again if the accused’s appeal is successful.  The Judge and the prosecution and defence 
teams move onto the next case.  The investigating Garda goes back to the Garda Station and 
before long he/she will be re-directed to his/her next crime for investigation not to mention all 
those he/she has outstanding on the desk.  The Garda will also immediately have to update the 
PULSE system with the outcome of the case.   
 
This is part of the reality of the criminal justice system and how it impacts on victims of crime.  
The recent E.U. Directive92 and supporting legislation93 here changes none of the reality that 
has just been described.  As noted in Chapter 1 the victim may have returned to centre stage, 
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but that stage must be shared by the accused, the Gardaí, the Judge, the jury and prosecution 
and defence teams.  It is a crowded place.   
 
There are further push backs against the Garland thesis in decisions from the Irish Courts. 
Kilcommins considered four cases to highlight this.94  In CC v Ireland and Others95, a 19-year-
old accused was charged with what might in Garda parlance be called “the statutory rape” of a 
14-year-old female.  The accused of 19 years stated that the girl had told him she was 16 years 
of age.  The accused said the intercourse was consensual.  There were four charges against him 
contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935.   The section did not 
provide for any defence once sexual intercourse took place.  It took no account of the man’s 
honest or innocent belief.  The Supreme Court ultimately held that criminalising the “mentally 
innocent” was wrong and the statutory provisions were found inconsistent with the Irish 
Constitution. 
 
In the case S.H. v The Director of Public Prosecutions96 the delay in bringing prosecutions in 
respect of belated complaint of historical sexual abuse was considered.  Since the 1990s these 
types of cases have become more public.  As noted by Kilcommins the Supreme Court held 
“that the only relevant question in such cases is whether there is a real or serious risk that the 
accused by reason of the delay would not receive a fair trial.  The accused benefits from the 
presumption of innocence at all stages of the process.”97  Heretofore the courts were 
disallowing an accused from succeeding in a plea of prejudice because of the delay in bringing 
the case if the prosecution could prove that such delay was due to a close personal relationship 
between the accused and the complainant. 
 
In Damache v The Director of Public Prosecutions98 the Supreme Court prevented the Gardaí 
from relying on a search warrant which was issued under Section 29 of the Offences Against 
the State Act 1939 because the Garda Officer who issued it was involved in the investigation.  
The section was struck down by the Supreme Court as being repugnant to the Irish Constitution 
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because it was not issued by an independent person.  The State has since legislated to remedy 
the situation and Ali Charaf Damache99 in recent times has pleaded guilty to a U.S. charge of 
supporting terrorism.    
 
In the case of People (D.P.P.) v Colm Murphy100 the criminal charges related to a car bomb 
explosion in Omagh in 1998.  The Special Criminal Court convicted and sentenced the accused 
to 14 years imprisonment.  The accused had raised the issue at trial concerning the alleged 
doctoring of notes by interviewing Gardaí.  The Court of Criminal Appeal would later overturn 
the conviction based on the tainted evidence. 
 
It is submitted that all these cases are push backs on Garland’s theory on the “culture of 
control”.  All the cases concerned heinous crimes but at the highest courts in the land were not 
going to accept the at least questionable behaviour of the Gardaí (the Damache101 and 
Murphy102 cases) and were not going to accept due process rights being eroded in historical 
sex abuse and statutory rape type cases.  (CC 103and SH104.)   These terrorist cases are discussed 
later in the substantive chapters and while they are evidence of a push back on Garland’s theory 
under his “public protection”105 and “crises”106 indices it could be argued that they are evidence 
of the accountability now being brought to bear on the Gardaí in his “new management styles 




In summary therefore, this thesis examines transformation in AGS by means of Garland’s 
theory on the “Culture of Control”.108  Six of Garland’s indices of change are specifically 
analysed in separate chapters simply because they are easily applicable to policing.   However, 
it is acknowledged that the remaining indices are also relevant.  The study uses Garland’s 
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devices of historical, penological and sociological themes and some of the shortcomings in 
Garland’s theory have been featured.  In the end it will be concluded that Garland’s thesis is 








THE RETURN OF THE VICTIM 




Three lads just ran in, with caps on and their faces covered.  They had guns.  They 
grabbed me and pulled me against the bullet proof glass and demanded the takings … 
Afterwards the Gardaí came and took statements.  Asked later if he was given any 






Garland argues that “(o)ver the last three decades there has been a remarkable return of the 
victim to centre stage in criminal justice policy.”110  Is this correct? And if so, how has this 
change manifested itself in the transformation of AGS over the last number of decades in 
particular?  This chapter will examine Garland’s assertion in an Irish context and argue that 
there is ample evidence to support his view.   
 
This section will highlight different areas of policing which historically may have tainted how 
the Gardaí interact with victims.  In that regard criminal due process and the Gardaí’s duty of 
care to the public are relevant.  It will be demonstrated how the Gardaí over the years have 
made considerable progress in their service and commitment to victims of crime in particular 
by means of their neighbourhood watch and community relations programmes.  In addition, 
restorative justice has been codified in legislation in respect of juvenile offenders.  In recent 
years AGS heralded its own Victims Charter and its Victim Service Policy.  Notwithstanding 
this, the Guerin and O’Higgins Reports (infra) have unhappily shown how Gardaí have failed 
victims during criminal investigations and were stingingly criticised and exposed for these 
failures.   This chapter will also highlight the new E.U. Victims Directive (infra) and the 
supporting Criminal Justice (Victims of Crimes) Act 2017 which will give effect to such 
Directive.  It will explore how these events will impact on how the D.P.P. and Gardaí make 
decisions in criminal cases.  It will look at how the whole area of reimbursement of expenses 
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to witnesses which in view of the recent Directive will now have to be improved upon.  It is 
submitted that all the foregoing is strongly indicative of the “return of the victim”. 
 
In the end the evidence presented in this chapter will demonstrate that: “The victim is no longer 
an unfortunate citizen who’s been at the receiving end of criminal harm and who’s concerns 
are subsumed in the public interest that guides the prosecution and the penal decisions of the 
state.”111 
 
The Exclusionary Rule/Due Process 
 
As noted by Garland “(i)n the penal welfare framework individual victims featured hardly at 
all … (t)heir interests were subsumed under the general public interest and certainly not 
counter-posed to the interests of the offender. All this is now changed”112  A crime victim in 
an interview with Gartland and Holland in the Irish Times states that once a crime is reported 
to Gardaí there is an expectation that it will be dealt with “very quickly”.  She adds however 
that the process “can be very slow, necessarily so as the guards have to work through statements 
of evidence.”113 This has always been the case. Due process demands that the AGS must 
patiently build the prosecution case and must explain to a victim that the investigative process 
can be slow and time consuming. Members of AGS must describe to injured parties the rigors 
of due process and how it will manifest itself in a contested criminal trial.  In the past there was 
no such thing as support for the victim but now as observed by Garland a victim is a “righteous 
figure whose suffering must be expressed and whose security must henceforth be 
guaranteed”114  As further noted by Shapland et al: 
 
Prosecution is a process occurring over weeks and months, a process in which the 
victim makes an appearance at different stages but only plays a peripheral role…the 
police appear to reserve the prosecution process to themselves requiring victims to jump 
the hurdle of deciding to press charges as soon as possible and then seeing them as 
having little further role until the time comes to give evidence in court.115 
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Similarly, Newburn noted: 
 
In the modern police service victims have been conceived as suppliers of evidence to 
help the State makes its case against the offender. Sympathetic treatment no matter how 
genuinely felt by individual officers has at an institutional level been offered primarily 
to secure the cooperation of victims in that endeavor.116 
 
In Ireland in the pre-1990s era, victims of crime had to rely on the individual professionalism 
or perhaps the thoughtfulness of the investigating Gardaí not only to update them on the 
progress of an investigation but also to explain the criminal justice system to them.  Too often 
the Gardaí did not do this very well and even in today’s surveys carried out by the Gardaí 
themselves, victims are still critical of them in this area.117  However, the Gardaí have 
endeavoured to improve notwithstanding that the views of Shapland et al and Newburn remain 
very relevant in how the Gardaí approach crime investigation.  In the failed Ian Bailey civil 
action against the Gardaí in 2014/2015 there is a good example of garda preoccupation with 
evidence which can push the role of the victim to the periphery. In a taped conversation on the 
26th June 1997 between two gardai who were involved in the investigation of the murder of 
Sophie Toscan de Plantier both men spoke of witness statements as follows: 
 
Garda 1– You see there are statements here that I have to go back and fill it in. I have 
to talk to them, one man put it in here ‘I believe she was attempting to tell the truth and 
trying to recall’…when the evidence clearly shows…she is anything but, she has been 
out there working, conniving, twisting. 
 
Garda 2– That’s not fucking evidence. 
 
Garda 1- I know but it is in the statement and has to be taken out of it.118 
 
None of the Gardaí were aware that their conversation was being taped by their own 
organisation but demonstrates that Gardaí were sharply focusing on evidential proofs in 
contemplation of any future court case.  This chapter will show that notwithstanding police 
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procedures, victims have returned to ‘centre stage’.119  As noted by Kilcommins et al “a 
growing consciousness has evolved in Ireland of the need for victims of crime or witnesses to 
be more prominent actors in the theatres of prosecution and sentencing.120  This too it is 
suggested is correct and it acknowledged that much has happened in the last four decades or so 
that has improved the lot of crime victims.  It is submitted that the Gardaí have been to the 
forefront of this change and will even more so with the advent of E.U. Directive 2012/29 
(Victims’ Rights) which came into effect in November 2015.  The Criminal Justice (Victims of 
Crime) Act 2017 transforms the Directive into Irish Law. 
 
However, it will also be argued that notwithstanding all the changes that have taken place over 
forty years – victims must still share centre stage with the accused, the Gardaí, the legal 
profession and the judiciary.   In this chapter it will be submitted that the changes that have 
occurred and that are about to occur while substantially beneficial victims – are in some ways 
cosmetic and superficial.  It will be shown how the changes have impacted on how the Gardaí 
deal with victims during investigations and during trial.  It will also be shown that victims are 
no longer willing to acquiesce and remain silent when they believe justice, as they see it has 
not been done and as stated by Newburn: 
 
… the police now have a responsibility to victims to ensure that their primary harms 
are addressed and that security harm (i.e. that which may result from engaging with the 




It is submitted that the rigors of criminal due process have not served victims well in the last 
number of decades and has coloured how the Gardaí have interacted with victims. In 1999 
Waddington noted: 
 
Detectives are valued more than patrol officers not because they catch criminals – 
which they do not – but because they legalize police decisions.  Transforming the messy 
reality of the streets into the clinical world of “evidence” that will be publicly examined 
in court in an enterprise fraught with danger for the police organization if done 
incompetently.  This the reason why patrol officers are treated so badly is that save for 
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the most exceptional circumstances what they do is of little consequence for the 
organization however important it might be to others.122  
 
It is contended that those with detective experience in AGS have substantial court experience   
and as a result a substantial knowledge of the laws of evidence.  Those members of AGS with 
detective experience are always conscious of evidential rules and practices and have a solid 
practical knowledge of the “exclusionary rule”. 
 
When an experienced Garda arrives at the scene of a serious crime he/she is immediately 
thinking of the court room – arrest, caution, the Judges Rules, search for exhibits, bagging and 
tagging exhibits, chain of evidence, warrants, preservation of crime scene, notifying and 
updating the chain of command.  Consequently, it is submitted that while many experienced 
investigators can be very adept, sympathetic and empathetic to a crime victim and/or his or her 
family, their minds are very much elsewhere.  To an investigator identifying and apprehending 
a suspect and getting the evidence for court can and often does mean more to them than a 
victim’s immediate needs.  A Garda investigator’s view is grounded on his/her investigative 
and legal experience and training.  The Gardaí are all too aware that any sloppiness or 
shortcomings in their investigations will be ruthlessly exposed in a contested court case and 
the judiciary and a jury, in the end are likely to be very unforgiving of any Garda 
unprofessionalism.   
 
It is contended that Gardaí would agree with the view of Bacik et al: 
 
Nor is the prosecution assigned the function of accommodating the victim’s unique 
position and particular needs in the trial process.  The contribution of the victim to 
proceedings is at best secondary, passive and incidental and it is carried without formal 
provision for representation or support. 123  
 
As further noted by Mr. Justice Paul Carney now deceased: 
 
Victims tend to instinctively feel that counsel appearing on behalf of the prosecution is 
“their” barrister as they would put it.  This is not the case and the prosecution does not 
in any way represent the victim.  There may be a coincidence of interest and there may 
                                               
122  P.A.J. Waddington, Policing Citizens Authority and Right, (London: UCL Press, 1999), at p.231 [hereinafter 
       Waddington]. 
123  I. Bacik, L. Heffernan, P. Brazil, M. Woods, Report on Services and Legislation providing Support for Victims  





not.  There can be situations where the interests of the victims as they see them, and the 
interests of the prosecution are diametrically opposed.124 
 
It is suggested that experienced Garda investigators of all ranks are very familiar with the views 
of the courts and this experience guides their view, conduct and behaviour.  A victim can get 
lost in all of this.  The Gardaí get wrapped up in their investigation and the victims get left by 
the wayside.  It is suggested that over the years that any perceived coldness or detachment by 
Gardaí when conducting criminal investigations is a reflection or an extension of the Rules of 
Evidence.  As noted by Geoghegan J. nearly two decades ago: “in the extreme history of the 
criminal law and procedure it has never been permitted for the victim to be separately 
represented at a criminal trial.  Such representation could dangerously compromise the 
necessary independence and detachment of the court and jury.”125   
 
McCracken J. a decade later in a Cork murder case held that if victim impact reports “deviated 
from court guidelines then the victim could be held in contempt of court and that scurrilous 
unfounded allegations may mitigate a sentence imposed on an accused.”126  A year later Judge 
Paul Carney, R.I.P. would state that this was a “right of censorship on killers and rapists over 
victims.” 127  
 
It is contended that while the decisions of the courts weigh heavily on the mind of Garda 
investigators in all their deliberations and enquiries into criminal matters there is none more so 
than those decisions that pertain to the exclusionary rule and even here this rule has evolved 
over time.  Nowhere does the Rule include the word “victim” but it does include the word 
“accused” and it is submitted that practically in every contested criminal trial this Rule must 
be explained by AGS members to victims who have little or no comprehension of why 
compelling evidence of guilt is being excluded from the prosecution case being presented to 
the jury.   
 
Some fifty years ago in (A.G.) v. O’Brien [1965] I.R. 142 the Supreme Court held: 
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The Courts in exercising their judicial powers of government of the State must 
recognise the paramount position of constitutional rights and must uphold the objection 
of an accused person to the admissibility at his trial of evidence obtained or procured 
by the State or its servants or agents as a result of a deliberate and conscious violation 
of the constitutional rights of the accused person where no extraordinary exclusionary 
circumstances exist, such as an imminent destruction of vital evidence or the need to 
rescue a victim in peril … I would also place in the exclusionary category evidence by 
a search incidental to and contemporaneous with a lawful arrest although made without 
a search warrant.128 
 
This rule was tightened further some twenty-five years later in The People (D.P.P.) v. Kenny 
[1990] 2. IR.110 when Finley C.J. stated:  
 
To exclude only evidence obtained by a person who knows or ought reasonably to know 
that he is invading a constitutional right is to impose a negative deterrent.  It is clearly 
effective to dissuade a policeman from acting in a manner which he knows is 
unconstitutional or from acting in a manner reckless as to whether his conduct is or is 
not unconstitutional., To apply on the other hand the absolute protection rule of 
exclusion whilst providing also that negative deterrent incorporates as well a positive 
encouragement to those in authority over the crime prevention and detection services 
of the State to consider in detail the personal rights of citizens as set out in the 
Constitution and the effect of their powers of arrest, detention, search and questioning 
in relation to such rights.   
 
It appears to me to be an inexplicable conclusion that a principle of exclusion which 
centres on both negative and positive force is likely to protect constitutional rights in 
more instances than is a principal with negative consequences only.129 
 
It would be another seventeen years in 2007 when there would be some indication of a revision 
of the rule in Kenny. There would now need to be a balancing of interests between society and 
the accused. Charlton J. in High Court commented in the People (D.P.P) v. Cash: 
 
A rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring 
by mistake does not commend itself to the proper order of society which is the purpose 
of the criminal law.  Any system of the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence must 
be implemented on the basis of balancing interests.  The two most fundamental 
competing interests in that regard are those of society and the accused.130 
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However, it would be fifteen years later in 2015 when the Supreme Court would decide that 
the exclusionary rule in respect of warrants would be relaxed. It is submitted that these 
decisions are more “victim friendly” O’Donnell J. in D.P.P. v. J.C. stated for the majority: 
 
First it seems clear that Kenny represents a near absolute conclusion which is the most 
extreme position adopted in the common law world.  Second it is apparent that on 
analysis the exceptions allowed for in Kenny have little or no scope for practical 
application particularly in the case of warrants.  Viewed in this way Kenny is worse 
than an absolute rule: it presents itself as superficially balanced while in practice always 
resulting in the exclusion of evidence. 
 
A central function of the administration of justice is fact finding and truth finding.  
Anything that detracts from the courts capacity to find out what occurred in fact detracts 
from the truth finding function of the administration of justice.  As many courts have 
recognized where cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not admitted on 
the basis of a trivial technical breach the administration of justice far from being served 
may be brought into disrepute.131 
 
While the decision in D.P.P. v. J.C. would be in ease to the “force publique” or AGS during 
criminal investigations the Supreme Court struggled to relax the Kenny decision.  As noted by 
Hardiman J. (now deceased) for the minority: 
 
The State have suggested albeit very obliquely that protections of citizens such as those 
contained in Kenny are perhaps no longer necessary because of developments since 
1990.  I consider this as entirely fallacious and have endeavored in Part IV to give some 
examples of serious cases of concern which presently exist including the finding by a 
former President of the High Court that “proper discipline had been lost from An Garda 
Síochána”.  If the State have their way in this case it will be possible to disregard 
breaches of the Constitution and of Constitutional Right and admit the fruits of these in 
evidence just as if the Constitution had not been breached at all … I am ashamed that 
our State is bringing this situation about.132 
 
In Part IV of his decision Hardiman J. lists the Morris Tribunal, the Smithwick Tribunal, the 
Short case, the Guerin Report and a reference is made to a phrase from author and former 
GSOC Commissioner Conor Brady referring to Gardaí as “fortress Garda”133 as an example of 
why the AGS or the “force publique” cannot be trusted. 
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It is submitted that there can never be any doubt that the courts should always remain vigilant 
to ensure that any citizen’s constitutional rights are not breached by AGS and the examples 
cited by the learned Judge are strong and compelling corroboration of his view.  However, the 
same Judge does not seem willing to give any credit for the solid investigative work that AGS 
has been carrying out since its foundation. Nor does the Judge take account of how victims 
might feel if a case against and accused failed because of some technical error.  The annual 
reports of the Court Service and D.P.P.’s Office furnish the statistics for the volumes of Garda 
investigative material coming before the Courts.  Gardaí have been murdered because of their 
dedication to duty but it would appear from the decision of Hardiman J. that there is no currency 
in that.  Nor indeed is there any apparent consideration for the victims of crime - only the 
accused. 
 
It is submitted therefore that the decisions of the court bear heavily on how Garda investigators 
carry out their work.  Evidence is paramount.  A witness or victims is only a part of the 
prosecution case which the Gardaí are obliged to prepare to very high standards.  Gardaí will 
busy themselves with their investigations and the victim may become detached from all that is 
going on.  To counteract this, the Gardaí have appointed Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) to 
engage with victims and families in serious cases to update them with details of Garda 
processes and the investigation itself. They will also supply families with details of victims’ 
organisations that can support them and in the event of a trial they will assist families with 
transport and accommodation if lengthy travel distances are involved.  At trial they will explain 
the process and whatever the outcome or verdict will continue to maintain contact with the 
family.  This will also be the case even if the Garda investigation proves inconclusive or no 
proceeding are directed by the D.P.P     However, even here it is a two-way street.  The F.L.O. 
is part of the investigation team and is expected to elicit any valuable information from victims 
and families and bring such information back to the investigation team.  In the end insofar as 
the Gardaí are concerned it is all about the investigation and the prosecution case.  If the Gardaí 
fail to bring someone to book for a crime – in particular a serious one – or if they fail to secure 







Duty of Care      
 
Traditionally AGS did not owe any duty of care to victims of crime.  In legal terms if a duty of 
care is owed by persons or organisations to others then a civil action for damages will lie against 
those who fail in giving effect to that duty.  No such duty applied to AGS.  In effect and broadly 
speaking a victim had no redress in Irish civil courts if members of AGS were negligent in how 
they pursued an investigation. Walsh134 uses the Hill135 case as an example of where the law in 
respect of victims of crime might have been heading.  In that case he says that the House of 
Lords in the U.K “ruled that victims of the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ had no cause for action against 
the police for the negligent failure of the police to detect and apprehend the ‘Ripper’ before he 
claimed them as victims.”136  Walsh highlights the rationale of the House of Lords: 
 
 …to enforce such an obligation on the police would have a negative impact on the 
overriding public interest in the efficient prevention and detection of crime. If police 
officers had to conduct criminal investigations under the burden of a duty of care 
towards third parties there is a risk that they would become too hesitant and less robust 
in their detection and apprehension of offenders to the detriment of the public good.137 
 
 
It would appear that this judgment is correct.  It is arguable that restricting police discretion in 
how they conduct serious criminal investigations in order to accommodate victims through 
recognition of a duty of care to victims would be detrimental to human life and police efficacy.  
Police will follow all lines of inquiry but inevitably will attach more weight to certain lines of 
inquiry rather than others because either evidence or intelligence leads them in a particular 
direction.  It is not an exact science.  As Morris noted, “being a policeman or woman in our 
society is a profession and a rightly respected one.”138 Experienced police officers build up a 
substantial knowledge of their work and the people they police over many years. Making 
subjective judgment calls is part of the job. To have experienced investigators fearful to make 
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these decisions because of “a duty of care to third parties”139 would, it is submitted, be an 
unwarranted interference with their professionalism.    However, the Hill case shows that 
victims now have little difficulty in challenging the police for decisions made in the course of 
investigations.   
 
Ben Mannering in the Irish Times reviewed similar case law in this jurisdiction regarding the 
duty of care of Gardaí.140    The decisions run parallel with that of Hill.  In Lockwood v. 
Ireland141   in 2011 a rape trial collapsed because of a Garda mistake in the arrest of the accused.  
The rape complainant sued Gardaí, but the court dismissed the claim.  The court held that the 
claimant would have to establish male fides on behalf of the Gardaí to succeed in her claim and 
that there was “no duty of care such as would create an entitlement to damages arising from 
the manner in which the Gardaí conducted its investigation.” 
 
Again in 2001 Hedigan J. in LM v. Garda Commissioner142 in the High Court dismissed an 
action by another rape complainant who complained that the Gardaí had failed to properly 
investigate a complaint made in 1990 when she was a child.  She complained that Gardaí only 
took up the matter in 1996 when an English Child Protection Agency contacted them.  She 
sued Gardaí for the delay in prosecuting.  In his decision Hedigan J. said: 
 
The imposition of liability might lead to the investigational operations of the police 
being exercised in a defensive frame of mind.  The result would be a significant 
diversion of police manpower and attention from their most important functions that of 
the suppression of crime. 
 
 
In Lorcan Roche Kelly v. Garda Commissioner143   Kearns J.  reviewed Garda and State liability 
where crimes are committed by a person on bail for other offences.  Lorcan Roche Kelly was 
the husband of Sylvia Roche Kelly who was murdered by Gerry McGrath on the 8th December 
2007.  He claimed that the Gardaí at the bail hearing failed to inform the court of other offences 
in which McGrath had been charged and as a result he was out on bail when he should have 
been incarcerated.  Mr. Justice Kearns dismissed the claim on the basis of long-established 
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common-law principle whereby a duty of care was deemed to arise was not present on the facts 
of this case. 
 
Notwithstanding the decisions in ease of the Gardaí in these cases, it is suggested that each of 
them are examples of the new-found willingness of crime victims to act and speak out when 
they believe the Gardaí have failed them.  Lockwood & L.M. were both appealed.  O’ Donnell, 
J. in the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff claims in each of these cases were dismissed at 
a preliminary stage and “no evidence was heard or facts found.”144  He allowed the plaintiffs 
appeal in each case stating that “these plaintiffs should be allowed bring their cases to trial” 
and have them “properly and fairly determined.”145  So it now can be seen that the judiciary 
have come to a point where they will not now automatically dismiss such cases of victims at a 
preliminary stage without a full hearing giving consideration to the facts of the case.  There 
can be no doubt that this is a very pro victim judgment which could have serious ramifications 
for AGS.  Similarly, Peart J. in the High Court at around the same time made a very comparable 
pro victim decision.146   
 
Crime victims are now also willing to speak out against the judiciary. Heretofore that may not 
have been the case. While Judges in this jurisdiction do not de jure owe a duty of care to crime 
victims it could be argued that de facto they now do so. It would be a foolhardy jurist who 
would not now attach substantial weight to the views of a crime victim. Perceived lenient 
sentences handed down in a higher court are now appealable by the D.P.P. who will take into 
consideration the views of the victims before deciding on such an appeal. This has been case 
since it was provided for in the Criminal Justice Act 1993.  A jurist may also not want to fall 
foul of the court of public opinion if his/her decision(s) are reported and not perceived to 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime perpetrated on the victim.  In 1986 Gertie Shields with 
others set up Mothers Against Drunken Drivers (MADD) after her daughter died with five 
other girls in February 1983 when the mini bus in which they were travelling was hit by a car 
driven by a drunk driver.  An obituary written in the Irish Times on the 22nd of August 2015 
after Gertie Shield’s death recalls the aftermath: 
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When the case came to the Circuit Court later that year before Judge Frank Roe the man 
concerned was given a two-year suspended sentence and a 15-year driving ban.  Just 
before that case Judge Roe had sentenced a sheep rustler to six months imprisonment. 
The contrast between the two sentences brought firstly Gertie’s son David to his feet to 
ask the judge “are sheep more important than people?” Mrs. Shields then reminded the 
judge “that’s my daughter you are talking about.”  In the days before victim impact 
statements in court the judge put Mrs. Shields in the witness box where she asked him 
who would see to it that the defendant would stay off the road all the 15 years.  Judge 
Roe answered that he would see to it; in fact, the man’s license was restored seven years 
later.147  
 
MADD the organisation she went on to set up had ten basic demands including a reduction in 
the alcohol limits, compulsory testing for drivers involved in accidents, photographs of drivers 
to be included on driving licenses and an obligation on those who sell alcohol to check the ages 
of customers before serving them alcohol.  In time all these aims were ultimately achieved, and 
the Shields case is a good example of victims asserting themselves and moving to the centre 
stage of the criminal justice process.   
 
Mawby contends that there are several reasons why it is important that the police provide a 
satisfactory service to the victim: 
 
1) Bring crime to attention and identify leads, 
2) Police are still the main agency to respond to the victim.  If wrong, it exacerbates 
the victims experience of crime and may lead to  
3) Secondary victimization through the attitude of police.148 
 
It is submitted that these reasons could ground at least in part, why AGS should owe a duty of 
care to parties injured by crime.  However, while no formal duty of care may have existed, it 
is contended that AGS since its foundation in 1922 has for the most part always endeavoured 
to be mindful of and respectful of victims of crime.  In other words, the absence of a legal duty 
of care was balanced by the basic humanity and conscientiousness of individual members of 
AGS.  The murder of Garda Tony Golden on the 11th of October 2015 at Omeath, Co. Louth 
is evidence of that.  He went to the assistance of a seriously distressed female victim of 
domestic violence because of his commitment to his duties and his concern for the victim and 
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her family. Garda Golden saw it as his job.  In eight Garda Public Attitude Surveys carried out 
since 2002 up to 2018 the Gardaí have always had high satisfaction ratings with the public 
notwithstanding the scandals that have occurred during that time.  There can be no doubt the 
controversies in more recent years had a more damaging effect on the organisation, but it 
continues to have the good will of the public.  Since the inception of the organisation the Gardaí 
have brought hundreds of thousands of accused people to book for their crimes.  These crimes 
range from murder to petty theft.  The Gardaí deal with victims all the time.  Even a light 
perusal of annual D.P.P or Court Service reports over the years would corroborate this.  The 
news media report on many of these cases.  It is submitted that Gardaí generally were and are 
good at dealing with victims. While it may not have been legally enforceable, a duty of care 
existed between the AGS and public it policed.   That is not to say that victims have been 
treated properly all the time.  Sometimes AGS has members who might be suited to another 
occupation or profession.  Sometimes there are significant lapses in the how the guards would 
deal with victims of crime.  The Guerin Report149 which will be highlighted later gives 
examples of some of these experiences.  It is contended that while AGS always prided itself as 
an organisation over many decades on its attentiveness to victims of crime, perhaps AGS took 
this attentiveness for granted.  So much so that for years there were no definitive policies within 
the organisation setting out a protocol in what the public could expect from Gardaí when they 
report a crime.  This has changed with the advent of the ‘Garda Victims Charter’ in 2010150 but 
it is submitted that any examination of the early Commissioners Annual Reports would 
manifest sparse detail on victims. 
 
Community Engagement; Neighbourhood Watch 
 
It was in 1978 when the Gardaí set up its Community Operations section151 while in the early 
1980’s it was reported that a full time Garda Crime Prevention Service was operating in Garda 
Divisions.152  Different security surveys were carried out by respective Crime Prevention 
Officers of banks, post offices and commercial premises in each division.  In 1983 the concept 
of Neighbourhood Watch was explained to a number of community groups and153 there were 
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concerns in 1984 of attacks on the elderly throughout the country.154  In 1986 they recorded 
92,783 households in 32 Neighbourhood Watch Schemes with a total of 200 Community Alert 
Schemes.155 It would seem that the benchmark criteria used by the Community Relations/Crime 
Prevention Section in each Annual Garda Report to measure what they were actually doing 
were the statistics for Neighbourhood Watch Schemes and the households in them.  It is 
submitted that these statistics are evidence of the realisation of Gardaí that they had to reach 
out to communities and seek their help not so much to solve crime but to assure and 
demonstrate to the public that the Gardaí were there and dealing with the problem.   
 
1986 - 92,783 households in 322 schemes156 
1987 - 135,528 households in 527 schemes157 
1988 - 160,800 households in 702 schemes158 
1989 - 184,084 households in 872 schemes159 
1990 - 199,701 households in 999 schemes160 
1992 - 227,953 households in 1,531 schemes161 
1993 - 304,205 households in 1,709 schemes162 
1994 - 300,000 households in 1,700 schemes163 
1997 - 2,332 schemes164 
1998 - 2,617 schemes165 
2000 - 2,469 schemes166 
2001 - 2,476 schemes167 
2002 - 2,371 schemes168 
2005 - 2,443 schemes169 
  Table 1.1 Statistics for Neighbourhood Watch Schemes Periodically from 1986 to 2005 
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The Gardaí stopped recording the number of “households” in the late 1990s and focused on the 
figure for Neighbourhood Watch Schemes.  The number seemed to have reached the apex in 
1998.  There was a falloff in recorded numbers after that.  It is submitted that statistics show 
that Gardaí saw merit in setting up and recording the numbers of Neighbourhood Watch 
Schemes to assuage the fears of the public in respect of crime.  It is suggested that these figures 
are good examples of Garlands ‘Outputs over Outcomes’ theme which is dealt with later in 
Chapter 5.  Local Gardaí were assigned to these schemes.  They met with neighbourhood 
representatives and had local meetings with all the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes with the 
local Superintendent in attendance.  It is the author’s experience that meetings were poorly 
attended by neighbours when crime was “quiet” or non-existent.  However, in areas that were 
problematic, these meetings could fill community halls and much anger would be vented at 
Gardaí and actions demanded to deal with whatever the local problem was.  Local 
Superintendents and even Chief Superintendents would attend these.  They would always 
ensure that local Gardaí (the familiar faces) were present to assuage public anger. 
 
Most persons attending these meetings would normally hold the local Gardaí in good regard 
but in some cases might hold the local Superintendent with some suspicion.  Many crime 
victims would attend these meetings and vent their ire and assert their views in a very no 
nonsense, articulate and maybe sometimes in colourful fashion, the Gardaí became adept at 
dealing with anger at these meetings and “soaked up” people’s fear and frustration and re-
assured them that everything was being done that could be done e.g. extra (more visible) patrols 
in the area, more checkpoints, all leads being followed up, station opening times improved.  
Generally speaking the effort would dissipate after a time especially if the criminal were 
brought to book.  Nothing has changed.  As noted more recently in the editorial of the Garda 
Review in October 2015: 
 
In rural Ireland, there has been an underlying fear of crime that passed without 
reflection from the political elite. Those citizens who expressed their fears were 
humoured with slogans such as ‘smart’ and ‘intelligence led policing’ that would save 
their communities from becoming ‘criminal badlands’.  Some accepted these platitudes, 
some remained vigilant – but now that the truth is beginning to emerge it has become 
apparent that certain swaths of the country were largely abandoned to ‘lip service’ 
policing.170 
   
                                               




The advent of Neighbourhood Watch in this jurisdiction is a good example of Garland’s 
‘Community Policing’ index which is examined in Chapter Three (infra). 
 
Mission Statement/Garda Practice 
 
Meanwhile while Gardaí were dealing with the public in neighbourhood watch meetings, in 
1991 Garda management produced their first Mission Statement which in effect was a nascent 
example of a victims’ charter.  It stated that: - 
 
The broad functional role of the Gardaí is: - 
 
a) to provide service within a legal framework. 
b) to encourage and advise the community on how to protect their person and 
property. 
c) To provide and assist  
 (i) young people to achieve social maturity. 
 (ii) in cases of tragedy whether of a personal and family nature 
 
and in so doing provide a quality service to the public and the individual citizen 
while maintaining the highest standard of integrity, professionalism and 
efficiency.171   
 
Victims of crime were now “customers” of AGS and its contact with them had to be measured 
and quantified.  Notwithstanding that victims were now so called “customers” there remained 
no legal duty of care towards them like other private/public organisations might owe to their 
customers.   It is submitted that in 1991 these words were very different to what Gardaí on the 
ground had been taught years earlier during their basic training in Templemore.  The principal 
function of all members of AGS as set out in internal regulations had not changed for decades.  
As noted by Breathnach in 1974 the “principal function of all members” according to the Garda 
Code at Section 3.10 was “to prevent and detect crimes, to protect life and property and to 
maintain public peace and good order.”172 
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Now in 1991 the language of managerialism was becoming part of the Garda vocabulary.  
Insofar as the public and victims were concerned the Gardaí were to provide service “within a 
legal framework”.  Did they not always?  We now have the words “service”, “framework” and 
“quality service”.  Managerialism was on the way and the public and crime victims were being 
referred to by Garda managers as “customers”.  It is submitted that what Gardaí on the ground 
had been doing reasonably well for years i.e. dealing with the public and crime victims every 
day – now it had to be quantified.  Heretofore there was no currency for Garda management in 
how it dealt with victims of crime.  Now it could be measured by Neighbourhood Watch 
Schemes, the number of meetings with victims and other groups.  As noted by Murphy in 1999: 
- 
 
Customers are often categorised in terms of internal organisational employees and 
people outside the organisation to which we deliver our diverse range of Garda services.  
Internally we regard every member and civilian employed in An Garda Síochána as 
well as their representative bodies as key customers.173 
 
It is submitted what he is asserting here, on the face of it at least, is problematic.  He advocates 
members of AGS and their representative associations are customers.  He seems to be asserting 
that it is solely Garda management are AGS and the rest of its membership is not.  He goes on 
in the same article to suggest that the “customer base” of AGS is very diverse.   He even lists 
the categories of customer’s AGS has. 
 
• The Public 
• Crime Victims 
• Community/Voluntary organisations 
• Social Partners 
• Offenders 
• Prisoners and their families 
• Statutory Bodies 
• Judiciary 
• Legal Officers and Practitioners 
• Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform 
                                               




• Community organizations 
• Non-Nationals 
• Other Gardaí and Garda Organisations.174 
 
It is not intended here to debate what Murphy is saying.  It is enough to highlight the language 
he is using.  Crime Victims, the judiciary, prisoners and offenders are all customers of AGS 
not to mention the D.P.P.  It is submitted that this cannot be the case. The Gardaí have massive 
powers provided for in common law and statute.  The courts have determined that during their 
investigations the Gardaí do not owe a duty of care per se.  Gardaí and civilians can lose their 
lives if Gardaí make a poor judgement call or fail to act or act improperly. What is set out here 
is of import because it shows that crime victims now had elevated profile in the mindset of 
Garda managers.  AGS now saw merit in measuring its contact with victims which 
demonstrates a new-found salience of victims in the Garda mindset.  Again, it is also an 
example of Garland’s ‘Outputs over Outcome’s theme discussed in the Chapter 5 (infra). 
 
Garda Victim Support 
 
In 1994 the Garda Victim Support Manual was published for the first time.  The advent of the 
Irish Association of Victim Support is mentioned very briefly.  It was Derek Nally a retired 
Garda Sergeant who set up this organisation nine years earlier in 1985.  The 1994 Garda Report 
states with some brevity: - 
 
Crime can seriously affect the lives of people.  While Gardaí strive to do their utmost 
for people in the aftermath of crime it is not possible for the Gardaí to supply all the 
support a victim needs.  Note should be taken of the following telephone number 01-
6798673.175 
 
It is suggested what appears in the Garda Report of 1994 is reflective of what Judge Paul 
Carney (now deceased) stated in 2007 “(i)n this community victims were ignored and even 
treated with disdain until a situation came about that they decided that they would take it no 
more and organised themselves”176 or as noted by Sanders “because the State can do little about 
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crime it turns its attention to the consequences of crime and victims in particular.”177 In addition 
the 1994 report indicates crimes perpetrated on tourists would now be in a separate heading in 
Garda crime statistics.178 In 1999 the Garda Community Relations Section acknowledged that 
it “would continue to review the manner in which victims of crime are treated and our 




A year later in the year 2000 there is evidence of the Gardaí carrying out surveys to measure 
its “quality of service.”180 
 
• 91% of those surveyed were satisfied with how phone queries were handled. 
• 81% of calls were answered between 1 and 6 rings. 
• 85% of 999 calls were answered within 10 seconds. 
• 94% of Garda respondents identified the station. 
• 94% of letters of correspondence was answered within 10 working days. 
• 82% of respondents rated Garda performance in their locality as “fairly good or 
very good”. 
• 89% were satisfied with Garda service. 
• 60% satisfaction rating was recorded in publicly provided housing in large towns. 
 
The survey even went so far as rating perceptions of Garda demeanour. 
 
    Better than Expected      As Expected 
       %              % 
Helpfulness    33    62 
Competence    25    70 
Sensitivity    22    64 
Politeness    26    68 
    Table 1.2   Public Perceptions of Garda Demeanour 
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It is suggested that this survey is evidence of the importance AGS placed on its public 
perception.  In fact, the AGS carried out four public attitude surveys between 2002 and 2008 
and four more between 2015 and 2018.   AGS realises it needs to know where it stands with 




In the Children’s Act 2001181 children over 12 years and under 18 years of age who come to 
the attention of Gardaí in the commission of crime would now receive the benefit of a caution 
perhaps on more than one occasion. Habitual offenders will ultimately end up on the wrong 
end of criminal proceedings in court. There now exists a voluntary process known as 
“Restorative Justice”182 where a young person accepts responsibility for a crime. If they so 
wish, a victim can have their views expressed at a meeting with a young person. These views 
may be expressed face to face or through a third party.  The meetings are arranged through the 
local Garda Juvenile Liaison Officer. The process is enshrined in a statutory frame work. As 
Garland states the “public good must be broken down into individual components. Specific 
victims are to have a voice…”183 Section 26 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 




By 2002 the Community Relations section had its own Chief Superintendent and two 
Superintendents.184  In 2003 in a public attitude survey 57% of the public were critical of Gardaí 
at not being kept informed of the progress of their cases.  This was reduced from 63% in 
2002.185  Also in 2003 the Gardaí could print pro forma victim letters from the PULSE system.  
Commissioner Conroy also signed a “partnership” agreement with the Victim Support 
organisation during the same year.  Working groups were established to progress this 
agreement.  The 2003 report further noted that 75% of persons felt safe in public areas and the 
Garda Research Unit carried out a review of the implementation of policing concerning victims 
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of crime in collaboration with the Community Relations Section and the Victims Support 
Groups. 
 
In 2005 5,590 pro forma PULSE letters were sent to victims of crime.186  In 2006187 AGS had 
an 80% satisfaction rating and this was notwithstanding the release of the first Morris Tribunal 
report in 2005.  41% reported a fear of being a victim of crime which was down 4% from 2004.  
86% reported they felt safe at home at night.  In 2007 37% of victims worried about being a 
victim of crime. 
 
It is arguable that the watershed moment in terms of crime victim policy in AGS came in 2010 
and 2011188 when the organisation produced and commenced the implementation of its new 
Victims Charter.  The Garda Crime Victims Liaison Officers worked towards developing a 
strategy for victims of crime.  Two national Crime Victims fora were set up and seven victim’s 
workshops were put together where crime victims could share their experiences with the Garda 
when reporting crime.  In 2013 a text alert initiative was set up countrywide.189  This enabled 
Gardaí to contact the public on their mobile phones with information regarding crime 
prevention or suspicious activity in an area.  It has also been effectively used by Gardaí 
disseminating traffic information and known or anticipated delays and diversions to traffic 
flow.  It is a helpful and effective initiative.   
 
In 2014 the scheme had morphed 580 text alert groups and approx. 100,000 signed up for it.190  
It is a joint initiative between the Garda Victim Liaison Office, Muintir na Tire and I.F.A.  In 
the same year Commissioner Noirín O’Sullivan stated that she was “committed to supporting 
the victim support organisations that assist in alleviating pain associated with crime.”  In the 
same year and in response to a stinging report from the Garda Inspectorate she announced the 
role out of 28 Divisional Garda Victims of Crime Offices that would be in place by 2015.  She 
also stated that there would be PULSE enhancement to facilitate the organisation interaction 
with crime victims in 2015. 
 
                                               
186  An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2005 at Evaluation Report at p.7. 
187  An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2006 at p.8. 
188  An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2011 at p.34. 
189  An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2013 at p.12. 




By 2018 Garda Victim Liaison Offices have been set up in each Garda division.  Each office 
is staffed by a Garda and clerical officer.  Its staff contact victims (by phone) in the aftermath 
of crime and pass on information to the victim about victim support organisations should they 
require this information.  The G.V.L.O. also ensures the PULSE pro forma letters are 
dispatched to victims and then make call backs (more phone calls) in the aftermath of crime.  
They can also act as a liaison between the attending or investigating Garda and the victim to 
ensure that the victim is given updates on the progress of their case.  The G.V.L.O. is presently 
in its infancy. Time will judge their effectiveness and whether or not they address criticism in 
the Guerin191 and Garda Inspectorate Reports of 2014.192 
 
As can be seen it is not too difficult to chart changes in the Garda attitude and commitment to 
victims of crime from 1978 when the Community Relations section was set up to 2010 when 
the Gardaí set out its new Victims Charter.  It can be seen from the Gardaí’s own reports that 
as an organisation it was becoming more sensitive to public perception.  The advent of 
Neighbourhood Watch and Community Alert Schemes are early evidence of this Garda 
sensitivity.  It’s carrying out of public attitude surveys and its new mission statement is further 
corroboration of what Garland says “(t)he victim is no longer an unfortunate citizen who has 
been on the receiving end of criminal harm whose concerns are subsumed by the “public 
interest”.”193  The victim is now willing to pressure and advocate change in how AGS deals 
with them.  This is done in the media through news shows, through the courts, through the 
investigative auspices of G.S.O.C. when they believe Garda standards have fallen short of 
expectation and through their public representatives.  In addition, Garda management is not 
slow to initiate disciplinary procedures for alleged Garda lapses or investigative shortcomings.  
Change may have been sometimes slow between years 1978 to 2010 but in the last nine years 
AGS has been pushed to improve its commitment to victims. The watershed document was the 
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Victims Charter and Victims Service Policy 
 
In 2010 the Victims Charter195 was written acknowledgement by AGS that the prominence of 
the victim is very much at its apex.  It begins with the words: “We are very aware of the special 
place that victims have in the Garda service and within the criminal justice system” and 
concludes with the sentence “[t]he welfare and support of the victims are central to our 
partnership with community groups, statutory agencies and voluntary organisations.”  Compare 
these words with that of Garland, “[t]he new political imperative is that victims must be 
protected, their voices must be heard and their memory honored, their anger expressed, their 
fears addressed.”196  What Garland asserts is evidenced in the words of the Charter.  Walsh 
argues that the Charter does not go far enough and what is needed is “a comprehensive code of 
victim’s rights together with clear procedures for its enforcement.”197  Booth and Carrington 
have a similar view regarding such Charters when they state that they “have been criticized as 
policy instruments that do not provide any substantive rights for victims but are an 
unenforceable set of minimal standards implemented in an ad hoc manner without much state 
funded support.”198  It is submitted that the advent of the Charter was substantive change for 
the AGS and its very existence evinces Garland’s view that victims were arriving “centre stage” 
insofar as the Gardaí were concerned. 
 
While the Victims Charter was on the face of it a substantial step forward it would still appear 
that Gardaí on the ground might have had some way to go in honouring its commitments.  In a 
2010 report Kilcommins et al199 in research in this area found that “(r)oughly 1 in 10 of their 
respondents who reported a crime” indicated that “they did not receive the name of the Garda” 
to whom they reported the crime.  A further “1 in 5 indicated they did not receive the contact 
details of the investigating Garda while 1 in 2 indicated they did not get the PULSE incident 
number.”  A further 1 in 2 did not receive a contact number for a group supporting crime 
victims.  The same report found a staggering 40.3% victim dissatisfaction rating with Gardaí 
concerning the information provided to them during the investigation.  It is submitted that 
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individual Gardaí might argue that in many cases there might not have been many 
developments to report – but in any event these figures show that in practice at least Garda 
members needed to do more to honour the Victims Charter of their own organisation. 
 
The Gardaí continue to move to address these issues.  The PULSE system has been enhanced 
to facilitate the easy production of a pro forma letter to each victim of crime signed by the local 
Superintendent or Inspector containing the name of the investigating Garda and the PULSE 
Incident Identification Number.  Similarly, in burglary and domestic violence cases Gardaí are 
to call back to the victim. 
 
In a more recent 2013 report Kilcommins et al conducted “comparative research on the legal 
and service provisions that are made available to people with disability as victims of crime.”200  
They looked at Ireland and several other jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada not to mention England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.  Their report 
highlighted the “service gaps that exist in Ireland in respect of victims of crime with disability” 
and how these may be cured by “reference to international standards and best practice.”201  The 
report says that the “lack of data collected on people with disabilities as victims of crime is 
striking.”202  The Garda PULSE system did have a “tick box” facility to record if an injured 
party has a disability.  However, the annual Garda crime report does not provide these figures, 
but the new PULSE enhancements brought into effect in November 2015 will enable the Gardaí 
to record these issues. 
 
In England and Wales for example there exists a Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. The 
Code is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.  A person is not liable to criminal 
proceedings for failing to comply with the Code.203  It does enable crime victims “to receive 
an enhanced service under the Code.”   The Code requires the police to ensure that there is an 
automatic referral to a local victim support group for a vulnerable victim.  It sets out criteria 
for the notification of victims if suspects are arrested or released in respect of their reported 
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crimes.204 The new victims’ legislation to be enacted in this jurisdiction in tandem with the new 
E.U. Victims Directive will run along similar lines (infra).  The Police Service of Northern 
Ireland has “defined a disability related incident to be any incident perceived to be on the 
grounds of a person’s physical or mental impairment by the victim or any other person.”  In 
2011/2012 there were 33 such individuals.205 Scotland’s Police Authority published a 
“Diversity Booklet” in 2008.  It said that the police are “mobilised to make reasonable 
adjustments so that persons with disability receive the same level of service as non-disabled 
persons.”206  In New Zealand the police have an emergency text messaging service for people 
who are deaf and hard of hearing.207 The Canadian Mounted Police Service has a link on their 
website specifically for persons who are apprehensive about reporting a crime.  It enables them 
to discuss matters with a victim service worker.  It is a service that is available at any hour of 
the day by calling a toll-free dedicated helpline.208  Australian Police Authorities have separate 
help lines for people who have speech and hearing difficulties in addition to a text messaging 
service.  They also support systems in place for vulnerable persons when being interviewed by 
police.  These supports are in place whether the vulnerable person is a suspect or a victim.209 
 
The depth of research in both reports from Kilcommins et al and the fact that these reports were 
commissioned at all it is submitted are evidence of Garland’s thesis insofar as AGS is 
concerned “(i)t is no longer sufficient to subsume the individual victim’s experience in the 
notion of the public good: the public good must be individualized, broken down into individual 
comparative parts.”210  Recently under Section 15 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) 
Act 2017 the needs of the victim now need to be assessed at an early stage by the Gardaí. 
 
In March 2015 the Gardaí published their “Victim Service Policy” and “Implementation 
Guidelines”.  The documents begin with the words: - 
 
An Garda Síochána has developed a policy to enhance the Garda services being 
provided to victims of crime and traumatic events.  The policy will place victims at the 
centre of the Garda service by providing a respectful reassuring responsive reliable 
                                               
204  Ibid. 
205  Ibid. at para 4.2.2 at p.58. 
206  Ibid. at para 5.2.3 at p.72. 
207  Ibid. para 6.2.2 at p.83. 
208  Ibid. at para 7.2.2 at p.96. 
209  Ibid at para 8.2.2 at pp.112-114. 





service addressing the needs and expectation of all victims who require an individual 
response.211 
 
This policy document and guidelines are being implemented in line with E.U. Directive 
2012/29/EU which establishes minimum standards of rights of victims.  As stated heretofore 
each Chief Superintendent is to establish a Divisional Garda Victim Service Office which 
would “augment the service provided by all Gardaí and will be available to assist victims in 
receiving timely updates.  They will be the central co-ordinating point of contact in each 
division for all victims.212 
 
Many rank and file Gardaí might argue that this is an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and 
that the injured party could always contact the local Garda Station directly.  However, the 
Garda Inspectorate’s Report of 2014 found that “victims find it extremely difficult to contact 
the investigating officer”213 and that there was “no formal process to monitor quality of service 
provided to victims.”214  They also found that “frontline Gardaí and detectives recognise the 
importance of updating victims but often cannot find the time to do so.”215  The difficulty in 
contacting investigating Gardaí is exacerbated by the organisation’s new rostering system.  
Frontline Gardaí in plain clothes or uniform now work ten hour shifts instead of eight-hour 
ones which was the practice since the 1970s.  The same Gardaí work 6 days followed by 4 rest 
days.  In effect that means that individual Gardaí are not on duty for approximately 50% of 
days in any twelve-month period.  This would include adding normal rest days with 34 days 
annual leave.  It is hoped therefore that the Garda Victims of Crime Office operating on a 9 
a.m. to 5 p.m. basis Monday to Friday can fill the vacuum created by Garda rostering.  
However, it seems at present the Garda Victims Office are referring everything back to the 
investigating Garda – so it might be a simple case of deja vous – but time will tell.   
 
The Garda Inspectorate’s Report 2014 recommended a system of referral to victim support 
agencies be put in place and the improvement in training in taking statements from victims 
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particularly where sexual offences are reported to them.216  In 2015 the Gardaí will now provide 
details of Victim Support organisations to victims and this must be recorded on PULSE by 
investigating Gardaí to show that this has been done.  In relation to children, the Gardaí now 
have a specialist interviewer unit to acquire statements from them when they are under 14 years 
of age.  In addition, these interviews with children are carried out in separate private premises 
away from Garda Stations.  It is submitted that these enhancements to Garda service about 
victims have been pressed upon the organisation due to the advent of the E.U. Directive 
2012/29/EU and the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 which has been enacted by 
the Oireachtas and will give effect to the corresponding E.U. directive.  The Guerin and Garda 
Inspectorate Reports of 2014 also bore heavily on the Gardaí to do better for victims. 
 
The Victim Directive 2012/29/EU and Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 
 
On the 16th November 2015 the aforementioned E.U. Directive217 came into force.  It declares 
the establishment of “minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of 
crime.”  It is a straight forward document which states that “crime is a wrong against society 
as well as a violation of the individual rights of victims.”  As noted by Garland: 
 
… in the penal framework the offending individual was at centre stage the primary 
focus of criminological concern …  The individual victim featured hardly at all.  For 
the most part he or she remained a silent abstraction; a background figure whose 
individuality hardly registered, whose personal wishes and concerns had no place in the 
process.218 
 
Garland goes on to say that the whole scene is now “reversed”: 
 
(t)he process of individualization now increasingly centers upon the victim.  Individual 
victims are to be kept informed, to be offered the support they need, to be consulted 
prior to decision making, to be involved in the judicial process from complaint through 
conviction and beyond.  Victim impact statements are to be produced in court in order 
to individualize the impact of the crime to show how the offence affected this particular 
victim.219 
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It is submitted that the recent Directive and Victims legislation contain all what Garland asserts.  
A victim is now defined as a “natural person who has suffered harm or a family member of a 
person who dies because of a criminal act.”220  It appears therefore that a victim is a victim if 
they alone say they are victims.  The definition of victims in the proposed Irish legislation runs 
parallel to the E.U. Directive.  A person is also a victim “regardless of whether an offender is 
identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship 
between them – and for the purposes of the Directive the moment a complaint is made to Gardaí 
“should be considered as falling within the context of legal procedures.”221  When reporting a 
crime, victims should now receive a letter of acknowledgement of that report.  The Directive 
allows for the provision of information to victims in “sufficient detail … to ensure that victims 
are treated in a respectful manner and to enable them to make informed decisions about their 
participation in proceedings.”  It also states that victims should know “about the current status 
of any proceedings and to allow them a request to review of a decision not to prosecute by the 
Gardaí or the D.P.P.”222 The Act also requires that Gardaí carry out an assessment of the victim 
at an early stage and where necessary ensure that measures are put in place to protect a victim 
from secondary or repeat victimisation, intimidations or retaliation.223 The prosecution must 
assess and consider if the victim should give evidence otherwise than that of viva voce evidence 
in court.224 The Gardaí must record these issues and will be able to do so with the PULSE 
enhancements which came into effect in November 2015.  
  
The Directive states that where the victim is a child, “the child’s best interest must be the 
primary consideration” and “shall be assessed on an individual basis”.225 It is submitted that 
the child’s “best interest” is always open to individual interpretation.  A social worker’s view 
may be different to that of a Garda.  The problem here is who gets to decide what is in the best 
interest of a child and when? 
 
In an investigation by Emily Logan, the Ombudsman for Children,226 she found the Gardaí 
wanting when they invoked their power under s.12 of the Child Care Act 1991 to take a child 
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in an emergency from a place of danger to a safe place.  It is submitted that it is only used by 
Gardaí in emergency situations where Gardaí have concerns for the safety of a child.  Ms. 
Logan found that the Gardaí who had taken a child from a Roma family had racially profiled 
that family and acted improperly.  The child was white while its family were of Roma origin.  
A member of the public had brought this situation to the attention of Gardaí.  At around the 
same time there was a case in the media involving the abduction of a young child in Greece. A 
blonde haired and blue-eyed child had been located by the police authorities on a Roma 
settlement and so there was a certain heightened awareness amongst the public in these types 
of cases.  It is contended that Gardaí would have acted in the best interests of the child by taking 
the child to a place of safety while investigating the child’s family origin. They invoked their 
authority under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 to do so.   Ms. Logan found otherwise.  
It is submitted that if Gardaí declined to invoke their authority in the case and that child then 
went missing or came to harm the Gardaí would be scandalised, ridiculed and would possibly 
face criminal charges.  Whatever the legislation or directive might be, the Gardaí can be 
damned if they do and damned if they do not.  Ms Logan had four months from the 9th 
December 2013 when the Inquiry was set up to 2nd of April 2014 when she submitted her report 
to the Minister to make her inquiries.   It is argued the Gardaí had no such luxury and a 
judgement call had to be made and it is submitted that they erred on the side of caution for the 
child’s safety.  It was not the case the Gardaí simply took custody of the child because it had a 
different complexion but there were also three discrepancies on the birth certificates which 
required clarification. The Victim’s Directive has the noble provision that a child victim’s 
interest must be paramount, but the Directive is silent on who decides the issue.  So, a victim’s 
interests are certainly to fore, but the Directive is open to subjective interpretation. 
 
Insofar as Garland’s thesis is concerned the E.U. Directive and its corresponding legislation in 
this jurisdiction is substantial and compelling evidence of what he asserts.  While it might be 
fair to say that Gardaí had moved over the decades to address victims’ concerns, the situation 
for the organisation is now more acute.    As noted by Kilcommins et al in 2004 “the State feels 
itself to be under an imperative to respond to the victims and their protection is the most 
important priority for penal policy.”227   
 
                                               




AGS as a result is now obliged to ‘up its game’ and ensure that lapses exposed in the Guerin 
and Garda Inspectorate reports in 2014 are not repeated.  However, while these developments 
have emphatically pushed victims onto “centre stage” there are some caveats in the proposed 
changes that are worth considering. 
 
Garda and D.P.P.’s Office:  Reasons for Decisions 
 
Under the new Directive and enacted legislation, it would appear that a victim will be a victim 
if he or she says they are. The D.P.P.’s own Victims Charter states victims will be entitled to 
reasons from the Gardaí and D.P.P. for not prosecuting their complaints and are entitled to a 
review of these decisions.  It is not uncommon for people to make false and spurious allegations 
to Gardaí for their own nefarious reasons. Notwithstanding this, the Directive and legislation 
does not appear to make any provision on how to deal with it.  The Gardaí and the D.P.P. 
sometimes will decide that a complainant’s (who will be a victim for the purposes of E.U. 
Directive and Irish law) credibility or bone fides for whatever reason may be in issue.  However, 
such people will still be entitled to demand reasons for non-prosecution and a review of the 
decision not to prosecute.  How will Gardaí and the D.P.P.’s Office tell such complainants that 
they are not proceeding with criminal charges based on their complaint because they don’t 
believe them, or they believe their complaint is spurious, vexatious or even frivolous?  How 
will the D.P.P.’s office and the Gardaí tell a complainant that they believe it is unsafe to proceed 
with their complaint?  Will it ultimately be sufficient to tell complainants that there is 
“insufficient evidence” to pursue criminal proceedings.  These are potential but real difficulties 
that will have to be surmounted over time. 
 
The D.P.P.’s office has now set up a separate section and structure to deal with these matters 
and provide assistance to the Gardaí when responding to victims when criminal proceedings 
are not instigated. It may be that any appeal of a Garda decision not to prosecute will be 
reviewed by the D.P.P.’s office. It is submitted that insofar as the D.P.P.’s office is concerned 
this means extra resources and probably extra cost.  There is also a review procedure in place 
for those unhappy with the reasons for D.P.P. or Garda decisions not to prosecute.  Insofar as 
the Gardaí are concerned this is yet again another layer of accountability along with internal 
disciplinary regulators G.S.O.C., the Inspectorate, the Professional Standards Unit (PSU), the 
Internal Auditors, Civil Law, Criminal Law and Judicial Review.  As regards the proposal to 




prospectively furnish reasons in cases where their decisions were made on or after the 16th of 
November 2015 while in fatal cases they will do so where the fatality occurs on or after the 
22nd of October 2008. It is not clear if a victim were to litigate the matter, if a court would be 
persuaded that the D.P.P. or Gardai should be directed to review their decisions made before 
these dates. If that were to happen it is contended that such a direction could be problematic 
for the prosecution authorities in terms of workload.  
 
There is nothing in the victim’s legislation that will impugn the “independence” of the D.P.P.’s 
office228  However, it is contended that the fact the D.P.P. now has to give reasons for decisions 
not to prosecute does impugn on the D.P.P.’s independence and arguably there is a danger that 
the independent filter in deciding to instigate criminal proceedings has been eroded. Where in 
the past the D.P.P.’s office may have directed no prosecution to Gardaí, that office may now 
decide simply to run prosecutions to avoid explaining their reasons not to prosecute and in the 
interest of transparency.  It is submitted that there is much danger here to guard against.  As 
noted by Sanders: 
 
If the crime control and due process models no longer encapsulate reality what about a 
victim’s rights approach? Using the purest form of this approach, victims would 
determine all decisions. Vengeful (and false accusing victims) would be able to insist 
on prosecution when there was no evidence and would be able to insist on widely 
disproportionate sentences.229 
 
A recent article by Maeve Sheehan in the Sunday Independent is a good example of this issue. 
The heading reads “(p)ressure on D.P.P. to appeal leniency of rapist’s sentence” the sub 
heading follows with “victims call backed by mounting public outrage.”230 The article began: 
“(p)ressure is mounting on the DPP to appeal the seven-year suspended sentence handed down 
last week to a Norwegian man who repeatedly raped his girlfriend in her sleep.”  It is not 
intended here to argue the merits or demerits of such an appeal but simply to state that a victim 
can now via the media exert pressure on the independent legal officer of the State to bring an 
appeal in her case. The article goes on to say that the victim has “yet to hear from the D.P.P. 
and (she) would welcome contact from that office to let (her) know what they intend to do”.  It 
is submitted that the victim’s words in this case could be construed as if she believes the D.P.P. 
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is in some way accountable to her.  If this is the case, then it is a complete change from might 
have happened thirty years ago when the victim would probably not have been able to progress 
her case much further and the D.P.P. had no right to appeal sentences handed down in court.    
 
Retired District Judge Michael Pattwell raised this type of “filtering” issue in 2014 in an article 
in The Irish Examiner concerning the prosecution of two Gardaí for assault.231  The case had 
been investigated by G.S.O.C. and proceeded with on D.P.P. direction.  The case against Gardaí 
went to hearing and was demolished in a very short time by Mr. Frank Buttimer, Solicitor 
acting for one of the Gardaí.  Judge Olan Kelleher who heard the case adjourned proceedings 
so that the D.P.P. could decide what to do.  The D.P.P. later withdrew the matter.  Judge 
Pattwell queries how the case might have come to court at all.  He stated “I’d expect GSOC to 
be a filter … they should have seen it was a non- starter … I’d expect the D.P.P. to be even a 
finer filter.”232 Historically the D.P.P. did not give reasons for decisions made by his office.  
However, in recent years the D.P.P. would consider giving reason for decision not to prosecute 
to family members in cases were a death had occurred.  In 1991 in H-v-D.P.P. the Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
The stance taken by the DPP is that he should not in general give reasons in any 
individual case as why he has not brought a prosecution because if he does so in one 
case he must be expected to do so in all cases.  I would uphold this decision as being a 
correct one.233 
 
It is suggested therefore that D.P.P.’s office is an important and independent filtering process 
regarding the commencement of criminal proceedings.  It is suggested that any legislation 
insisting that the D.P.P. give reasons for decisions erodes that office’s independence to the 
detriment of due process.  On examining a Garda file, the D.P.P. may decide that there is a lot 
of evidence contained therein to indicate that a suspect may be guilty, but not enough evidence 
to commence a prosecution.  The D.P.P. cannot impugn a suspect by revealing this reason to 
an injured party.  Similarly, the D.P.P. should not disclose reasons for non-prosecutions where 
a person’s life may be jeopardised.  Section 11 of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 
2017 codifies the D.P.P.’s criteria for non-disclosure of reasons not to prosecute but the issue 
                                               
231  S. O’Riordan, “Watchdog to Discipline Pepper Spray Gardaí” Irish Examiner, (23rd January 2014). 
232  Ibid. 





it is suggested might be problematic in particular where there has been a loss of life.  There is 
a substantial interplay between the D.P.P.’s office and AGS.  The D.P.P.’s office receives 
approximately 15,000 files annually234 mostly from the Gardaí and it is arguable that this 
legislation may in hard cases cause the D.P.P.’s office to be no more than a rubber stamp in 
proceeding with criminal matters, particularly so in 50/50 cases where there is a doubt 
regarding the State being able to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, the 
D.P.P. in hard cases may for the purposes of transparency decide to prosecute cases simply to 
“wash dirty laundry” in public rather than refuse to prosecute on the merits of the evidence 
presented by the Gardaí.    
 
 Traditionally Garda files to the D.P.P.’s office were for the most part confidential and the 
D.P.P.’s office formed an independent view of all the evidence presented on the Garda file.  It 
is now possible that Garda files will now be less candid and more politically correct in 
presentation of investigative paperwork.  The Gardaí may have anecdotal evidence which goes 
to the credibility of a complainant or witness or several witnesses but may not now be willing 
to disclose same because of a fear they could at some stage be relayed back to the complainant.  
There exists a provision in the legislation where reasons for non-prosecution will not be given 
where: 
 
• It will interfere with an ongoing investigation 
• Prejudice proceedings 
• Endanger a person’s security 
• Endanger the security of the State.235 
 
 Only in the fullness of time will we see how these provisions will be interpreted by the AGS 
and D.P.P. via its review panels and grievance bodies and how they will impact on the 
independence and quality of their decision-making processes.  Similarly, it will be seen how 
far a victim in litigation will be prepared to go to obtain in-depth information from the D.P.P. 
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The issue of victims’ expenses is addressed in the E.U. Directive but not clearly in Irish 
legislation.  S.23 of the Directive states: 
 
Information about the reimbursement of expenses should be provided from the time of 
first contact with a competent authority, for example in a leaflet stating the basic 
conditions for such reimbursement of expenses.  Member states should not be required 
at this early stage of the criminal procedures to decide on whether the victim concerned 
fulfils the conditions for reimbursement of expenses.236 
 
 
It is suggested victims and witnesses may not always be properly remunerated by the State as 
regards the recoupment of their expenses from the State after or during criminal proceedings. 
Section 5 of the Victims legislation allows for the Minister to pay witness expenses while 
Section 7 provides that victims can seek such information at the point of contact with Gardaí. 
However, the information is not easily available.  
 
There can be delays in AGS processing claims for witness expenses.  The same goes for the 
State funding of Victim Support groups most of which is done on a voluntary basis by trained 
volunteers who receive little or no expenses.   At the conclusion of a court case the Judge may 
award a witness his expenses if such expenses are brought to the notice of the Judge.  The 
Judge will allow for reasonable expenses for any state witness.  However, the State may not 
bring the expenses issue to the attention of the court.  Alternatively, the Gardaí will use the 
schedule submitted to them from the Department of Finance via the Department of Justice.  
The schedule arguably gives lie to the rhetoric of Victims Charter’s Mission Statement, Victims 
Service Policy, Victim Policing Directive, Victims Services Offices and Garda Charters.  It 
came into effect on the 1st January 2003 and it has not been changed since. 
 
The Department of Finance has sanctioned the rates of allowance which may be paid with 
effect from the 1 January 2003 to lay witnesses who appear on behalf of the State.237 For self 
employed persons the allowance paid by the State for a day will be equivalent to the loss 
certified by their accountant.  For salary and wage earners the amount allowed by the State will 
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be equal to that which is certified by the person’s employer.  Non-income earning persons will 
receive €22 if they are absent for 4 hours or more and €11 if they are absent for under 4 hours.  
School-going children are paid nothing.  Subsistence allowances are paid to the amount of €26 
for an overnight stay covering a period from 6 p.m. to 8 a.m.   A daily allowance is paid for the 
period 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.  This amounts to €11 for a period of 5 to 10 hours or €17 if in excess of 
10 hours or more (but not extending to an overnight stay).  Hotel accommodation will be paid 
up to €82 provided the claim is accompanied by a receipt.  Witnesses are allowed travelling 
expenses when using public transport by means of second-class rail or bus fare.  If they use 
their private car they will be allowed 37c per mile while if using a motor cycle 22c per mile 
will be allowed.  The cost of a hired car will be paid provided it is vouched for and only when 
public transport is not available or is not reasonably practicable.   
 
It is suggested the witness expenses schedule is paltry.  They are mostly only paid after the 
witnesses have attended court and as stated before there are sometimes significant delays in 
processing mostly due to the workload of the Gardaí and some queries and clarifications of 
expenses claim at different levels.  It is submitted the witness expenses allowable in each case 
are untenable (even back in 2003) and it costs money for a victim to attend court.  School going 
children (who according to the E.U. Directive a victim child’s interest are of “primary 
consideration”)238 get nothing and while victims may have arrived at ‘centre stage’ they will 
be out of pocket for the privilege notwithstanding the lofty language in reports, E.U. Directives 
and the ancillary legislation. The schedule has now been removed from the Department web-
site. 
 
It is further suggested that the expenses schedule will be in clear breach of Section 47 of the 
Victims Directive which state “Victims should not be expected to incur expenses in relation to 
their participation in criminal proceedings.”239  It is contended that witnesses in many cases do 
not pursue expenses either because they feel they have a moral responsibility to attend court or 
they are not made aware that they are entitled to such expenses. 
 
It will be interesting to see how long it will take the State to change the expenses schedule (as 
it will have to) and will Gardaí be able to speed up the process of payment? Further evidence 
                                               
238  The Victims’ Rights Directive 2012/29/EU supra at note 25.  Chapter 1(2), 7. 




of the State’s poor performance in this area is highlighted an article in the Irish Examiner on 
the 7th of August 2015 by Sean O’Riordan headed “Crime Victim Support Group forced to beg 
for funding.” The article states that a “charity that has provided support to more than 10,000 
victims of crime has had to send out begging letters because of a shortfall in financial support 
from the Department of Justice.”240 The State does not appear to be in any hurry to improve 
matters.  It is also worth noting that the new Victims Directive and supporting legislation does 
not appear to allow for any penalty for breach of its provision.  However, it is expected that the 
Directive will ultimately bring about positive change on this issue by elevating the salience of 
the victim in the mindset of AGS and the Department of Justice via its policies and training. 
 
Gardaí, Victims and Investigations 
 
Members of AGS have seriously been found wanting in their attitude to and dealings with 
victims. The Guerin report published on the 6th May, 2014241 made for uncomfortable and 
unsettling reading for AGS.  While the Guerin report didn’t make any finding in respect of the 
matters inquired into it did make several observations and recommendations to Government 
that some of the issues it looked at required further investigation. In response the Government 
set up the O’Higgins Inquiry to look into these matters.  Therefore, for the purposes of this 
chapter some of the incidents examined in the Guerin/O’Higgins reports are worth reviewing 
for the purposes of demonstrating how things in practice might go wrong in a Garda 
investigation and how victims suffer as a result. 
 
• At 4.30 a.m. on the 25th February 2007 a female made contact with her Garda station 
to complain of the behaviour of a number of youths on a minibus she was driving, and 
she requested Garda assistance.  Although a statement was taken from the complainant 
an investigation file in the incident was never completed.242  O’Higgins found the 
investigation into this matter was very poor and the injured party’s “legitimate 
expectation of the Gardaí was not met.”243 
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• On the 14th April 2007 a victim alleged he was assaulted and “felt a bang on the side of 
his head” at a night club.  The file was allegedly poorly prepared.  The conflict of 
evidence in the case could have been clarified by CCTV footage which but it was never 
downloaded.  The case was dismissed, and the Garda investigation was subject to 
unfavourable remarks by the sitting District Judge.244 O’Higgins concluded that the 
Garda investigation into this matter was “characterised by delay and error.”245 
 
• Another case involved a person who a committed serious crime on bail.  A 
Superintendent allegedly had full details of the two serious incidents. When seeking 
directions from the D.P.P. on a local matter he failed to advise the D.P.P. of the charges 
in existence in another Garda district and failed to make contact with Gardaí in that 
other district to establish the background of the case.246  O’Higgins found inter alia that 
there was “a lamentable failure to communicate effectively within An Garda 
Síochána.”247 
 
• In respect of a public order incident on the 5th August 2007 Guerin observed that a 
“practice of confronting a suspect in an unstructured and uninvited way even for the 
purposes of an apology is undesirable” as it may intimidate a complainant.248  
O’Higgins later held that the injured party in the case was not “well served”.249 
 
• In respect of an alleged assault false imprisonment on the 2nd December 2007 Guerin 
observed that “it would be surprising to think that a matter of such gravity would be left 
entirely in the hands of an inexperienced probationer Garda”.  Guerin went on “(t)he 
investigation lacked the direction of an appropriately experienced and attentive 
officer.”  Even more seriously he states that “one significant and abiding concern” in 
relation to this investigation is that “I have seen no document which identified any 
grounds for suspecting that the person was arrested for those offences may have 
committed it.”  Guerin believes that the fact that interview took only 31 minutes “lends 
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weight to the concern that there was either no real evidence against the suspect or there 
was inadequate preparation for interview.”250  O’Higgins again later held that “the 
victim was not well served in this investigation.”251 
 
• On St. Stephen’s night 2007 a BMW reversed into the doors of a hotel premises.  Guerin 
reviewed the Garda paperwork in this matter and stated that “the Commissioner’s letter 
of the 26th February, 2013 to the Secretary General of the Department of Justice fails to 
mention that there was no investigation of the offence until well after a year after it was 
committed.”252  Later O’Higgins would conclude that “the investigation never 
recovered from a fundamental failure to properly identify who was investigating it.”253 
 
• On 23rd May 2007 a serious assault took place, but the CCTV was not ascertained by 
the Gardaí in time after three days.  The injured party in the case withdrew his complaint 
but he alleged he was told by Gardaí that there was insufficient evidence in the case 
and nobody in the pub had seen anything and the Gardaí presented him with a prepared 
statement of withdrawal for him to sign.254  Later O’Higgins in his conclusion chose to 
refer to a quote from a victim who gave evidence to the Inquiry.  She stated: 
 
My husband and I were raised in Bailieboro.  It is a small town so if you have 
trouble or are concerned or anything your first stop is the Garda station.  They 




O’Higgins concluded “unfortunately in this instance their trust was not justified.”255 
 
The cases give a brief outline of some of the cases that Guerin reviewed.  He said that his 
analysis of these and other cases “reviewed information which supports allegations that there 
were significant deficiencies in the conduct of these investigations.”  He said that these 
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deficiencies “were widely replicated.”  It would “challenge the public confidence in the 
criminal justice system itself.”256 
 
It should be noted that Guerin doesn’t use the word “victim” very often in his report 
notwithstanding that people involved in these incidents would be defined as victims as set out 
in the E.U. Directive and proposed victim legislation in this country. O’Higgins does use the 
word “victim.”  However, it is clear from the examples given that many of problems 
highlighted in the Guerin report and investigated by O’Higgins emanate from a lack of 
supervision.  The Garda Inspectorate in its report in 2014 stated that supervision was a problem 
in AGS.257  In many cases it doesn’t exist or does so only on paper or in skeletal format. No 
matter how effective Garda training is, there no substitute for real life policing experience.  As 
noted by the Garda Inspectorate in its most recent report “lack of availability of patrol Sergeants 
and Inspectors to supervise is a contributing factor of poor investigation.”258  It is noted that 
victims who contacted them during the enquiries acknowledged good initial action by the 
attending Gardaí but unsatisfactory follow up by them.259 
 
It should be noted that Gardaí who for the most part respond to public calls for assistance come 
from what are known as the “regular unit”.  There are five units detailed to provide 24 hours 
service 365 days of the year.  As observed by the Garda Inspectorate, “In most cases regular 
units are the first responders and will complete the full investigation of that case.”  The 
Inspectorate was critical of this practice when it stated, “regular units are under pressure to 
move to the next call for service resulting in some aspects of the initial investigation being 
postponed.”260 
 
This practice has been the way the Gardaí have dealt with what the organisation calls “crime 
ordinary” for decades.  Most burglaries and thefts are investigated in this way.  The attending 
Gardaí will request the attendance of the local scenes of crime unit at the crime locus and any 
leads or suspects will be passed on to detective branch personnel who will assist them in the 
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follow up of their investigation.  Sometimes Gardaí will be able to confront criminals at the 
scene of the crime and make arrests.  Victims are normally fulsome in their praise for the 
bravery Garda members on these occasions. 
 
Since the Garda Inspectorate report in 2014 matters have not changed much about the Gardaí’s 
initial response to crime.  There are very elaborate enhancements to the PULSE system 
instigated in November 2015 to ensure that victims receive the service they are entitled to.  The 
planned new enhancements to the PULSE system are essentially box ticking exercises.  Details 
such as Garda or doctor gender requests by the victim are recorded i.e. whether they require a 
male/female doctor or Garda to deal with their complaint.  It will now be recorded if a victim 
is fluent in Irish or English or if he or she has specific needs e.g. “visual”, “hearing”, “literacy”, 
“mobility” etc.  A preferred contact method is recorded and so too are “discriminatory motives” 
such as “ageism”, “homophobia”, “anti-Muslim” “racism”, “anti Roma”, “sectarian” “anti-
Semitism” and “anti-traveller” are some of those listed.   
 
It is contended that these PULSE enhancements while helpful to victims will be cosmetic in 
practice if AGS do not provide adequately trained personnel and supervisors to ensure crimes 
are followed up on.  It is submitted that the lack of recruitment in the AGS in the last number 
of years has badly damaged the organisation in this and other reports and so victims’ issues 




It is submitted that there is ample evidence in this chapter to demonstrate what Garland asserts 
i.e. that the victim has returned to “centre stage”.  It has also been shown that this “stage”, as 
it were, can be a crowded place. AGS may now have it Victim’s Policy and Charter but the 
victim must also share the limelight with the accused, the judiciary, the legal profession and 
the Gardaí.   In response to the E.U. Victim’s Directive AGS has enhanced its PULSE system 
to ensure that Garda contact with the victims is recorded monitored and proper service 
maintained.261   
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The Courts have held that the Gardaí do not have a duty of care to victims per se but that does 
not prevent victims from litigating contra AGS when things have gone wrong.  However, the 
judiciary in their later decisions show a reluctance to dismiss a plaintiff victim’s proceedings 
contra AGS at a preliminary stage and these cases will now go for a more substantial hearing. 
When the Gardaí or D.P.P. do not prosecute, a victim can now ask why?   This chapter has 
shown that Gardaí will always focus on evidence in their investigation sometimes to the 
detriment of their service to victims and the Garda obsession with evidence comes from their 
training, experience and judicial precedent.  This chapter also highlights how Gardaí have been 
scandalised when they have done or are perceived to have done little or nothing for victims.  
However, Gardaí have much improved and enhancements in the Garda service to crime victims 
has moved those victims into the limelight. 
 
It is contended that this chapter shows that victims have certainly returned to centre stage as 
Garland asserts but that they are not always properly compensated by the State for the privilege. 
This should change, and it is very likely that victims will not easily be moved or pushed from 
centre stage for a long time.  However, while victims may have to compete for the limelight it 
is argued that this chapter contains overwhelming proof of Garland’s thesis insofar as AGS and 
its interaction with victims is concerned. There has been much transformation in how the AGS 
treats crime victims. The transformation in many ways may be flawed and imperfect but it is 
substantial and ongoing.    It is submitted that what has been outlined is evidence of “a new 
cultural theme, a new collective meaningful victimhood and a reworked relationship between 
the individual victim, the symbolic victim and the public institutions of crime control and 
criminal justice.”262 It is contended that what has been set out in this part convincingly proves 
Garland’s theory in respect of victims of crime in that: “the victim is now in a certain sense a 
much more representative character who’s experience is taken to be common and collective 
rather that individual and atypical – whoever speaks on behalf of victims speaks on behalf of 
us all.” 
 
                                               






Above All, The Public Must Be Protected:263 
 From Delinquent to Crackhead.264 
 
Gangland did not exist before the late 1960s.  Ireland was a sleepy place in the days 
before the outbreak of war in Northern Ireland and the mayhem which spread south of 
the border as a result.  The economic boom of the 1960s also played its part in the 
transformation that was to come.  In a few short years, petty crime became much more 
serious. The burglars and the pickpockets of the 1960s became the armed robbers of 
the 1970s.  And in turn, a lot of robbers became the drug barons of the 1980s and 1990s 
… (d)rug dealing brought death and devastation to the streets.  It also created a new 




Garland states that “(p)rotecting the public is a perennial concern of crime policy …”266  He 
acknowledges that when crime rates were low “and fear of crime was not yet a political motif, 
protecting the public was rarely the motivating theme of policy making”.267  However, times 
have changed.  He argues that there is now “a new and urgent emphasis upon the need for 
security, the containment of danger, the identification and management of anything of risk and 
that (p)rotecting the public has become the dominant theme of penal policy.”268 
 
Garland’s work examines what occurred in the U.S.A. and the U.K.269  This chapter will focus 
specifically on his index of change, the protection of the public, to establish if Garland’s theory 
has any relevance to this jurisdiction and in particular to the transformation of AGS generally.  
Garland notes that “there is a relaxing of concern about the civil liberties of suspects and the 
rights of prisoners and a new emphasis upon effective enforcement and control.”270 He 
highlights that the “call for protection from the state” is now second best to the demand “for 
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protection by the state.”271 He notes that surveillance cameras are now a routine feature of the 
public streetscape and criminal justice procedural safeguards have been eroded while bail or 
release from custody are subject to “intense scrutiny” and concludes that the “risk of 
unrestrained state authorities, of arbitrary power and the violation of civil liberties seem no 
longer to figure so prominently in public concern.”272  He notes too the perception of the “needy 
delinquent” and “feckless misfit has transformed into the “career criminal(s)” the “crackhead,” 
the “thug” and the “predator.”273 
 
Garland’s theory if correct would place AGS at the frontline of the changes that he describes.  
Indeed, it is argued in this chapter that there is a plethora of evidence in this jurisdiction to 
corroborate his theory and in particular its relevance to AGS.   In an effort to demonstrate the 
accuracy of his theory, a review of Irish legislation is carried out over the best part of five 
decades from 1968 to 2017.  The legislation is examined to trace the extension of Garda powers 
for the period under review and to highlight where procedural safeguards were adjusted 
downwards.  Indeed, it will be shown that new criminal offences were created, and existing 
ones extended, penalties were strengthened, detention periods were elongated, Garda powers 
of arrest were increased, bail was restricted and the right to silence was fettered.  The D.P.P. 
subject to the approval of the Court, would now determine in many types of cases (i.e. hybrid 
offences) if a case would be dealt with on indictment by Judge and Jury.   Watershed moments 
in Garda and criminal activity are brought to the fore to demonstrate what prompted and 
brought about these profound and radical legislative changes.   
 
The chapter is broken into a number of sections.  Each section covers a ten-year period.  Each 
section commences with details of what was taking place on the criminal and policing scene in 
Ireland at that time.   Each statute is then listed, and the more substantive provisions 
highlighted.  The historical narrative together with highlighted legislative changes are cross 
referenced with Garland’s work to demonstrate how his theory runs very much parallel with 
what he says took place in the U.S.A. and U.K.  It is not being contended that the historical 
narrative given here is exhaustive or complete.  Nor is it contended that the highlighted 
legislative provisions are likewise.  What is being contended is that the evidence presented in 
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this chapter is strong corroboration of Garland’s theory when he states “(l)aw making becomes 
a matter of retaliatory gestures intended to reassure a worried public and to accord with 
common sense, however poorly these gestures are adapted to dealing with the underlying 
problem.”274 
 
The Late 1960s and 1970s 
 
It has been argued that from: “(t)he 1960s onward, Ireland in common with virtually every 
other western country saw a steady rise in organised crime, albeit from a low base.”275 The 
Supreme Court in its judgment in the O’Callaghan case in 1966276 impacted at the time in how 
the Gardaí did business.   Prior to O’Callaghan suspects were arrested, charged and remanded 
to an eventual court hearing.  If convicted, then sentences were handed down.  The system de 
facto empowered the Gardaí to have criminals taken off the streets for substantial periods 
without conviction because of a Garda belief that other crimes may be committed.  As a result 
of the Supreme Court ruling, this manner of policing was now at an end. 
 
A comprehensive Road Traffic Act was enacted in 1961 to reflect the increased use of motor 
vehicles in Irish society.  The public would now have to be protected from bad driving practice 
and strong Garda powers of arrest were provided for.  The Garda Commissioners’ reports of 
the time recorded no gangland crime but “from the late 1960s to the closing years of the 20th 
century ‘the Troubles’ overshadowed the political and public life on the island of Ireland … 
and while the politicians and civil servants sought to deal with the political crisis, the Garda 
Síochána was given the primary task of holding the security line.”277 Holding the “security 
line” would not be easy and Gardaí would lose their lives and be seriously injured in the effort. 
 
On the 20th February 1970 six men carried out a raid at a bank in Rathdrum, Co. Wicklow and 
stole guns from a nearby gunsmith.  Telephone wires had been cut outside the town.  This was 
one of a number of similar raids at the time.  Gardaí believed them to be the work of a group 
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who styled themselves “Saor Éire”.  The raiders operated with speed and forward planning.278  
On the 3rd April 1970 Garda Richard Fallon was shot and killed when he responded to one of 
these raids at a bank at Arran Quay in Dublin a very short distance from the Four Courts 
building.  It was nearly three decades since a Garda was murdered on duty.  The investigation 
into Garda Fallon’s murder and the follow-up would be controversial.279 Violent crime was 
beginning to escalate, and the State would have to act.  In 1971 the Garda Commissioner’s 
report stated that 111 people were charged with drugs offences and there were no heroin 
seizures.280 The figures are indicative that the sale and supply of illicit drugs were not yet 
problematic for AGS and that form of criminality was in its very nascent stage.   
   
In 1972 as “The Troubles” spilled over into the Republic of Ireland, the British Embassy was 
mobbed and attacked in Dublin.  It was burnt down notwithstanding AGS attempts to defend 
it.281  On the 8th June 1972 Inspector Samuel Donegan was killed in a booby trap explosion in 
Co. Monaghan near the border.282   This was followed on the 26th of November 1972 when an 
I.R.A. team attempted to secure the release of a convicted I.R.A. member who was in custody 
but attending the Mater Hospital.  The escape effort failed after a shoot-out with Gardaí.283  The 
previous day a bomb went off at Burgh Quay at a cinema.284  A substantial amendment to the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 would follow (infra).    Later, on the 1st December 1972 
two C.I.E. employees would be killed in a bomb blast near Liberty Hall in Dublin.285   The year 
1972 would see the establishment of the non-jury Special Criminal Court when the government 
exercised its power under s.35 (2) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.  In 1973 the 
“Claudia” vessel would be intercepted off the southern Irish coast with five tonnes of arms 
bound for the P.I.R.A.286  In the same year rioting took place in Mountjoy Prison and prison 
officers were taken hostage.   Gardaí supported by the defence forces eventually restored 
order.287  In Portlaoise Prison, Saor Éire prisoners refused to wear prison clothing288 and an 
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unsuccessful attempt was made by a mob to burn down Dundalk Garda Station.289  Later in the 
year a helicopter would touch down in Mountjoy Prison and three P.I.R.A. prisoners would 
make their escape in same.  As noted by Brady, “the escape made headlines around the 
world.”290   
 
In addition to crime linked to the “troubles” the Garda Commissioner’s Report in 1972 
acknowledged the “growth in industrialisation” in this country and the resulting “opportunities 
for planned as well as casual crime”.   The Commissioner states that the “techniques employed 
by criminals had become more sophisticated” and the “commission of crime by criminals on 
bail awaiting trial stood at 1784 crimes against property, committed by 462 persons while on 
bail.”291 Also, in 1973 the Gardaí would set up the Traffic Corps “aimed at improving 
behaviour of road users and roadway accidents and saving lives.”  It was hoped that the unit 
would have 300 members throughout the country.292  
 
In 1974 came the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and Senator Billy Fox of Fine Gael was 
murdered in Monaghan293.  The Beit Art Collection at Russborough House was stolen but later 
recovered.  Rose Dugdale a P.I.R.A. member would later be convicted of the crime.294  The 
Littlejohn brothers would escape from Mountjoy but one was quickly recaptured295 while 
I.R.A. prisoners would blast their way out of Portlaoise Prison.296 The Gardaí would now be 
assigned prison duty to secure the prisons.297  In 1975 Ireland had its first Director of Public 
Prosecutions in Eamon Barnes and the Gardaí would have a Forensic Science Laboratory in 
the precincts of their own headquarters in Phoenix Park.298  Garda Michael Reynolds was shot 
dead when off duty when he set off in pursuit of armed bank robbers in Dublin on the 11 th 
September 1975.299  Tiede Herrema, the Managing Director of Ferenka a Dutch company in 
Limerick was kidnapped but later released in Monasterevin after a siege involving the 
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kidnappers, Gardaí and defence forces.  A detective Garda was wounded when shot at by one 
of the kidnappers.300 On the 10th June 1975 Larry White was killed in a hail of machine gun 
fire in Cork City.301  A number of persons were charged.  The Supreme Court in the Madden 
case302 would later free one of those convicted in respect of the crime as the incriminating 
statement he made to Gardaí was made partly when his period of detention under the Offences 
Against the State Act 1939 as amended had expired.  The Commissioner’s 1975 Report would 
state that “criminals were becoming more vicious and mean.”303 Capital murders, kidnappings, 
dramatic prison escapes, “drive by murders” bombings and high-profile thefts, and the illegal 
importation of firearms on a large scale all occurring in a five-year period. The Government 
would respond by entrusting AGS with the most draconian of powers to protect the public and 
the State itself (infra).  
 
In 1976 what became known as the Sallins Mail Train Robbery took place on the Dublin/Cork 
mail train in Kildare and nearly €250,000 in cash was stolen.  Six members of the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party were arrested under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 
1939 and detained and questioned under the same provisions.  They were charged and brought 
before court. No money was ever recovered by Gardaí. At trial hearings before the Special 
Criminal Court allegations would be made that the Gardaí beat confessions from those 
accused.304  Also, in 1976 five P.I.R.A. prisoners would blast their way to freedom from the 
Special Criminal Court in Green Street305 and the British Ambassador to Ireland Christopher 
Ewart-Biggs would be assassinated as he travelled from his home in Dublin.  A civil servant 
travelling with the Ambassador was also killed when a bomb exploded under the car they were 
travelling in.306 The government would enact two important pieces of legislation in the 
aftermath. (infra) Garda Michael Clerkin was killed in a booby trap explosion in Portarlington 
on the 16th October 1976.307  On the 29th September 1976 Joseph Shaw was arrested with 
another male in Galway City for being in a stolen car.  They were questioned in respect of the 
disappearance of two young women from Mayo and Wicklow some four days and four weeks 
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previously.  They made incriminating statements to Gardaí implicating themselves in murder. 
There was no statutory power for their questioning or detention.308  The Supreme Court in the 
Shaw case309 would ultimately hold that there were “extraordinary excusing circumstances” in 
line with the Kenny Judgment310 to justify the Gardaí’s actions.  At the time of the arrests the 
Gardaí believed that the missing Mayo girl might still be alive and her constitutional right to 
life superseded that of the rights of the accused. AGS was making full use of its powers and 
the Supreme Court would tolerate AGS acting ultra vires if there were “extraordinary excusing 
circumstances” It is submitted that the protection of the State and the public were paramount 
in the mindset Government and the Supreme Court.  
  
In 1977 in the Irish Times allegations of a Garda Heavy Gang would surface.  Kerrigan & 
Brennan state that “no-one paid too much attention at first when allegations emerged that 
Gardaí were beating up suspects.” He says that: 
 
the allegations remained consistent from area to area; the same names of Gardaí 
cropped up again and again … the (h)eavy (g)ang seems to have begun informally with 
Gardaí coming to know which of their colleagues in which sections of the force were 
prepared to take the gloves off when interrogating suspects.  It developed from that into 
a still informal but recognisable group which saw itself as doing a distasteful but 
necessary job in which occasional violence and the threat of violence was inevitable.  
There was no cohesive group answering to the Heavy Gang nickname.311  
 
These allegations would have robust legislative repercussions later (infra) and while the 
veracity of the allegations against members of the Gardaí are not for consideration here it is 
contended that AGS was making full use of its empowerment and taking its public protection 
duties very seriously. Also, in 1977 there was a disturbing dispute between two Garda 
fingerprint experts regarding a finger-mark found on a helmet found at the scene of the British 
Ambassador assassination.  No fingerprint was found on initial examination.  When a second 
Garda expert examined the exhibit, a finger-mark was found that was identified as that of an 
I.R.A. man known to Gardaí.  The first Garda expert who examined the exhibit couldn’t believe 
that he had missed something so vital.  The mark was later established to be that of the first 
Garda and not the I.R.A. man.  The event was embarrassing for the Irish government who had 
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to recant on what was initially told the British authorities that the mark was that of an I.R.A. 
man.312  It is submitted that this is an example that AGS was under pressure to solve violent 
crime. 
 
In 1978 in Belfast a U.D.A. member was arrested by Gardaí when a number of firebombs 
detonated in a number of Dublin commercial premises.313  Also, in that year the O’Briain 
Report314  published what safeguards could be put in place for persons in Garda custody.  The   
O’Briain Committee was set up the previous year in response to allegations of heavy-handed 
Garda mistreatment of persons being detained.  His recommendations would be reflected in 
legislation that would come piecemeal for many years thereafter such as custody officers or 
“custodial guardians” who would be responsible for the proper treatment of prisoners and the 
establishment of an independent body which would investigate complaints contra the Gardaí. 
The Garda Commissioner Patrick McLaughlin would state that our legislation was “studiously 
vague as to Garda powers and interrogation … the few statutes that authorised (the Gardaí) to 
question remained silent on any need to answer.”315  He went on to say that “we have down the 
years tried to make an impossible system work only to find ourselves being constantly accused 
of being the ’bad guys’ whose only aim is to deprive people of their rights. Why should the 
Gardaí be trying to do the job that you expect us to do, have to put up with constant vilification 
both inside and outside the courts in their efforts to make a bad system work?”316 It is submitted 
that the State in the fullness of time would substantially if not fully address these matters (see 
infra) AGS would receive arguably all the powers it had been seeking at that time.  The 
Commissioners words it is suggested, are indicative of a certain sensitivity to Gardaí being 
portrayed as the “bad guys” when all they’re doing is trying to protect the public.  In 1979 Lord 
Mountbatten and three others were killed when they were blasted to death by the P.I.R.A. while 
sailing on his boat near Mullaghmore, Co. Sligo.   He was under Garda protection at the time.317 
It contended that since the early 1970s insofar as this jurisdiction is concerned “protecting the 
public had become the dominant theme of penal policy”318 
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Notwithstanding the events highlighted above the Gardaí were also facing substantial increases 
in the level of indictable crime.   The Annual Garda Commissioners Report319 set out the 
figures: 
 
Year No. of Indictable Offences Detection Rate 
1968 23,104 61% 
1969 25,792 61% 
1970 30,756 50% 
1971 37,781 46% 
1972 39,237 43.4% 
1973 38,022 47.6% 
1974 40,096 48.1% 
1975 48,387 43.4% 
1976 54,382 41.3% 
1977 69,946 38.8% 
1978 62,000 40.7% 
1979 64,057 41.2% 
     Table 2.1   Garda Statistics for Indictable Crime and Detection Rates from 1968 to 1979 
 
In the Foreword of the Report of 1975 the Commissioner remarks that “the overall crime figure 




The legislation enacted for the period 1968-1979 that strongly relates to the Gardaí can be set 
out as follows: 
 
1. Road Traffic Act 1968 
2. Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1972 
3. Air Navigation and Transport Act 1973 
4. Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1973 
5. Prosecution of Offences Act 1974 
6. Air Navigation and Transport Act 1975 
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7. Criminal Law Act 1976 
8. Emergency Powers Act 1976 
9. Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976 
10. Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
11. Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1978 
 
Extension of Powers – 1968 to 1979 
 
The Road Traffic Act 1968 amended the parent legislation of 1961.  The new Act would now 
allow the Minister to make regulations regarding speed limits that would be enforced by 
Gardaí.321   A statutory obligation for persons to provide a breath specimen on the roadside to 
Gardaí for the purposes of grounding an arrest for a drink driving offence was also created.322  
The legal blood alcohol requirement was set at 125 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres 
of blood323 and there would now be an obligation to provide such a blood specimen consequent 
to arrest and having been brought to a Garda station.  The provision of a sample of urine was 
also provided for.324  The Medical Bureau of Road Safety was to be set up which would have 
responsibility to analyse blood and urine specimens sent to it by Gardaí.325  An offence was 
also created of “driving without reasonable consideration326  and careless driving.327  It would 
also be an offence to be found in a public place in such a drunken state that traffic or persons 
themselves would be endangered.328  The offence of an unauthorised taking of a vehicle was 
created (i.e. joyriding).329 The legislation would be the backbone of Garda road traffic 
enforcement for many years although it would be amended repeatedly. 
 
The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1972 empowered Gardaí to question a person 
found near the commission of a scheduled offence and permitted the admissibility of oral or 
written evidence of self-incrimination regarding membership of an unlawful organisation.330  
                                               
321   Section 24 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
322   Section 28 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
323   Section 29 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
324   Section 30 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
325   Section 37 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
326   Section 49 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
327   Section 50 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
328   Section 59 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 
329   Section 65 of the Road Traffic Act 1968. 





A Chief Superintendent could now give evidence that he/she believed that a person was a 
member of an unlawful organisation and on its own that evidence would be sufficient to convict 
on such a charge.331 This was a massive power as P.I.R.A. members initially refused to 
recognise the courts and basically turned their backs on the judges and declined to engage or 
defend themselves at trial.  The foolhardiness of their approach would be clear over time when 
they found themselves behind bars and their policy would subsequently change.  The Air 
Navigation and Transport Act 1973 gave Gardaí powers in circumstances where an aircraft is 
unlawfully seized.  Gardaí could arrest and detain in respect of offences committed under the 
Act.  The Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1973 is a piecemeal change to road traffic legislation 
and adjusts procedures that permit a doctor to take blood/urine specimens in drink driving 
cases.  The Prosecution of Offences Act 1974 establishes the independent office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions who will direct on criminal proceedings in files submitted to him by the 
Gardaí.  The Air Navigation and Transport Act 1975 creates an offence to endanger an aircraft 
with power of arrest for Gardaí for persons committing an offence under the Act.  It also creates 
a period of detention for 48 hours. 
 
The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976 extended the reach of Irish criminal law for offences 
committed in Northern Ireland.  It widened the scope of offences of causing explosion by 
explosive substances,332  robbery,333 burglary334 and aggravated burglary335 and created an 
offence of possession of firearms and ammunition in suspicious circumstances336 and carrying 
a firearm with criminal intent.337 It created the offence of hijacking of vehicles.338  The Gardaí 
now have wide powers of arrest and for the purposes of making the arrest have authority to use 
force to enter without warrant “any place”.339  The Act comes complete with a wide schedule 
of offences wherein the Gardaí can to invoke these powers. 
 
The Emergency Powers Act 1976 is no longer in force.  It gave the Gardaí substantial power 
of arrest but in particular gave a power of detention initially for 48 hours which could be 
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extended for up to 5 days in total solely on the authority of a member of AGS not below the 
rank of Chief Superintendent.340  The header of this legislation that it is an Act “for the purpose 
of securing public safety and the preservation of the State in time of armed conflict.”  At the 
time, the State believed its authority was under challenge. 
 
The Criminal Law Act 1976 created an offence to assist and escape lawful custody341 and 
entrusted Gardaí with powers to search, demand names and addresses, photograph, fingerprint 
and carry out tests on persons for traces of firearms and explosives.342  There is also power to 
seize and detain items considered to be evidence.343  There is also extensive power to stop and 
search vehicles and persons found in vehicles including the placing of a barrier to stop a vehicle 
in the event of a pursuit.344  It also created an offence to incite or invite a person to join an 
unlawful organisation.345  A wide power to seize was given in respect of searches carried out 
under this particular Act or another statute.346 Gardaí can simply seize anything which “is 
believed to be evidence of any offence or suspected offence.”347 This power of search continues 
to be used almost daily by Gardaí. 
 
The Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 was the first legislative acknowledgement that Ireland had a 
serious drugs problem.  It defined what were to be controlled drugs and created offences and 
penalties for simple possession348 and unlawful supply of these drugs.349  Again there was a 
wide power of arrest afforded to Gardaí350 together with a provision to obtain search warrants351 
and powers to search persons without warrant352.  The Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1978 
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Summary - 1968 – 1979 
 
From 1968 to 1979 recorded crime increased almost three-fold from 23104 crimes in 1968 to 
64,057 in 1979.  Paramilitary crime was on the increase and illicit drugs were available on Irish 
streets.   More people owned cars and drinking and offences pertaining to driving became an 
issue.  The Irish government responded by expanding Garda powers of arrest, detention and 
search.  All of the statues aside from the Emergency Powers Act 1976 remain law.  It is 
submitted that this is consistent with Garland’s theory as highlighted earlier in this chapter.   
 
In 2007 Campbell wrote that, “liberal notions of the primacy of the individual and of individual 
rights are eroded by premodern calls for vengeance and a heightened legislative concern has 
compromised liberty.”353 Similarly Conway notes that “the 1950s and 1960s have been 
presented as a policeman’s paradise.”354 She goes on to say that:  
 
While one Garda spoke of dealing with little more than thefts of bicycles in his first few 
years in the force, Gardaí were now dealing with dramatic rise in crime with a 
particularly large increase in armed robberies occurring, being sent to the border or to 
prisons and responding to incidents where individuals have been killed.  355 
 
It is contended that there can be no doubt that what was happening in Ireland between 1968 
and 1979 and which is highlighted in this chapter is benchmarked by the legislative changes 
which took effect during the same period.  The State in the form of the government and the 
Gardaí were under pressure because of paramilitary activity and reflects Garland’s theory when 
he states; 
 
This pervasive sense of failure fuelled by the sharply increasing crime rates of the 1970s 
and 1980s would eventually lead to questioning of the state’s ability to control crime 
and a rethinking of the role of criminal justice.  It would prompt the emergence of new 
forms of criminology, a new crime control agenda … the late 1970s became the ground 
zero for a newly contested field of crime control.356 
 
                                               
353   L. Campbell, From Due Process to Crime Control – The Decline of Liberalism in the Irish Criminal Justice  
       System (2007) 25 ILT 281. 
354   C. Brady supra at note 275 at p.240.  
355   V. Conway, Policing Twentieth Century Ireland, a History of An Garda Síochána (London: Routeledge  
       2014)  at p.136. [hereinafter Conway]. 





It is submitted that this is largely true in relation to Ireland in the period under review.  As 
Garland notes “it was the opening phase of a transformative process that has brought about 
major changes in institutions, ideas and practices across a whole crime control field.”357  In the 
1970s drug abuse was becoming more prevalent.  As noted by Williams “since criminals moved 
into the narcotics trade, dozens have been executed in feuds fed by greed, their names added 
to ganglands role of dishonour … 358 The Gardaí were also trying to face down paramilitary 
violence and an increasing crime rate and as Garland noted “the assault on individualized 




Violent crime continued into the 1980s.  In January 1980 Phyllis Murphy’s naked body was 
found in Wicklow.  Gardaí established that she was raped and had been choked to death.360  
Later in the same year two Garda detectives were shot at and wounded in the course of an 
armed robbery in Stillorgan in south county Dublin.361  Garda Henry Byrne and Detective 
Garda John Morley lost their lives in a shoot-out with armed raiders when they were intercepted 
in the aftermath of a robbery at the Bank of Ireland in Ballaghadreen, Co. Roscommon.362 Two 
years earlier Garda detectives were balloted on whether or not they wished to be armed.  Most 
voted “no”.   In the aftermath of what happened in Ballaghadreen, this would be reversed.363  
At that time very few Gardaí were trained in the use of firearms.  On the 13th of October 1980 
Wexford Detective James Quaid was shot dead after a shoot-out when he and a colleague 
Detective Garda Donal Lyttleton intercepted a P.I.R.A. man conveying arms and 
ammunition.364  In 1980 the Commissioners Report would declare that 189 firearms were 
seized and that full time drugs units were now operating in Dublin, Cork and Limerick and that 
999 people had been charged with drugs offences.365  As noted by Brady “within the Garda 
hierarchy drugs continued to be a low priority and a career backwater.”366  Somewhat similarly 
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Williams states “during the 1970s and 1980s the slow and inadequate responses of both Gardaí 
and legislature effectively gave gangland its independence and the godfathers established its 
borders.”367   While the nascent Garda drugs unit had been set up in Dublin in 1970 it would 
take the Gardaí another fifteen years to make any real effort to address the problem.  The Misuse 
of Drugs Act in 1977 was the first indication of change but its provisions were not commenced 
until 1979 - more delay.  It was only the first year into the new decade and the trend from the 
1970s continues.  Gardaí are being murdered and shot at, a woman is raped and murdered, and 
her body discarded, plain clothes Gardaí want to be armed full time and the AGS was slowly 
reacting to the illicit drugs scene.  It is contended that these demonstrate what Garland states 
in that there was a “new and urgent emphasis upon the need for security”368 and the” 
containment of danger”369 The public would require protection and crime would continue to 
dominate the news. 
 
In 1981 many Gardaí and protestors were injured during a riot at the British Embassy in 
Ballsbridge in Dublin.  A protest was organised in support of H-Block prisoners in Northern 
Ireland who were on hunger strike.370  Ben Dunne Junior of the Dunnes Stores Group was 
kidnapped and a ransom of £500,000 sought for his release.  Roughly one week later he was 
released unharmed and Gardaí suspected that the ransom had been handed over or handed over 
in part.371  The Garda Commissioners Report for this year states that in all 211 firearms were 
seized372 and 1,256 persons were charged with drug offences.373 
 
On the 20th of February 1982 Garda Patrick Reynolds was murdered when he was shot after he 
confronted several people in a house in Tallaght when they were counting cash from a robbery 
previously carried out in Limerick. He had only come to Tallaght as a recruit Garda four years 
previously.374  In the same year a nurse was found beaten to death in the Phoenix Park and 
some days later a farmer was shot dead in Co. Offaly.  The Gardaí would arrest Malcolm 
McArthur, the suspect for these crimes at the home of the Attorney General in Dublin.  The 
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A.G would later resign.375  Also, in 1982 Dr. James O’Donovan of the Forensic Laboratory 
would be seriously injured when a bomb went off in his car outside his home.376  Also, in 1982 
Peter Matthews died while in Garda custody at Shercock Garda Station, Co. Cavan.  Two 
Gardaí would later be charged in connection with his death.377  In 1982 the Commissioner’s 
Report states that 1,593 people were found in possession of drugs and unusually the 
Commissioner does not reference the number of indictable offences recorded as detected in his 
foreword to the report.378 The work of AGS was rarely far from the news. 
 
Early in 1983 Commissioner McLaughlin and Deputy Commissioner Ainsworth would resign 
from the Gardaí in the aftermath of the “bugging scandal” where two journalist’s phones were 
tapped by Gardaí at the behest of the then Minister for Justice.379  The year 1983 would also 
see the murder of two Gardaí, a prison officer and a member of the defence forces.  The prison 
officer, Brian Stack was murdered while off duty in Dublin.380  Sergeant Patrick McLoughlin 
was shot when he answered a call to the Garda station late at night.381  In December of the same 
year recruit Garda Gary Sheehan and soldier Private Patrick Kelly were murdered while 
searching for kidnap victim Don Tidey at Derrada Wood, Co. Leitrim.382  This year was the 
year that the racehorse Shergar was kidnapped apparently by a P.I.R.A. unit.383  An attempt to 
kidnap Canadian businessman Galen Weston was foiled by Gardaí after a shoot-out with a 
P.I.R.A. unit in Co. Wicklow.384  Some of the gang were wounded and others got away.  No 
Gardaí were hurt.  Martin Cahill also known as “The General” was now probably the most 
prolific criminal in the country.  He was suspect for the attack on Dr. James Donovan385 (supra) 
in 1982 and his gang would also be the main suspects for the break-in to Thomas O’Connor 
and Sons Jewellers near Harold’s Cross in Dublin.  They fled with in excess of £2 million in 
jewellery.   The premises had a reputation for being one of the most secure in the country.386  
The Commissioners Report for 1983 states: 
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The year saw the emergence of concerned groups of citizens coming together to 
consider trends and similar problems particularly those related to drugs … of continuing 
concern is the number of children and young persons who become involved in crime 
… the continuing inability of social agencies responsible for the welfare of children to 
cope with this problem is of concern.387 
 
The drug abuse epidemic was taking hold on young people and the Government would 
eventually legislate to codify drug offences and further empower AGS. 
 
On the 10th of August 1984 Detective Garda Frank Hand was murdered and his colleague 
Detective Garda Michael Dowd injured in a shoot-out with raiders as they escorted monies at 
Drumree Post Office, Co. Meath.388  Dominic McGlinchey was arrested in Newmarket on 
Fergus, Co. Clare after a gun fight with Gardaí.389  He was handed over to the R.U.C. shortly 
afterwards.  He and his wife were also suspect for tying up two Gardaí at Carrigtwohill, Co. 
Cork some weeks earlier.  The Gardaí had called to the home of a local P.I.R.A suspect in the 
course of a nationwide search for McGlinchey.  They found him and his gang at the house.  
The Gardaí were uniformed and unarmed and easily overpowered.  The suspects fled the 
scene.390  In the same year the Irish Naval Service intercepted the “Marita Ann” vessel off the 
Kerry coastline.  The vessel secreted seven tonnes of arms for the P.I.R.A.391  Martin Ferris 
was one of those arrested.392 He has been a T.D since 2002.  
 
The Kerry Babies case would come to prominence this year after the stabbed body of a baby 
was found in White Strand, Co. Kerry.  Joanne Hayes who was the suspect in the case would 
be criminally charged with the crime, but those charges would later be dropped.393  Michael 
Noonan the then Minister for Justice would have one of the most salient pieces of legislation 
enacted from the point of view of Garda investigative powers.  The Criminal Justice Act 1984 
empowered Gardaí to detain people for the purpose of questioning them as well as other 
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substantial powers.  The Gardaí who were charged in connection with the death of Peter 
Matthews at Shercock Garda Station were acquitted.394  There was much public concern about 
safety of persons in Garda custody and the Government would introduce Custody 
Regulations395 in tandem with the Criminal Justice Act 1984.  Three Gardaí would be dismissed 
because of the Shercock. case.396 The 1984 Commissioners Report noted “an upsurge in attacks 
on the elderly” and in his Foreword, he fails to mention a detection rate of 32.2% which is 
approximately 10% lower than previous years. 397 
 
In 1985 the Kerry Babies Tribunal began hearings.  It would sit for 77 days.  Joanne Hayes and 
others were alleging that statements made to Gardaí were coerced and made under duress.398  
In the same year Sergeant Patrick Morrissey was shot dead near Ardee, Co. Louth when he 
intercepted an armed raider subsequent to a robbery at the local labour exchange.  The Sergeant 
in uniform and unarmed in the course of a struggle with raider had fallen helplessly to the 
ground but the raider shot him to death anyway.399  Prisoners in the new Spike Island prison in 
Cork Harbour rioted and burned down buildings.  A stand- off ensued between rioters, Gardaí 
and prison officers.  The Defence Forces were called in aid to the civil power but when they 
arrived at the gate of the prison they were sent away again.  Gardaí and the prison service would 
later restore order.400 The 1985 Commissioners Report declared that the “green man (facility) 
would be installed in unattended Garda Stations.401   In the years 1984 and 1985 Martin Cahill, 
a prolific criminal, was suspect for carrying out many high-profile robberies. 
 
In 1986 Jennifer Guinness the wife of a Dublin Banker was kidnapped.  Gardaí would later 
rescue her unharmed.  Three persons were arrested and charged with the kidnapping.402  Peter 
Robinson, the then deputy leader of the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland would 
lead hundreds of loyalist supporters across the border in a protest concerning the Anglo-Irish 
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Agreement which had been signed in 1985.  The event was also to highlight the paucity of 
security on the border on the southern side.  The Gardaí responded and the then deputy leader 
of the Democratic Unionist Party was arrested and charged and later convicted.403  A 
schoolboy, Philip Cairns from Rathfarnham in Dublin went missing.  Gardaí and civilians 
conducted searches over a wide area.  He has never been found nor has anyone been made 
amenable for his disappearance.404  Armed robbers fled with approx. £1 million in cash when 
they held up a Securicor van in Fairview in Dublin.405  Also, in 1986 Martin Cahill was suspect 
for stealing the Beit Art Collection from Russborough House.406  This would be the second 
such break-in and theft.  All but two would be subsequently located by police across Europe.  
He was also suspect for breaking into the D.P.P.’s office in this year and stealing a number of 
sensitive files.407 
 
In 1987 the Dublin dentist John O’Grady was kidnapped by Dessie O’Hare and his gang.  A 
shoot-out in Midleton, Co. Cork between the Gardaí and the gang would follow.  The gang 
escaped, and O’Grady was not rescued.408  When two detectives were later checking out a lead 
that emanated from the Midleton area at an address at Carnlough Road in Finglas, Dublin it 
would result in the rescue of O’Grady after a shoot-out between the gang and Gardaí.   
Detective Garda Martin O’Connor from New Inn, Co. Tipperary would be seriously injured 
from a gunshot wound but survived.   His colleague Detective Garda Henry Spring was slightly 
injured.  The gang remained at large.409  Dessie O’Hare would later be arrested after being shot 
in a joint operation by Gardaí and defence forces at Urlingford, Co. Kilkenny.  Martin Byran 
who was O’Hare’s driver on the occasion was shot dead by the security services.  The rest of 
the gang were eventually all arrested (after violent exchanges with Gardaí).410  The French 
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authorities would find 150 tonnes of guns and explosives on the vessel called the “Eksund” in 
the Bay of Biscay destined for the P.I.R.A.  The seizure was massive, and Gardaí learned that 
there were four other deliveries that landed in Ireland.411  If that was the case the P.I.R.A. had 
arms that could cause serious loss of life and damage to property on both sides of the border.  
Operation Mallard was executed before Christmas in 1987.  A comprehensive search of suspect 
P.I.R.A. premises and properties were carried out in addition to vacant and/or remote holdings.  
No significant arms were found but a number of well-constructed bunkers were located.412 
 
Martin Cahill continued to dominate the crime scene.  Operation Tango was set up by Gardaí 
to disrupt his activities.  Cahill would now be subject of round the clock surveillance by teams 
of Gardaí and the operation continued into 1988.413  In retaliation Cahill was suspect for the 
slashing of his neighbours’ tyres and digging up the greens at the Garda Golf Club in 
Stackstown Co. Dublin.414  He still managed to evade Gardaí on occasions and was suspect for 
a number of other attacks.  The Department of Social Welfare stopped his Social Welfare 
payments.  The department official whom Cahill deemed responsible, Brian Purcell, was 
kidnapped from his home, bound, hooded and gagged and brought to a location where it is 
alleged that Cahill shot him at point blank range in each leg.  The official survived.415  Many 
years later the same civil servant as Secretary of the Department of Justice would be sent to 
Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan’s home by Taoiseach Enda Kenny in controversial 
circumstances in respect of a serious but unrelated policing matter.  The Commissioner would 
retire from his post the following day amid much contention.416  Don O’Leary’s house was 
searched by Gardaí in Cork City and thirty-seven posters were found. The posters depicted a 
masked I.R.A member brandishing an armalite rifle.  The picture was accompanied by the 
words “I.R.A. Call the Shots”. O’Leary was charged with being a member of the I.R.A and 
with possession of incriminating documents.  The evidence of a Garda Chief Superintendent 
of his belief that O’Leary was an I.R.A. member together with that of the posters was enough 
to convict O’Leary. The Supreme Court would later endorse the conviction.417 The 1987 Garda 
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Commissioner’s Report would state that “particular attention is being given to armed and 
organised crime.”418 
 
In 1988 the D.P.P. in the Supreme Court would attempt to have bail restricted if evidence was 
tendered that persons seeking bail would be likely to commit further serious crime.419  The 
Supreme Court was having none of it and indicated that it was for the Oireachtas to legislate 
for such an occurrence.   In 1989 RUC Chief Superintendent Bob Buchanan and Superintendent 
Harry Breen were murdered by the P.I.R.A. north of the border when returning from a security 
meeting with Gardaí in Dundalk.  There would later be allegations that some members of the 
Gardaí colluded with the P.I.R.A. in the deaths.  The Smithwick Tribunal would be set up many 
years later to inquire into the matter.420 
 
For the ten-year period from 1980 to 1989 the Gardaí recorded the following numbers of 
indictable offences.421 There were substantial fluctuations. 
 
Year No. of Indictable Offences Detection Rate 
1980 72,782 39.9% 
1981 89,400 36.6% 
1982 97,626 32.6% 
1983 102,387 32.9% 
1984 99,727 32.2% 
1985 91,285 32.6% 
1986 86,574 31.6% 
1987 85,358 32.6% 
1988 89,544 33.2% 
1989 86,792 33.2% 
     Table 2.2   Garda Statistics for Indictable Crime and Detection Rates from 1980 to 1989. 
 
It will be noted that the upward trend continued up to 1983 when it peaked more than 102,000 
offences.  It was around this time that the Gardaí began recording crime on a computer system.  
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In any event since 1968 recorded indictable crime spiralled by almost 400 %. The 1980s would 




For this period the following legislation pertained to the Gardaí. Some of them are more prolific 
that others but all of them substantially increased Garda powers in one way or another: 
 
1. Casual Trading Act 1980 
2. Criminal Law Rape Act 1981 
3. Litter Act 1982 
4. Criminal Justice Act 1984 
5. Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 
6. Control of Dogs Act 1986 
7. Garda Síochána Complaints Act 1986 
8. Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act 1987 
9. Data Protection Act 1988 
10. Intoxicating Liquor Act 1988 
 
Extension of Powers - 1980 to 1989 
 
In terms of the amount of legislation passed by the Oireachtas during the 1980s of significance 
for the Gardaí, it can be said it is consistent with the previous decade.   While the 1970s saw 
the enactment of very draconian legislation, the 1980s also has law which will have profound 
consequences on how the Gardaí investigate crime.  It will be the next decade when there would 
be an acceleration in the amount of law being passed by law makers and its penetrating effect 
on the rights of individuals. 
 
The Casual Trading Act 1980 as the name suggests provides for “the control and regulation of 
casual trading” and in that regard the Gardaí are given strong powers to seize goods when they 
are being sold unlawfully and a strong power of arrest when the Act is not complied with.423  
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The powers are useful particularly during the times of big matches and events and assist Garda 
in monitoring and controlling street trading.   The Criminal Law Rape Act 1981 defines a 
“rape”424 and a “rape offence”.425   It provides that “no evidence will be adduced” in respect of 
a complainant’s sexual past426 and allows for the anonymity of complainant427 and the 
accused428 in particular circumstances.  The sentence for indecent assault on females was 
increased to up to ten years imprisonment.429  The Litter Act 1982 affords a power of arrest to 
Gardaí if a litter warden is obstructed in the course of his duty.430 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1984 made acute changes to the investigative process.  Up to now 
Gardaí could only rely on the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and the Emergency Powers 
Act 1976   to detain and question suspects.  The essential focus of these Acts was subversive 
crime.  In D.P.P. –v- Quilligan431 (which was known locally as “the Willis Murder” which 
occurred near Glanmire in Cork in the mid-1980s), the Gardaí invoked their power under 
Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 to arrest and question the suspects.  The 
Willis murder was in no way connected with subversive activity and Gardaí relied on the fact 
that offences under the Malicious Damage Act 1861 were listed as schedule offences under the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939.  There was no other legislation that would permit them to 
question suspects other than the 1939 Act.  Damage had been caused to the murder victim’s 
watch and the Gardaí relied on that fact to use their statutory power under the 1939 Act.  The 
main crime was murder but the lesser offence of damage to the watch was connected to it.  
Judge Barr in the Central Criminal Court ruled against the Gardaí’s use of their power in this 
way.  The Supreme would later hold otherwise.  Once there was a bone fide intention on the 
part of the Gardaí to investigate the lesser malicious damage offence then they could 
legitimately use their power as they did in that particular case.  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1984 would now permit Gardaí to detain persons for non-subversive 
type crime for a total period of 12 hours.432  The Gardaí could also demand a name and address 
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and seek fingerprint and palmprints in addition to searching the prisoner.433  Other provisions 
allowed for inferences to be taken from a person’s silence in certain specific circumstances.434 
An accused person would now have to give notice of his alibi (if any) to Gardaí before trial435 
and certain proofs could be permitted in court simply by reading a statement into the court 
record with no appearance by the witness.  This power was limited and had to be agreed 
beforehand with the defence.436   The court could now accept a majority verdict of 10/2 and 
jurors no longer had to be unanimous in their decision.437  The electronic recording of 
questioning was also provided for although Gardaí didn’t equip stations for this purpose for 
years afterwards.  Another significant power is that Gardaí could now take fingerprints or 
palmprints of convicted persons438 in a wide set of circumstances. While these powers would 
be added to over the years they would form the bedrock of how Gardaí would investigate 
“crime ordinary” i.e. non-terrorist type crime.  Substantial resources at time would be allocated 
for the training of Gardaí in these new procedures. Week long courses took place which most 
likely would not happen in more recent times.  
 
The Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 broadens the definitions of cannabis and opium poppy439 while 
certain penalties are also strengthened under the Act.440  A certificate from the Forensic Science 
Laboratory confirming the exhibit is a controlled substance will be sufficient evidence to that 
effect, dispensing with the need of Laboratory personnel travelling all over the country to give 
evidence.441  Search warrant powers are strengthened442 and Garda power that flowed from 
same were increased.443  
 
The Control of Dogs Act 1986 empowered Gardaí to arrest persons who obstruct dog 
wardens444 and the Garda Síochána Complaints Act 1986 “provided a system of investigation 
and adjudication of complaints made by the public about the conduct of members of AGS.”  
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This legislation was the first of its kind in this jurisdiction.  Heretofore the Gardaí would 
investigate themselves but because of concerns of Garda misconduct in respect of persons in 
custody, the Act came about in tandem with the Criminal Justice Act 1984.   Its commencement 
was delayed for a number of years until this new complaint procedure was set up.  In addition, 
the Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Stations Regulations came into effect in 1987.  
These regulations clearly define the Gardaí’s duties and responsibilities in respect of an arrested 
person and both the new regulations and complaints procedures and a number of provisions of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1984 addressed what the O’Briain Report445 had recommended in the 
late 1970s. 
 
The Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act 1987 was 
legislation that gave effect to the European Convention on Terrorism done in Strasbourg on the 
27th January 1977.  The Act defines political offences and in particular what is not a political 
offence to disallow accused people from walking free from courts by simply arguing that their 
crimes were “political”.446   
 
The Data Protection Act 1988 would change things for everyone and not just those in the AGS.  
A duty of care will now be owed by the data controller and data processors who held 
information of persons on the I.T. systems.  The use of computers in AGS at the time was in 
its infancy but the advent of PULSE had massive ramifications for the organisation. The 
Gardaí’s later failure to manage their own PULSE system would later haunt and tarnish Gardaí 
of every rank.  
 
The Intoxicating Liquor Act 1988 made it an offence to sell alcohol to a person under 18 years 
of age447 or to provide alcohol to such a person.448  It would also be an offence for a person 
under 18 years of age to consume alcohol449.  The Gardaí would now have substantial Garda 
powers in respect of these matters to seize alcoholic drink, arrest and demand names and 
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addresses.450  The Act also provided for the issuing of Garda Age Cards.451  Night Club venues 
would come to rely on these cards to check if patrons were 18 years or over when endeavouring 
to gain admittance to such premises.  The legislation was in response to what was being 
highlighted in the 1983 Commissioner’s Report concerning young people being involved in 
crime and alcohol/substance abuse.452  From the point of view of Gardaí it would be legislation 
that was very fit for purpose and it is submitted that all the legislation highlighted here 
corroborates Garland’s public protection index. 
 
Summary – 1980-1989 
 
Paramilitary and non-paramilitary violence continued into the 1980s.  Three high profile 
kidnappings were carried out while seven Gardaí were killed in the course of duty.  Two RUC 
Officers were also murdered in Northern Ireland when returning from a meeting with their 
counterparts in AGS in Dundalk in the Republic of Ireland.  An off-duty Prison Officer was 
shot dead in Dublin and a member of the Defence Forces was shot and killed in a search 
operation in support of the AGS.  Recorded crime increased from 72,782 to 86,792 from 1980 
to 1989.  A civil servant was seriously injured because of his work for the State in confronting 
crime.  The AGS was controversial in how it dealt with prisoners and there were allegations of 
abuse and assault.  The illicit drug scene was becoming more prevalent and the use of 
computers was on the increase.  The government would respond inter alia with ten pieces of 
legislation as highlighted earlier in this section to address these issues and further empower 
AGS.  However, the empowerment on this occasion came with the caveat of other statute and 
regulation which for the first time codified how AGS dealt with prisoners and how it would be 
held to account when complaints would be made against members of the organisation. 
 
It is submitted that what is seen from the historical policing narrative and legislative changes 
in the 1970s and 1980s support an observation by Orange who states: 
 
Historically the police enjoyed powers that were no greater than the powers enjoyed by 
ordinary citizens.  As the duties of the police expanded the common law tended to 
gradually extend those powers to enable them to fulfil their duties so that the powers 
available to the police became greater than those available to others.453  
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Traditionally the Gardaí had wide common law powers of arrest for treason, felony and breach 
of the peace and they served Gardaí well.  Their common law powers were still in use in the 
1980s.  Orange goes on to state that “in the last forty years the range of powers available to 
Gardaí have dramatically increased by legislation.”454 We now see nascent evidence of this 
increase in powers throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  As will be seen, the trend will continue. 
As stated by Garland “the state’s impotence in the face of crime has become so well 
established”455 in recent decades.  It is submitted that the evidence presented so far in relation 
to this jurisdiction in the 1970s and 1980s are strong examples of what Garland states are 
“flourishing penal powers to send law breakers to their death or to impose life cancelling terms 
of imprisonment.”456 Garland compares these “flourishing penal powers” to Michael 
Foucault’s description “of the execution of Robert Damiens in 1757457 in graphic detail how 
harsh punishments have long been used to reaffirm the force of law and to reactivate the might 
of sovereign power.”  Some of the legislation highlighted in this chapter only increases Garda 
powers in minimal ways and of themselves might not seem significant but taken in total with 
the more substantive criminal legislation they are firm evidence of the state’s “flourishing penal 
powers”.  As will be seen, the State at the conclusion of the 1980s is not yet finished with the 
empowerment of Gardaí.  
 
Garland refers to the 1970s and 1980s as the “crisis decades”458  and notes “what capital 
markets give so also do they take away”.  As noted by Garland the “oil crisis of the 1970s 
ushered in a period of economic recession.”459  The “Troubles” in this country certainly created 
problems for the Gardaí but the solution to that was always going to be a political one and not 
a policing one and not all the problems over these two decades were created by paramilitaries.  
As noted by Williams: 
 
  Crime is about the gulf between the ‘haves and the have nots’.  The vast majority of our 
criminal population grew up in deprivation on the wrong side of the social and 
economic boundary wall, behind this wall there exists a sub culture where the norms of 
middle class mean little.460  
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It is contended that what Williams says ties with Garland’s assertion that: 
 
Politicians have tended to take the easy route here to opt for segregation and punishment 
rather than try to embed social controls, regulate economic life and develop policies 
that will enhance social inclusion and integration.  If late modern societies are to uphold 
the ideals of democracy … they will need to ensure that moral regulation and social 
control are extended to mainstream processes of economic decision making and market 
allocation.461 
 
It is submitted therefore that insofar as Ireland is concerned by the end of the 1980s Garland’s 




In this new decade AGS would continue to confront and face down armed violence and 
organised crime on a grand scale and the Government would support them by increasing their 
powers on a grand scale (see infra). In 1990 there was another shoot-out between Gardaí and 
raiders at the Bank of Ireland, Athy, Co. Kildare.  Gardaí confronted the raiders having received 
reliable intelligence.  One of the raiders was shot and killed by Gardaí while two raiders were 
injured.  Three Gardaí were also injured as well as two civilians and a bank official hostage 
was wounded by a Garda bullet.  In fact, the raiders didn’t fire any shots at all and Gardaí did 
all of the shooting.462  Another robbery in that year took place at the AIB Bank in Enniscorthy.  
When the alarm was raised the local Superintendent issued several uniformed Gardaí with 
firearms from the station firearm store.  It was something akin to a Sherriff in the times of 
America’s “Wild West” breaking open the firearms locker and arming his Deputies.  All gang 
members were apprehended, and one was wounded.  There were shots fired.  No medals for 
bravery would follow for Gardaí.  They had broken internal regulations relating to the use of 
firearms (i.e. uniform members carrying firearms).463 Two other raiders lost their lives in 
another shoot-out in the aftermath of a raid on the Bank of Ireland, Leixlip, Co. Kildare.  Gardaí 
would later establish that both men were on bail for previous crimes of violence.464  As noted 
by Brady: 
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The struggle against the I.R.A. and other illegal organisations had been the chief 
preoccupation through the 1970s and 1980s but by the early 1990s it was arguable that 
urban crime principally armed robbery and drugs was becoming almost as great a threat 
as subversion … gangland shootings were now common place and were taking a high 
toll of lives that the paramilitary community … the evidence was there in the rising 
number of persons engaged in the importation of drugs and the devastation being 
wrought by the drugs trade in working class communities.465 
 
The Commissioner’s Report in 1990 recorded 2,071 persons being charged with drugs offences 
with 16 AK47 rifles (a favourite with P.I.R.A.) and 4 heavy machine guns seized. 466 The 1991 
report would state that 3,088 persons were charged with drugs offences467 and this would 
increase again to 3,494 in 1992.468  Similarly in 1991 in excess of 161 grams of heroin were 
seized469 but in 1992 this increased to an amount in excess of 793 grams.470  In 1992 the State 
Solicitor for Cork City Barry Galvin went on the Late Late Show and indicated in his view the 
country was awash with drugs and people were building criminal empires from the proceeds.471 
The importation sale and supply of illicit drugs was now arguably out of control and Barry 
Galvin would later go on to lead the Criminal Assets Bureau in 1996 to dismantle these 
empires.   
 
In 1992 armed raiders escaped with more than £2 million in a raid in Lisduggan, Co. 
Waterford472 and the trend would continue to 1995 when an armed raid yielded nearly £3 
million at the Brinks Allied premises in Clonshaugh, Co. Dublin.473  The Downing Street 
Declaration was signed in 1993474 and in 1994 the P.I.R.A. would commence a ceasefire that 
would last a year and a half.475  Before announcing the ceasefire, they would be suspect for 
assassinating Martin Cahill (The General) outside his home.476  Michael Crinnion was shot 
dead outside the Clannad Bar in Cork City in 1995477 and an R.T.E camera crew were attacked 
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while covering his funeral.478 At the same time, a number of newsagents in Cork were 
threatened because they stocked and sold the Cork Examiner newspaper which had reported in 
detail on the murder and its investigation. The Gardaí arrested, charged and convicted persons 
for the attack on the camera crew and the intimidation of newsagents but the gunman who shot 
Crinnion remains at large.479  In the same year in the northside of Cork City the Gardaí would 
carry out digs for the bodies of Patrick “Patch” O’Driscoll, Kevin Ball and Cathal O’Brien. 
Gardaí believed they had been butchered and buried.480 The Gardaí narrowly missed locating 
O’Driscoll’s body at one site and the suspect returned afterwards to excavate the remains and 
secrete them elsewhere.481 Fred Flannery was later charged with the murder of O’Driscoll, but 
the case would collapse in controversial circumstances in the Central Criminal Court before 
Judge Robert Barr.482  The case contra Flannery was dismissed when the Court learned that 
one of the lead Garda investigators did not initially or earlier disclose material of relevance to 
the defence or indeed to the D.P.P.  The Court would say that the said material in the end had 
to be “dragged out” of the Gardaí. A subsequent investigation into the matter would clear 
investigating Gardaí of wrongdoing.483  The three leading Garda investigators in the case in the 
aftermath of the trial were unfairly referred to as “Keystone Cops” on the front page of the 
Cork’s Evening Echo.484 Fred Flannery would hang himself years later.485 Interestingly, one of 
the same lead investigators played a prominent lead role in the Willis murder investigation (the 
Quilligan case) which Judge Robert Barr presided over as trial Judge at the Central Criminal 
Court.  In the mid - 1990s money laundering was a concern as gangsters sought ways to 
legitimise their ill-gotten gains.  The Criminal Justice Act 1994 (infra) ensued and the Garda 
Fraud Squad was strengthened. 
 
Commissioner Culligan noted in 1996 that: 
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I do not share the widely promoted view that we live in an age of urban crisis and moral 
panic.  But the Gardaí must acknowledge that public perceptions and expectations of 
the force are influenced by this outlook.486 
 
The Garda Commissioner’s view of events at that time are at variance with public perception 
but the legislature’s vigour in empowering AGS continues. In 1996 Brendan O’Donnell a 
disturbed local man kidnapped and shot Imelda Riney and her three-year old son in Co. Clare.  
He also killed Fr. Joe Walsh.  Gardaí were strongly criticised at the time for not doing enough 
to prevent the tragedies.487  Detective Garda Gerry McCabe was shot dead during an armed 
raid as he escorted a Post Office van in Adare.  His colleague Detective Garda Ben O’Sullivan 
was also badly injured.488  Some weeks later a prominent journalist Veronica Guerin was 
ruthlessly executed in her vehicle at Newlands Cross in Dublin while stopped at traffic lights.489  
A huge public outcry would ensue and the Oireachtas would swiftly pass what many would 
consider to be draconian legislation in an effort to curb gangland activity.   
 
As the 1990s were coming to a close Brady succinctly notes the following: 
 
It is perhaps ironic that even as the final pieces were being put into place to bring the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement to completion the most serious failure of discipline and 
organisation since the 1920s was in gestation within the Garda Síochána.490 
 
Brady is referring here to Garda conduct and activity that would later be inquired into by the 
Morris Tribunal.491  The events considered by Morris would have commenced in or around the 
mid-1990s.  Brady succinctly states that: 
 
The Garda Síochána had played its role with effectiveness in holding the line for almost 
30 years against terrorism and subversion while politicians struggled to find a solution.  
Now with the prize of peace in sight it seemed that a cohort within the Gardaí had 
abandoned discipline and standards.492  
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In 1994 the Garda Commissioner would acknowledge that “it is impossible to set up a special 
squad of Gardaí for every problem arising”493 which may be indicative that Gardaí were feeling 
the pressure of holding the line on crime.  The same year heralded the Garda’s Domestic 
Violence Intervention Scheme to ensure that Gardaí were more pro-active when dealing with 
domestic violence matters.494 
 
The 1996 Commissioner’s Report advised on the establishment of the Criminal Assets 
Bureau495 and in 1997 the Commissioner’s Report highlighted Operation Dóchas which ran 
from October 1996 to 1997.496  The primary objective of the Operation was to make substantial 
inroads into the drugs problem in the city (i.e. Dublin).  The 1999 Report highlights the advent 
of Children First – National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of Children.497  In 1999 
Sergeant Andrew Callanan died after a man entered the public office at Tallaght Garda Station 
with an amount of petrol to torch the building.498   
 
Collectively the Commissioner Reports499 for the decade would record indictable crime as 
follows: 
Year No. of Indictable Offences Detection Rate 
1990 87,658 33.1% 
1991 94,406 33.5% 
1992 95,391 33.5% 
1993 98,979 35.7% 
1994 101,036 38.7% 
1995 102,484 37% 
1996 100,785 41% 
1997 90,875 43% 
1998 85,627 44% 
1999 81,274 42% 
     Table 2.3   Garda Statistics for Indictable Crime and Detection Rates from 1990 to 1999. 
In 1995 reported crime was the highest ever recorded but the figure reduced significantly by 
circa 20,000 in 1999.   Again, there are significant fluctuations.  In the mid-1990s the recorded 
crime rate peaked similar to the figure for 1983.   In 1983 the drugs abuse was taking hold 
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throughout the country and drugs gangs were beginning to emerge.  Up to 1995 the drug gangs 
had dominated the crime scene but a sharp decrease in crime can be noted in the aftermath of 
the killing of Detective Garda Gerry McCabe and the journalist Veronica Guerin.  It is 
contended that the legislative programme enacted in 1996 would no doubt have had a positive 





1. Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence) Act 1990 
2. Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990 
3. Criminal Justice Act 1990 
4. Larceny Act 1990 
5. Firearm and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 
6. Criminal Damage Act 1991 
7. Child Care Act 1991 
8. Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991 
9. Criminal Evidence Act 1992 
10. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 
11. Road Act 1993 
12. Criminal Justice Act 1994 
13. Road Traffic Act 1994 
14. Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 
15. Casual Trading Act 1998 
16. Criminal Law Incest Proceedings Act 1998 
17. Road Traffic act 1995 
18. Sex Offences Jurisdiction Act 1996 
19. Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 
20. Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 
21. Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 
22. Domestic Violence Act 1996 
23. Licencing (Combating Drug Abuse) Act 1997 
24. Prompt Payment of Accounts Act 1997 




26. Bail Act 1997 
27. Criminal Law Act 1997 
28. Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 
29. Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 
30. Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 
31. Immigration Act 1999 
32. Criminal Justice Act 1999 
 
Extension of Powers – 1990 to 1999 
 
It can be clearly seen in the 1990s that in response to what was happening on the crime scene 
for the period, the Oireachtas had massively increased and accelerated the volume of legislation 
being passed into law.  It is submitted that the Gardaí themselves could hardly keep abreast of 
the powers they were being given.  The Garda powers as highlighted below certainly could be 
regarded as a robust erosion of civil liberties and as Garland states “the assault on 
individualized treatment opened the floodgates for a period of change that has been with us 
ever since.”500  The speed of legislation and the increase of powers being given to the Gardaí 
would continue past the 1990s and well into the new century. 
 
The Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence) Act 1990 amended the law “to authorise the taking 
of bodily samples for forensic testing from persons suspected of certain criminal offences.”  
Inferences could be taken in particular cases if a person refused to provide such samples to 
Gardaí.501  The Criminal Law Rape Amendment Act 1990 created the new offence of 
Aggravated Sexual Assault,502  Digital Rape503  and Sexual Assault.504   It abolished the marital 
exemption for rape505 and facilitated alternative verdicts at court trials.506  All rape cases would 
now be heard in the Central Criminal Court.507  The Criminal Justice Act 1990  would abolish 
the death penalty.  A conviction for treason or murder would now lead to a prison sentence for 
                                               
500 D. Garland supra at note 2 at p.63. 
501 Section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence) Act 1990. 
502 Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
503 Section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
504 Section 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
505 Section 5 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
506 Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 





life.508   If convicted for the murder of a Garda or prison officer then at least 40 years of a life 
sentence would be served before consideration given for release.509  The Larceny Act 1990 
created a new offence for being in possession of an article in suspicious circumstances when 
not at home.510 It also created a new handling stolen property offence.511   It also provided for 
alternative verdicts at criminal trials.512  The Firearm and Offences Weapons Act 1990 widened 
the scope of the definition of firearms to include crossbows and stun-guns513 and created a new 
offence of reckless discharge of a firearm.514 Possession of knives or other articles with a 
blade515 would now become an offence as well as trespassing with a knife516 or producing an 
article capable of inflicting injury.517  The Gardaí had a strong power of arrest under the Act518 
and Gardaí could acquire a search warrant from a District Court Judge in specific cases519 and 
there was also a strong power to search persons without warrant if congregated in public and 
breach of the peace has, is or about to occur.  These were potent and useful powers to Gardaí 
on the street and are used regularly. 
 
The Criminal Damage Act 1991 repealed and modernised the antiquated Malicious Damage 
Act 1861.  Malicious damage would now be criminal damage.520  Gardaí would have to prove 
recklessness.  It created a new offence of a threat to commit damage521 and possessing anything 
with intent to damage property.522 It provided for compensation orders by the courts523 and 
gave the Gardaí a wide power of arrest for offences committed under the Act524 together with 
a facility to acquire a search warrant in the District Court in specific instances.525  It also created 
a new I.T. offence of unauthorised access of data.526  Similar to its predecessor (the Act of 
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1861) offences committed under the instant legislation would be a scheduled offence for the 
purposes of Section 30 Offences Against the State Act 1939.  Therefore, depending on the 
context of the case Gardaí could arrest and detain under the provisions of Section 4 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1984 or Section 30 Offences Against the State Act 1939. 
 
The Child Care Act 1991 gave Gardaí a substantial power to enter a house without warrant (if 
need be by force) to remove a child to safety if Gardaí believed there was a serious risk to the 
health of a child.527  The power for a long time appeared uncontroversial until Emily Logan the 
Ombudsman for Children second guessed the Gardaí’s use of the power in respect of a Roma 
child in 2013.528 The Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991   
empowered Gardaí to detain a child who is reasonably suspected to be removed from the state 
in contravention of certain orders. 
 
The Criminal Evidence Act 1992 would allow for the admissibility of documents in court as 
proof of facts contained in the document in certain circumstances.529  It permitted the giving of 
evidence by television link530 and via intermediary531 or from behind a screen in certain 
cases.532   There was also protection afforded against cross examination of a party by an accused 
person533 in specific circumstances.  A video recording could now be given as evidence at a 
trial.534 Spouses and former spouses were now compellable to give evidence contra the opposite 
spouse or former spouse535 and were also compellable to give evidence at the instance of the 
prosecution.536 The requirement for the corroboration for the unsworn evidence of a child was 
abolished. 
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The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993 abolished the offence of buggery between 
consenting adults537 but buggery with a person under 17 years would be an offence538  as would 
gross indecency with persons of that age group539 or with a mentally impaired person.540  
Soliciting for prostitution would now be an offence541 (S.7) and Gardaí would now have formal 
powers for something they were doing for years i.e. directing loiterers for prostitution to leave 
an area542 but now it would be an offence not to comply.  Pimping would now be an offence543 
and the Gardaí could now obtain a warrant in court to search a brothel.  Force could be used.  
The Act also gave Gardaí a power of arrest for offences committed in respect of same.544  
 
The Roads Act 1993 gave very strong powers to Gardaí to remove temporary dwellings on 
national roads or motorways.545 This would have ramifications for traveller families.  The 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 permitted the D.P.P. to appeal lenient sentences546 and for a court to 
make Compensation Orders in certain cases.547  The Criminal Justice Act 1994 was a serious 
potent piece of legislation aimed at the “recovery of the proceeds of drug trafficking and other 
offences.”  It created the offence “money laundering.”548  A court could now make confiscation 
orders in respect of drug trafficking offences549 and was allowed to assess the proceeds of drug 
trafficking.550  Furthermore the D.P.P. could seek a re-assessment if new evidence came to 
light.551  Substantial powers of seizure and detention of property were given to Gardaí and 
customs officers552 and the Act provided for the transfer of prisoners in the State to give 
evidence outside the State on the authority of the Minister for Justice553 and vice versa.554  
Search for material relevant to an investigation could now be permitted outside the State555 and 
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there was now power to apply to the District Court in a money laundering case to compel a 
person to hand over or grant access to material that would assist in an investigation.556  There 
are also robust powers provided for in respect of the interception and boarding of vessels at 
sea.557 
 
The Road Traffic Act 1994 reduced the drink driving blood/urine alcohol levels and allowed 
for breath testing for alcohol at stations.558  It also extended the Gardaí’s road side breath test 
powers.  If the Gardaí are not in possession of a breathalyser then a person could be asked to 
wait one hour at the scene until the apparatus is acquired.559  Gardaí could now seek blood/urine 
specimens in drink driving cases if people are in hospital after say a traffic accident and alcohol 
is suspected to be involved.560 Gardaí could now also detain persons for up to six hours if 
having been arrested for drink driving they were in no condition to be released from custody 
because of their drunken state.  The Gardaí could also now release such a person to the custody 
of a responsible adult.561  A driving licence must now be carried if driving a vehicle562 and 
disqualifications periods varied for first and second or subsequent offences.563  Gardaí could 
also use reasonable force to enter a premises to effect an arrest.564 
 
The Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 updated the area relating to drunkenness and 
disorderly behaviour and breach of the peace.  Drunkenness,565  Disorderly Behaviour566 and 
Breach of the Peace567 were now all defined.  Entering a building with intent to commit a crime 
would now also be an offence568 together with trespassing on a building for the purpose of 
causing fear.569   Riot,570 Violent Disorder571 and Affray572 were also defined as were blackmail, 
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extortion and demanding money with menaces.573   A separate offence was created for an 
assault with intent to commit bodily harm.  It would be an indictable offence.574  Obstruction 
or assaulting a peace officer575  was also an offence and in certain cases was indictable.  The 
Act also gave Gardaí power to do what they had been doing for years i.e. controlling access to 
events576  (e.g. the placing of barriers) and the surrender of alcohol or suspicious articles before 
passing these barriers.  If search was declined the person would not be allowed to proceed into 
the event.577  
 
The Casual Trading Act 1995 strengthened Garda powers of arrest, seizure and removal in 
casual trading cases while the Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1995 provided for the 
anonymity of the victim and accused persons under the legislation.  The Road Traffic Act 1995 
linked disqualification limits to blood/urine/breath alcohol levels.  The Sexual Offences 
(Jurisdiction) Act 1996 created the sexual offence to a child outside the state to be an offence 
within the state578 and transport of children for this purpose would also be an offence.579  Gardaí 
could obtain a search warrant in court in certain circumstances.580  
 
The Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 established the Criminal Assets Bureau (C.A.B.).  Its 
objectives were “to identify assets wherever situated deemed for criminal activity, to legally 
deprive people from benefitting from these assets and to investigate and follow-up on ill-gotten 
gains of criminals”.581  It would be an offence to obstruct582 or intimidate583 a Bureau Officer 
and search warrants could be obtained to search for and seize assets.  It would be a separate 
offence to assault a Bureau Officer584 and there was a power of arrest for obstructing or 
intimidating such an officer.585  In tandem with this legislation came the Proceeds of Crime Act 
1996 which empowered the High Court “as respect the proceeds of crime to make orders for 
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the preservation and where appropriate the disposal of property.”  The High Court could make 
an Interim Order to prohibit the disposal of suspected criminal assets on an ex parte basis on 
the application of a Bureau Officer.586   Follow-up interlocutory and disposal orders could later 
be made by the court.587   There was also a power to seize property (if being removed from the 
state) in contravention of a Court Order.588 
 
The Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 was a parallel piece of legislation with the 
previous two.  It permitted the arrest of person for committing a drug trafficking offence and 
subsequent detention for a period of six hours.  This could increase to a total of 7 days.589 The 
Licensing (Combating Drug Abuse) Act 1997 made “provision for measures to combat drug 
abuse in places used for public dancing, licensed premises and other places of entertainment.”  
Persons could now be disqualified from holding a dance licence if convicted of a drugs 
offence590 or have their dance licence revoked if convicted for such an offence.  The Prompt 
Payment of Accounts Act 1997 applied across the public sector and was enacted to ensure the 
prompt payment of business accounts by public sector organisations including AGS.591  
 
The Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 abolished the common law offences of 
assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment and replaced them with new offences i.e. 
assault,592 assault causing harm593  and assault causing serious harm.594   New offences like 
threat to kill595 and offences relating to tainted syringe attack596 were also created although 
these could be covered by what was set out in sections 3 & 4.  Fresh definitions for coercion597  
and harassment 598 were provided for.   New offences for demanding payment of debts so as to 
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cause alarm,599 poisoning600 and endangering someone’s life601 were created.  The Act also 
provided definition for the justifiable use of force602 and the justifiable use of force when 
making an arrest.603  It abolished the rule where teachers were immune from criminal liability 
in respect of physical chastisement of pupils604  and certificate from a doctor would be evidence 
of any facts contained therein.605  This provision would free up doctor’s time so that they would 
not have to be travelling to courts to give evidence. 
 
The Bail Act 1997 permitted the refusal of bail to a person charged with a serious offence if the 
court was satisfied that such refusal was reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of a 
further serious offence.606  The Gardaí would view this legislation as essential in keeping 
violent people incarcerated and to protect witnesses.  The Criminal Law Act 1997 abolished 
felonies and misdemeanours607 and in lieu defined an arrestable offence as one where a court 
on conviction or indictment could sentence an accused to at least 5 years imprisonment or 
more.608  The Gardaí were also given a very strong power of arrest for “an arrestable offence”609 
and the provisions of the major detention legislation could be invoked thereafter for the 
purposes of questioning.  Gardaí were also given a robust and wide power of entering a 
premises including a dwelling without warrant to effect an arrest for “arrestable offences” 610 
and anyone who aided, abetted or counsels or procures the commission of an arrestable offence 
in the State would be liable to be indicted and punished as if the original offender.611  The 
Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997 allowed a person detained under the 
provisions of Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 for a particular offence and if he/she 
was also suspected of another crime that person could be questioned for other offences as if 
initially detained for original offence.612 The detention period would remain the same.  In 
addition, formal evidence of arrest, charge and caution by Gardaí could now be given by 
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certificate.613 It would save overtime.  The Act also provided for a new search warrant that 
could be issued by District Court Judges on application by Gardaí when seeking evidence in 
respect of certain scheduled serious offences which included those of a serious sexual nature, 
false imprisonment or crime involving death or serious bodily injury.614  The Act also provides 
for the Gardaí to electronically record fingerprints and palmprints. 
 
The Offences Against the State Amendment Act 1998 permitted inferences to be drawn in court 
if a person was charged with being a member of an unlawful organisation declined or failed to 
answer certain questions when quizzed by the Gardaí.615 It would now also be an offence to 
direct an unlawful organisation616 and the period of detention allowed for under Section 30 of 
the Offences Against the State Act 1939 could be extended for a further 24 hours by the District 
Court on the application of at least a Superintendent in AGS.  This increased the detention 
period from 48 to 72 hours.617 A person could now be re-arrested for the same offence if 
previously arrested under Section 30 by order of a District Court Judge on the application of at 
least a Garda Superintendent.618  Under this Act penalties were strengthened for serious 
firearms offences.619  
 
The Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 “prohibits trafficking in the use of children 
for the purpose of sexual exploitation and the production and dissemination, handling or 
possession of child pornography.”  It is now an offence to traffic a child for the purposes of 
sexual exploitation620 or allow a child to be used for pornography621 or possessing child 
pornography622 or producing, distributing such material.623  The Act empowers Gardaí to 
acquire a search warrant from a District Judge when seeking evidence in relation to child 
pornography. 
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The Immigration Act 1999 permits the Minister to allow deportation of non-nationals624 and 
issue exclusionary orders.625   Gardaí are given powers of arrest in respect of particular breaches 
of the Act626 and a summary offence of obstructing Gardaí is created.627   There are also powers 
to take fingerprints of non-nationals if over 14 years of age in certain circumstances.   
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1999 created a mandatory sentence if convicted of possessing drugs 
in excess of £10,000 (later €13,000) or more.628  A Court is mandated to hand down a prison 
sentence of at least 10 years unless it would be unjust in all the circumstances to do so.  The 
Act provides that Court can take into account a plea of guilty in the case and how early that 
plea was indicated.  It must take into account the circumstance of a plea of guilty and to what 
extent the accused co-operated in the investigation.629  This would assist Garda intelligence in 
these types of cases. 
 
The Act also provides for witnesses who were subject to intimidation or in fear could give 
evidence by television link630 and it would now be an offence to make enquiries in respect of 
relocated witnesses in a trial.631  It would be a crime intimidate witnesses and jurors.632 The 
Gardaí could now formally arrest someone who was already incarcerated in prison and take 
them to a Garda station for questioning.633  Up to now if Gardaí wanted to question someone 
in prison they could not do so if the prisoner refused to meet them at the prison. 
 
Summary – 1990 - 1999 
 
There is a total of thirty-two pieces of legislation highlighted for the 1990s period.  Each one 
is a benchmark moment which highlighted transformation in how crime was committed and 
investigated in Ireland.   
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Coen states that: 
 
Many would argue in recent years that legislative developments in Ireland represents a 
move from due process model to a crime control model of criminal justice that is to say 
a move from the prosecutorial obstacle comes to one in which the repression of crime 
is the primary focus with maximum efficiency emphasised in the pursuit of pleas of 
guilty.634 
 
She is talking here in particular about the new mandatory sentences introduced under Section 
4 and 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999.  Conway would concur with that view when she 
states: “It seems clear that there has been a shift in the Irish criminal process model from its 
due process foundations towards a crime control orientation.”635 
 
This corroborates what Garland says and as highlighted at the start of this chapter that “the risk 
of unrestrained state authorities of arbitrary power and the violation of civil liberties seem no 
longer to feature so prominently in public concern.636  The legislators he says have become 
more “hands on” and “more directive”.  Politicians are more concerned to subject penal 
decision making to the discipline of party politics and short-term political calculation.637   
Garland states that crime control theories come “from a much darker vision of the human 
condition.  They assume individuals will be strongly attracted to the self-serving anti-social 
and criminal conduct unless inhibited from doing so by robust and effective controls.”638  
Retired Assistant Commissioner Tony Hickey who led the Veronica Guerin murder 
investigation recently said in a recent R.T.E. broadcast on the 2nd of August 2017 called 
“Veronica Guerin: A Legacy”, 
 
I came across a small number of people who are intrinsically evil … some social 
commentators blame depravation, poverty, lack of opportunity and education but you 
can’t get away from it that there are some people and they are just evil.639 
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It is submitted that most members of AGS would concur with the retired high-ranking 
colleague but in any event his view is consistent with what Garland says about control theory 
and its dark view of the human condition.  The former head of the CAB Chief Superintendent 
Felix McKenna stated in the same programme that the CAB caused “massive disruption” to 
organised crime but that the “disruption in itself” does not “dismantle the organisation.”  He 
advocated that certain criminals “needed to be convicted of major crime and sent to prison and 
kept there.”640  These are strong words of two highly respected and very experienced Gardaí.  
 
It is submitted that what has happened in Ireland in the 1990s is an apt and strong example of 
what Garland states: 
 
The 1980s and 1990s have seen a return to restraints, a retrofitting of controls, an 
attempt to put the lid back on a newly disordered world but despite these efforts the 
clocks have not been turned back.  There has been no return to a world in which all 
individuals are hemmed in by command controls of local belonging steady work and a 
tight family.641 
 
It is strongly contended that has thus far been presented in this chapter in compelling evidence 
of Garland’s theory being applicable to this jurisdiction. 
 
The Noughties 2000 to 2009 
 
As Brady noted AGS “were now operating in something close to ‘peace time’ conditions vis a 
vis the Provisional I.R.A.  There was no abatement of activity of the Dublin criminal 
underworld or among the Limerick criminal families.”642   Gangland crime continued to 
preoccupy AGS into the new century and the State empowerment of AGS would continue.  In 
addition, there would be further paring back of due process rules.  A night club manager Brian 
Fitzgerald was murdered in Limerick in 2002643.  Kieran Keane was murdered after being 
abducted in 2003.644  Eddie Ryan was also murdered in Limerick in 2000.645 All were gangland 
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members.  In 2005 Lusk Post Office was raided and two men were killed in a shoot-out with 
Gardaí.646  The State Solicitor for Limerick called for adjustment to a person’s right to silence.  
He believed intimidation was inhibiting Garda investigations and criminal prosecutions.647  In 
2006 there were 21 gangland murders.648  Michael McDowell the then Minister for Justice 
would introduce a hat-trick of potent legislation to stem the gangland violence. (see infra).  He 
famously said that a number of the gangland killings were “the last sting of a dying wasp.”649   
More Gardaí were to be recruited in 2006 and the age of retirement for some Gardaí was 
increased so that Garda numbers could be maximised.650  The witness protection programme 
was founded without a monetary ceiling and there was a staff increase at the Forensic Science 
Laboratory.651  These changes reflected a changed landscape, as noted by Brady: 
 
Confessions would no longer be secured by third degree.  Criminals had learned how 
to avoid leaving forensic traces at crime scenes.  Witnesses and jurors could be got at.  
Defence lawyers pounced on the slightest deviation from the rules by Gardaí.652 
 
 
Minister McDowell’s legislation aimed to address these matters, but he was concerned about 
their constitutionality.  He set-up a “Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group.”  The Review 
Group said that the “traditional fundamental features of the system are necessary and 
appropriate and would not want to see these elements changed.”653 
 
It is also acknowledged that the individual freedoms were not the monopoly of the defendant.  
Notwithstanding the view of the Review Group, McDowell’s legislation became the law of the 
land.  In 2007 two children were burned when they were in their parents’ car when it was 
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firebombed,654 and a rugby player Shane Geoghegan was murdered in 2008 when he was 
mistaken by his assassin for a Limerick gangland figure.655 
 
In 2009 Roy Collins who for a long time was under Garda protection was killed after the Garda 
protection was lifted.  A family member of his had given prosecution evidence in a previous 
Limerick gangland court case.656  The Minister for Justice Dermot Aherne would acknowledge 
clearly in the Dáil in 2009 that the Criminal Justice Surveillance Bill he was introducing was 
influenced in part by anti-racketeering legislation in America.657  In all over twenty-nine pieces 
of legislation passed through the Oireachtas further empowering the Gardaí.  It is submitted 
that all legislative activity evinces the Garland theory that “(t)here is a relaxing of concern 
about the civil liberties of suspects and the rights of prisoners and a new emphasis upon 
effective enforcement and control.”658  Meanwhile crime statistics659 fluctuated wildly.  
Whether the figures are grounded in an actual upsurge in crime or simply a matter of the manner 
Gardaí were getting to grips with recording data on PULSE in a matter is a matter perhaps for 
further or other study. 
 
Year No. of Indictable Offences Detection Rate 
2000 73,276 42% 
2001 86,633 41.1% 
2002 106,415 38.5% 
2003 103,360 35.9% 
2004 98,964 35% 
2005 101,659 35.9% 
 2006* 103,710 40% 
2007 104,946 41% 
2008 Total indictable crime no longer given in overall figures but broken down in 
separate headings e.g. 76 homicide offences. 
2009 As above e.g. 80 homicide offences. 
     Table 2.4   Garda Statistics for Indictable Crime and Detection Rates from 2000 to 2009. 
 
*Central Statistics Office (CSO) take over the compilation of crime statistics. 
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 2008 2009 
Homicide Offences 89 88 
Sex Offences 1,406 1,480 
Attempts/Threats to Kill etc.  19,150 18,353 
Robbery 2,299 2,491 
Offences Against Courts and Justice. Organised Crime.   13,255 11,898 




1. Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000. 
2. Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000. 
3. Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
4. Children’s Act 2001. 
5. Mental Health Act 2001. 
6. Sex Offenders Act 2001. 
7. Road Traffic Act 2002. 
8. Housing and (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2002. 
9. European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. 
10. Road Traffic Act 2003. 
11. Intoxicating Liquor Act 2003. 
12. Immigration Act 2003. 
13. Criminal Justice (Illicit Traffic by Sea) Act 2003. 
14. Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 2003. 
15. Road Traffic Act 2004. 
16. Intoxicating Liquor Act 2004. 
17. Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004. 
18. Immigration Act 2004. 
19. Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
20. Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. 
21. Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005. 
22. Road Traffic and Transport Act 2006. 
23. Road Traffic Act 2006. 
24. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. 
25. Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 




27. Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
28. Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009. 
29. Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009. 
 
Extension of Garda Powers - 2000 to 2009 
 
The Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 dealt with many copyright issues but made 
infringing copyright an arrestable offence.660  The Act would give assistance to the Gardaí 
when policing car booth sales throughout the country where boot-leg DVDs would be sold at 
stalls in breach of copyright.  Gardaí now had power to arrest persons and seize property.  In 
the same year the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000 would change prohibited hours661 and permit 
licensed premises to open for non- licensed business at any time.662  Legislation pertaining to 
theft was overhauled by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act in 2001 creating 
new offences for handling663 and possession of stolen property.664  It broadened the definition 
of theft and created offences of active corruption665 withholding information on stolen 
property666 and passive corruption.667  The offence of money laundering as set out in previous 
legislation (i.e. Section 31 Criminal Justice Act 1994) was updated.  It allowed for alternative 
verdicts in respect of certain offences668 and a robust warrant to search was provided for 
Gardaí.669  It would also be an offence to obstruct Gardaí when acting under a warrant. 
 
The Children’s Act 2001 codified the Garda Juvenile Diversion Programme while the Mental 
Health Act of the same year empowered Gardaí to take persons with a mental health disorders 
into custody in particular circumstances.670  The Sex Offenders Act 2001 was passed by law 
makers “in the interest of the common good the notification of information to AGS by persons 
who have committed certain sexual offences”.   Convicted sex offenders would now be required 
                                               
660 Section 140 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000. 
661 Section 3 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000.  
662 Section 4 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000. 
663 Section 17 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
664 Section 18 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
665 Section 43 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
666 Section 19 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
667 Section 44 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
668 Section 55 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
669 Section 48 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 





to notify Gardaí of their movements in particular circumstances671  and there would be penalties 
for non-compliance.672 Sex offenders would now have to notify employers if their work 
permitted “unsupervised access to or contact with a child”.673  A Garda Chief Superintendent 
in certain circumstances could apply for an Order from a court to have the movements of a sex 
offender delimited in certain circumstances.674  Mr. Brendan Howlin, the Labour Party 
spokesman on Justice at the time was critical of the legislation because it was “not accompanied 
by a comprehensive programme of treatment for all sex offenders.”675 
 
The Road Traffic Act 2002 was nascent legislation on penalty points for road traffic offences.  
Suspect offenders would no longer have to be brought to court if fines were paid in strict 
circumstances.  The Gardaí were to receive further substantial powers in 2002.  It would now 
be an offence to enter and occupy land without consent676 and there would be very potent 
powers of arrest for suspected breaches of the Act and strong power to remove and store 
property.  This legislation focused on the movement of members of the travelling community 
onto certain lands.  The European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 created an obligation to surrender 
persons to the judicial authority of another state in particular circumstances.677 A European 
Arrest Warrant could now be executed here.678  The Gardaí were empowered with an 
emergency power of arrest “in cases of urgency” i.e. warrant issued but not received by Gardaí 
and the suspect will flee the jurisdiction.679 The Garda Commissioner’s Report of the same year 
highlights the Schengen Agreement which provides “for closer E.U. wide police and custom 
co-operation in monitoring cross-border movement and tackling serious crime”.  Gardaí would 
now have direct access to “a database called the Schengen Information System.” 
 
The Road Traffic Act 2003 would now permit Gardaí to breathalyse anyone suspected of 
committing a road traffic offence or being involved in a traffic accident.680  Prior to this Gardaí 
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could only do so if a driver was suspect of having alcohol and/or drugs taken.  The Intoxicating 
Liquor Act of the same year would make it easier for the Gardaí to enforce laws in respect of 
drunkenness.  Drink could no longer be served to drunken persons.681 It would now be an 
offence to be drunk in licensed premises682 and the licensee now had a duty to preserve order 
on his premises.683 Disorderly conduct in licensed premises would be a separate offence684 and 
the law now provided for the temporary closure of a premises by court order685 in certain 
circumstances.  There would be a prohibition of entertainment during drinking up time686 and 
persons under 18 years of age could no longer be permitted in licensed premises.687  Persons 
between 18 years and 21 years would now have to produce evidence to that effect on demand 
by certain persons688 and the Gardaí had a strong power of entry to inspect such premises.689 
The law would allow Gardaí to rein in errant publicans whose commitment to keeping order 
on their premises was questionable. 
 
The Immigration Act 2003 strengthened Garda powers of entry and arrest in certain 
circumstances when enforcing the legislation and Gardaí could demand identification in certain 
circumstances.690  The Garda Commissioner’s Report of 2001 highlighted that 400 people were 
arrested on foot of deportation orders that year and 365 of them were actually deported.691 In 
2003 Gardaí were now empowered to board certain defined ships or vessels outside Irish 
territorial waters and bring such vessels to an Irish port and persons before the High Court.692 
This was for the purpose of detecting offences of illicit traffic at sea i.e. narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances.  The Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 empowered Gardaí to 
seek and courts to order areas of exclusion in respect of public order matters693  and in certain 
circumstances to order closure of certain premises under defined criteria. 
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The Road Traffic Act 2004 adjusted speed limits694 and permitted the electronic evidence of 
speed in court prosecutions.695 Garda powers to demand a driving licence were also 
extended.696 The Intoxicating Liquor Act 2004 amended a controversial section of the 2003 
legislation permitting persons under the age of 18 years of age to be in licenced premises in 
certain circumstances e.g. family get- togethers and 21st birthdays.697 
 
The Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004 permits under specific criteria for 
police officers of different police forces within the E.U. to form investigation teams for 
offences committed in the State with connections to other states.698   Outside police force 
members would be regarded as members of AGS.  Another Immigration Act was passed in 
2004 to make “provisions in the interest of the common good for the control of entry into the 
State, the duration and conditions of stay of non-nationals.  A register of non-nationals with 
permission to land was created699 and Gardaí were given a power of arrest700 and power to 
obtain a search warrant in certain circumstances.701 
 
The Garda Síochána Act 2005 had profound implications for accountability within AGS itself 
but insofar as protecting the public was concerned it provided for the installation of CCTV 
cameras in public places with the authorisation of the Garda Commissioner “for the primary 
purpose of securing public order.”  The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005   is a 
complex piece of legislation “to enable the State to meet commitments undertaken as part of 
the international community to amend the Offences Against the State Act 1939 to 1998 and the 
European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.  Definitions for “terrorist group”702 and “terrorist 
activity”703 are set out.  New offences for hostage taking,704  terrorist bombing,705  financing 
terrorism706 are created.  The Gardaí were now empowered to seek interlocutory orders in the 
                                               
694 Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 2004. 
695 Section 15 of the Road Traffic Act 2004. 
696 Section 33 of the Road Traffic Act 2004. 
697 Section 1 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act 2004. 
698 Section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004. 
699 Section 9 of the Immigration Act 2004. 
700 Section 13 of the Immigration Act 2004. 
701 Section 15 of the Immigration Act 2004. 
702 Section 5 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005.  
703 Section 6 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. 
704 Section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. 
705 Section 10 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. 





High Court to freeze funds.707  Previous drug trafficking legislation was amended to include 
“financing terrorism.”  It amended the Section 31 Extradition Act 1965 by broadening the 
definition of what is not a political offence.708  
 
Also, in the same year the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005 was enacted “to make 
further provision in relation to the recovering of and disposal of proceeds of crime and for that 
purpose amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 and the 
Criminal Justice Act 1994.  The full header of this legislation is set out to demonstrate that 
legislation for the period was being enacted, changed, adjusted and repealed in a prompt and 
piecemeal fashion.  It will be submitted later that the Gardaí found it difficult to keep up with 
the pace of change to their legislative powers. 
 
The Road Traffic Act 2006 created the offence of driving while holding a mobile phone709  and 
allowed for Mandatory Alcohol Checkpoints710 where on the orders of at least a Garda 
inspector Gardaí could randomly breathalyse people who were suspect of committing any 
offences or not.  For the first time it would be a specific offence to drive while disqualified 
from doing so711 and Gardaí could now also seize and detain a vehicle if it had no insurance, 
tax or certificate of roadworthiness (i.e. NCT cert.).712   The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) 
Act 2006 provided for the defence of “honest belief” in respect of the actual age of a victim in 
sexual offence cases with persons under 15 years of age713 and 17 years of age.714  The Criminal 
Law (Insanity) Act 2006 it set out the procedure for “the trial and detention of persons suffering 
from mental disorders who are charged with offences or found not guilty by reason of insanity.” 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2006 was the most substantive legislation enacted in that year about 
the extension of Garda powers.  It was codified that Gardaí could now designate crime 
scenes.715  Again, Gardaí were doing this for years without statutory back up.  What was known 
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to Gardaí as the “Section 10 warrant” under 1997 legislation716 was now extended and 
strengthened.717  Garda powers to secure and retain evidence were extended718  while detention 
periods were further elongated under previous legislation719.  A Sergeant could now direct the 
taking of photographs of a detained person for identification purposes720 and witness statements 
in certain circumstances could now be used in evidence if the witness declined or refused to 
give evidence at trial.721  This was in response to Limerick’s Liam Keane who had been on trial 
for murder when he gave a defiant “fingered salute” to a cameraman outside the Court.722 A 
witness in his case notwithstanding having made a statement to Gardaí would not give evidence 
in Court consistent with his statement.  The murder trial collapsed.   In addition, the D.P.P. 
could now reference a question of law for the attention of the Supreme Court.723  It was Part 7 
of the Act that related to Organised Crime.  Conspiracy to commit crime would be redefined724 
while the commission of an offence for a criminal organisation would be a separate crime.  
Monetary figures were put on what would be considered a drug trafficking offence725 and the 
D.P.P. would not now have to prove that an accused knew that substance(s) being trafficked 
were actually illicit drugs.726 It would also now be a separate offence of supplying drugs into 
places of detention.727   The Act also provided for the of post release from prison supervision728 
and restriction of movement orders729  by the courts in certain circumstances.  The electronic 
monitoring of persons was also provided for.730   The legislation was also the advent of the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders.731  
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There is follow up and complimentary legislation in the Criminal Justice Act 2007.  Certain 
statements in writing would now have to be submitted by bail applicants unless waived by the 
D.P.P.732  A Chief Superintendent’s evidence of his/her belief that a person would commit 
further serious crime if released on bail would now be given substantial weight by court.733   
Inferences that could be drawn by a court in certain circumstances were strengthened734 and in 
addition a negative inference could be drawn where an accused fails to mention particular facts 
that he subsequently relies on his defence.735  Minimum terms of imprisonment were set for 
particular firearms offences736 and a new set of fingerprints or photographs or palmprints could 
be taken by Gardaí on a second occasion if the first set were lost or damaged.737 
 
The Intoxicating Liquor Act 2008 makes it an offence to send a young person (at 15 years but 
under 18 years of age) to licensed premises to purchase alcoholic drink.738 The Criminal Law 
(Human Trafficking) Act 2008 makes it an offence under the Act, an arrestable offence, and a 
scheduled offence for the purposes of bail.739 
 
Surveillance was codified in 2009 and could be authorised by a Judge or a Garda superior 
officer in specified circumstances.740  An application could be made in the District Court on an 
ex-parte basis and in camera.741   A Garda superior officer could authorise surveillance limited 
to a 72-hour period742 and the legislation also provided for the installation of tracking devices 
on a high ranking officer’s authorisation in defined circumstances.743 The Criminal Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 had an international policing perspective.  It allowed for 
“alerts” to issue for European Arrest Warrant purposes.744   Gardaí would now have a power 
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of arrest for persons subject to these “alerts”745 and would have powers to fingerprint, palmprint 
and photograph people arrested under this legislation.746  
 
Also, in 2009747 several amendments were made to the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  It would 
now be an offence to direct a criminal organisation748 or to participate or contribute in organised 
criminal activities.749  It would also be an aggravating factor in terms of sentencing if a serious 
offence was committed for the benefit of a criminal organisation.750  Inferences from silence 
were also strengthened.751 Organised crime type offences could be heard in the Special 
Criminal Court.752 The header of the Act stated that the legislation would provide “for 
additional measures to combat organised crime.” 
 
Summary – 2000 - 2009 
 
A total of 29 pieces of legislation have been highlighted in this part for the ten-year period 
2000 to 2009.  Singularly and collectively they gave substantial further empowerment to AGS.  
It was becoming more difficult to secure solid convictions in court against gangland members 
for their crimes. The traditional pillars of a prosecution case such as witness, forensic and 
confession evidence were harder to come by.  Witnesses were fearful of coming forward, and 
criminals were more experienced in dealing with Gardai.  Recorded crime went from 73,276 
in 2000 to 104,946 in 2007.  This was the highest recorded crime figure ever.   The reported 
crime for 2000 was almost similar to that of 1980 which stood at 72,782.  In 2006 the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) took over the compilation of crime figures and changed the manner in 
which they were set out.  The enacted legislation for the decade covered a plethora of criminal 
activity ranging from theft and sexual crime to immigration, extradition and organised crime 
matters.  It is submitted that the legislative and Garda history for the period support Garland’s 
thesis. 
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Kilcommins states that: 
 
Ireland’s criminal justice system is showing some signs of drift in the direction of an 
‘assembly line’ model of justice in which the state – individual balance is increasingly 
tipped in favour of the former.753 
 
It is contended that this is correct and that what has been outlined so far in this chapter is 
convincing evidence of the legal “tooling up of the Irish State”754 to tackle serious crime.  
“Judicial territory is being ceded to the police”755 by a “hyper active legislature”756 and as noted 
by Garland “politicians are more concerned to subject penal decision making to the discipline 
of party politics and short-term political calculation”.757  Conway et al would concur when they 
state that: 
 
 “statutes altering aspects of the criminal process have seemed to come hot on one 
another’s heels particularly in the past fifteen years … substantive reforms to the 
investigation, prosecution and sentencing for serious crimes … forced new concepts on 
the criminal process and have replaced old rules.” 758 
 
They go on to state that all this activity “raises concerns about the protections of important 
individual rights of the citizens of the state”759 and like Garland and Kilcommins they conclude 
that “it seems clear that there has been a shift in the Irish criminal process from its due process 
foundations towards a crime control orientation.”760 
 
It is submitted that never has there been a time when the Gardaí have not sought more powers, 
nor have they ever stated they had enough powers. It is contended that they do not do this 
because they want to be the ‘bad guys’ and in fact Gardaí are very sensitive to being portrayed 
in that way. This is evidenced from Commissioner McLaughlin’s remarks cited earlier in this 
chapter. Walsh explains that: 
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  “the Garda Síochána’s preoccupation with crime control is reflected by the fact that a 
substantial portion of the of the Garda Síochána Code is devoted to the prevention and 
detection of crime and related matters. This is further supplemented by more details in 
the “Crime Reporting and Recording Systems Manual”. The Crime Investigation 
Techniques Manual and the Charging and Summons Application Manual.”761 
 
It can be said that these materials have been revised and updated since Walsh wrote about them, 
but it is submitted that these themes still exist and remain valid insofar as the Garda PULSE 
system is concerned. Walsh concludes that they are proof that “the principal function of all 
(Garda) members is to prevent and detect crime and offences.  Garland argues that the crime 
control model assumes a darker view of the human condition.762  It is submitted that any fresh-
faced idealism or “sacred cows” that a young Garda has when he or she first passes the 
threshold of the Garda College are soon dismantled or “slaughtered” after a few years front 
line policing experience.763  In the end it is being strongly contended that Garland’s theory 
holds true for the first decade in the new century.  
 
2010 to 2017 
 
The second decade of this century thus far shows no sign of a deceleration in legislative activity 
in the further empowerment of Gardaí.  While the terrorist threat may have receded, there 
remains the menace of organised crime and dissident republicanism. Gangland murder 
continues.  In addition, Gardaí are having to investigate cyber-crime.  In 2013 Detective Garda 
Adrian Donoghue was assassinated while escorting money.764  The last such assassination was 
that of Detective Garda Jerry McCabe in 1996.  Detective McCabe was also escorting money 
at the time he was killed.  By 2013 the “virtually all” gang leaders who had been creating 
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difficulties in Limerick were all “behind bars”.765  In 2010 CAB would collect €4 million in 
tax in respect of income from criminal activity766 and GoSafe speed cameras were introduced 
throughout the country.767  A total of 1,241 persons were risk assessed by Gardaí under the Sex 
Offenders Act 2001768 and 1,117 persons were recorded and subject to the legislation.769  There 
were 79 homicides offences for the year.770  The following years would see the rate drop to 63 
homicide offences771 and Charlie Taylor in the Irish Times would report “a big rise in speeding 
arrests as cameras deployed.”  He reported that there had been a six-fold increase in the number 
of people arrested for speeding over the St. Patrick’s Day period.772  In 2013 the Forensic 
Science Laboratory reported the total value of drugs forwarded to them amounted to 
€64,872,695. 773  There were 157 grow houses detected.774  In the same year the Criminal Assets 
Bureau and the Garda Bureau of Fraud investigation served 639 production and freezing orders 
in respect of criminal assets775 and 27 tax assessments were raised by the CAB.776  They would 
issue 847 Adult Behaviour Warnings.777  James Smith would report in the Irish Times in 2011 
the Gardaí arrested 177 persons under new so called “anti-begging” legislation.778  The Gardaí 
now had power to move beggars on from shop fronts and bank machines.779  The Irish Times 
would report that new laws would “take effect to help Gardaí tackle white collar crime.”780  In 
addition in 2013 the Gardaí had to increase Vetting Unit staff to comply with the Garda 
obligations under the National Vetting Bureau (Children and Vulnerable Person) Act 2012.781   
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In 2014  €358 million in cocaine was seized off the coast of Cork (Operation Valsa)782 and 
there were a number of other similar successful operations concerning international drug 
trafficking carried out by Gardaí in assisting their counterparts abroad.783  The Gardaí were 
now handling 323,032 vetting applications a year784 and invoked their authority under Section 
12 of the Child Care Act 1991 in a total of 1,345 incidents.785  Garda successes in detecting 
drug trafficking offences continued in 2015 with 204 persons arrested for such offences786 and 
€46.7 seized in controlled drugs.787  On 11th October, 2015 Garda Anthony Golden was 
murdered in Omeath, Co. Louth when attending a domestic dispute.788  The Commissioner’s 
Report would declare that 88 members of AGS at that point had lost their lives in the line of 
duty.789 A total of 16 people were charged with I.R.A. membership790 and 2 with assisting an 
unlawful organisation.791  Crime statistics for the period are as set out hereunder under selected 
headings.792 In 2016 David Byrne was shot and killed “when four men opened fire at a boxing 
weigh-in that was open to the public” at the Regency Hotel in Dublin.  Byrne was reported to 
be a “member of an Irish led crime cartel based in southern Spain.” Two of the raiders were 
described as wearing Garda style type uniforms and were in possession of automatic weapons 
while the other two were said to have handguns.  The Taoiseach Enda Kenny would describe 
the event as an “extreme case of criminal activity … and that it was the work of rival gangs in 
the Dublin area.” 793  In the same year, Aiden O’Driscoll who was reported to be the former 
Chief of Staff of the Real I.R.A. was murdered after being shot three times by what appeared 
to be two gunmen in Cork City.  O’Driscoll was also believed to be a victim of a punishment 
by dissident republicans in 2013794.  In October 2018 two men were charged in respect of the 
murder.795  In 2017 Garda only seizures of illicit drugs amounted to €71,859,695.796 
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 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Homicide Offences 89 66 79 83 80 63 71 
Sex Offences 2,366 2,014 2,116 2,009 2,053 2,348 2,549 
Attempts & Threats to Murder, 
Harassment, & Related Offences 
   17,703 17,062 15,710 14,502 15,164 16,976 16,360 
Robbery 3,196 2,931 2,817 2,806 2,647 2,577 2,096 
Offences Against Government, 
Justice & Organised Crime 
11,396 10,172 9,445 9,187 9,765 11,438 11,688 





1. Road Traffic Act 2010. 
2. Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
3. Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010. 
4. Criminal Justice (Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing) Act 2010. 
5. Criminal Law (Defence of Dwelling) Act 2011. 
6. Road Traffic Act 2011. 
7. Road Traffic (No. 2) Act 2011. 
8. Criminal Justice Act 2011. 
9. Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 2011. 
10. The Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012. 
11. Criminal Justice (Withholding of Information on Offences Against Children and 
Vulnerable Persons) Act 2012. 
12. Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013. 
13. Criminal Justice Act 2013. 
14 Protection of Children’s Health (Tobacco Smoke in Mechanically Propelled Vehicles) 
Act 2014. 
15. Road Traffic Act 2014. 
16. Road Traffic (No. 2) Act 2014. 
17. Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Data Based System) Act 2014. 
18. Criminal Justice (Burglary of Dwellings) Act 2015. 
19. Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015. 
20. Children First Act 2015. 




22. Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act 2016. 
23. Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2016. 
24. Criminal Justice Act 2017. 
25. Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information Systems) Act 2017. 
26. Criminal Justice (Suspended Sentences of Imprisonment) Act 2017. 
27. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017. 
 
Extension of Powers - 2010 to 2017 
 
In 2010 blood alcohol levels in drink driving cases were further revised downwards797 and 
Gardaí were empowered to enter the curtilage of a dwelling to make an arrest.  Reasonable 
force could be used.798   The Gardaí could perform impairment tests on suspected drink drivers 
on the side of the road799 and demand blood/urine specimens in hospital800 and could still detain 
drunken drivers for safety reasons for up to six hours.801  In 2010 the exceptions to the double 
jeopardy rule were codified and evidence in court by a child or person with a mental disorder 
could now be given by TV link.802  The D.P.P. could now seek a retrial in cases where “new 
and compelling evidence” came to light803 or where a person acquitted becomes tainted.804  In 
the same year it would become an offence to sell or supply psychoactive substances805 and 
Gardaí received ancillary powers to enforce legislation with an extended power to search 
without warrant.806   The law provided for warrants to be acquired by Gardaí from the court in 
respect of dwellings.  Money laundering would now be an offence if it occurred within or 
outside the state807 and  not reporting suspicions of financial transactions would now be an 
offence.808  Money laundering type offences would now be offences under the drug trafficking 
legislation and theft legislation which both gave massive powers to Gardaí of arrest, 
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questioning and detention.809 Justifiable use of force in defence on a dwelling was defined in 
2011 and a person would not be liable in tort if reasonable force was used in defence of a 
dwelling.810  
 
Preliminary breath test powers were widened in the Road Traffic Act 2011 and Garda powers 
of arrest were further strengthened in the Road Traffic (No. 2) Act 2011.811 It was now on the 
statute books in the same year to provide detention periods in questioning to be suspended on 
not more than two occasions but not exceeding 4 months from the period of the first 
suspension.812 New anti-begging laws permitted Gardaí to move beggars on from shop fronts 
and bank machines with ancillary Garda powers of arrest.813 The following year would see the 
creation of offences in respect of the withholding of certain information in respect of children 
and vulnerable adults.814 The penalties for these crimes would make them arrestable offences 
with ancillary and supporting periods of detention.   
 
Historically Garda Chief Superintendents could issue warrants under Section 29 of the Offences 
Against the State Act 1939 to members of Sergeant rank to search for evidence pertaining to 
offences under that legislation.  In 2006, Morris was concerned that a local Chief 
Superintendent may not have the “measure of objectivity”815 necessary to independently 
exercise his reason.  In such cases he may give “greater weight to the needs of the Garda 
investigation … than to the right of the citizen under Article 46.5 of the Constitution and Article 
8 of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the protection of a residence.”816   
 
In Damache v. D.P.P. in 2012 the Supreme Court struck down the Section 29 warrant because 
it was not issued by an independent person.817  This led to the Criminal Justice (Search 
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      Relating to Same. (Dublin: The Stationery Office, 2006) at para. 6.20 at p.268. [hereinafter Morris]. 
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Warrants) Act 2012 which reintroduced the Section 29 warrant only on this occasion it had to 
be issued by a Judge of the District Court.  It allowed for a Superintendent to issue such a 
warrant in emergency circumstances but reduced its period of validity in those cases from seven 
to two days. 
 
In 2009 the Law Reform Commission acknowledged that a “small number of Acts enable a 
Peace Commissioner to issue search warrants”818 but that it was “notable” that a 1990 Act “was 
the most recent Act where power to grant a search warrant is afforded to a Peace 
Commissioner.”  This Commission suggested that this “may indicate an unwillingness by the 
Oireachtas to extend the role of Peace Commissioners in the issuing of warrants.”819  The 
Commission goes on to suggest that “some of this reluctance may have arisen from a number 
of cases where warrants issued by Peace Commissioners were challenged in respect of their 
constitutional validity.”820  In 1990 in People (D.P.P.) v. Kenny821 the Supreme Court was 
asked to determine whether the forced entry into a person’s home by the Gardaí on foot of an 
invalid search warrant (which had been issued by a Peace Commissioner) was deliberate and 
conscious violation of an individual’s constitutional rights.  If that was held to be the case was 
the evidence obtained by Gardaí inadmissible contra the accused. Finlay C.J. gave a Judgment 
for the majority on that occasion.  He held: 
 
 To exclude only evidence by a person who knows or ought reasonably to know that he 
is invading a constitutional right is to impose a negative deterrent … To apply on the 
other hand the absolute protection rule of exclusion whilst providing also the negative 
deterrent incorporates as well a positive encouragement to those in authority over the 
crime prevention and detection services of the State to consider in detail the personal 
rights of citizens as set out in the Constitution and the effect of their powers of arrest, 
detention, search and questioning in relation to such rights.822 [emphasis added] 
 
The words of Finlay C.J. in the Irish Supreme Court are clear.  They appeared at least to be an 
erosion of trust in AGS.  Especially so when this decision is compared to the decision in 1965 
                                               
818 S.106 of the Road Traffic Act 1961; S.26 Misuse of Drugs Act 1977; S.26 Control of Dogs Act 1986; S.3 
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     Video Recording Act 1989; S.15 Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990.   
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in the case People (Attorney General) v. O’Brien823 where a search warrant issued by a Peace 
Commissioner was flawed but held to be constitutionally valid notwithstanding errors in its 
issue.  As noted by the Law Reform Commission, the Oireachtas did not enact any fresh 
legislation giving fresh powers to Peace Commissioners since 1990.  The Kenny824 decision 
was handed down by the Supreme Court in that year.  It is arguable that the Oireachtas will in 
future adopt the view as cited by O’Malley that warrants “should always be issued by a 
Judge.”825  In fairness to AGS it is asserted that its members would always prefer to seek out a 
Judge to issue a warrant.  However, as things stand it remains difficult to acquire the services 
of a District Court Clerk and a Judge out of hours at short notice.  Coonan and O’Toole826 
highlight the case People (D.P.P.) v. Mallon827 and a Judgment by O’Donnell J. in 2011 and 
state, “it is now clear that a mere error will not invalidate a warrant especially one which is not 
calculated to mislead or perhaps just as importantly does not mislead.”828  However up to 2015 
the Kenny decision remained the overarching precedent in these matters.  In that year 
O’Donnell J.in a majority decision in the Supreme Court would dilute the Kenny decision.  He 
said, “… where cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not admitted on the basis 
of a trivial technical breach the administration of justice far from being served may be brought 
into disrepute.”829  The Kenny decision in 1990 arguably “flew in the face” of Garland’s theory 
but the O’Donnell judgment in J.C830 now does a volte face on the decision in Kenny.  Garland’s 
theory continues to hold true notwithstanding the criticism of Morris in 2006 in respect of the 
Section 29 warrant did not fully remove that particular power away from the Gardaí but did 
revise it to ensure that there was an element of objectivity by the senior Garda officer who 
would apply for the warrant.   
 
In 2013 the definitions of “exploitation”, and “pornography” were widened and if committed 
by an official would lead to a stronger sentence on conviction.831 Earlier money laundering 
legislation was amended in 2013.  The definition of money laundering is widened, and mobile 
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communication systems could be stood down by the Minister for Justice in certain 
circumstances.832 
 
In 2014 smoking in a vehicle with a child present would be an offence and Gardaí could 
demand names and addresses and issue a FCPS notice to the offender.833  There were further 
amendments to road traffic legislation834 and Gardaí could now take blood in certain cases from 
an unconscious driver.835  It would also now be permitted to take bodily samples in the course 
of investigations836 and have details recorded on a Garda DNA database system which 
generated DNA profiles. A power of arrest was afforded of a person where there was a “match” 
on the DNA database.837  
 
In 2015 it would now be more difficult to get bail if before the court on a burglary offence838 
and a consecutive sentence would follow if on conviction it was shown that a person was 
convicted for burglary within the past 5 years.839 Public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence and recruitment and training for terrorism840 would now be criminal offences and also 
in 2015 a member of AGS would be a “mandated person” with obligations to report wrong-
doing (in respect of suspect offences perpetrated on children) to the Child and Family 
Agency.841  The best interest of the child was now to be of “paramount” consideration.842 
 
In 2016 drugs driving was made a criminal offence843 and Gardaí were given the power to 
demand fluid specimen from a person’s mouth when investigating a drug driving offence.844 
The Minister ordered that further substances be deemed to be controlled substances for the 
                                               
832 Section 19, Section 20 and Section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2013. 
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purpose of anti-drug legislation.845  CAB powers were strengthened in the seizure and detention 
of property.846  
 
In 2017 the detention for a period of up to six hours of persons arrested for breach of the peace 
type of offences (for their own safety) was provided for.847 Courts were given the power to 
direct an accused to keep away from certain people while on bail or limit their access to motor 
vehicles.848  There was power of arrest for Gardaí where an accused would breach his/her bail 
in certain circumstances.849  The court was vested with the power to hear complaint evidence 
in particular circumstances850 and was obliged to give reasons to grant or refuse bail.851   
Historically courts were doing these things anyway but they were now codified in statute.  It is 
expected that the power of arrest for breach of bail offences would be very helpful.  Heretofore 
Gardaí would have to acquire a warrant from a District Court Judge before such an arrest could 
be made. 
 
Accessing information on computer without lawful authority was made an offence852 as was 
interfering with information systems without the said authority.853  On the application of the 
Gardaí the court could grant a search warrant when evidence was being sought in relation to 
the commission of these type of offences.854  In addition, suspended sentences could in future 
be invoked if a convicted person is convicted again within the period of the first suspension.855  
 
Summary – 2010 -2017 
 
AGS continued its purge against gangland crime and increased its visibility on Irish roads in 
an effort to protect life.  The government continued to strengthen legislation in respect of 
organised crime and road traffic matters.  Homicides offences reduced from 89 in 2010 to 71 
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in 2016 while the incidents of robbery were also down.  Offences against government, justice 
and organised crime increased from 2010 from 11,396 to 11,688 in 2017.  AGS aided and 
abetted by government legislative support was making a positive impact on gangland crime.   
Much as in previous decades, legislative vigour in dealing with criminal matters continues.  
Legislation in certain cases is being amended and adjusted over and over again. The almost 
incessant morphing of the road traffic legislation has been more than problematic for the Gardaí 
and has seen the organisation scandalised in respect of fixed charge penalty matters as the 
Gardaí were unable to keep up with complex statutory changes.856The second decade of the 
new century is not yet complete and potent legislation continues to emanate from the 
Oireachtas encapsulating all areas of criminal law.  It is clear that what has happened in these 
most recent years (as in the previous decades covered in this chapter) are excellent examples 
of what Garland says are “dramatic developments that have occurred in our social response to 
crime during the last thirty years and about the social culture and political codes that gave rise 





This chapter has reviewed more than one hundred pieces of criminal legislation over just short 
of a fifty-year period and given a snap shot of the Irish policing history that grounded them.   
Over five decades, Gardaí received many of the powers that they have sought.  So much so that 
in the end it could be said that they failed to keep up with the velocity of change in respect of 
their own empowerment.  Internal continuous professional development within the Gardaí has 
failed to keep up with that change.  To instruct, train and update members of the organisation 
with advancements of their power is a substantial task that has not been met by the 
organisation’s management.858  AGS is scandalised in part because of this failure.   Continuous 
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Professional Development training sessions (C.P.D.) are now short and very much abridged.  
Members receive little or no handouts or explanations on their new powers – only what’s shown 
in class or on overhead projectors.  Management need to keep their respective policing shows 
on the road.  There is insufficient time, inadequate resources to be sending members on week 
long or lengthy training courses.  The internal Garda website is used to post new legislation 
and the membership is more or less expected to study it up for themselves. As noted by the 
Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland in 2018 in their examination AGS and policing 
in Ireland: “An Garda Síochána however has not treated training as a critical function … but a 
disposable one when a choice had to be made”859 regarding resources. 
 
Rebecca Coen, a barrister who acts for the D.P.P. has described Garda power in legislation as 
“unwieldly”860 and she adds that: 
 
The practice of continuing amendment section by section by deletion and substitution 
complicates rather than clarifies and there are a number of consequences – citizens 
cannot have any degree of certainty as to the law and as to their rights interacting with 
the Gardaí … from the perspective of the Gardaí it makes training difficult, it provides 
more scope for errors and complicates matters such as detention periods and search 
procedures.861 
 
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Claire Loftus, herself notes that: 
 
The increase in Garda powers has not been matched by a streamlining or simplification 
of their application.  The current fragmented state of the law constitutes a daily 
challenge to investigators.862 
 
In the last thirty years legislation has been amended numerous times.  Sometimes amendment 
came in the same year as the parent legislation or indeed in the same year as previous amended 
legislation and while Gardaí may have received their wish list in respect of powers, they 
struggle to keep up with their complexity.  As noted by Coen: 
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As policing has become increasingly sophisticated and professionalised layer upon 
layer of law has been introduced which legislatives changes are piecemeal rather than 
by consolidation.  Important legal principles are teased out case by case while the 
Constitution and human rights instruments provide the backdrop.  The result is a 
patchwork quilt of powers neither easily identifiable nor readily accessible.863 
 
It is submitted that Garland’s theory is strongly evidenced in what occurred in AGS over the 
last fifty years in terms of policing history, legislation and the public’s willingness to seek more 
and more protection by the state rather than from the state and that trend continues unabated.  
As stated by Garland in 2001 “The new culture of crime control born of the fears and anxieties 
of the late twentieth century could well continue long after its originating conditions have 
ceased to exist.”864  
 
Garland’s theory it is submitted has and will remain relevant to AGS for some time to come.  
Until AGS comes to grips with its substantial powers, its own PULSE system and public 
expectation and accountability the organisation may be vulnerable to further scandal at least 
into the medium-term future.  However, it is strongly contended that if the recommendations 
set out in the report from the Commission of the Future of Policing in Ireland in September 
2018 are fully implemented then much of the issues that caused AGS to be scandalised in the 
last number of decades would dissipate.  
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From Policing of the Community to Policing with the Community865 
 
The Dunnes did for smack what Henry Ford did for the motor car: made it available to 




This chapter examines another of Garland’s ‘Indices of Change’ which he refers to as the 
“expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety.”867 While Garland’s 
theory relates the transformation of the criminal justice system generally this chapter will apply 
his hypothesis as it pertains to An Garda Síochána.  Garland states the following about this 
“index of change”868  
 
 Over the past two decades, while national crime debate in Britain and America have 
focused upon punishment, prisons and criminal justice, a whole new infrastructure has 
been assembled at the local level that addresses crime and disorder.  Developed under 
the tutelage of the Home Office in Britain and largely by private enterprise and local 
government in the U.S.A. this network of partnership arrangements and inter agency 
working agreements is designed to foster crime prevention and to enhance community 
safety, primarily through the cultivation of community involvement and the 
dissemination of crime prevention ideas and practices.869 
 
So, while the Garland’s thesis refers to the jurisdictions of the U.S.A. and Britain, this chapter 
will explore the relevance of his thesis to policing in the Republic of Ireland.  It is contended 
that what is presented in this section will strongly evince Garland’s theory in respect of this 
index and its relevance to transformation in An Garda Síochána.  It is proposed to robustly 
corroborate Garland’s work by focusing on the history of the organisation over the last five 
decades.  The Gardaí’s own reports over the period will be heavily referenced and the work of 
other commentators together with this writer’s own Garda experience will be used to give 
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context. It will be seen that the words of the Gardaí and that of Garland have strong parallels.   
It can be said that the watershed period for community policing in this jurisdiction occurred in 
the early 1980s.  As noted by Williams “in the space of five years from 1980 to 1985 seven 
Gardaí were shot dead by various subversive groups during armed robberies.”870  However, the 
cold-blooded murder of Gardaí was not the only danger that the organisation was endeavouring 
to face down.  The advent of illicit drugs had brought about a more insidious difficulty for 
Gardaí in confronting crime.  It was a difficulty which AGS would view as surreptitiously 
usurping its own functions and authority.   The advent of the drugs epidemic in this jurisdiction 
would be the catalyst for AGS fully embracing the concept of community policing not only as 
an instrument to reduce crime but to maintain public support for the organisation itself.   
Therefore, it is being contended here that the advent of the drugs epidemic was the genesis in 
this country of Garland’s index regarding “the expanding infrastructure and community 
safety.”871 
 
This chapter will be set out in three parts.  The first part will deal with the period from the late 
1960s to the early 1980s.  The second part will demonstrate what occurred during what has 
been referred to here as the “watershed” period over the early 1980s.  The final part will 
consider what evolved thereafter.  In conclusion it will be asserted that the sea of change in 
AGS over a fifty-year period will provide convincing corroboration of Garland’s theory in 
respect of community policing. 
 
Pre -Watershed Period – 1968 to 1979 
 
In 1968 the Gardaí reported that there were 3,314 prosecutions against persons for being “found 
on” licensed premises during prohibited hours872 while there were 2,954 proceedings contra 
persons for having their dogs unlicensed.873 It is suggested these figures are indicative of 
quieter times for the Gardaí and would not be found in more modern reports from AGS. The 
sale, supply and use of illicit drugs had not yet become a problem for the Gardaí or anyone 
else.  However, the Gardaí were still mindful of their crime prevention remit.  The Garda 
Commissioner Michael Wymes reported 625 free crime prevention lectures given to the 
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public874 and the crime prevention exhibits room at Dublin Castle was being transferred to a 
larger space at Ship Street.875  The Gardaí had crime prevention stalls at the RDS Spring Show 
and the Munster Agricultural Show in Cork.876  The television programme “Garda Patrol” had 
“52 editions” with “491 crime items” and “65 special inserts”.877  The Commissioner advised 
that viewing time was reduced from 15 minutes to 10 minutes since 1967878 and the amount of 
burglar alarms installed continued to increase.879  The nascent “fetish for the quantifiable”880 
was beginning to emerge in the organisation but even in 1968 the Gardaí believed it important 
to highlight and measure what it was doing in respect of crime prevention.  What was heralded 
in the 1968 report might appear simplistic in comparison with what the Gardaí would be doing 
fifty years later but it does demonstrate the import that the Gardaí have always attached to their 
crime prevention role.881 History now shows that AGS would be challenged to do more over 
the decades to maintain and enhance its crime prevention and community policing 
commitments.  
 
In 1969 the Commissioner Wymes furnished similar information in respect of crime 
prevention.  He would add that “crime prevention materials were fed to daily newspapers and 
magazines”.882 In 1971 the same Garda Commissioner would state: 
 
 The following circumstances are regarded as having contributed to the increase in crime 
during the year under review. 
 
1. The commission of further crime by criminals while on bail awaiting trial.  A total 
of 383 persons while on bail committed 1570 crimes against property …  
2. The lack of proper security sense by some members of the general public … 
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3. The growth of urbanisation and industrialisation with increased affluence in 
sections of the community. 
4. Increased mobility of criminals.883  
 
Some thirty years later in 2001 Garland would write: 
 
 Late modernity’s impact on crime rates was a multi-dimensional one that involved: i) 
increased opportunities for crime, ii) reduced situational constraints, iii) an increase in 
the population ‘at risk’ and iv) a reduction in the efficacy of social and self -controls as 
a consequence of shifts in social ecology and changing cultural norms.  The consumer 
boom of the post war decades put into circulation a mass of portable, high value goods 
that presented attractive new targets for theft … densely populated neighbourhoods 
were replaced by sprawling urban tracts … more and more well stocked houses were 
left empty during the day while both wives and husbands went out to work.  The coming 
of the motor car- which helped bring about this more spread out, more mobile society-
was itself a prime instance of its criminogenic properties.884   
 
 
It is worth placing the Garda Commissioner’s assessment in 1971 side by side with Garland’s 
thesis in 2001.   It is contended that they are saying the same thing and the Commissioner’s 
view some thirty years ago is indeed a profound corroboration of Garland’s theory. 
 
The Commissioners’ Reports throughout the 1970s would continue to enumerate security 
surveys, crime prevention lectures and exhibitions.  In 1971 the Commissioner Wymes would 
acknowledge that “the present mobility and daring of criminals also places greater strain on the 
crime prevention services of An Garda Síochána.”885The Commissioner however was 
optimistic.  He stated: 
 
 Nevertheless, with increased public awareness of security needs and greater acceptance 
by business people of crime prevention advice it is confidently expected that our crime 
prevention service will prove effective in reducing opportunities to commit crime.886 
 
By 1973 the Commissioner’s optimism in this regard would appear to have dissipated.  
Commissioner Patrick Malone would now state:  
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 At a time when police resources are under severe pressure the ordinary citizen is 
presented with an opportunity to make a more significant contribution in an effort to 
prevent crime.887 
 
He goes on to advise that a “Good Neighbour” scheme888 introduced in the Dublin area during 
the year “aims to involve people in looking after each other’s property during absence from 
home or business.”889  The Commissioner’s optimism appears to return.  He says, “the scheme 
has made a promising start.”890 
 
In 1974 Commissioner Edmund Garvey laments the overall increase in crime over the previous 
year.  He succinctly states that it “is not great.”891  As highlighted in other chapters the Gardaí 
were under serious pressure during that period.  The Northern Troubles were spilling into the 
Republic and the Gardaí were confronting very serious crime and dangerous criminals.  The 
Commissioner states that he “should like to see more attention given to aspects of policing 
which relate to the prevention of crime and offences.  This is difficult to achieve in prevailing 
conditions when so many members of the force have to be employed on duties of a security 
nature.”892 
 
Garland states that: 
 
 From the 1980s onwards, it has become increasingly common for government policy 
documents, Chief Constable and Policing Commissioners’ reports even political party 
manifestos to emphasize that government agencies cannot by themselves succeed in 
controlling crime.893   
 
What Garland states is strongly evidenced in Garda Commissioner Garvey’s words in 1975: 
 
 Going forward the problem of ameliorating social conditions which tend to generate 
crime is one for the community as a whole; and is not one that can be solved with the 
parameters of the criminal justice system per se.  The growing awareness on the part of 
the public of the significance of its own role in law enforcement, the rising sense of 
individual civic responsibility in security matters and the increasingly constructive co-
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operation which the Gardaí receive from the public constitute grounds for the hope that 
criminality in our midst has passed its peak.894 
 
Again, the Garda Commissioner remains hopeful.   However, in 1977 Commissioner Patrick 
McLaughlin would lament that, “(t)he continual upward trend in cases of burglary and larceny 
from unattended vehicles again demonstrated the necessity for the public to take greater 
protections to safeguard their property.”895 
 
The Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 was enacted but its provisions would not become effective until 
some years later.  In that year there were 381 people charged with drugs offences896 but 
interestingly the Commissioner in his foreword doesn’t mention drugs.  In 1978 total crime 
came down by “1.5% on the 1977 figure.”897  Commissioner McLaughlin said this was “in part 
attributable to the greater awareness among the public of safeguarding property.”898  However, 
the optimism was again short-lived because in 1979 the same Commissioner would almost 
appear to admonish the public when he complains that, “it is emphasised time and time again 
that people should not leave their property in parked cars.  Commercial vehicle owners can 
also play their part here by providing adequate security.”899 
 
It is submitted that there was an element of “ground-hog day”900 about Garda reports relating 
to crime prevention at this time.  Almost the same material and vocabulary were being used 
every year.  Crime continues to rise for most of the 1970s.  However, the Garda reports are a 
good demonstration of nascent themes of partnership, neighbourhood watch and community 
policing within the Garda organisation.   The reports also manifest the apparent lack of urgency 
in respect of the drugs and organised crime problem that “was thriving”901 and as noted by 
Williams: “Garda Headquarters tended to adopt an ostrich approach to an unfolding crisis – 
they stuck their heads in the sand hoping it would all go away.”902  
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The Watershed Years 1980 to 1985 
 
In 2004 Kilcommins et al would say, “It might seem that ‘zero tolerance’ and community 
policing lie at opposite ends of the spectrum and are therefore difficult for any police force to 
encompass in a consistent fashion.  Yet it appears that the Gardaí has tried to do this.”903 As 
the then Chief Superintendent Catherine Clancy and head of the Garda Community Relations 
Section would explain: “(t)he Garda Síochána Community Relations and Juvenile Liaison 
Section was established in 1979 though official notice of its establishment was not announced 
until the 19th May, 1980.”904   She would further note that the “drug abuse endemic was 
spreading and drug users became involved in thefts and other crimes to support an expensive 
drug habit.”905 In the early eighties the Garda Commissioner Lawrence Wren admitted “that in 
some large urban centres it is becoming clear that the Gardaí need to start building bridges back 
to the community unless we are to find ourselves in trouble.”906   
 
It is contented therefore that the advent of Community Policing to AGS is concomitant with 
Garland’s view.  He states: 
 
 So, while the most prominent measures of crime control policing are increasingly 
orientated towards punitive segregation and expressive justice there is at the same time 
a new commitment especially at local level to a quite different strategy one might call 
preventative partnership.  Today’s’ most visible crime control strategies may work by 
expulsion and exclusion, but they are accompanied by patient ongoing low-key efforts 
to build up the internal controls of neighbourhoods and encourage communities to 
police themselves.907  
 
 
Clancy states that the terms of reference of the new Garda Community Relations Section 
included: 
 
1. Establish ways and means of cultivating and fostering good relations with AGS and 
the community. 
2. Inculcate in young people respect for authority … 
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3. Obtain and maintain greater co-operation from the community. 
4. Liaise with interested agencies … 
5. Advise the community on the best means to protect themselves. 
6. To co-ordinate policy.908  
 
It is being suggested that these are examples of the “low key efforts”,909 highlighted by Garland 
and are evidence of what he calls “the responsibilization strategy.”910  He says the “key 
phrases”911 of the “new strategy”912 are terms such as, ‘partnership’913, ‘public private 
alliance’914, ‘inter agency co-operation’915, ‘the multi-agency approach’916, ‘activating 
communities’917, creating ‘active citizens’918, ‘help for self-help’919 and the ‘co-production of 
security’920.  It is contended that all these phrases are reflected in the terms of reference of the 
Garda Community Relations Section as highlighted by Clancy.  Garland’s theory is that “the 
primary objective is to spread responsibility for crime control onto agencies, organisations and 
individuals that operate outside the criminal justice state and to persuade them to act 
appropriately.”921  He says all this is done to avoid “an image of the police as a hostile army of 
occupation.”922  It would seem that Commissioner Wren quoted previously in this section also 
saw it that way.  Clancy cites Commissioner Wren who in 1981 stated: 
 
 Neither the Gardaí nor the public can act in isolation in the prevention and detection of 
crime.  One of the most effective measures to be taken to contain the spiralling crime 
rate and vandalism trends would be to encourage the community to accept its 
responsibility through becoming more deeply involved in law and order matters.923 
 
While the Gardaí were concerned about spiralling crime rates being fuelled by illicit drug habits 
there was something far more insidious afoot at that time.  The Concerned Parents Against 
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Drugs Group (CPAD) emanated from the perception of some members of the public that the 
Gardaí were either unwilling or unable to deal with the escalating drug epidemic. 924   
 
The Garda response to the drug problem has been described as “lethargic”925 and the crisis was 
salient in less well-off working-class communities with high unemployment and other social 
issues.926 The modus operandi for CPAD was to publicly name alleged drug pusher(s) at their 
meetings and give them an opportunity to defend themselves or to desist in their illegal 
practices.  They would march in their hundreds to the home of alleged drug dealers to highlight 
their opposition to their behaviour.  The Gardaí had to supervise these marches in numbers and 
the tension in the air was always palpable.  This writer as a young serving Garda witnessed 
these scenes.  There was a latent hostility about them but for the most part they passed 
peacefully.  Young Gardaí would watch their grim-faced bosses and supervisors engage and 
converse with CPAD march organisers.  The genuine protester was not the problem.  There 
were others who it was feared by Gardaí would use the event for their own nefarious and self- 
serving agendas and if violence would assist that agenda then so be it. The Minister for Health 
at the time Mr. Barry Desmond believed that CPAD were a “front for Sinn Fein”.927    
Commissioner Wren’s “building bridges back to the community”,928 cited earlier, it is 
submitted is a strong sign of his concern at CPAD’s influence.  He would state in the AGS 
Report of 1983 that:   
 
 This year saw the emergence of concerned groups of citizens coming together to 
consider trends and similar problems particularly those related to drugs.  The groups 
need to be very alert in maintaining their independence and integrity in the interest of 
community welfare and in avoiding the encouragement of political ideologies.929   
 
It is submitted that the Commissioner’s vocabulary here is a good model of diplomatic 
language.  The Gardaí were facing down paramilitary violence and their members were being 
murdered as they did so.  Any insidious Sinn Fein influence at the time to undermine police 
authority could not be tolerated by the Gardaí.  Indeed, some of the problems may have been 
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of the organisation’s own making.   As noted by Williams “during the 1980s Garda 
management policy was to refuse to even acknowledge the term “organised crime … (t)he 
gangsters soon realised that one good drug deal could earn them a lot more money, with a lot 
less risk than a bank heist.”930 Community policing was belatedly embraced by AGS in an 
effort to reassert itself in the face of the CPAD  movement931 whose practices were gradually 
becoming more effective and popular in disrupting the nefarious activities of drug dealers in 
Dublin. 932  Ireland is not alone in its watershed period where community policing emerged as 
a possible solution to a crime crisis.   A very similar situation occurred in New York City in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 933   
 
In 1984 Commissioner Wren would optimistically opine that “there are some indications that 
the drug menace has been brought under control”934 and that “the increase in patrolling of 
uniformed members in urban areas have helped to reduce the crime rate.”935  In 1985 the same 
Commissioner would report “at year end 29,600 households were members of a 
Neighbourhood Watch Scheme and 175 Community Alert Schemes had been set up.”936  As 
noted by Garland “the state monopoly has begun to give way.”937 
 
Post Watershed Period - 1986 to 2017 
 
In 1987 the Garda Commissioner Eamonn Doherty reported that there were 527 
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes consisting of 135,528 households.938  In 1988 this would 
increase to 702 schemes involving 160,800 households.939  Perhaps an early example of a 
“cutting and pasting” exercise can be seen in the Commissioner’s Foreword in each of these 
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reports.  After setting out the aforementioned figures in respect of each, both say word for 
word: “We are grateful for the assistance received from so many members of the public in this 
matter and also from our friends in Muinter na Tíre.”940 It is interesting to note that a different 
Commissioner signed off on each report i.e. in 1987 it was Commissioner Doherty while in 
1988 it was Commissioner Eugene Crowley. 
 
While the acknowledgement in each report may be authentic, it is submitted that the replication 
would not fortify public perception in the real commitment of AGS to Community Policing at 
that point.  In 1990 Commissioner Patrick Culligan announced that the Community Relations 
Section “continues to investigate various anti-crime measures that will involve further citizen 
participation in crime prevention.”941  He also noted in the same year that “Certificates of 
Appreciation”942 were awarded to Dublin Neighbourhood Watch Representatives by the 
Commissioner himself on the 31st March,1990.943  In 1991 the Gardaí extended their “Schools 
Programme.”944  The Gardaí will visit local 5th class students in primary schools in their area 
and speak on the following topics: 
 
1. Role of the Garda 
2. Vandalism 
3. Child Safety 
4. Road Safety 
5. Safe Cycling945       
 
In 1992 Commissioner Culligan would declare that “partnership between the Gardaí, 
government departments and business community and public representatives was vital.”946  It 
was notable from the 1992 report that the Community Policing Section was moved to the front 
of the report.  Traditionally it was more to the rear.  In 1993 the Commissioner announced that 
the “mission” of AGS was inter alia: “to encourage and advise the community on how best to 
protect their persons and property from criminal behaviour … to provide services within a legal 
framework, available resources and community support.”947 
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In 1995 the Commissioner acknowledges that: “detection itself cannot provide the full answer 
to crime and related social problems.  This fact is becoming broadly recognised and is reflected 
in the endeavours of the many agencies combining to address these issues.”948  It is contended 
that this is a significant admission from the Commissioner.  Garda detection rates will not in 
themselves solve the crime problem.  The issue is greater than AGS.  This was the year 
preceding the death of journalist Veronica Guerin and Detective Garda Jerry McCabe.  In 1994 
the previous year, Martin Cahill also known as ‘The General’ was shot dead.  In 1995 itself 
Michael Crinnion was gunned down and killed in Cork in a gangland feud.  In 1994 Treacy 
Gilligan, daughter of John Gilligan was interviewed by officials from the Department of   
Welfare “to discuss her allowance.”949  Social Welfare staff had been “tipped off” by Gardaí 
in respect of the “rise and rise of the Gilligan family fortunes.”950 She was quizzed about “her 
new car”951 which she said was a “present from her dad.”952  The official wanted proof.  John 
Gilligan when he heard of the matter was enraged.  He made several phone calls to the Social 
Welfare Officer dealing with his daughter’s case stating that the civil servant was a marked 
man.953 
 
The Revenue Commissioners on a Garda report pursued Gilligan writing to him and “asking 
him to furnish a tax return.”954  He wrote “Fuck Off on the back of the letter and returned it.”955  
“The civil servants backed off.”956  Gilligan did not hear from the Social Welfare or Revenue 
Commissioners again.957 It would be another two years before the “infrastructure”958 and “inter 
agency working agreements”959 would be in place to “foster crime prevention”960 and address 
organised “crime and disorder.”961 
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In 1995 therefore, partnership with AGS by these State Agencies was now more or less at 
nought insofar as organised crime was concerned.  The Commissioner would also announce in 
the 1995 report that: “one member attended a seminar on ‘Approach to Designing out Crime’.  
This was an invaluable opportunity to acquire insight into the concept of architectural liaison 
practices which utilise the principles to design out crime.”962 In addition, Crimeline TAM 
ratings were up963 and Garda Síochána “special projects funded by the Department of Justice” 
are “providing services for young people at risk in a defined community.”964  Two more 
projects were added in 1995 making a total of seven.965 It is submitted that all these are 
examples of “ the beginnings of a new crime control establishment that draws upon the new 
criminology’s of everyday life to guide its actions and mould its techniques.”966 
 
In 1997 a Ministerial Committee was established to see what could be done to reduce the 
demand for drugs.967  Eleven Drugs Task Forces were set up involving the Health Board, the 
Probation and Welfare Service, Local Authorities, voluntary drug agencies, community 
representatives and a Garda Inspector.968  Their remit was to explore and find ways to reduce 
the demand for illicit drugs.969  In 1998 there would be “training for civilian participants for 
Neighbourhood Watch for the first time”970 while 1999 Crime Prevention Officers were 
“playing a significant role for new Town Centre CCTV System.”971 
 
By the end of the Millennium therefore we can see that community policing in all its forms 
remains part of the Garda agenda very much.  However, in 1999 organised crime remains in 
the ascendency.  A good example of partnership of government agencies in tackling organised 
crime was the establishment of the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB).   Garda, Revenue and Social 
Welfare Officers collaborated to investigate and seize the assets of organised crime. It is an 
example of the “inter agency working agreements”972 and “infrastructure”973 being put in place 
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to tackle serious crime.   The CAB is codified in statute by means of the Criminal Assets Bureau 
Act 1996 following murders of Veronica Guerin and Detective Jerry McCabe which caused 
public revulsion. It is submitted that what has been so far set out here is strong evidence of 
what Garland states: 
 
 The predicament for government authorities today then, is that they see the need to 
withdraw their claim to be the primary and effective provider of security and crime 
control, but they also see just as clearly that political costs of such withdrawal are liable 
to be disastrous.  The consequence then in recent years we have witnessed a remarkably 
volatile and ambivalent pattern of policy development – one that has become 
increasingly febrile in the urgency with each policy initiative succeeds the one 
before.974  
 
The Gardaí’s annual reports over the decades would consistently enumerate the number of 
neighbourhood watch and community alert schemes that had been set up.  The reports would 
also spell out the number of crime prevention lectures and exhibitions that took place including 
the number of security surveys carried out on different premises.  It would quote the number 
of Gardaí employed in the Community Relations Section.  In 2001 Clancy would state: 
 
The Policing Plan 1998-1999 asks us to “Produce results which are measurable and 
open to evaluation.  What gets measured gets done.”  Herein may lie the difficulty with 
the strategic fit of the Garda Community Relations Section.  Performance measurement 
of community relations and crime prevention initiatives are a necessary ingredient for 
success.   Performance indicators have been established at corporate level, but at local 
level these need specific focus on the issues which are more difficult to measure.  For 
example, expanding the various ‘watch’ schemes demonstrate quantitative rather than 
qualitative measurement criteria.975 
 
Managerialism in AGS is to the fore again, measuring “outputs rather than outcomes”.976  It 
submitted that what Clancy is saying here is that the real benefit(s) of community policing 
cannot always be measured by numbers.  As noted by Garland “there is also a new and all-
pervasive managerialism that affects every aspect of criminal justice.”977 Kilcommins et al 
refer to it as a “fetish for the quantifiable.”978 It is submitted that this is a good example of one 
Garland Index overlapping with another. AGS was measuring its “output” in terms of crime 
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prevention and community policing.  As can be seen, Clancy enumerates the output and the 
responsibilities of the Community Relations Section under three headings to measure and 
highlight what AGS was doing in this area. 979  
 
Community Relations (General) 
Office 
National Juvenile Office National Crime Prevention Office 
 
1.   Community Policing 
 
1.   Garda Juvenile Diversion  
      Programme 
 
1.   Security Surveys 
2.   Neighbourhood Watch 2.   Schools Programme 2.   Crime Prevention Surveys  
3.   Community Alert 3.   An Garda Síochána 
      Special Projects 
3.   C.C.T.V. 
4.   Campus Watch 4.   Local Drugs Task Force 4.   Alarm Policy 
5.   Coastal Watch 5.   Integrated Services 
      Projects  
5.   Crime Prevention Design 
      Advisor 
6.   Mobile Crime Prevention  
      Drugs Unit 
6.   Child Care Advisory  
      Committees 
6.   Business Watch 
7.   Victim Support 7.   Children Bill / Family 
      Conferences 
7.   Fraud Seminars 
 
8.   Tourist Victim Support 8.   Age Cards 8.   Crimeline Programme 
9.   Rural (Community)  
      Policing 
9.   Copping On 9.   Crimestoppers 
10.  Hospital Watch (Pilot 
       Prog.) 
10. City/County  
      Development Boards 
10.  Other tasks 
11. Policing Forum 11. Other Tasks  
12. Liaison – Minority/ 
      Ethnic Groups (include.  
      Gay and Lesbian  
      Communities) 
  
13. Literature/Trophies   
14. Exhibitions, Meetings/  
      Initiative Launches 
  
15. Focus Groups – incl.  
      Elderly 
  
16. Racial & Intercultural 
      Office 
  
17. Other Tasks   
     Table 3.1   List of Responsibilities of Community Relations Section 
 
The list shows Gardaí had substantially expanded their activities in respect of Community 
Policing up to the beginning of the new millennium.  The Garda output can be measured at 
thirty-eight items in total. 
 
In 2002 the Gardaí “in conjunction with the petrol retail industry developed an initiative that 
resulted in a reduction in forecourt crime by up to 50% in certain cases.”980  In the same year 
the RAPID initiative was an “attempt by government to focus resources in the most 
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marginalised areas of the country.”981  RAPID was an acronym for Revitalised Areas by 
Planning Investment and Development.  There would be a “Garda representative on each 
implementation team comprising of representatives from statutory agencies working in that 
area.”982  It is submitted this is a good example of “preventative partnerships”983  that Garland 
speaks of.  
 
It was 2005 when community and partnership policing would be codified in the Garda Síochána 
Act.984  The legislation providing for Garda-public engagement in the form of Joint Policing 
Committees985 (J.P.C.s) and a voluntary Garda Reserve986 would be recruited to support local 
Gardaí.  Local Authorities also had their crime prevention role codified987 and were given 
extended powers in respect of tenants and occupiers involved in crime and anti-social 
behaviour.988  The “principle of public empowerment”989 was now set in statute in the form of 
Joint Policing Committees.  Under the legislation J.P.C.s are empowered to: 
 
1. Serve as a forum for consultations, discussions and recommendations on matters 
affecting policing of the local authorities’ administrative areas. 
2. Keep under review the levels of crime disorder and anti-social behaviours as well as 
the factors underlying and contributing to levels of crime disorder and anti-social 
behaviour. 
3. Organise and host public meetings to discuss problems.990  
 
 
This writer has experience of sitting on a J.P.C.  They are effective and workmanlike and good 
relationships and rapport are built up with those involved and those who are invited to 
participate.  Generally speaking, there is excellent co-operation between all those involved, and 
Gardaí do account for themselves and constructive ideas are acted upon.  The same legislation 
established local Policing Fora at street or neighbourhood level.991 The intention is that these 
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Fora would operate more informally than the J.P.C. model.  These Fora commenced in 2009992  
in the six local authority areas where the local Drug Task Forces operate which were essentially 
in Dublin and Cork.  The J.P.C.’s began to establish themselves in 2006 in 29 local authority 
areas but are nowadays nationwide.993  It was in 2007 that the Gardaí set up their Joint Policing 
Committee Office.994   
 
The Gardaí escalated their Community Policing effort in 2009 launching the National Model 
of Community Policing.  Commissioner Fachtna Murphy would write: “the positive 
meaningful partnerships which we foster with our community stakeholders are the life blood 
of effective policing in Ireland.”995 The strategic objectives of the National Model of 
Community Policing were to: 
 
• Provide a dedicated … Garda service to the community. 
• To establish effective engagement processes. 
• To devise problem solving initiatives with partners and stakeholders. 
• To reduce the fear of crime. 
• To engage meaningfully with young people. 
• To develop a participative management style within AGS.996  
 
In addition, in 2009 the Gardaí would set up their “SMS short messaging service to issue crime 
prevention advice and information on suspicious activity to the Community Alert Group 
quickly and efficiently.”997  It is an effective system and works well.  The cover page of the 
Commissioner’s Report of this year declared front and centre that “The Mission of An Garda 
Síochána is working with Communities to Protect and Serve.”998  
 
In December 2011 the Gardaí would issue their first public version of an e-newsletter 
“Community Times”999 on the Garda website to inform the public of community based 
initiatives while in 2014 the Gardaí would report that there were 100,000 subscribers to their 
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text alert scheme.1000 The report would also advise that each J.P.C. was to develop a 6 year and 
annual strategic plans.”1001 In 2016 Community Gardaí in Cork would engage “with local 
agencies, schools and creches to develop early intervention programmes for children and 
parents.”1002  Cork Gardaí in a particular area “were experiencing adverse behaviour among 
young children.”1003  These efforts included: 
 
• Training for teachers in schools 
• Funding for volunteers for various agencies “Peers Early Education Partnership 
programme.1004 
 
This is a good example of different agencies co-operating with each other in order to remedy 
the problem. 
 
As noted by Garland: 
 
 Alongside policing and penality there has grown up a third ‘governmental’ sector – the 
new apparatus of prevention and security … these preventative concerns have come to 
be felt across the whole field … the field of organised crime control has thus been 
extended even if the institutional architecture of the criminal justice state remains 




This chapter has traced what Garland refers to as “the expanding infrastructure of crime 
prevention and community safety”1006 from 1968 to 2017.  This infrastructure was examined 
via the transformation in the practices of AGS as it confronted escalating crime rates, the advent 
of the illicit drugs trade and organised crime.  In the early 1980s the Gardaí perceived their 
own function as being usurped by CPAD whom Gardaí had suspected to be a front for Sinn 
Fein.  At the same time the Gardaí were involved in a violent and dangerous showdown with 
paramilitaries.  As noted by Williams “Garda management reckoned that the only way to catch 
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criminals was to nab them in the act of breaking the law.”1007  However, the insidious drugs 
trade and the opaque motivations(s) of the CPAD instigated a Garda response to “start building 
bridges back to the community.”1008  
 
This chapter is not intended to carry out an assessment of the value of community policing.  
McCullagh would say in 1996 that “many claims have been made for the success of these 
schemes but they are not based on any systematic evaluation.”1009 Some eleven years 
previously the Commissioner would state that “(n)eighbourhood (w)atch is a community based 
crime prevention programme by which the local community act as ‘the eyes and ears’ of the 
Garda.”1010  McCullagh would complain that “while the Gardaí may be prepared to allow the 
public to be the eyes and ears they are not prepared to allow them to be the brain.”1011 This 
criticism it is submitted is blunted somewhat by the advent of J.P.C.’s and Policing Fora which 
the Gardaí are accountable to. 
 
In any event it is being submitted here that this particular Garland index is strongly evidenced 
in the transformation and practices of AGS in the period under review.  It is strongly contended 
that what happened in the AGS in the last half a century or so is compelling and convincing 
evidence of this aspect of Garland’s thesis and strongly supports his view that:   
 
 Preventative partnerships involve a whole new infrastructure of arrangements whereby 
state and non-state agencies co-ordinate their practices in order to prevent crime and 
enhance community safety through the reduction of opportunities and the extension of 
crime-consciousness.1012   
 
The Gardaí’s own words in their own reports over fifty years have been deliberately set out 
alongside the words of Garland in 2002.   It is contended that it is clear that they are saying the 
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An installation has been recently marketed by a commercial company which is fitted in 
business or other premises and is designed to give warning to the presence of 
thieves.1013 
 
The above quote comes from the Report of the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána on Crime 
for the Year 1947.  It was used in an article by the then Garda Inspector Eamonn Lynch1014 
about crime that year in Ireland.  It is submitted that extract from the Commissioner’s Report 
of the time is a nascent example of the commercialisation of policing in this jurisdiction.  
Alarms were being introduced to protect business and private property.  The Gardaí could not 
be everywhere but could respond to alarm activations.   
 
This chapter will examine Garland’s theory on what he calls the “commercialisation of crime 
control”1015 in this jurisdiction and in particular how his thesis relates to AGS and policing.  He 
says that policing “has become a mixed economy of public and private provision and more and 
more routine security functions are undertaken by private police and more businesses and 
households invest in the hardware and protective services offered by the commercial security 
industry1016.   This chapter will highlight a transformation in the how policing is carried out in 
this country and it will be contended that what has occurred is convincing evidence in support 




While the Commissioner’s Crime Report of 1947 highlights the early advent of alarm systems 
in Ireland it is suggested that dramatic change in commercialisation did not take off until the 
early 1980s and beyond.  It was from this period that Garland argues that “these clear lines 
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between the public and private have now become blurred” and commercial interests have come 
to play a role in the development and delivery of penal policy that would have been unthinkable 
twenty years ago.1017 What he is saying is evidenced in changes in the policing practices and 
obligations of AGS. 
 
In the past Gardaí walked the beat and Gardaí stations were open for business.  The Gardaí 
enforced dog licences1018 and noxious weed legislation.1019  They performed cycle patrols.  The 
Garda roster pre- Conroy Commission1020 only allowed very limited time off for Gardaí.  Gardaí 
were more on duty than off duty and consequently more visible and available to the public 
when on patrol and when manning Garda stations.  Post Conroy Commission1021 Garda rosters 
changed.  They now worked eight hours a day on a four-unit system.  They had rest days and 
annual leave.  Any hours worked over and above this roster was overtime with a cost factor to 
Garda management.  Over time, Garda station opening times became more limited and perhaps 
Gardaí were less visible on the beat.  They no longer enforced noxious weed legislation or 
compiled the agricultural statistics.  They now rarely enforce dog licence legislation and while 




A number of factors occurred over the last half century which impacted on policing.  As noted 
by Lynch the ownership of consumer goods and individual property substantially increased in 
the 1960s.1022  Supermarkets and large department stores came to the fore and the “physical 
barrier of the shop counter” was removed which made shoplifting a substantial crime issue for 
store management.  The number of mechanically propelled vehicles on the road has increased 
in the last number of decades resulting in a heavy burden on Garda resources to enforce road 
traffic legislation which would not have existed heretofore.1023 Commercial and private 
vehicles were easy targets for crime.  The Gardaí could not be everywhere to protect personal 
property, supermarket and department store inventories and cars.  It is submitted that a vacuum 
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was created that was filled by private security interests who for profit could install or provide 
security alarm systems, surveillance and static security.  As noted by Garland:  
 
 The State’s new strategy is not to command and control but rather to persuade and align, 
to organise to ensure that other actors play their part.  Property owners, residents, 
retailers, manufacturers, town planners, school authorities, transport managers, 
employers, parents, individual citizens … the list is endless … must all be made to 
recognise that they have a responsibility in this regard.1024  
 
It is submitted that this transformation robustly corroborates Garland’s assertion that the police 
“have begun to admit their failings, emphasize the constraints that affect the system and point 
to the limits of their capacity to control crime.”1025   Garland readily acknowledges that the,  
 
“police still claim success in solving serious crimes and bringing the worst offenders to 
justice … but hold out lower expectations for the control of what they now refer to as 
‘random’ or opportunistic offending which in fact constitutes the great majority of 
criminal behaviour.”1026  
 
It is strongly contended that what Garland says is strongly corroborative of what AGS was 
confronted with in Ireland.  Business premises and public and private areas are monitored by 
CCTV, static security and alarm systems.  Even Garda stations have commercially installed 
private security systems in place.   The judiciary at the highest level have highlighted the 
importance of Gardaí seeking and maintaining CCTV footage in the investigation of crime.1027  
Fast food premises and licenced premises hire security to police the premises.  Health and 
Safety legislation mandates business owners to provide their own security to deal with crime 
and public order issues.1028  Failing to do so leaves them vulnerable to civil action if someone 
is hurt during a criminal or public order episode.  Nightclubs and licenced drinking pubs have 
security staff.  The extension of the liquor licencing hours to allow for late night drinking and 
dancing on a grand scale has necessitated static security and CCTV facilities at these premises.  
Garda response times in turning out to criminal or public order incidents at these types of 
premises may not be sufficient to prevent serious injury, loss of life or damage to property.  
Garland refers to what he calls ‘supply side criminology’.  He says: 
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 Rather than rely upon … the dubious ability of the police to catch villains (supply side 
criminology) sets in place a more mundane set of reforms designed not to change people 
but to redesign things and reshape situations.  A thousand small adjustments are 
required.1029 
 
He goes on to elaborate further and what he asserts it is submitted is corroborated in what is 
being depicted in this chapter.  He states that crime can be controlled in replacing cash with 
credit cards and elaborates that crime can be reduced if one can, 
 
 … build locks into steering columns of automobiles.  Employ attendants at parking lots 
and use close circuit TV cameras to monitor city centre streets.  Co-ordinate the closing 
times of rival clubs and discos.  Lay on late night buses and special routes to and from 
football games.   Advise retailers about security.  Encourage local authorities to co-
ordinate the various agencies that deal with crime.  Remind citizens of the need to 
safeguard their property and supervise their neighbourhoods.1030  
 
In the Garda context it is easy to parse what Garland says line by line and find evidence to 
support his view.  Some of the evidence is obvious.  There exists Gardaí Neighbourhood Watch 
schemes.  Gardaí have CCTV systems in major cities and Joint Policing Committees1031 which 
are grounded in statute facilitate the collaboration of the Gardaí and local authority to deal with 
mutual stakeholder interests.  Any visit to any commercial urban centre will find ample 
evidence of private uniformed security personnel at work. 
 
It is contended that it is clear the Gardaí (whether they like to admit it or not) have been ceding 
policing functions to the private sector and other stakeholders since the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s.  It is reasonable to argue that while Gardaí may have ceded these functions to other 
stakeholders and while this change has impacted on how the Gardaí carry out their duties it 
certainly hasn’t corroded their responsibilities in the investigation of crime.  
 
Transformation and Duties 
 
In the writers experience the following hypothetical narrative is an example of what the Gardai 
might have to face when working night duty.  The Garda communications room will dispatch 
a call to the appropriate unit or mobile or foot patrol.  The radio controller’s words are succinct 
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- “Disturbance in Progress” at a particular location.  Depending on the information gleaned by 
the Garda dispatcher who takes the 999 call he will decide how many units attend the locus.  
The Gardaí arrive.  The situation is fluid.  It can be violent.  The public police intervene to 
restore order.  If necessary, the public police on site request further assistance and backup.  The 
private police are also present.  Violent disorder has broken out on licenced premises.  The 
private police are holding two men and they advise the public police that the men are 
responsible for a serious assault and damage to property.  One other suspect has fled the scene.  
A victim lies bloodied and unconscious on the pathway.  The private and public police deal 
with these situations all the time.  The private police will hand over the men they have held to 
the public police who will make and secure their arrest.  The private police may presumably 
know the suspect who has fled the scene.  These details will be furnished to their public 
counterparts.  The public officers find an independent witness who can identify the fleeing 
suspect.  He is conveyed in the official patrol car on a tour or patrol of the vicinity in an effort 
to locate the third suspect.  A short distance away the witness points out the suspect.  He is 
arrested after a struggle.  All suspects are brought to the local Gardaí station.  They are 
searched, and illicit drugs may be found.  Garda station CCTV footage will be downloaded and 
secured.  It has substantial probative value in any criminal or civil proceedings thereafter. The 
public and private police have restored order, but the public police must pursue the 
investigation.  The public and private police will liaise again for the purpose of acquiring and 
making witness statements.  The evidence of the private police can be compelling and crucial 
to any prosecution case.  The public and private officers watch the private CCTV footage.  The 
private police download it and furnish it to their publicly paid colleagues.  The victim is 
conveyed to hospital.  Whether the victim lives or dies the public police must procure the 
medical evidence.  They must engage with the victim’s family and if necessary deliver grave 
news.  In the following hours and days, the Gardaí will canvas other premises for CCTV 
footage and witnesses to build a prosecution case. 
 
Private business people maintain their own CCTV systems.  They download material at a cost 
to themselves.  The public police do not reimburse them for the use of their private policing 
systems.  These private systems can provide crucial evidence in criminal cases.  Generally 
speaking in a case like this the public and private police won’t liaise again until criminal 
charges are being heard in court, but it is the public police who must get the case there. It is 




public and the private have now become blurred”1032 and that “policing has become a mixed 
economy of public and private provision as more and more routine security functions are 
undertaken by private police…”1033  The public police have come to rely on their private 
counterparts to detect crime and restore order.  
 
The advent of alarm systems can be said to have a preventative effect on crime, but the public 
police will turn out for alarm activations the vast majority of which will be false.  An alert night 
watchman may come across a break-in on some premises or find intruders actually on the 
premises, but the public police will be called to provide the follow up.  Most shoplifting cases 
for obvious reasons are solved by private store detectives.  The suspects are handed over to the 
public police who will process them for a court hearing. 
 
The public and private police interact in a routine way every day.  In many cases private police 
provide essential evidence in criminal court cases.  It is submitted that these proofs secure 
convictions that the public police would otherwise not be able to secure.  Store detectives can 
detain people.  So too can bouncers at licenced premises if a crime is committed.  They can 
search patrons (if parties’ consent) or prevent their access to a premises in lieu of co-operation.  
It is contended that all of what is stated here is evidence of what Garland says: 
 
 In these private settings (many of which are mass public spaces such as shopping malls 
that happen to be privately owned and administered) individuals may be required to 
submit to searches or be monitored and filmed and they may be subject to exclusion 
without cause shown.  There is here rough justice if exclusion and full force surveillance 
that has become more and more routine in our experience and which is increasingly 
viewed as a necessary condition for securing the safety and pleasure of consumers and 
decent citizens – ‘wicked people exist’.1034  
 
A landmark event in the rise of private security in this jurisdiction goes back to 1972 when the 
Irish Security Industry Association (ISIA) was established.1035  It was set up to ensure that 
proper standards and accountability were maintained within the security industry in this 
country.  At the time the Association boasted many large and well-known security companies.  
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Some of them could now be said to be household names such as Chubb Ireland, Securicor, 
Group 4 and ADT.  These companies it was said provided a whole range of services such as 
central monitoring stations, static guards, technical service and manufacturing and distribution 
services.1036  In 2004 Kilcommins et al noted that the Irish Security Industry Association 
comprised of 62 firms with a turnover of 250 annually with a workforce as large as AGS.1037   
It is submitted that it was no coincidence that Garda reports at the time lamented “the growth 
in industrialisation”1038 and the fact that there were “more opportunities for planned as well as 
casual crime.”1039  The Gardaí attributed the increase in crime to “increasing affluence in the 
community” and “a distressing lack of security sense on behalf of many members of the 
public.”1040  It also stated that criminals were committing crime while on bail awaiting trial.  It 
cited “1,784 crimes against property committed by 462 persons while on bail.”1041  It said that 
the techniques employed by criminals were becoming more sophisticated and there was an 
increase in the use of motor vehicles in the commission of crime.1042 AGS were beginning to 
struggle with the increase in crime and acknowledging that they could not be omnipresent on 
every street and corner.  Private security firms were more and more beginning to fill the 
vacuum.  In 1973 the Gardaí Commissioner stated that “a time when police are under severe 
pressure the ordinary citizen is presented with the opportunity to make a more significant effort 
in the prevention of crime.”  The Commissioner acknowledged “the continuing trouble in the 
North of Ireland makes heavy demands on manpower for border duty.”1043  All the while private 
security interests continue to increase.   Standards and accountability within the security 
industry have since been codified in the Private Security Services Act 2004.1044  As at the 30th 
November, 2016 the industry reached 26,028 individual licence holders while contract licence 
holders reached the number of 1,125.1045  This was well in excess of sworn and unsworn 
members of AGS which at the time stood at 16,272 (comprising of 12,816 regular members, 
1,124 reserves and 2,332 civilian staff).1046 
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It is submitted that all of the above is compelling evidence of what Garland says: 
 
 At the same time we have seen the remarkable expansion of the private security industry 
that originally grew up in the shadow of the state but which is increasingly recognised 
by government as a partner in the production of security and crime control policy has 
become a mixed economy of public and private provision as more and more routine 
security functions are undertaken by private police and more and more businesses and 
households invest in the hardware and protective services offered by the commercial 
security industry.1047   
 
Garland goes on to ask why this is so and in answering his own questions he says, “because 
the old-fashioned sovereign state can deliver punishment but not security.”1048   
 
Commercialisation and Codification 
 
It is submitted that one of the most salient pieces of legislation introduced in this jurisdiction 
which is corroborative of Garland’s thesis is the Private Security Services Act 2004 (as 
amended) under that legislation the Private Security Authority (P.S.A.) is mandated to regulate 
the following industry sectors. 
 
• Door Supervisor 
• Installer of Electronic Security Equipment 
• Security Guard 
• Providers of Protected forms of Transport. 
• Locksmiths 
• Suppliers and Installers of Safes 
• Private Investigations 
• Security Consultants 
• Event Security 
• CCTV Equipment 
• Monitoring of Alarms1049   
 
The PSA has its own mission statement which states: 
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 The mission of the PSA is … to regulate the activities of those involved in the private 
security industry to ensure that the interests of consumers are fully protected through 
the establishment promotion monitory and enforcement of appropriate standards.1050 
 
It is submitted that the codification of controls and regulations and supervision for the security 
industry in Ireland is a compelling example of what Garland asserts when he states: 
 
 (t)he state now operates in a mixed economy of security provision and crime control 
and its agencies here to accommodate the private security arrangements that have 
grown up over the last thirty years.1051  
 
However, Garland warns that: 
 
 Today’s governmental authorities may be obliged to operate alongside this private 
sector and in conjunction with it, but they are not obliged to stand back and allow its 
unregulated consequences fall where they may.1052   
 
Hence therefore the introduction of the Private Security Services Act 2004 (as amended). 
 
Another piece of legislation that brought profound change in how the Garda Síochána carries 
out its functions is the Garda Síochána Act 2005.  It is submitted that this and other pieces of 
legislation in this sector are good examples of what Garland says: 
 
 (t)he modern field of crime control is being rapidly reconfigured in ways that decentre 
not only the states specialist institutions but also the political and criminological 
rationalities that sustain them.1053   
 
In that regard AGS may have had to cede ground to the private security interests over time but 
so too did the organisation have to change internally to be more commercially minded.  
Inevitably there is some overlap here with Garda managerialism, but these statutory examples 
demonstrate diverse ways in how Garda managers could now generate an income for providing 
a specific policing service or outsource to a private commercial interest a previous Garda 
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function.  Similarly changes to statute empowered Gardaí to bring cost savings to criminal due 
process.  
 
Section 15 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 provides for the establishment of a Garda Reserve 
with limited training and powers.  They are strictly supervised and are a very cost-effective 
way on the face of it at least of propping up Garda numbers.  They permit Garda managers to 
provide a more visible presence on the street particularly during concerts and events.  However, 
the power of Garda Reserves is limited, and they can only act in the presence of a full time 
Garda.  Their presence it may be said, has only a “scarecrow effect”.  Section 29 of the same 
legislation empowers the Garda Commissioner to enter into contracts with other persons or 
bodies who can assist with policing functions.  Traditionally Gardaí have had their own fleet 
of tow wagons particularly in the Dublin area but also on a lesser scale in urban areas outside 
‘The Pale’.  Garda tow truck/wagon crews dealt with obstructions to traffic flow and 
transported vehicles to pounds.  All this work has now been contracted out to private companies 
who also provide detention facilities for vehicles on a 24-hour basis.  Garda station yards 
around the country have been freed up as a result.  They are excellent arrangements.  In 
addition, the Garda Commissioner had entered into contracts with private contractors with the 
Go Safe anti speeding vans which are regularly seen on Irish roads.  It is expected that any 
legislation introducing electronic tagging of repeat offenders will be monitored by a private 
security company and not AGS.1054  
 
Section 30 permits the Garda Commissioner to charge for policing services in certain 
circumstances.  The Commissioner is also empowered to recover monies in simple contracts if 
these services are not paid for.  Organisers of sports events, concerts, festivals, exhibitions, 
meetings, conferences, film/television programme makers and advertisers must pay the Garda 
Commissioner pro rata fees for Garda services.  In certain circumstances the Commissioner 
can charge for Garda escorts.  Section 37 states that Local Authorities must take account of 
crime disorder and anti-social behaviour when carrying out their functions and arguably the 
provision is an example of the State’s endeavour “to spread out the crime control effort beyond 
the specialist state organizations.”1055 It is also perhaps an example of the overlap between 
Garland’s indices on “community policing” and “commercialisation.”  Similarly, section 38 
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permits the Commissioner to give not just Gardaí but civilian and third parties such as Local 
Authorities permission to set up CCTV facilities areas subject to the caveat that the Gardaí 
would have access and supervision of same. 
 
Section 131 sets out special powers given to civilian security officers employed by the Court 
Service, a Department of Government, House of the Oireachtas, the Attorney General’s Office, 
National Gallery and National Museum.  Civilian personnel have powers of search, seizure and 
removal from a premises and can use reasonable force if necessary.  Local Authorities also use 
traffic, dog and litter wardens.  Other examples of cost effectiveness codified in statute include 
the Criminal Justice Miscellaneous Provision Act 1997.  Section 3 permits the Gardaí to release 
and arrested person on station bail to a court sitting held within thirty days following the next 
scheduled court sitting.  Previously an arrested person could only be bailed to the following 
morning.  A Gardaí making such an arrest on night duty would at least cost the State three 
hours overtime to be in court the next day.  The new provision facilitates a court appearance 
on a rostered working day with little or no overtime expense.   Notwithstanding the Section 3 
provision, Section 6 allows for evidence of arrest, charge and caution to be given by means of 
certificate to the court.  Again, the attendance of Gardaí would not be required for this initial 
hearing and the potential extra cost to the exchequer would be spared.  Section 5 permits a 
District Judge to make remands of an arrested person to a court area where the arrested person 
is being detained in prison.  This is a basic procedure to negate the cost of a Prison Officer or 
Garda escort travelling long distances from the prison to the court for straightforward remand 
purposes. It is submitted that these provisions are an example of Garland’s view that “(p)ublic 
sector agencies …are now being remodelled in ways that emulate the values and working 
practices of private industry.”1056 AGS is endeavouring to reduce its costs and traditional 
evidentiary rules are being modified to facilitate such savings. AGS has become very 
commercially minded. 
 
Similarly, Section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 permits the reading of witness 
statements into evidence in criminal trials in certain circumstances if the defence and 
prosecution so agree.  This obviates the necessity for Garda and civilian witnesses to attend 
trials with savings to the Exchequer of the witness subsistence and travelling expenses and loss 





of earnings from work.  It is a good provision that saves expenses and expedites the trial 
process.    
It can also be argued that the examples cited would also be relevant under Garland’s “outputs 
over outcomes” index which is examined within the next chapter. 
 
For many years AGS processed firearm fees.  It was an annual undertaking requiring 
painstaking attention to detail in every station to ensure that all firearm certificates were 
properly renewed and accurate.  The Gardaí would ensure that all fees were paid and in order.  
While Gardaí still vet all applications for firearms, since 2009 the processing of the fees has 
been outsourced to An Post.  There is no doubt this was an ease to the Gardaí personnel tasked 
with the processing of these records and fees, but it also results in a loss of contact between 
Gardaí and members of the public.  Traditionally every August local Gardaí as they progress 
through their substantial firearms holder list were engaging with the public at all times.  This 





Since the late 1960s AGS has transformed from being the almost sole provider of public 
protection and policing to being a key partner with other private security interests and these 
public/private partners have come to rely on each other in their endeavour to prevent and detect 
crime.  In 2004 Kilcommins et al wrote that: 
 
The greatest hindrance to accepting Garland’s thesis is that the Gardaí do not believe 
themselves to be confronting the predicaments that allegedly face all criminal justice 
organisations.  They have not acknowledged that they face an insuperable obstacle in 
the face of rising crime rates and consequently they need to devolve responsibility for 
crime prevention throughout society.1058   
 
This chapter has shown that the Gardaí have outsourced road traffic enforcement functions and 
rely heavily on private security to bring criminal, public order and drugs offences to their 
notice.  Private security companies and insurance companies now provide home and personal 
security information on a grand scale.  Crime Prevention Officers still exist in AGS but even 
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they rely on having an up-to date knowledge on what is available from the private security 
industry when they meet with the public or carry out security assessments.  Every day the 
Gardaí rely on the produce of the private security industry to solve crime.  Even statutory 
provisions were introduced that gave effect to more commercial and economic practice with 
AGS.  It is submitted that since the words of Kilcommins et al in 20041059 AGS has transformed 
almost unrecognisably in the past thirteen years.  In 2006 Jones and Newburn said that these 
types of developments,  
 
 Are affecting the vast majority of western societies but predictably they are doing so in 
different ways and at different speeds depending on the nature of the social, political 
and cultural circumstances in which they are taking place.1060 
 
It is contended that the evidence presented in this chapter is a compelling corroboration of 
Garland’s theory who says:  
 
 We have seen a remarkable expansion of the private security industry that originally 
grew up in the shadow of the State, but which is increasingly recognised by government 
a partner in the production of security and crime control.1061 
 
Or as noted by Newburn and Reiner in 2007: 
 
It is arguably only in the last two decades that the police service’s dominant position in 
the public mind as the ‘thin blue line’ protecting the public from crime and lawlessness 
has come under successful challenge from the private security industry.1062   
 
It is submitted that AGS now depends on private security to assist them in the prevention and 
detection of crime.   
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Outputs Over Outcomes 
From Charge Sheets to Spread Sheets 
 
The Commissioner’s role is analogous to that of a Chief Executive.  Normal practice 
and procedure would then be that the Chief Executive would in turn delegate authority 
to senior management by defining their roles and responsibilities and setting them 




This chapter is about how AGS manages and has managed itself over a period of approximately 
five decades.  The cornerstone years will be the early 1990s because that is the period that 
managerialism emerged in AGS.  It is suggested that the management style within the 
organisation before that time had not changed much since the 1920s.  However, that is not to 
say that many improvements had not been made within the organisation before that era in areas 
such as equipment, rostering, work conditions and facilities. 
 
This chapter examines how and why management within AGS had morphed substantially in 
the last fifty years.  The transformation is looked at from the context of Garland’s thesis on 
how agencies within the criminal justice system in the USA and UK: 
 
(h)ad developed a managerialist business like ethos that emphasized economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources … as well as an emphasis upon 
strategic planning, line management, devolved budgets and financial responsibility 
within agencies.  In time these new practices affected not just the management of the 
organization but also their mission … [P]olice Chiefs found that their budgetary 
responsibilities and financial regulatory duties made a difference to how they responded 
to their staffs, the police and clients.1064   
 
Therefore, this section specifically examines this “managerialist business like ethos” from the 
perspective of one of Garland’s “indices of change” that he calls “new management styles and 
working practices”.  Transformation in AGS is viewed through the prism of this index and the 
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evidence adduced in this part demonstrates that Garland’s thesis is on point with what occurred 
in AGS over the last half century.  Managerialism visited AGS circa the mid-1990s and has 
remained with the organisation ever since that period.  For the purposes of this chapter the 
“managerialist business-like ethos” is explored by analysing transformation in AGS under the 
following benchmarks: 
 
1. Language Change 
2. Economy and Efficiency 
3. Strategic Planning. 
4. Staffing. 
5. Resources. 
6. Performance measurement and counting.         
 
It is inevitable that there will be some overlap between these criteria, but the author’s insight 
as a retired Garda will be offered into how AGS organised itself during the period under review 
and to explain how Garda practice and procedure metastasized, as Rowe said of other police 
organisations into “a perpetual incitement for the incessant improvement of systems, 
generation of more knowledge, invention of more techniques, all driven by the technological 
imperative to tame uncertainty and master hazard.”1065 
 
Since 2013 AGS was rocked by a series of high-profile scandals which culminated in the 
Guerin Report, the O’Higgins and Charleton Inquiries, the F.C.P.S. controversy and the 
Fennelly Commission not to mention the Garda Inspectorate’s report in 2014 on how AGS 
investigates crime.  AGS was criticised in how it managed and recorded information on its 
P.U.L.S.E. database (Police Using Leading Systems Effectively).  It is submitted that these 
scandals have had a massive negative effect on Garda morale and it is argued in this chapter 
that the way AGS has embraced the practices of the corporate world has played a significant 
part in this proud organisation’s difficulties. 
  
                                               




Tracing Language Change 
 
Garland says “(p)ublic sector agencies are now being remodelled in ways that emulate the 
values and working practices of private industry.”1066  However, Garda “speak” permeates 
AGS and has remained the same for decades.  Gardaí do not refer to themselves as “guards” or 
“Gardaí” or “policemen”.  They refer to themselves as “members” or “polis”.  Gardaí are either 
“on duty” or “off duty”.  They do not have days off, they have “rest days”.  They do not have 
holidays or vacations.  They have “leave”.  The vocabulary of each “member” is grounded in 
their work.  Gardaí never “go” when they can “proceed”, and they will never “see” when they 
can “observe”.  They will never “get” when they can “acquire”, and they certainly will never 
“give” when they can “furnish”.  When Gardaí are socialising, they refer to themselves with 
some self-deprecation as “mules”.  This is probably an acknowledgement by Gardaí of their 
perception of themselves as incredibly loyal but sometimes incredibly stubborn.  
 
The list of Garda ‘speak’ is endless.  It must do with their training experience and the legal 
world in which they work.  Perhaps Garda “speak” is more reflective of what is asserted by 
Newburn and Reiner that “police officers have a sense of mission concerning their work 
masked by a veneer of cynicism.”1067 In an episode of the fictional R.T.E. series “Love Hate” 
there is a scene where two Garda detectives drive into a housing estate/apartment complex.  
They observe many uniformed Gardaí searching several youngsters.  The younger detective 
looks to his more senior colleague and queries what’s going on?  His senior colleague replies, 
“This is ‘bacon and cabbage’s new thing.  Stop and search all the young fellas.  Input into 
PULSE and draw up a bar chart.  Never gets the serious ‘gow’ but looks good on power 
point.”1068  First, a word again on language.  “Bacon and cabbage” is the nickname the 
detectives have for their Chief Superintendent.  Members of AGS use them a lot.  Nicknames 
are not synonymous with any rank.  A lot of members have them.  The word “gow” means 
“gouger” i.e. a criminal.  The script in the scene brings to the fore the language of 
managerialism with words like “bar charts” and “power point” and “looks good on power 
point”.  It is a straightforward example of how managerialism has pervaded AGS and arguably 
reflects that Garda management and rank and file members do not always see eye to eye on 
how policing is managed.  Once policy is set few managers are likely ‘rock the boat’ lest it 
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undermine his or her promotion prospects.  The language of the Morris Reports was sometimes 
scathing but always straightforward.  Walsh reviewed the different reports of the different 
Garda working groups set up in response to Morris.  He noted that, “Overall the reports of the 
Working Groups focus heavily on the internal organisational structures, processes, and training 
and management issues.  Some of them are heavily weighted down by management jargon.”1069  
Similarly Conway noted that “the reform process which emerged centred on a discourse of 
managerialism and performance indicators, not of moral or ethical issues nor of a return to core 
fundamental policing basics.”1070 However, while Garda ‘speak’ may always be the same, the 
language of Garda management in how it manages controls and effects change in AGS has 
evolved over time.  The language of the corporate world has been fully embraced by Garda 
management and is vividly evidenced in different reports emanating from AGS over recent 
decades.    
 
As noted by Breathnach in 1974, the “principal function of all members” according to the Garda 
Code at Section 3.10 was “to prevent and detect crimes, to protect life and property and to 
maintain public peace and good order.”1071  Many years later this straightforward language was 
codified under Section 7 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 which sets out the functions of AGS 
as follows: 
 
Preserving peace and public order. 
Protecting life and property. 
Vindicating the human rights of each individual. 
Protecting the property of the State. 
Preventing crime. 
Bringing criminals to justice including by detecting and investigating crime.   
Regulating and controlling road traffic and improving road safety … and carrying out 
such other functions conferred by law including those relating to immigration. 
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What was contained in the Garda Code in 1974 is now enshrined in law some 31 years later 
with little change in vocabulary.   However, note the change in discourse in the early 1990s.   
In 1993 the Gardaí had their mission statement1072 and their Corporate Strategy Document 
effective from 1993 to 1997.1073  In 1995 coloured graphs were set out in the annual Garda 
report to emphasise output and statistics.1074  In 1998 the annual Garda report and the crime 
statistics came in separate publications.1075  In 2000 there was an Evaluation of the Garda 
Policing Plan of that year.1076  There was a total of 35 “performance indicators” set out as key 
policy priorities to achieve the organisation’s “six corporate goals”1077 which were:  
 
1. Enforcing the laws relating to drugs. 
2. Investigating crime. 
3. Ensuring immediate response to emergencies. 
4. Providing help and support to victims of crime. 
5. Contributing to improving road safety and the reduction of casualties. 
6. Maintaining State security1078. 
 
Later the AGS Policing Plan of 2009 cites the “Vision”1079 of the organisation as “[e]xcellent 
people delivering policing excellence”1080 and its “Mission”1081 is “[t]o achieve the highest 
attainable level of [p]ersonal [p]rotection, [c]ommunity [c]ommitment and State security.”1082  
The difference in expression in outlining how Garda functions are defined in statute in 2005 
and in the organisation’s own policing reports and plans is stark and is evidence of - what 
Garland is saying. It is also indicative of his other “indices of change.”1083  However, for the 
moment the focus will remain on Garda parlance. 
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Garland states that “[t]he continuing effort to ‘re-invent government’ led to the development 
of clearly specified ‘performance indicators’ against which an organisation’s activities might 
be measured.”1084  These indicators Garland argues are themselves indicators of what he refers 
to as the “commercialization of justice.”1085  He says that “(w)ithin specific agencies and 
organizations performance indicators and management measures have narrowed professional 
discretion and tightly regulated working practices.”1086 
 
The Garda Evaluation Report in 2000 goes into these “performance indicators”1087 under each 
“strategic goal” giving details on how the organisation performed under each heading.  The 
language is much different from the Garda Code in 1974 in outlining Garda functions. It is also 
fundamentally different to how Michael Staines the first Garda Commissioner eloquently 
articulated the organisations mission back in 1922 when he said “(t)he Civic Guard will 
succeed not by force of arms or numbers but on their moral authority as guardians of the 
people.”1088  Some eighty years later 2002 Tyler and Huo who studied and researched moral 
authority and procedural justice in the U.S.A. stated “people are more willing to consent to the 
directions of legal authorities when police and court procedures are in  accord with peoples 
sense of fair process… and when people believe that the motives of the authorities are 
trustworthy.”   The views of Staines and the work of Tyler would appear to be in complete 
accord notwithstanding the passage of eight decades between them.1089 Nonetheless, this 
gradual change in the terminology of Garda management can be traced via other reports of 
AGS over the decades. As noted by Rose, “privatization, marketization and consumerziation 
have been accompanied by the increased use of techniques of accountability such as continually 
set but locally managed budgets and the practices of evaluation and auditing.”1090 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s the language of managerialism in AGS did not exist.  For example, the 
1973 Garda Report notes “the continuing trouble in the North of Ireland makes heavy demands 
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on manpower for border duty.”1091   The same report further notes that “the Force greatly 
appreciates the support and wholehearted co-operation which at all times it received from 
newspapermen and radio television people.”1092  How things have changed.  The Garda Traffic 
Corps was established in 1973 “aimed at improving the behaviour of road users and to reduce 
accidents and saving of lives.  The Traffic Corps in its early days had a membership of 300 on 
full time traffic duties with units in each division operating in specially marked cars.”1093  The 
membership of the Traffic Corps in 2009 swelled to 1,200 members but slipped back to 750 in 
2015. 
 
The 1975 report notes that “criminals are becoming more vicious and mean.”1094  The 1976 
report again has almost fawning praise for the media.  The Commissioner states: 
 
I gratefully acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the press; the fair 
minded, and responsible reportage of current events is indeed essential to the 
preservations of those free institutions which are the hallmark of the democratic state 
and among which the Press itself occupies an honoured place.1095 
 
It is submitted a Garda Commissioner nowadays is unlikely to make such a statement in a 
Garda Report. In each Annual Report from 1970 to 1980 the statistics for indictable crime 
and detection rates are faithfully recorded.  The reports are interesting, and matter of fact and 
the use language is straight forward.  Drugs seizures are recorded and there is a breakdown of 
the type of drugs seized.  The 1983 report records “the coming on stream of the Neighbourhood 
Watch Scheme this year should be effective in curbing lawlessness and vandalism.  The scheme 
ultimately belongs to the people.”1096 The same report announces that “1,540 members of the 
Force are now fully trained in drug abuse.”1097  The 1985 report states that 29,600 households 
are part of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes and 175 Community Alert Schemes have been set 
up in rural areas.1098  The “Green Man” has also been installed in unmanned rural Garda stations 
so that those who call to stations that are closed make contact with Gardaí in the 24 hour 
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headquarter station some miles away.1099  Time would show that these apparatus were wholly 
ineffective insofar as the public were concerned and were later stood down.  The 1986 report 
announces that a new “Command & Control System for the Dublin area would be completed 
by the Autumn.”1100 This new system was arguably the tentative   genesis of the audit function 
in AGS and would determine how Gardaí would be dispatched to emergency and other calls. 
 
The 1986 report highlights the successful rescue of Jennifer Guinness after her kidnap by a 
Dublin criminal gang and acknowledges the advent of the “Report on Garda Probationer 
Training” issued by the Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. J. Walsh.  It says that it is 
an “excellent and well researched document.”1101 The 1991 Commissioner’s Report is an 
acknowledgement by the Garda Commissioner that the detection of crime was a partnership 
issue.  The Commissioner states, “If success is to be achieved in the prevention and detection 
of crime and in other policy objectives all agencies, government departments and public 
generally have a vital contribution to make?”1102 
 
This is an early indication from the Garda Commissioner that the detection and prevention of 
crime is not solely a Garda function and that other agencies need to be involved.  Garland refers 
to this as the “expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety”1103 or 
“preventative partnerships. It is suggested that the Commissioner’s words are the 
commencement of what Garland states are the “patient ongoing low-key efforts to build up 
internal controls of neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to police themselves.”1104  
This area is explored previously in Chapter 3.  
 
As the 1990s progressed the garda vocabulary would begin to change. In the 1997 report, 
corporate language is evidenced with the mention of “purchasing policy,” “stock control,” 
“budgets” and “net expenditure.”1105  In 1998 the Commissioner acknowledges “it is difficult 
to ensure consistency in the way crime is recorded”.1106  We learn of “Garda Corporate 
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Strategy” which states that “excellence in the organisation is to be reached through the 
development of effective quality management.”1107  The process would assist Garda 
management “to achieve and evaluate goals and targets.”1108  
 
The Quality Service Bureau was heralded in the 1998 report “as a consequence of the Strategic 
Management Initiative”1109 and in fulfilment of AGS Policing Plan 1998.  By 1998 Policing 
Plans have arrived in the organisation.  To reinforce the arrival of managerialism in the 
organisation in AGS an approved NCEA Degree Programme in Police Management was 
instituted.  It was a two-and-a-half-year modular programme for those who held Superintendent 
or higher rank.  Also, in the 1998 report the Commissioner states that “the S.M.I. (Strategic 
Management Initiative) process is a fundamental review into the operation of AGS and will 
present many interesting challenges in the immediate future.” The S.M.I is discussed infra in 
this chapter.  By the noughties the language of managerialism was well embedded in AGS.  
Not only did AGS have its annual Commissioner Reports it now has its policing plans, 
corporate strategy documents, mission and policy statements. 
 
Managerialism – Economy and Efficiency 
 
While the move to managerialism in AGS can easily be tracked through the Commissioner’s 
various reports from the 1970s to the noughties, the real language of managerialism in the job 
occurred in the early 1990s.  How then did this shift in the way the organisation managed itself 
and spoke of managing itself manifest itself to the members who operated the front line?   
 
AGS divides the country into 25 policing divisions.  A Chief Superintendent oversees each 
division.  Each Division is sub-divided into districts.  A Superintendent takes charge of each 
of the 109 districts.  Each district is further divided into sub-districts.  A Sergeant oversees each 
sub-district. 
 
Traditionally in the writer’s own experience, each Garda sub-district which had a Sergeant at 
helm was almost autonomous from every other sub-district.  The local Sergeant was 
responsible for the running of his/her station and sub-district and the detailing of his/her 
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personnel.  He/She was seen to be the local ‘sheriff’.  In the larger stations there existed more 
than one Sergeant to assist with those responsibilities.  Each station in areas outside Dublin, 
had what was known as a Sergeant in Charge.   The person who held this role was the main 
administrator in a station who was ultimately responsible for its efficient policing operation.  
The other Sergeants were known as Duty Sergeants who had immediate responsibility for the 
respective shifts or units.  In Dublin generally, there was no Sergeant in Charge.  Instead there 
was what is known as a Station House Officer (SHO) of Sergeant rank attached to each shift.  
Each Station House Officer had what was known as a Gaoler and between them they had 
responsibility for the safe custody of prisoners in the station and the SHO had responsibility 
for the efficient running of his shift. 
 
While there was much co-operation and interaction between station parties they were 
essentially run autonomously from each other by their local Sergeant.  Each Sergeant was 
answerable to the local Superintendent also known within the job as the District Officer and 
the District Officer was accountable to the Chief Superintendent also known as the Divisional 
Officer.  In a rural district in the 1980s and 1990s there was probably only one patrol car 
attached to the District Headquarter Station.  This had to serve the needs of the whole district.  
Some districts were geographically peculiar.  In the 1980’s the town of Cobh, Co. Cork was a 
Headquarter station on the east side of Cork Harbour.  At that time part of its district included 
the town of Crosshaven which was located on the west side of the harbour approximately 30 
miles away.  To travel to Crosshaven to attend to a call the Cobh patrol car would have to leave 
Cobh and travel around the harbour to Cork City and make its way down through other garda 
districts to the western side of the harbour to Crosshaven.  The journey time was problematic 
especially in traffic.  
 
Crime was investigated by local Gardaí.  District Headquarter stations outside Dublin had a 
detective branch unit allocated to them.  These plain clothes and armed personnel were 
responsible for the investigation of crime in their own sub-district but also assisted local Gardaí 
in other sub-districts within the district.  Sometimes members of the detective branch had 
access to their own unmarked patrol car but in the 70s and 80s and often they had to rely on 
the uniform district patrol car.  In the bigger cities like Cork, Limerick and Galway there were 
large detective branch units broken into difference sections.  There were units that would deal 
with ‘Crime Special’ and would monitor subversives and perform protection and cash escort 




subversive activity.   In the 1970s and 1980s in the Dublin Metropolitan Area (now known as 
the Dublin Metropolitan Region) each station for the most part had its own District Detective 
Unit (DDU).  The Central Detective Unit (CDU) was based at Harcourt Square and dealt with 
organised crime and serious aggravated crime and supported local District Detective Units.  
Also housed at Harcourt Square was the Special Detective Unit (SDU).  This unit, like country 
areas, monitored subversives and performed protection and cash escort duties.  All these 
branches were later amalgamated into what is now known as the ‘National Bureau of Crime 
Investigation’ (NBCI).  All are based at Harcourt Square and in serious cases traversed the 
country to assist local detectives and Gardaí with the more serious investigations.   It was the 
local sergeant who was responsible to ensure that criminal enquiries were followed up to a 
conclusion.  The local district officer was proactive in ensuring that this was done.  
 
Similarly, it was the writers experience that the local Superintendent paid regular visits to the 
stations in his/her district and station records were inspected.  These were known as formal and 
informal inspections.1110  In a formal inspection the District Officer set a date for the local 
sergeant to have his/her books and records in order.  The informal inspection was more random, 
and Gardaí did not have notice of the Superintendent’s intention to visit.  The Superintendent 
examined the warrants register to ensure all warrants were being recorded and executed and 
attended to and monies properly accounted for.  He/She inspected the cash records to ensure 
all cash coming into the station for firearm fees and such like were being properly transmitted 
to his/her office in accordance with regulations.  He/She inspected the drugs register to ensure 
all detections were accounted for and drugs exhibits were transmitted for analysis in Dublin.  
He/She inspected the summons register to ensure summonses were being served and the crime 
register to ensure crime was being recorded and investigated.  He/She inspected the property 
book and property coming into the possession of the Gardaí to see that it was being properly 
accounted for.  He/She also checked prisoner and drink driving records and examined the 
accommodation generally and the cell areas.  He/She also checked the patrol cars and their log 
books which showed mileage dates and times and signatures of patrol car crews.  The 
Superintendent discussed crime and local issues with the station party.  He/She recorded and 
certified his/her inspections with his/her signature and date and would also complete the 
Inspection Book in which he/she summarised his/her inspection and findings.  The Chief 
Superintendent for his/her part also called to each Garda Station and carried out a similar 
                                               




inspection.  Garda officers knew their Gardaí and Gardaí were known to their officers.  At the 
end of each calendar year each Sergeant in Charge was tasked with checking all these records 
for the purpose of preparing his/her sub-districts crime statistics which were then submitted to 
his/her District Officer for onward transmission Headquarters so that the annual 
Commissioners report on crime could be put together.  It was a task that was straight forward 
but could take some time depending on the workload of the station.  Official correspondence 
between stations was transmitted by ordinary post.  In the 1970s details of crimes were 
circulated by teleprinter between stations when one was allocated, otherwise it was by post or 
perhaps via patrol car in cases of urgency.1111 
 
In the mid 1990’s things began to change.  District Officers began to manage their districts as 
a single entity, rather than as different “satellite” type areas.  If staff was short in the District 
Headquarter Station the staff from the outer stations were called in to make up the shortfall.  
Sergeants in outer stations were called in to replace Sergeants in the District Station if need 
arose.  It was rare for Sergeants in the larger stations to be sent to the outer one if the local 
Sergeant was on leave.  The Superintendent was managing his resources.  It is not that this 
process did not happen prior to the 1990s – it did but not to such a regular extent at least that 
is the writers view.  Superintendents began to focus on the overtime budget and they moved 
their staff around to remain within budgetary limits, but it was not always possible to do so.  
This was the beginning of the end for smaller stations insofar as their opening hours were 
concerned.  The hours local Gardaí were at these stations and available to the local public was 
very much restricted.  The other side of the coin was that the Superintendent was seen by 
authority as effectively managing his/her District.  Earlier in 1978 the organisation to address 
issues arising because of restricted opening hours at smaller garda stations AGS had installed 
what was known as the Green Man communication system in rural Garda Stations. A caller to 
garda station when it was closed could avail of this facility to speak with a garda in the District 
headquarter station some miles away.   By the mid-1980s this was a failure as the public had 
no interest in using it. When they could not communicate face to face with a Garda at a garda 
station they simply went away.   
 
This is in stark contrast to earlier years.  As noted in Brady: 
 
                                               




(t)he early Commissioners understood the importance of keeping the police close to the 
people.  Bonds of trust developed in the villages and indeed in the larger towns where 
the Gardaí were part of the community.  This was key to successful crime detection and 
above all to good intelligence.1112  
 
He goes on to state that: 
 
(c)onversely the community looked to the Gardaí for security and often as a point of 
contact for other state services.  There was an understanding that with a Garda presence 
in the town or village there was a connection into the system.  A friendly Garda could 
solve problems; a prosecution for speeding, a passport needed in a hurry, a cautionary 
word with an aggressive neighbour or an overcharging shopkeeper.1113 
 
It is submitted that all what Brady states has been lost to financial expediency. A good example 
of the value smaller stations occurred in the Graham Dwyer murder trial 2015.  In the course 
of the trial evidence was given by three witnesses of strange objects located in a reservoir in 
Co. Wicklow.  One of the witnesses thought the objects were suspicious enough to bring to the 
local Garda Station.  It was a small station in the village of Roundwood in Co. Wicklow.  The 
station was open for business notwithstanding it was not a 24 hour one.  The objects were 
received by a local Garda who immediately put them into evidence bags and was troubled and 
disturbed enough to visit the reservoir himself to make further enquiries.  He located further 
objects all of which became exhibits in one of the most controversial murder trials in the history 
of the State.  Paul Williams a journalist, who covered the trial would pen an article in the Irish 
Independent on the 28th March 2015 entitled “All in a day’s work says tenacious young Garda” 
commending the member’s efforts. It is contended that it is simply not possible to quantify 
what AGS have lost as a policing service by the closure of these smaller stations. However, 
savings could easily be measured.  It is submitted that managerialism tended to make Garda 
managers - who are committed police officers by vocation and training – sensitive to the cost 
of everything but myopic to the intrinsic or real value of anything.  In 1950 there were 785 
stations.  In 2012 there were 664 stations and in 2013 there were 564 stations.   In the Sunday 
Independent on the 22nd October 2017 Philip Ryan wrote an article with the headline “Gardaí 
want freedom to criticise government decision.”1114  He reported that, “(s)enior Gardaí are tired 
of being forced to defend government decisions and budget cuts.  They want a distinction drawn 
                                               
1112 C. Brady supra at note 275 at p.212. 
1113  Ibid. 





between the work of the guards and the work of the government.”1115 It is submitted that it is 
true to say that a Garda Commissioner rarely if ever criticises government policy or budget 
cuts insofar as they affect AGS.  The closest a Garda Commissioner came to do so in recent 
times was Commissioner Patrick Byrne.  At the time of the Garda ‘Blue Flue’ on the 1st May 
1998 the government wanted Commissioner Byrne to invoke disciplinary regulations in respect 
of ‘striking’ Gardaí.  He refused to do so stating that it was an industrial relations matter.  Aside 
from this exception, Garda Commissioners are not known to publicly criticise the government 
on budget or policy issues.  Philip Ryan’s report goes further – it says, “Senior Officers were 
less likely to speak up under the Commissioner over fears it would stymie their career 
progression.”1116 Morris years earlier would say “no-one should serve as Superintendent 
without having the training, the expertise, the commitment to duty and the front-line experience 
that will enable them to make real judgements on matters relating to criminal investigation.”1117  
Morris would also say that “what An Garda Síochána needs is a combination of experience, 
dynamism and honesty.”1118  As noted by Garland: 
 
The relations between the organization and its political masters routinely involve 
conflict over budges and resources … it can also entail more substantive conflicts 
particularly when measures are proposed that clash with the organizations view of its 
mission and the most effective methods of pursuing it.1119  
 
However, it was not just in investigative and policing matters that Garda managers had to be 
mindful of their budgets. They also had to be mindful of economies and efficiencies on more 
business and commercial matters. 
 
As noted by Dodd in 2006: 
 
  Procurement is a complicated area and the Garda Organisation has to adhere to the E.U. 
Directives and thresholds.  Procurement guidelines have to be added to and proper 
structure put in place to monitor compliance … in order for the Commissioner to fulfil 
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the role of Accounting Officer the implication and impact of not complying with 
procurement rules has to be understood by the whole organisation.1120 
 
 
Some years earlier AGS was scandalised in how it purchased tyres for the Garda fleet of patrol 
vehicles. The Comptroller and Auditor General carried out a review of the allegations at the 
time and his report in 2001 found:   
 
  The management and control of systems in place in 1998-2000 in relation to purchasing 
was completely inadequate.  In effect the Garda Síochána ceded control of key aspects 
of the supply of tyres to Advance Pit Stop and allowed themselves in crucial respects 
to become captive to their supplier.1121 
 
It is submitted that it was unusual at the time for AGS to be scandalised on these types of issues 
and it was something new to account for matters that pertained to how the organisation 
conducted and managed its procurement business. 
Similarly, in 2000 the Comptroller and Auditor General published another report concerning 
how AGS collected fines.  It concluded: 
 
  Overall the fines system is not working as intended.  Apart from the on-the-spot 
speeding offences where there are high rates of voluntary payment of fixed penalties, 
very many of the cases detected resulted in offences not being punished mainly because 
of the administration and management of the fines system procedure.1122 
 
 
Over a decade later in 2012 the Comptroller and Auditor General again reported that: 
 
  A member of AGS contacted the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General seeking 
a meeting to discuss concerns that a member had about the operation of the Fixed 
Charge Notice System.1123 
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It was alleged that there were circa 4,000 cancellations of notices by senior members of AGS.  
Another report emanated from the Comptroller and Auditor General because of an 
investigation in these matters and he concluded that: 
 
  … because of significant weaknesses in aspects of the operation of the Fixed Charge 
Notice System a substantial portion of offenders – up to one in five – are able to avoid 
penalties and do not end up in court.  These operational weaknesses need to be 
addressed urgently by AGS.1124 
 
The conclusion in the 2012 Auditor’s Report is almost the same as his finding in 2000.  He 
found that the Exchequer received €21.5 million in receipts for the F.C.P.S. system.  Seventy-
One per cent of fines were paid, 22% went to court, 5% were terminated and there was 2% not 
paid for “other” reasons.1125 AGs was now in difficulty in how it operated fines and a collection 
of monies system. 
 
As indicated in the Comptroller and Auditor General’s 2012 report it was allegations of two 
Garda whistle blowers that highlighted irregularities in how Superintendents and Inspectors 
were cancelling F.C.P.S. notices.  Consequently, the Garda Inspectorate investigated these 
matters and, in its report, published in February 2014 it found:  
 
  … in its analysis of the reports of the Assistant Commissioner and the Controller and 
Auditor General that there are consistent and widespread breaches of policy by those 
charged with the administration of the F.C.P.S.  With few exceptions the Inspectorate 
found no meaningful evidence of consistent quality management supervision of the 
cancellation process either at Garda Headquarters, Regional, Divisional, District or at 
any level that would have detected and rectified these problems.1126 
 
 
The Inspectorate reported that in 2012 a total of 114,507 FCPS notices were issued by Gardaí.   
The Central FCPS Office sent back 15,408 such notices to detecting Gardaí because they were 
not completed properly.  These are known as “sendbacks” and it was the detecting Garda’s 
duty to return the “sendback” to the Central FCPS office clarifying the issue(s) that had been 
raised.  The Inspectorate found that 10,701 “sendbacks” were not returned which amounted to 
a substantial 69% of them in total.  The Inspectorate estimated that the loss of revenue in total 
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to the Exchequer in this instance was €850,000.  The Inspectorate also examined the number 
of summonses issued and the amount of cancellations made by Garda management.1127 
 
In the period 2011 and 2012 the figures are as follows:1128 
 
   Summonses Issued   -  178,500 
   Summonses Served   -  85,000 (48%) 
   Summonses Unserved   - 93,500 (52%) 
 
   Loss of revenue estimated at €7.4 million. 
     Table 5.1   Summonses Issued/Served/Unserved for Period 2011 and 2012 
 
In the period 2011-2013 the following is the breakdown of FCPS notices cancelled by Garda 
management:1129 
 
  2011 FCPS Notices Issued 514,959 - Cancelled 22,781 (4.4%) 
  2012 FCPS Notices Issued 449,403 - Cancelled 21,960 (4.8%) 
  2013 FCPS Notices Issued 393,588 - Cancelled 17,393 (4.4%)  
     Table 5.2   FCPS Notices Issued/Cancelled for Period 2011 to 2013 
 
It is contended that these reports are strong evidence of what Newburn and Reiner assert: 
 
  … recent decades have witnessed some important developments in policing, many 
prompted by the pressures under which all criminal justice agencies were placed by 
governments increasingly concerned to secure “value for money” and economy 
efficiency and effectiveness in public services.1130 
 
Similarly, it can be argued that these reports are solid evidence of Garland’s thesis where he 
states that: 
 
  … issues of costs and effectiveness are foregrounded in policy decisions today to the 
extent never seen before … and the police … are costed and audited more thoroughly 
today than at any time in their history.1131  
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Garland argues that the “pressure to attain ‘value for money’ … has given rise to a framework 
of economic thinking that has become increasingly pervasive and powerful.”1132 The powers 
of the Dáil Public Accounts Committee in tandem with Section 43 of the Garda Síochána Act 
2005 it is submitted are evidence of this “economic thinking” which has become so “pervasive 
and powerful”. 
 
On 23rd January, 2014 Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan gave evidence before the P.A.C. 
in respect of the F.C.P.S. controversy regarding the cancellation of F.C.P.S. notices.1133  He 
highlighted that the internal Garda report into the matter covered the period 1/1/2009 to 
30/6/2012.1134 He noted that “66,407 fixed charge notices were terminated which is the 
equivalent of 4.55% of the 1.46 million tickets that were issued.”1135 He said that where legal 
and technical reasons for the termination of notices were accounted for there remained 2.57% 
of the 1.46 million issues in the review period that were terminated by authorised officers 
exercising discretion.1136 There were 859 which required more scrutiny.1137  Of the 859 there 
were 661 of cancelled by three Garda officers and came in for disciplinary investigation while 
in the remainder warnings or advices were given.1138  The 859 figure is approx.05% of the total 
number of notices issued.   He gave some context to the figures by stating that the figure 
amounted to approximately two cancellation of notices per week per Garda District and pointed 
out that each District can range from between one and six stations.1139   He said that the internal 
Garda report and that of the Comptroller and Auditor General in respect of “the level of 
terminations during the (respective) periods under examination were very similar” in that the 
Garda report found that terminations came to circa 4.5% while the C&AG’s report found that 
it was 5%.1140 
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Deputy Shane Ross T.D. when examining the Commissioner would later give a different 
context to these figures.  He argued that it amounted to 300 cancellations a day and kept 
pressing the Commissioner on the figure.1141  The Commissioner did his own arithmetic and 
corrected Mr. Ross that that figure was only 30 cancellations a day and not 300 as stated by 
Mr. Ross.1142  Mr. Ross acknowledged the error and the Commissioner remarked with brevity 
and perhaps some irony “we will not fight over it.”1143 
  
The Commissioner stated that the 661 cancelled notices required disciplinary investigation 
because Superintendents/Inspectors had acted outside the process, but no criminality was 
found.1144 That 661 accounted for 0.04% of all tickets issued.  Lally, Humphries and McGee 
for the Irish Times on the 24th June 2014 in an article headed “Garda Commissioner take legal 
advice on Gardaí speaking to P.A.C. – Callinan consults A.G. as he seeks to prevent whistle-
blower testifying on alleged wrongdoing” focused on a particular remark by the Commissioner.  
He said, “(a)s a rule serving Gardaí should not use an Oireachtas Committee as a platform to 
air grievances or raise concerns about the Force.  The Commissioner should not be usurped by 
subordinates.”1145  The Commissioner it is contended tried to distinguish between the PAC’S 
right to enquire into “value for money” matters pertaining to AGS and its attempts to enquire 
into potential criminal accusations made by Garda whistleblowers against their colleagues.  He 
stated: 
 
  I do have a strong view that matters of this importance where clearly members of AGS 
are making very serious criminal accusations against other members of AGS and 
producing personal sensitive individual data that this is not the appropriate forum for 
any member of AGS to be involved in that exercise to use this committee as a platform.  
I fully respect the Committee and subscribe to the work it is doing in the context of how 
people conduct their business in terms of value for money … the appropriate person to 
deal with these issues is the Accounting Officer namely the Commissioner … I am the 
legitimate target for all those questions.1146 
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The Commissioner here boldly acknowledges his statutory role as Accounting Officer but also 
simultaneously refers to himself as “a target”.  The Commissioner gave evidence for circa five 
hours before the PAC and perhaps his role as Accounting Officer was wearing very heavily 
with him at that point.  It was towards the conclusion of his evidence that he made his most 
controversial remarks in response to a query from Deputy Shane Ross T.D.    The 
Commissioner stated: 
 
  … We have two people out of a force of over 13,000 who are making extraordinary and 
serious allegations.  There is not a whisper anywhere else from any other member of 
AGS however about this corruption, malpractice and other charges levelled against 
their fellow officers.  Frankly on a personal level I think it is quite disgusting.1147 
 
The Commissioner’s “quite disgusting” remark created substantial controversy.  Just over two 
months later Commissioner Callinan on the 25th March 2014 retired unexpectedly from AGS.  
It is not known to what extent (if any) the controversy concerning his remarks to the PAC 
played a part in his departure from the organisation and it is not the purpose of this chapter to 
examine the details. These were subject inter alia to an investigation by the Fennelly 
Commission of Inquiry set up by order of the Government on the 8th April 2014 and were also 
part of the inquiries being carried out by Judge Peter Charlton at the Disclosures Tribunal 
(infra) . The fact that the Garda Commissioner was so thoroughly and extensively questioned 
by a Dáil Committee on these matters is convincing evidence of what Garland says:  
 
  Agencies like the police … are now increasingly subject to State imposed standards and 
guidelines and are closely monitored and inspected to ensure that they comply.    The 
long-term trends towards professional autonomy and the delegation of penal powers 
has been abruptly reversed and the State has begun to tighten its grip upon criminal 
justice agencies and employees.1148 
 
It should be noted that the Gardaí have been issuing Fines on the Spot notices for years.  In the 
1970s such notices (tickets) would have been issued for parking offences and for vehicles 
having no tax disc displayed on the vehicles.  The Commissioner’s Report of 1970 gives the 
following details in respect of the Dublin Metropolitan Area.1149 
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 1970 1969 
FOS Issued Gardaí 





Paid 97,838 99,392 
Court 38,077 37,861 
Cancelled 3,110 6,703 
Other cases for Cancellation (viz statute barred, drivers untraced, 
summons not served, drivers out of jurisdiction) 
27,788 16,925 
Spoiled Notices 1,819 3,151 
Pending Court Proceedings 7310 365 
     Table 5.3   Fine on the Spot Details for 1969 and 1970 
 
The Commissioner’s Report of 1982 made similar reading.1150 
 
 Parking No Tax Displayed 
Gardaí 133,517 38,859 
Wardens 424,232 55,420 
Total 557,749 94,270 
Paid 218,317 19,694 
Court 177,598 22,710 
Cancelled 70,998 18,291 
Pending 76,379 32,533 
Spoiled 14,457 1,051 
     Table 5.4   Fine on the Spot Details Garda Commissioners Report 1982 
 
In 1969, 1970 and 1982 that there were substantial cancellations in Fines on the Spot notices 
but there was no scandal or controversy.  It is difficult to know why then Commissioner 
Callinan didn’t highlight these facts when interviewed before the P.A.C.  At the very least these 
figures would have given some context to the recent F.C.P.S. controversy.  Perhaps these 
figures over a forty-five-year period are indicative of what Niamh Horan states in an article in 
the Sunday Independent newspaper dated 30th March 2014, “we’re all to blame for point mess 
in the ‘nod ‘n wink’ world.  Bending the law would be our national sport as long as we’re given 
half a chance to do it.”1151 In the 1970s and 1980s Garda discretion in these matters was not 
likely to be challenged but things were now changing. 
 
In the aftermath of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report of 2000 which criticised the 
Fines on the Spot system and on how the Garda managed it the Government set up the F.C.P.S. 
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system.  The FCPS was given effect by the Road Traffic Act 2002 however it was the Road 
Traffic Acts 1961 – 2011 and ancillary regulations that essentially grounded the system.  From 
the 31st July 2008 some public order offences can now be dealt with under the FCPS system 
i.e. simple drunkenness.  AGS developed the FCPS to allow for the systematic computerized 
recording of offences including drink driving within certain alcohol limits that incur fixed 
charges under the legislation.  The drink driving offences were included in FCPS under the 
Road Traffic Act 2010 which was given effect on the 27th October 2011.  The legislation was 
further amended by the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 2018 which provided for the 
disqualification from driving of persons paying a fixed charge penalty in respect of a drink 
driving offence.  Such disqualifications were not provided for previously. 
 
S.17 of the Road Traffic Act 2006 permitted the printing, posting and payment of FCPS notices 
to be outsourced.  There were further amendments to the legislation in s.81 of the Road Traffic 
Act 2010 and this provides for the outsourcing of safety speed camera detections on behalf of 
AGS. 
 
The legislation replaced the old “fine on the spot” system and improved matters in many ways 
in that more time was given to pay the fine and the later the payment the higher the fine. In 
addition, if the owner was not driving at the time of the offence he or she would now have to 
furnish the name and address of the driver. Also drink driving under certain blood/urine/alcohol 
limits was decriminalised if the fine was paid and penalty point accepted by the driver. 
 
This penalty points system is administered by the National Roads Authority under the aegis of 
the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport.  It is submitted that this is a good example of 
the Gardaí outsourcing its previous functions and demonstrates that Government and Garda 
management’s policy “to maximize the practices that are most easily measured.”1152 
 
It is contended that drink driving has never been far from the media’s headlines.  The whole 
FCPS system and in particular the inclusion of drink driving into that system is supportive of 
Garland’s theory of a  
“generalized cost consciousness in the allocation of criminal justice resources including 
investigative resources, court calendars … statutory fines, fixed penalties and de facto 
                                               





decriminalization of minor offences …  all embody this tendency to conserve expensive 
crime control resources for the more serious offences and the more dangerous 
individuals.1153   
 
The FCPS system has freed up Garda time as Gardaí do not have to attend court if the fines are 
paid. AGS members could now be directed to more serios criminal matters.   This would be in 
ease to what Garland refers to as Garda or police court “calendars”.  Certain low alcohol-level 
drink driving detections and many other road traffic offences conclude in fines and penalty 
points and do not end in court with the result that there is no criminal conviction recorded 
against the person.  
 
The FCPS is now the bedrock of Garda Road Traffic law enforcement within this jurisdiction 
and it is submitted the decisions made by Gardaí in how they enforce the system and cancelled 
notices created controversial problems for AGS afterwards and saw Commissioner Callinan 
before the Dáil Public Accounts Committee (PAC) as highlighted earlier.  What happened here 
was that detections for road traffic offences were simplified which resulted in a massive 
increase in detection rates.  This created problems at the other end of the prosecution system 
as Gardaí still had to serve a substantial number of summonses on non-compliant drivers which 
is very time consuming and in effect Gardaí could not keep up with their own detection rate.   
In 2018 in its report the Commission for the Future of Policing in Ireland would recommend 
that the Court Service take over service of summonses.  The wide Garda discretion in the 
cancellation of notices has been eroded and strict guidelines are now in place to delimit such 
discretion.  It is contended that all of what has been said in this section is compelling evidence 
of what Garland calls “the economic style of reasoning” and how it has “changed how criminal 
justice institutions control their staff and how they manage their internal actions.”1154 
 
Morris was critical of managerialism in AGS.  When asked by Morris if there “was a distinction 
between a service provided by a voluntary company such as a computer firm selling a product 
of service and An Garda Síochána?” a Garda of much experience replied: 
 
 No. Well I see both as providing a service, in the sense that the Garda Síochána is now 
providing a service to the public. It is more generated in the last number of years 
towards a service industry and I don’t use that word lightly, but it is expected and the 
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people expect it because they are paying our wages and we are subject to the taxpayers’ 
good wishes that we provide a service and that it would be done to the best of our ability 
… we are the unitary police force in the State and therefore the people expect the Garda 
Síochána to do the job.1155 
 
This is the view and mindset of a member of AGS.  However, Morris was having none of it 
when it held: 
 
 The Tribunal rejects this. This evidence expressed a view of the purpose and role of the 
police force in any modern State that is not in any way tenable. (emphasis added) 
Members of An Garda Síochána cannot be equated in any way with the service industry. 
In the history of the State many have died in the course of heroic efforts to enforce the 
law. They are vested with enormous powers and are obliged to account for these in a 
manner that preserves the integrity of the process of interaction through force with the 
people living in this country.1156 
 
Morris would investigate several policing matters that caused the AGS much turbulence.  The 
issues that were inquired could be said to be a microcosm of many important Garda functions.  
What Morris investigated, and his findings would be clearly set out in a series of 
comprehensive reports over a four-year period between 2004 and 2008.  The incidents that 
Morris would investigate go back essentially to 1993, the same year that managerialism would 
manifest itself in the AGS (infra). Since the mid-1990s in terms of economy and efficiency 
AGS was being scrutinised like never before. The trend would continue.  
 
Managerialism – Strategic Planning 
 
Garland argues that: 
 
Agencies like the police … that were once given statutory powers and responsibilities, 
an annual budget and a degree of freedom to get on with it, are now increasingly subject 
to state imposed standards and guidelines and are closely monitored and inspected to 
ensure they comply.1157  
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As stated before and as noted by McNiffe in 1997: “(i)nspections of guards and sergeants by 
superior officers was an integral part of the Garda Síochána organisation from the force’s 
inception in 1922.”1158  Officers carried out detailed inspections of entire stations.  The station 
records were examined to ensure that they were regular and correct. 
 
In modern times these inspections are still carried out by officers but because of the data 
recorded on PULSE much of the inspection (now called audits) can be carried out by each 
Superintendent and Chief Superintendent from their own offices before they arrive in a Garda 
station at all.  The result is that senior Garda officers do not spend too much time visiting 
stations any more.  PULSE is a significant instrument of Garda audit. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that these “audits” by senior officers are carried out, Morris was 
stingingly critical of AGS when it stated: “An Garda Síochána cannot be compared in industrial 
relations terms or in terms of its internal accounting to a business. It is not a commercial 
enterprise.”1159   The very strong emphasis now on the tracking of paperwork and ensuring that 
all enquiries are followed up is attributable to further criticism from Morris when it castigated 
Garda management when it stated “it is wrong to have in place a system whereby inspections 
by senior officers including the divisional commander and the regional commander do not 
involve scrutiny of paperwork.”1160 Traditionally inspections and audits carried out by senior 
officers focused on cash handling within stations and detection rates not to mention 
accommodation, equipment, transport, uniform and community issues.  
 
The advent of Information Technology has facilitated accountability in AGS in the aftermath 
of Morris. Traditionally all correspondence arriving or emanating from each office was 
recorded in correspondence registers and given its own file number.  This was effective from 
the point of view of recording if individual items of correspondence had arrived or had been 
sent but it was not effective in ensuring that it was responded to or replied to.  There was no 
easy way of checking this.  All correspondence registers are now computerised, and reminders 
are automatically flagged on the system highlighting if no reply has been received to any given 
item of communication.  The system automatically prints out a reminder to be forwarded to the 
correspondent reminding them that a response is sought.  Routine checks are carried out by 
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supervisors and management to ensure responses are received in time.  The system also permits 
checks to be carried out on the number of reminders sent in respect of any subject.  Excessive 
reminders and failing to respond to correspondence may lead to disciplinary sanction. 
 
P.U.L.S.E. went live in AGS during late 1998 and has profoundly changed the organisation at 
every level.  It permits Gardaí to record details of everything they do and everyone they deal 
with.  It is a massive source of information and an important tool in the investigation of crime.  
However, the process must be managed.  At its inception it was heralded inter alia as a paper 
reducing exercise.1161  Not so.  Gardaí will record a criminal incident on the PULSE system.  
A paper investigation file will then be opened in respect of each one.  If the crime has been 
detected the file will be prepared in full and submitted to the Garda authorities, or where 
appropriate, to the DPP for direction.  Each investigation file will be given a file number from 
the correspondence register.  This must also be recorded on the PULSE system for cross 
referencing and audit purposes.  Meetings are held on regular basis in each Garda District 
between local management and supervisors. Cases are tracked planned and discussed.  There 
is a large agenda at these meetings encapsulating all outstanding incidents requiring Garda 
review or attention.  Each agenda is easily generated from PULSE.  Updates of these meetings 
must then be recorded and dated on each individual crime record on the PULSE system.  Where 
the crime is not detected, then after witness statements have been taken and nothing evidential 
has come from scenes of crime examination, the paperwork is filed with a PULSE reference 
number and correspondence register number for audit and crime referencing purposes.  The 
investigating Gardaí in these cases must confirm that any CCTV available has been sought and 
viewed if it exists and that a door to door canvass for witnesses has taken place.  The file 
number is recorded on the PULSE system also for cross referencing and audit purposes.  The 
Inspectorate in 2014 (infra) was critical of AGS for acquiring large amounts of statements in 
cases where there was no likelihood of proceedings being taken further.1162  As noted by Rose 
“control workers whether they be police or psychiatrists thus have a new administrative 
function – in the administration of marginalia ensuring community protection through the 
identification of the riskiness of individuals.”1163 
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All Mandatory Alcohol Testing checkpoints are recorded on the PULSE system with details of 
detections if any in each case.  The checkpoint is even recorded if it is not carried out, but a 
reason must be given on the PULSE system for its non- performance and it must then be marked 
“invalid”.1164  In 2017 AGS would be scandalised inter alia on how it recorded these 
checkpoint on the PULSE system. (infra) 
 
In recent times the organisation implemented a new way for accounting for property and 
exhibits coming into the possession of AGS.  Traditionally these details were recorded in what 
was known as a ‘Property Book’ or a ‘Drugs Register’ if property concerned emanated from 
an illicit seizure of drugs.  Property Exhibit Management Stores (PEMS) are in the process of 
being set up country wide.  The PEMS system is a hugely effective instrument of accountability 
but much work is needed in setting up, managing and supervising the process.  As things stand 
each PEMS store has its own computer system.  Initially it was not linked to the PULSE system 
and there was much work involved to ensure that the PULSE property records and the PEMS 
record were ad idem. This has now changed.  Effectively when property arrives at the PEMS 
store it does so with a pro forma paper record and bar code with its own individual reference 
number and the PEMS/PULSE systems are now easily reconcilable.  Meanwhile a paper record 
remains on file at the PEMS store.  Each transaction after that regarding the tracking of any 
movement of an individual item of property generates more paperwork again and further 
updating of computer records. 
 
In a Garda Inspectorates Report dated the 1st February 2012 styled “Responding to Sexual 
Abuse” it stated that when carrying out its audits of Garda Districts nationwide it found that it 
had no effortless way of auditing if AGS was effectively dealing with allegations of child abuse 
and making the necessary referrals to the HSE.  What they found was filing cabinets full of 
investigative paperwork and record books in these matters but no easy way to cross reference 
or audit them to see that they had been properly concluded or could be cross referenced with 
HSE records.  The PULSE system was changed to permit such an audit.  HSE referrals now 
have their own separate category to facilitate audit and cross referencing. However, 
notwithstanding the improvements and enhancements on the PULSE system paper records are 
kept for everything. 
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The PULSE system continues to evolve. In the writers view it provides a system for 
management and supervisors to ensure that all matters are followed up and investigated to a 
conclusion.  However, the managing of the process is huge.  Copious hard copy lists are printed 
off in every Garda District to ensure that every incident on PULSE is closed off in every detail.  
The role-outs, enhancements and modifications to the PULSE system continue and create a 
constant state of flux in managing the whole process.  No sooner has one got to grips with the 
system as it is when a new enhancement brings with it more checking, monitoring and cross 
referencing.  In 2018 in a Report from the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland it 
stated that “the current PULSE system dates from the 1990s.  It is neither a crime investigation 
tool or a management tool. It is an incident recording system that has become too complex and 
slow and is proving difficult even in the functions for which it was originally designed.”1165  
 
The PULSE system has not reduced the paperwork of the organisation.  It is an effective 
instrument in monitoring that paperwork, but it doesn’t decrease it.  It adds to it and runs 
parallel to it.  As noted by the Inspectorates Report of 2014 (infra) there is “unnecessary 
duplication of PULSE reports with paper reports.”1166  It is all about managing the process and 
managing risk.  The risk being the failure of the organisation to follow up on something it 
should have followed up on to avoid embarrassing scandals for the organisation.  It is also 
about the avoidance of blame and damage limitation.  In the event of serious issues arising, the 
organisation itself and the people in it can protect themselves by highlighting the systems that 
were in place to prevent such failure.  However, the system is only as good as the people who 
manage it, use it and supervise it.  If sufficient suitable personnel are not in place to manage 
the system or supervise it, then it is inevitable that the problems that the PULSE system was 
intended to avoid will continue to occur. The PULSE system itself is subject to audit by the 
Data Protection Commissioner as highlighted by Fiona Gartland in the Irish Times on the 23rd 
February 2012 with an article headlined “Garda Pulse System Audit to go ahead.”1167  The Data 
Commissioner has checked the Garda PULSE Information process for unlawful use of 
information contained on the system.  There are strong statutory penalties for persons or 
organisations found in breach.  The Audit uncovered some irregularities but nothing of 
substantial significance. 
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It is submitted therefore that what Garland says is correct when he states:  
  
Within specific agencies and organizations performance indicators and management 
measures have narrowed professional discretion and tightly regulated work practices.  
Across the system as a whole a new system of monitoring, information technology and 
financial auditing have extended centralized control over a process that was previously 
less well co-ordinated.1168 
 
The Garda process as described here is also evidence of what Rose asserts: 
 
Risk classifications tend to become the means by which such professionals think, act 
and justify their actions.  In that service the very gaze of the control professional and 
the nature of their encounter with their client, patient or suspect is liable to be formatted 
by the demands and objections of risk management.1169  
 
Risk management – the identification, assessment, elimination or reduction of the 
possibility of misfortune or loss – has thus become an integral part of the professional 
responsibility of a host of professions.1170 
 
 
Notwithstanding the lofty managerialist speak in the reports emanating from AGS in the 1990s 
and noughties serious shortcomings in Garda planning and managing serious investigations 
were exposed by Morris.  In a report into the investigation into the death of Richard Barron 
Morris would say, “(t)he theory that Mr. Barron was murdered was never built of firm 
foundations.  The six incriminating statements of ‘Mr. X’ had never been analysed … against 
existing statements of honest people.”1171  Gardaí in all investigations routinely cross-reference 
statements and the Incident Room is crucial for that purpose.  It requires strict and proper 
management. Morris would hold that this broke down in Donegal. However more criticism of 
the organisation was to come, “(t)he failure to call in a forensic pathologist is completely 
inexplicable in the light of the burden of proof in criminal cases.”1172  The scene of all road 
fatalities should be closed off and forensically investigated.  The Gardaí believed the death of 
Richard Barron was murder and the fact that a forensic doctor was not called in by the Gardaí 
“was indication of the most unbelievable incompetence on the part of the senior officer in the 
Donegal Division.”1173 
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Morris would also refer to the morale of Gardaí in the Donegal Division and laid the blame for 
poor morale with Garda management: 
 One should not lose sight of the disgraceful extent to which the morale of the Gardaí in 
the Donegal Division had fallen during and as a result of all this.  One has an example 
of a Garda taping a conversation with his Chief Superintendent apparently for his own 
protection.  It demonstrates in my view a collapse in the leadership qualities associated 
with an officer holding the rank of Chief Superintendent.1174 
 
There was more stinging criticism to come.  “The situation in County Donegal was 
characterised by an almost indescribable breakdown in morale of senior officers who were at 
each other’s throats.”1175  The lack of impartiality of Gardaí was further an issue, “(f)ault … 
has to be laid on the entire organisation of the Incident Room, its lack of objectivity, its chaotic 
nature and its hysterical determination to prove the culpability of suspects.”1176The lack of 
impartiality is further evidenced in finding that, “(t)he device as put on the mast by Sergeant 
(named) for the purpose of effecting arrests under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State 
Act 1939 in respect of an earlier arson attack.  Either this was done by him or on his behalf.”1177 
 
Morris held that the Gardaí planted evidence to ground arrests and similarly criticised two 
Gardaí who, “(m)anipulated the procurement of false information … then furnished to the 
investigation team which grounded the search warrant on foot of which the house was 
searched.”1178  
 
Never has AGS been so strongly and disturbingly criticised in how it went about its work.   
Morris was concerned, “(w)ith potential for catastrophic injustice that arises when laws are 
flouted, protections abandoned and lies told by some Gardaí in pursuit of those whom they 
regard as guilty”1179 and was: 
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 Staggered by the amount of indiscipline and insubordination it has found in the Garda 
force.  There is a small but disproportionally influential core of mischief making 
members who will not obey orders, who will not follow procedures, who will not tell 
the truth and who have no respect for their officers.1180  
  
Morris was unsparing but AGS would respond in the language of managerialism.  It is being 
submitted that what Morris found was very much at variance with what was being presented in 
the Gardaí’s own managerialist reports. Conway in 2010 would state that “Justice Morris told 
Ireland what was wrong with the police force, but Ireland has failed to listen.”1181  AGS would 
disagree and would point inter alia to the following changes: 
 
i) HETAC accredited Batchelor of Art Programme in Police Management for 
Senior Officers  
ii) Officers going on transfer or promotion have been told that it is now policy that 
such transfer “may require permanent relocation to other areas.”  
iii) A civilian has been appointed head of the Internal Audit Section.  
iv) Each Assistant Commissioner is now “prime managerial strategist for his/her 
domain of responsibility.”  
 
v) Regular meetings between managers are now held at District, Divisional and at 
Regional level.1182 
 
AGS would also state that “street level policing will benefit from the cascading of external 
professional assistance at Headquarters “1183 and that developments at a strategic level “will 
result in a cascading of new and improved processes to the Tactical Operation level within the 
Garda Síochána.”1184  AGS would also say that Information and Communications Technology 
“skill”1185, “competences and abilities”1186 need to be developed to deliver “the conceptual 
architecture, hardware and software platforms and technical support to service customer needs 
and expectations …”1187  Indeed, AGS would also need to build, “Professional H.R. capacity 
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incorporating core H.R. competencies and business processes to serve the operational policing 
organisation.”1188  AGS would also advise that, “(r)eports 3, 4 and 5 of the Morris Tribunal 
have been reviewed and synopsised.  The main issues raised in the three reports have been 
distilled into the following core themes …”1189   
  
In the aftermath of Morris AGS continues to embrace managerialism and the language of the 
corporate world in its planning notwithstanding that Morris emphatically rejects same as 
having place in AGS.  Morris would say: 
 
 An Garda Síochána cannot be compared in industrial relations terms or in terms of 
internal accounting as a business 1190… (Policing) is a serious business.  It is not a matter 
in which industrial relations chaos can be brought without potentially affecting 
everyone in Ireland.1191 
 
While Morris was one of the most stinging indictments of Garda management since the 
foundation of AGS, its management would continue to be rocked by other scandals since the 
time of Morris.  Many them are dealt with in other chapters but there is one incident that 
occurred at or around the same time frame of the incidents that were examined by Morris but 
not connected to that Inquiry.  In Abbeylara1192 Mr. Justice Barr would castigate Garda 
management and planning. He held that two senior Garda Officers “as scene commanders had 
primary responsibility for the circumstances which led to Mr. John Carthy’s death.”1193 Carthy 
had been involved in an armed stand-off with Gardaí.  This was a damning finding at the time, 
but the officers concerned might now take some consolation in that their efforts ensured that 
nobody else was killed or injured.  It is submitted that what the police faced in Newtown, 
Connecticut, U.S.A. on the 14th December 2012 and Las Vegas on the 1st October 2017 would 
later give some context text to what occurred in Abbeylara. A total of 28 people were killed in 
Connecticut while 58 were slaughtered in Las Vegas. In both cases a single gunman carried the 
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shootings If Abbeylara were to occur now, it is suggested the criticism of Garda action might 
not be as harsh. 
 
The Garda “managerialist ethos” in its strategic planning goes back to the Strategic 
Management Initiative (SMI)1194 which emanated from a Government Report styled 
“Delivering Better Government (1996).”1195 It was stated that the “culture of the Garda 
Síochána needs to change from a command and control style to a more consultative 
management style.  Middle and senior management should be visible and accessible to all ranks 
and members should be given feedback on performance including praise for a job well 
done.”1196  Some ten years later Morris would reject this view and declared “(m)embers of An 
Garda Síochána cannot be equated in any way with the service industry.”1197  As mentioned 
earlier but more specifically here the SMI also introduced a human resource allocation model 
known at the Garda Establishment Redistribution Model (G.E.R.M.).1198 This model sought 
answers to four questions: 
 
1)  What do the Gardaí do? 
2)  How much do they do? 
3)  How much time do they spend doing what they do?   
4)  How many Gardaí should be doing it? 
 
The SMI Management project team set out to get answers to these questions and identified in 
excess of two thousand tasks that the Gardaí perform.  The project team used what was called 
“datawand” technology among a sample number of personnel to establish “some indication of 
how much time Gardaí spent on the identified tasks. Gardaí using the “datawand” could record 
the time spent on each activity when it was swiped across the relevant barcode.1199 
 
Contrast for a moment the words of Regan who accompanied Gardaí for a number of weeks in 
the mid-1990s while researching his book.  He states: - 
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The police are called in when a situation gets ugly and unmanageable.  They are not 
around to see the build-up.  There is no time to prepare.  The radio gives out the 
command and in they go dropped into the centre of chaos armed with only their wits 
and a piece of wood.  Violence for some is an everyday thing, a way of life, a way of 
expressing themselves and when it erupts we expect the Gardaí to get in there and sort 
it out.  The Garda has to understand the language of violence and be eloquent in its use.  
This is what we ask of them.1200 
 
These words give context to the SMI project and “datawand” technology.  The team was 
endeavouring to pigeonhole Garda tasks that do not lend themselves easily to such labelling.  
It is submitted that the very fact that “the team identified in excess of two thousand such tasks” 
supports this.1201  Any occupation that can perform in excess of two thousand tasks cannot ever 
lend itself fully or comfortably to the reasoning of economics, managerialism and the factors 
of production.  The final report of the Committee when it was issued in 2003 was given 
anything but an enthusiastic endorsement by members of the Garda representative bodies of all 
ranks who were part of the committee.1202 
 
It is submitted that what the SMI report tried to achieve is similar to what Garland says occurred 
to “criminal justice agencies in the U.S.A. and U.K.”1203 from the mid-1980s.  He called it “this 
systemization of criminal justice.”1204  He argues that “a different way of approaching problems 
has emerged, a style that might be described as economic rather than social.  This way of 
thinking has shaped how criminal justice practitioners make decisions, how they allocate 
resources and how they deploy their powers.”1205 In the end the G.E.RM. model as it was 
known was embraced by AGS and became the guide to Garda management in the equitable 
allocation of personnel between districts.1206 
 
The Inspectorate some two decades later in 2014 would make further pejorative findings of 
Garda management regarding the allocation of personnel within the organization i.e. G.E.R.M. 
model.  It has this to say: 
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During the inspection process the Inspectorate did not meet any senior Garda who was 
able to explain the rationale behind the numbers of people in particular divisions or in 
national units and could not recall when the allocation of resources was last 
reviewed.1207 
 
The Garda Síochána has a model called G.E.R.M. (Garda Establishment Reserve 
Model) created in 1999 for allocating Garda resources but it has been a considerable 
period of time since this model redistributed staff.1208 
 
So, the benchmark by which Garda management allocated staff and resources was not known 
by the managers themselves. Waddington’s words as highlighted previously about “bright 
ideas are implemented without any systematic evaluation at all or if evaluated are doomed to 
success because senior officers cannot be seen to have erred”1209 come to mind. 
 
In the writers view the work of AGS was hampered by the lack of supervisors between circa 
2010 and 2016. Garda Districts have a serious lack of supervisors of Sergeant rank.  The 
Inspectorate has highlighted this in its 2014 report.1210 Every shift needs its individual 
supervisors.  Members of all ages need supervision and instruction in good practice.  There 
were many units without supervisors and heavily tasked supervisors on other units covering 
the unsupervised unit notwithstanding that they do not work the same hours of work at them.  
In 2018 the situation is being remedied with substantial promotions to supervisory rank. The 
Gardaí are subject to the discipline regulations, the criminal law, civil law and judicial review.  
They are subject to investigation by the Garda authorities and G.S.O.C. and subject to audit by 
Professional Standards Unit (P.S.U) and the Headquarter based Garda Internal Audit Section 
(G.I.A.S.) – the organisation’s own internal audit group.  It is contended that it is wrong that 
Gardaí are vulnerable to discipline and investigation when they are not allocated supervisors 
to supervise them and it is particularly wrong to have overburdened supervisors being over-
tasked with supervision to the extent that they just cannot watch or be there for everything. It 
is submitted that the S.M.I and the G.E.R.M model are examples of what was argued by 
Golding and Savage:  
 
(p)olice management is premised on an assumption now taken largely for granted that 
policing can be ‘managed’ as such.  This is not a straight forward assumption as it made 
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clear; some scholars have questioned whether management principles and processes 
which apply to other organisations private and public can ever apply to the specific 
world of the police organization.1211   
 
Waddington in particular has articulated this thesis by arguing that ‘management by 
objectives’ involving a cycle of objective setting plans to achieve objectives and 
assessments and review of outcomes in terms of performance is a model which cannot 
realistically apply in a policing context.1212 
 
Why?  Policing is reactive rather than pursuing goals.1213 
 
These remarks are supported by Reiner who argues that “what the police are is as important as 
what the police do – and as such policing cannot be reduced to the execution of measurable 
tasks as performance measurements as management appears to assume.”1214  The Inspectorate’s 
report dealt solely with how the Garda management investigated crime, but the same 
difficulties manifest themselves in other areas of work.  In the AGS Policing Plan of 2015 
makes reference to Section 22 of Garda Síochána Act 2005.  This piece of legislation sets out 
that the Commissioner must include in its Plan any station closures or openings that are to take 
place in following year.  When the Gardaí closed one hundred stations in response to Minister 
Shatter’s order to rationalise in 2012 the Gardaí closed Kilmihil Garda Station in Co. Clare on 
the 31st January,2013 and moved its staff to Lisseycasey Garda Station.  Kilmihil Station is a 
new purpose-built Garda Station but nevertheless it was closed.    The AGS 2015 Policing Plan 
now announces that staff are being reallocated from Lisseycasey to the purpose built Kilmihil 
Garda Station because the OPW has declared that it will not be renewing the 99-year lease on 
Lisseycasey Garda Station when it expires in 2016. 
 
It contended that on the face it difficult to comprehend the initial decision to close Kilmihil 
Garda Station. PULSE was meant to be an instrument that grounded Garda planning.  Instead 
the management of PULSE became a burden that distracted from that purpose.  Morris would 
find the practices of the corporate world should have no place in policing, but these practices 
continue to permeate AGS and Garda managers continue to struggle to equate budgets with 
strategic plans and coping with the unexpected.  
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Managerialism – Resources 
 
The greatest resource of AGS is its members. Garda management’s greatest responsibility is 
not only how it manages them but how it treats them, when they highlight problems, 
particularly in relation to resourcing. A Deputy Garda Commissioner who gave evidence at 
Morris stated afterwards in 2008 that Morris “created an awakening that the 21st century 
required a new paradigm for the Garda Síochána: that is policing to accountability.”1215  
Cormac O’Keeffe in the Irish Examiner on the 6th July 2012, some four years later in an article 
headlined “Garda members issued with gag order over station closures” cited an internal Garda 
H.Q. Directive as follows: 
 
 (m)embers of An Garda Síochána are forbidden to communicate either directly or 
through some other person with any public representative or other person with the 
objective of lobbying or otherwise attempting to influence any future decision of the 
Commissioner without his express authority on the matter.1216  
 
 
The Commissioner’s decisions regarding station closures and district realignments were 
publicly released only five months later in the Policing Plan for 2013.  So, what were the 
grounds for the so called “gagging order?” The Commissioner’s directive is at least inconsistent 
with the earlier words “policing to accountability”1217 and in the end, this matter was only an 
efficiency/ management/resourcing issue and not human rights one, but Garda managers have 
always been sensitive to criticism on how they manage resources.    
 
On the 24th November 2013 an editorial in the Sunday Independent criticised the management 
of AGS for “the mentality of the barrack room”1218 when they moved to discipline Detective 
Garda over his appearance on the popular T.V. drama “Love Hate”. Garda bosses were 
concerned about what this detective Garda was doing in his spare time. He was type cast 
playing a detective Garda in the T.V drama who did not hold his on screen Garda manager in 
high regard.  
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In a front-page headline in The Examiner on the 20th April 2015 the “gagging” word appeared 
again.  The headline went “Gardaí   call for end to political gagging.”1219 In an article again by 
Cormac O’Keeffe it was reported that rank and file Gardaí “have called on Garda management 
to open up to the public so it can see the force is not a secretive or suppressive organisation”.  
The article reported the Garda Representative Association as stating that the Garda Press Office 
is “often restricted when the force came under scrutiny but laid the blame on Garda bosses: 
(t)his is the responsibility of our leadership to explain the situation as it happens in a timely 
and responsible manner.  “The organisation cannot look for permission to speak from a political 
master.  As it stands too many careers are dependent upon political interference.”1220 
 
The Irish Examiner’s editorial of the same date supports the G.R.A.’s view: 
 
This is the kind of initiative that could if done openly and honestly, rebuild the Forces’ 
image and undo the damage caused by the former justice Minister Michael McDowell’s 
gagging legislation, legislation that has deeply damaged the relationship between the 
public, the media and this society’s understanding of the daily challenges faced by its 
police force.1221 
 
The Guerin Report contains criticism and examples of the intransigence of Garda management.  
Garda Whistle-blowers had made allegations concerning the deficiencies of accommodation 
and resources at Bailieboro Garda Station, Co. Cavan.  A Garda Inspector (referred to as 
Inspector Delta) in a minute to Garda management in respect of the accommodation issue 
stated, “(t)he station clearly reflects the ambivalence of transient District Officers over a 
protected period.”1222 
 
Guerin commented that “the deficiencies in the accommodation and resourcing at Bailieboro 
were widely recognised” but what  
 
causes concern in relation to this particular incident is whether it is reflective of the way 
in which criticism of Garda management was handled within the Force.  Inspector Delta 
was effectively saying that a particular problem was not being dealt with because no-
one served long enough as District Officer to be committed to solving it.  That is an 
implicit criticism of policing and practice of allocating newly appointed 
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Superintendents to Bailieboro for short periods of time … At the time Inspector Delta 
had served as Inspector within the Division for more than ten years.  It would be a 
matter for concern that a critical voice of an experienced officer would be silenced; it 
would be a matter of altogether greater concern if an effort were made to pretend that 
he had never spoken.1223 
 
In the same report Guerin was also critical of Garda management for the routine preference for 
the evidence of senior officers in respect of whom complaints had been made and that 
“conclusions were arrived at as a result of the investigative process without there ever being a 
thorough and searching test of the evidence.”1224 
 
Two senior officers initially investigated the complaints made by Sergeant McCabe.  Their 
report was referred to in the Guerin Report as the Byrne/McGinn report.  Later Deputy 
Commissioner Rice carried out a review of this report.  Guerin had this to say: 
 
Commissioner Rice expressed the view that the Byrne/McGinn investigation was 
professional, impartial and carried out properly.  He was satisfied in respect of the 
investigation … that all matters were fully enquired into.  Given the various outstanding 
issues identified during my review I cannot share the view that all matters were fully 
enquired into.  Having regard to the apparent failure to give Sergeant McCabe an 
opportunity to comment on evidence and the answers of superior officers were accepted 
without ever testing them too rigorously against other available evidence or given 
Sergeant McCabe an opportunity to respond to them.  I cannot share the generally 
approving conclusions of Deputy Commissioner Rice’s review.1225 
 
 Higher ranking Gardaí in this instant did not appear to give a low-ranking member the facility 
of due process in the investigation of his complaints.   
 
Guerin goes on to say: 
 
The overall impression given by the internal Garda investigation process was that 
complaints of matters of concern were put through a process of filtration and distillation 
so that by the end of the process any matter of concern had been removed as a form of 
impurity and only what was good was found to remain.1226   
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It is submitted that Waddington might agree when he said that “(t)he punishment centered 
bureaucracy operates to ensure that any responsibility for wrongdoing remains with the lower 
echelons and rarely implicates their superiors.”1227 
 
Notwithstanding that Garda management had embraced managerialism since the mid 1990’s 
and had trumpeted its merits and advantages to the organisation in its internal Communiqué 
magazine for the years the Garda Inspectorates investigation into how Gardaí manage crime 
and its subsequent report would view things differently. 
 
In the foreword of the report it said: 
 
The Inspectorate has found a police service in critical need of modernisation of its crime 
investigation, operational and support infrastructure.  The absence of up to date 
technology and date of inefficient investigative processes and policies combined with 
internal audit controls inconsistent with case management and poor supervisory 
practices had led to the systematic operating deficiencies identified in this and other 
recent government-initiated reports.  As a result, potentially, hundreds of thousands of 
Garda staff hours and resources which should be spent on front line policing are 
currently allocated to those inefficient processes.1228  
 
 
This is straight forward language.  There is no mention here of “strategic goals”, “mission 
statements”, “performance indicators” or “corporate strategies”.  The Inspectorate went on: 
“(t)he Inspectorate had identified several deficiencies in recording practices.  The veracity of 
crime recording in Ireland would have to be addressed.”1229  The Communiqué Journal is no 
longer being published by the organisation. 
 
The Inspectorate made a series of other negative findings which would make difficult reading 
for a proud organization. 
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• Unnecessary bureaucracy with the organisation and significant numbers of Gardaí 
in non-operational roles performing administrative functions and there were 
imbalances in the number of members across districts.1230  
• Control Rooms outside the Dublin Metropolitan Region sometimes operate below 
minimum staff levels.1231  
• Large amounts of statements taken in cases where there is no prospect of a 
prosecution taking place.1232  
• Lack of availability of Patrol Sergeants and Inspectors to supervise members in the 
investigation of crime.1233 
• Reception areas of certain Garda Stations are unsuitable for discussing matters of a 
sensitive nature.1234 
• Limited evidence of supervisors checking PULSE incidents to ensure correct 
recording of crime.1235 
• Unnecessary duplication of PULSE records with paper records.1236 
 
It is submitted all these issues are basic policing and organisational matters.  The criticism in 
the report is extensive. It submitted that it would be difficult to reconcile the Inspectorate’s 
criticism of the organisation with the glossy documents and colourful language, policing plans, 
reports and mission statements that have emanated from Garda Headquarters over the last 20 
years.  In 2018 a report of the Commission of the Future of Policing in Ireland stated that AGS 
“needs to take better care of its employees.”1237  It went on to state that AGS “should foster and 
environment of psychological safety where people feel empowered to speak up and share 
ideas1238 … personnel at all levels, sworn and non-sworn, should be encouraged to speak up, 
share ideas, challenge current orthodoxies and develop new initiatives.”1239   
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Managerialism - Staffing 
 
Traditionally, in the writer’s experience Garda Superintendents had a strong autonomy in how 
they progress serious investigations.  When a serious crime occurred within a Superintendent’s 
district it was essentially a case that he/she adopted an ‘all hands-on deck approach’.  Teams 
were set up to prepare house to house questionnaires, others to make door to door enquiries, 
Plain Clothes personnel were tasked with the more sensitive enquiries.  An incident room was 
set up and properly staffed.  The Superintendent it is submitted did not have to be overly 
conscious of the cost of his/her investigation because a serious crime had to be fully 
investigated and solved.  The Superintendent had no devolved budget and the Commissioner 
was not the Accounting Officer.  As noted by Garland “there has never been a time when police 
… did not complain that their budgets were inadequate”1240 but today Garland argues that “the 
practices of crime control and criminal justice are required to talk the economic language of 
‘cost benefit’, ‘best value’ and ‘fiscal responsibility’”1241.  The Superintendent who is first and 
foremost a police officer must now think of his/her budget.  He/She must think of the rosters 
of his/her staff that is, who is working, when they are working and when they are off duty.  
Enquiries and follow up investigations might be assigned to members who are working but not 
necessarily the most accomplished or experienced investigators.  It is difficult to determine 
therefore how this might  impact on an investigation or what serious matters remain unsolved 
because of this practice.  Sometimes judgment calls are made which leave experienced 
investigators at home on their days off while less experienced personnel carry out sensitive 
enquiries.  All this because the Superintendents are very mindful not to exhaust their budget. 
If he/she does so, it could adversely affect the way other events are policed in his/her district 
for the remainder of the year and additional resources may have to sought. 
 
It is submitted that it is difficult to know if a Superintendent’s distraction with the budget affects 
an outcome of a criminal investigation.  In such cases it is a lonely role and if there are 
shortcomings highlighted in the investigation afterwards the Superintendent is likely to pay an 
adverse price with his/her career and standing possibly compromised or seriously damaged.   
He/She may even face a tribunal of inquiry, a civil action or a G.S.O.C. investigation leading 
to disciplinary or criminal charges. 
                                               






A Superintendent’s budget also plays a huge role in how cases are prosecuted in court.  Over 
the decades individual Gardaí attended court as witnesses to prosecute their case.   Nowadays 
a case will rarely go ahead on its first appearance in court.  Solicitors acting on behalf of 
defendants will normally apply for the prosecution paperwork in each case and evaluate same.  
On its first appearance in court a case will be adjourned for approximately one month to enable 
solicitors to advise their clients.  On the second occasion in court there will either be a plea of 
guilty or a date will be fixed for the hearing of the case, if no such plea is forthcoming.  If such 
a hearing date is fixed this will almost certainly be on a date when the Garda witnesses are 
rostered to work to avoid the payment of overtime.  As stated by the Commissioner in his 
evidence to the PAC “Going to court is an expensive item.  There are huge expenses and factors 
involved.”1242 This distillation of cases means that a prosecuting Garda may never have to 
attend court with substantial savings to the taxpayer.  However, the loss of court experience to 
investigating Gardaí is incalculable.   
 
The State makes further savings in the Circuit Court in respect of appeals from the District 
Court.  In the past, all investigating Gardaí would attend the Appeals Court and give evidence 
of the facts of their respective cases whether contested or not.  Today in general, a Sergeant is 
tasked with briefing himself/herself on all cases before the Appeal Court so that s/he gives 
evidence in each case where only the severity of the sentence handed down in the District Court 
is in issue.  Again, there is a substantial savings to the taxpayer in these instances.   However, 
there is an element of false economy as Gardaí lose out on valuable court experience and no 
matter how well the presenting Sergeant prepares himself/herself he/she will not know as much 
about the case or the accused as the detecting members themselves.  A valuable or helpful 
nugget of information could go astray which otherwise might have led the court to a different 
outcome. Sergeants who are tasked with this duty can have a large volume of cases and must 
do justice to each one. Any shortcomings in his/her information to the Court can have dire 
consequences.  As highlighted by Michael Clifford in the Irish Examiner on the 15th April 2014 
in a high-profile case there was a “failure by Gardaí to inform the Court” that the person 
charged before it “was already on bail.” This resulted in the suspect been released again on 
                                               





bail.  Shortly afterwards he murdered a separate victim.1243 The matter was part of the terms of 
reference of the recent Guerin Report.   
 
Historically Superintendents and Inspectors normally prosecuted cases in the District Court.  
In Dublin a Presenting Sergeant presents the case if there is a plea of guilty, otherwise the case 
is dealt with by a Superintendent or Inspector.  What is known as a Court Presenters allowance 
is payable to the Sergeant who performs this duty on a full-time basis.  It is an effective and 
serious cost saving measure which the organisation would like to extend countrywide. 
 
Due to the volumes of drugs exhibits being forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory in 
Dublin, several Gardaí in each district were trained to carry out preliminary tests on such 
exhibits to establish if they are of the genus cannabis.  The trained Gardaí then submitted a 
statement of evidence in respect of his/her own examination for each court/investigation file.  
If there was a plea of guilty then there was no difficulty but if the accused chooses to contest 
the matter, then the Forensic Laboratory analysed the exhibit for court.   This is simply another 
example of how AGS endeavours to cut court costs and reduce the workload of the staff at the 
Forensic Science Laboratory. 
 
As contended by Garland: 
 
  (r)ecently however a different way of approaching problems has emerged, a style that 
might be described as ‘economic’ rather than ‘social’. This way of thinking has shaped 
how criminal justice practitioners made decisions, how they allocate resources and how 
they deploy their powers.1244 
 
 
The Inspectorate states that in other jurisdictions serious crime is investigated by detectives 
and specialist units.  In response to this criticism AGS now assigns a Detective Garda to every 
crime reported notwithstanding the member who first attends the scene.1245  The Inspectorate 
found in some rural areas the allocations of members investigating crime might be determined 
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by who is available rather than who has the skills available to investigate a serious crime.”1246  
This goes back to the Superintendent’s budget which was highlighted earlier in this chapter.  
The report also highlighted “a disconnect between what senior officers thought detectives 
investigate and what they do in practice”1247 and that only 25% of available training time was 
spent on operational policy and criminal investigation.1248 
 
The issue of frontline supervision was raised with the Inspectorate during its visits to selected 
stations by members of AGS.  The Inspectorate noted that, “prior to the implementation of the 
new Garda roster some regular units were already operating without a Sergeant on each unit.  
The introducing of the roster has further reduced the presence of Sergeants in front line 
operation roles. “ 1249 
 
The Inspectorate later went on: 
 
Throughout the inspection operational problems with rosters featured in every visit.  
The impact of “one size fits all” roster is having a serious impact on policing in Ireland. 
 
No additional staffing was allocated to create this fifth unit and personnel had to be 
found from other units. 
 
The new roster does not meet the demands of policing.1250  
 
Perhaps some explanation is necessary.  Since the Conroy Report1251 in 1970 where 
recommendations revolutionised pay and conditions in AGS a new roster was put in place.   
The Guards would now have certainty regarding hours, shifts and rest days over a 4-week 
period which would repeat itself every 4 weeks.  Prior to this Gardaí worked at the whim of 
the organisation with very little time off and there was no such thing as overtime.  The new 
system was known as the ‘three relief system’.  The three shifts of eight hours every day from 
6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (Early Tour), 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. (Late Tour) and 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. (Night Tour).  
While three Garda units covered each 24-hour period and fourth unit was on ‘rest days.’ 
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The new Garda roster introduced in 2012 was agreed by Garda management and the Garda 
Staff Associations.  It is argued that it was an ill-conceived but well-meaning effort which was 
grounded in an E.U. Directive to allow 11 hours rest periods for workers between shifts.    AGS 
could have sought a derogation from the E.U. Directive but chose not to do so.  All concerned 
thought that that they could do better than the long standing and very effective three relief 
system.  Garda management thought the new roster to be in ease to their budgets while Garda 
Staff Associations liked the 6 ten-hour days on duty followed by 4 rest days.  To make the new 
roster work needed a fifth unit.  No additional resources were available to make the fifth unit 
(shift) so the fifth unit was staffed by depleting the existing four units.  The five-unit system 
allows for some overlap of personnel between two shifts of ten hours, but it is not working.  In 
2018 the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland noted that “virtually every member 
of the police that we have consulted has complained to us that the roster is neither fit for purpose 
nor good for the well-being of police members.   It is long past the time when this problem 
should have been resolved.”1252 It should be sorted out immediately.   As asserted by 
Waddington,  
 
repeatedly well-intentioned programmes are implemented inadequately with the result 
that they fail or have perverse effect.  Programmes are introduced without clear aims or 
any definite plan for implementation.  In the Notting Hill sector policing trial 
evaluations came to the conclusion that senior management was beguiled by the various 
‘management speak’ that surrounded the scheme - a triumph of appearance over 
substance … but many ‘bright ideas’ are implemented without any systematic 
evaluation at all or if evaluated they are doomed to ‘succeed’ because senior officers 
cannot be seen to have erred.1253 
 
 
It is submitted that Waddington’s words are an example of management’s implementation of 
the new Garda roster.   In the writer’s view it is difficult to understand how a five-unit system 
could be preferred to the long standing four-unit system with no increase in personnel or 
supervision.  The roster was established at a time when there was no recruitment into the 
organisation and little promotion of supervisors. 
 
In the early noughties in the noble effort to bring down road deaths the Gardaí pursued a policy 
to increase road traffic detection rates.  It became known as Operation Lifesaver.  Extra speed 
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traps and checkpoints were set up across the country.  New Garda Traffic Corps Units were set 
up throughout the jurisdiction and where such units already existed their staffing levels were 
increased.   Gardaí and Sergeants were taken from regular policing units and were seconded to 
Garda Traffic Corps Units.  The regular policing units who are responsible for keeping stations 
open to the public and keeping patrol cars on the road, the implementation of the Custody 
Regulations and having a beat patrol in towns and villages were reduced and their numbers 
were not replaced.  The Traffic Corps was to be and is solely and enforcement unit.  They 
perform checkpoints, speed checks, issue FCPS notices and enforce drink driving laws.    
Traditionally in the writer’s experience members of the Traffic Corps had more senior status 
in terms of years and service and had a good knowledge of Irish and E.U. Law Directives 
pertaining to vehicles and large articulated vehicles.  The new Traffic Corps were younger and 
had no such experience and training.  As the Garda Inspectorate would find (infra) there was 
little, or no training given to members regarding the FCPS system.  For the most part they were 
given FCPS notice books and directed to issue notices. 
 
The Garda Inspectorate in their examination in 2014 would also highlight a number of issues 
including: 
 
• In more rural areas, the allocation of a serious crime might be determined by who is 
available, rather than who has the skills or experience to investigate a particular crime; 
• Responsibilities of traffic units must include investigating collisions, crime prevention 
and crime investigation; 
• Community Gardaí should be allocated for crimes to investigate; 
• With the introduction of the pilot roster some pro-active specialist units were disbanded 
or reduced in numbers, whilst administration units maintained many Gardaí that could 
be redeployed to operational duties; 
• Administrative posts should also be reduced first to maintain patrol numbers delivering 
police services. 1254 
 
On a regular policing unit Gardaí are exposed to all types of investigations.  Any type of crime 
can be reported to a Garda when on station, patrol car and beat duties.  If a crime is reported to 
                                               




them then they must follow it up.  Ideally a supervisor and Detective Branch member will assist 
them in that regard.  Although the Guerin Report (infra) and the Inspectorate Report (supra) 
were critical of Garda management in that regard.  In addition, Gardaí on a regular unit were 
routinely exposed to the implementation of the Custody Regulations which is one of their most 
important statutory and human rights functions.  It is submitted that all this experience is lost 
or blunted even after a short secondment to the Traffic Corps not to mention a full time one. 
 
The Inspectorate was critical of the Traffic Corps and stated that “the responsibility of Traffic 
Units must include the investigation of collisions, crime prevention and crime investigation” 
(supra).  It is submitted that maintaining the Traffic Corps as solely an enforcement unit has 
created problems within the organisation.  What Waddington says is known as “figures” or 
“activity” in the UK1255 is known here as a “return of work”.  The FCPS system makes 
detections for the Traffic Corps very straight forward.  The Traffic Corps members just issue 
the notice, send a copy electronically or by hard copy to the FCPS office for processing.  The 
detecting member would hear no more about it unless the fine wasn’t paid, and he/she had to 
attend court to prosecute the offence.  The processing of summonses was all handled by the 
FCPS Office.  Before this Traffic Corps members made their detections, returned to the station 
and had to make out summonses for themselves and follow the case through to conclusion.  
The new system meant that detections increased but the summons service rate was only at 48% 
(supra).  It was the regular units and not the Traffic Corps members who had to serve the 
summonses and these units were depleted and tied up on other mainstream policing duties.  The 
Garda Inspectorate was critical of AGS in this matter. Serving a summons can take time and 
the service rate was poor.  Many people comply with the system and pay their fines but those 
who don’t had approximately 50% chance of evading detection.  In 2014 the Garda Inspectorate 
stated that: 
 
   Summonses must be served by a member of the Garda Síochána and the time diverted 
to serving summonses which at best has less than a fifty per cent success rate impacts 
on Garda availability to undertake more urgent policing duties.  The Inspectorate 
believes the high level of Garda resources involved in the summons process and the 
low outputs for all the effort involved is inefficient.1256 
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There can be many genuine reasons for non-service such as people leaving the jurisdiction, 
changing address within the jurisdiction.  There is also difficulty in serving summonses on 
companies or on persons who are not domiciled in the jurisdiction.  AGS works on improving 
the situation but it is a difficult area.  In 2018 the Report from the Commission of the Future 
of Policing in Ireland recommended the Court Service take over the whole area of the service 
of summonses. 
 
In circa 15,000 cases the FCPS office couldn’t process the notice submitted by the detecting 
member (supra) and would return the notice to the detecting member with a query.  There are 
approx. 10,000 or two thirds of them not returned.  The Inspectorate would find that it was 
down to a lack of training and audit and the Inspectorate would also note “the absence of any 
structured training guidance on the implementation of any aspects of the FCPS policy.”1257    
 
It must be acknowledged that many lives have been saved by since the advent of the FCPS 
system, but it is strongly submitted that the shortcomings in the system are due at least in part 
to the way the AGS had set up and manned the Traffic Corps as strictly an enforcement unit.  
It is contented that the regular policing units should not have been depleted of members to staff 
Traffic Corps units.  The same detections could have been made from regular units.  There 
would have been no dumbing down of the policing expertise of personnel.  The detections 
would have been moderate and just as effective.  A member’s performance would be assessed 
not just on his/her ticket numbers but also on how he/she performed their station duties and 
investigations.  Supervisors who were seconded to the Traffic Units would remain in normal 
policing units maintaining a broader supervisory function and policing experience.  It is argued 
that the Traffic Corps Units should have been left as smaller units with properly trained and 
experienced members to deal with not just FCPS offences, but the more intricate offences set 
out in E.U. law in respect of larger vehicles.   In 2014 the Garda Inspectorate would state that 
“traffic officers expressed a view that they were underutilised in respect of crime 
investigation.”1258 
 
It is submitted that managerialism places a focus of Garda management on measurement and 
numbers.  It is suggested that it distracts their attention from focusing on shortcomings/quality 
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in the administration in the system.  As noted by Garland the “political parties in power during 
the 1980s and 1990s emphatically favoured ‘market solutions’, ‘private sector’ values, and 
managerial solutions, and encouraged state agencies to adopt this way of thinking.”1259  
However, in the Morris Tribunal we see evidence of explosives finds being broken up so that 
other “finds” could be “found” at a later stage to enhance professional careers and standing1260. 
 
Only in 2018 AGS is now promoting supervisors and middle managers to address the paucity 
of effective supervision.   
 
Managerialism – Counting and Measurement 
 
The year 1993 was a watershed period in how AGS managed itself.  The Commissioner’s 
Annual Crime Report was now a glossy brochure with statistics, pie-charts and colours.  The 
report would now also include details of what AGS was doing and intended to do.  It was an 
impressive document from what had previously existed and a sign perhaps that AGS was 
progressing into a new era of policing.  As noted by Brady: 
 
 A plateau had perhaps been reached upon which the Garda Síochána battered and 
bruised by more than two decades of pressure and controversy could draw breath, take 
stock of itself and address not merely the urgent but also some of the important issues.  
It was now well led and well enough equipped.  Its new advanced training system had 
come on stream.  It had succeeded in retaining its largely unarmed status while being 
able to deploy effective armed units as required and it had a plan for the medium-term 
future.1261 
 
It was all so promising.  As Brady would further state “the new language of managerialism 
now started to emerge in how the Garda Síochána saw itself operating for the future.”1262.  What 
Kilcommins et al referred to as the “fetish for the quantifiable”1263 would begin and hindsight 
has shown this “fetish” did not suit AGS. 
 
As Brady would elaborate:  
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Nothing illustrated this change more clearly then the abandonment of the old-style 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and its replacement with 
the Annual Report of An Garda Síochána. 
 
The change in title was significant; police business was not simply any longer about 
totting up reported crime and detection rates.  The Annual Report now fronted with a 
picture portrait of the Commissioner of the day put up a wealth of information about 
policy, innovation, technical advances, training and organisation as well as the years 
crime statistics.1264 
 
It is submitted that this is evidence of Garland’s ‘outputs over outcomes theme’.  As highlighted 
earlier it was in 1996 when the Irish Government published a document entitled “Delivering 
Better Government.”1265 It outlined how improvements could be made in how the public service 
was managed and insofar as the Gardaí were concerned led to the Strategic Management 
Initiative.  The AGS now had a mission statement, a corporate strategy and performance 
indicators.  Each Division and District had a policing plan with objectives and targets.  The 
organisation now pursued goals.1266   
 
It is submitted that the Irish Police Force was as Garland says (supra) “being remodelled in 
ways that emulate the values and working practices of private industry.”1267  It had been decided 
that managerialism was the way forward for AGS.   The Gardaí it is suggested were being 
‘shoehorned’ into a form of a corporate entity with the corporate values akin to the pursuit of 
profit. 
 
It is suggested that he experience of the NYPD might be a good comparison.  William Bratton 
was appointed NYPD Commissioner in 1994.  He would later boast that: 
 
 
We began to run the NYPD as a private profit orientated business.  What was the profit 
I wanted?  Crime reduction.  I wanted to beat my competitor – the criminals – who were 
out there seven days a week, 24 hours a day.  I wanted to serve my customers, the public 
better and the profit I wanted to deliver to them was reduced crime.1268 
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Bratton was referring to “CompStat”.  It was how his administration would hold local precinct 
commanders to account.  CompStat is shorthand for “Compare Statistics” or “Computer 
Statistics”.  Crime statistics would be recorded and tracked on computer and regular meetings 
would be held where local police commanders would be held accountable for the investigation 
of crime in their precincts.  After a sojourn in other police forces Bratton returned as 
Commissioner to the NYPD in 2014. 
 
As noted by Rayman:  
 
In the beginning crime was so out of control that once NYPD committed to CompStat, 
it was easy to reduce numbers but as time went on it got harder.  At the same time crime 
numbers became inextricably linked to career trajectory.  Those two factors combined 
to provide an incentive to precinct Commanders to fudge the numbers to look better in 
these CompStat meetings.1269  
 
Rayman asserts that in hindsight Bratton’s view of CompStat as a business “foreshadowed the 
future focus on gimmicks and inflated bottom lines that would distort precinct reporting.” 1270 
Rayman uses the analogy of “the auto industry in Detroit – bound to go bust because the cars 
they produced weren’t really what the people wanted.”1271  He argues “that the role of a police 
officer after all involves human interaction in a broad spectrum of community affairs not the 
mindless building of widgets on an assembly line.”1272  
 
By way of comparison Garda Superintendent P.V. Murphy wrote in 2004 that “one of the 
primary purposes of performance measurement and control is to allow for fact-based 
management – that is management that moves from intuition and hunches to analysis based on 
hard data and facts.” 1273[emphasis by original author].  It is clear that Bratton’s approach to 
the NYPD is arguably similar to Garda Management’s approach as encapsulated in the 
vocabulary by Superintendent Murphy who goes on to say:  
 
… when the strategic goals of An Garda Síochána are juxtapositioned with the strategy 
map, integrated performance plans and measure can be developed for each strategic 
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goal.  Facilitated operational planning workshops are ideal for this type of forward 
planning.  Operational Managers can be confident that they have engaged essential 
capability building needs when they use the strategy map process as a guiding template 
for their management and measurement scorecard development.1274  
 
What the Superintendent says is not an issue here but his language it is contended is clear 
evidence of the Garland thesis and supports Conway’s view that “the rhetoric of managerialism 
plays an important role in Irish Policing”1275 and is evidence of what she calls “the creeping 
managerialism” that has pervaded AGS in the last thirty years.1276  The Gardaí too in the past 
have had their own controversies (see infra) regarding the compilation of crime statistics and 
how they investigate crime and the manner in which they recorded these crime figures was the 
subject of much criticism from the Garda Inspectorate in 2014. 
 
“Gardaí massaging crime statistics for years, new C.S.O. reports show” this was the headline 
in Jim Cusack’s report ten years ago in the Sunday Independent, 27th April 2008.  Cusack states 
in the above article that “(a) (m)ajor independent appraisal of crime has shown a shockingly 
low level of convictions for the most common forms of crime in Ireland”.1277 The Garda 
Commissioner’s report on crime has essentially been the Garda report card over many decades.  
Garda effectiveness could be viewed through these statistics.  Gardaí could claim credit for 
reductions on crime rates and increase in detection rates, but Cusack’s report alleges that here 
the Gardaí were “massaging” the statistics relating to their outcomes.1278  A report published 
in 2014 by the Garda Inspectorate1279 would be very critical of how the Gardaí recorded crime 
and was corroborative of Cusack’s report.  
 
Up until 2006 Irish crime statistics were published by the Gardaí.  The 2006 Crime Report was 
first such a report where the Gardaí did not have the responsibility of compiling the crime 
figures.  The Central Statistics Office (CSO) now performs this function following a report by 
an Expert Group on Crime Statistics in 2004.1280 While the CSO compiles its crime report it 
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does so from records on the Garda PULSE system.  The Expert Group did not recommend any 
changes in the “counting rules”1281 of AGS (including the principal offence rule and the 
detection rules.  It said that those rules were “a sensible and prudent statistical convention 
similar to those in use in England and Wales.”1282 However, the Expert Group was divided in 
its views.  The group had eleven members and three of them issued a “minority report separate 
from the recommendations of the majority.”1283 
  
The Gardaí operate a primary or principal offence rule when counting crimes1284.  If two or 
more offences are disclosed in a criminal episode it is the most serious or the most serious 
offence is the one counted.  A crime can also be marked detected notwithstanding that no 
proceedings have been taken under certain specific criteria, that is where the offender dies 
before proceedings can be taken or where an essential witness or victim refuses or is 
permanently unable to come forward.   Also, in cases where an offender is too ill to stand trial, 
or an essential witness has passed away.  Similarly, in cases where there is sufficient evidence 
to bring criminal proceedings, but statutory time limits have expired or in cases where it would 
not be in the public interest to proceed.  These instructions were issued internally by Gardaí in 
2003 after AGS reviewed the way it compiled crime statistics after high profile events in 2002 
in the Waterford Garda District where during an internal Garda conflict there were allegations 
pertaining to crime statistics and detection rates.1285 
 
It is submitted that classifying crime can be very subjective.  If Gardaí attend a call to a break-
in in a building or premises and there are 10 offices in that premises where property is stolen 
from different injured parties – then how is the crime to be enumerated?  Is it a singular crime 
because only one building has been broken into or are their 10 crimes because there are 10 
independent victims?  If Gardaí are called to a shoplifting incident and arrest the suspect and 
bring him to the Garda Station, if that suspect is questioned and admits stealing groceries from 
the shop on 20 occasions for the past 6 months then how is the crime to be quantified?  Is it 
recorded as 1 crime in respect of the shoplifting when the arrest was made or are the 20 other 
crimes to be included in the calculation?  If Gardaí attend the scene of a public order incident 
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and someone makes an allegation of assault but later in the cold light of day declines to make 
a statement on the matter how is that to be classified and counted?  Is it an assault or is it not?  
These examples highlight why the Gardaí have crime counting rules because counting crime 
and classifying crime is not always straight forward. 
 
However, in the Minority Report issued by the new group raised a number of issues: 
 
1) It had “no understanding of the extent to which reported crimes are not recorded” and 
therefore could not come to conclusions about the quality, reliability and accuracy of 
Garda data.1286 
 2) It highlighted an 11% reduction in the number of recorded indictable crimes with the 
introduction of PULSE in 2000.  This was followed by an increase in 18% in 2001 and 
23% in 2002. (This brings into question the assertion in the aforementioned Garda 
Report of 1999 (supra) that the crime rate was at its lowest in twenty years.)1287 
 
The minority group thought it “improbable” that this reflected change in “underlying criminal 
activity” but were changes in the way Gardaí recorded matters.1288  The minority group was 
critical of the Garda primary counting rule and believed that all offences should be recorded.  
The group questioned why the detection rate “remained so stable in those years despite major 
fluctuations in the level of recorded crime.”1289 
  
Perhaps Newburn and Reiner could clarify these issues: 
 
The Police are primarily managers of crime and keepers of the peace, not a vehicle for 
reducing crime substantially.  Crime is the product of deeper social forces largely 
beyond the ambit of any policing tactics and the clear up rate is a function of crime 
levels and other aspects of workload rather than police efficiency.1290  
 
Similarly, Maguire when dealing with the same issue says: 
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Despite rules to limit it, the police inevitably retain considerable discretion as to which 
of the incidents observed by or reported to them are deemed to be crimes and recorded 
as such.  How this discretion is exercised or contained can be influenced by a wide 
variety of social, political and institutional factors and may change over time.1291 
 
Or perhaps one of Conway’s Garda sources in a recent publication put it best. 
 
Discretion has now gone because at that time you went to an incident took out your 
notebook and you wrote down the details.  If you wanted to do something about it was 
up to you to come back and do up your file but now when you go to an incident you 
must put that on PULSE.  That is now a public record.1292 
 
A good example of Garda management’s ‘fetish for the quantifiable’1293 that led to AGS being 
unnecessarily scandalised occurred in 2017.  An audit carried out by Gardaí consequent to an 
anonymous complaint to the Road Safety Authority that was passed on to the Garda 
Commissioner found that Gardaí had been inflating the number of roadside breath tests 
performed by them by a staggering 1,4588,221 over nearly a decade.1294  The number of breath 
tests recorded on the PULSE system did not tally with the figures recorded on the Drager 
breath test apparatus used by Gardaí and provided to them by the Medical Bureau of Road 
Safety.  This was a “71% disparity.”1295  The media and public seemed to be mesmerised by 
the inflated figure of approximately 1.5 million breath tests.  The scandal went on for months.  
It is being submitted here that the “fake” breath test scandal was unnecessary and avoidable.  
 
Sometime around 2009 it became policy to record the amount of breath tests being carried out 
by Gardaí1296.  All tests whether positive or negative were to be configured on PULSE.  Just 
figures.  No names, no addresses, no vehicle numbers.  The recording on PULSE was 
duplicitous because the breath test apparatus itself would show how many tests were carried 
out with that apparatus.  In the writer’s experience and Assistant Commissioner O’Sullivan 
who later investigated the matter would find that no one explained it to the rank and file 
membership why this had been made policy.  It is the writer’s view that the only statistics that 
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matter in respect of drink driving offences are the numbers of detections, arrests and 
prosecutions.  
 
The Gardaí have been breathalysing people for years.  The statutory power of arrest was 
enshrined in Section 4(8) of the Road Traffic Act 2010 and state that a Garda “may arrest 
without warrant a person who in the member’s opinion is committing or has committed an 
offence under this section.” The power has been the same since the 1960s.  Traditionally the 
breathalyser was an aid to the Garda forming his opinion before making an arrest.  A Garda 
could also arrest without using the breathalyser if he was able to form the requisite opinion 
having observed the demeanour or driving the person in question.  The power gives Gardaí a 
discretion.  He/She “may” arrest and be empowered to do so solely on his/her opinion.  A Garda 
can also justify an arrest based on a positive alcohol test alone, but the use of a breathalyser 
might suggest that the Garda had some doubt about his opinion in the first place.  This argument 
could be effective in court if the subsequent blood/urine analysis showed that the driver was 
only marginally over the limit.  The same statute empowers the Gardaí to arrest and use the 
breathalyser.   On the 22nd February 2017 the Irish Times in an article entitled “Can Garda 
Management do anything Right”1297 stated:  
 
“Two years ago, the Central Statistics Office declined to publish crime figures because 
they were not reliable.  It found the incidents of ordinary crime was under reported in 
the Garda PULSE system while the detection rate was exaggerated.  Now we find that 
these recording mistake(s) were compounded by an exaggeration of Garda activity in 
response to drink driving.  The common thread appears to be a massaging of figures to 
create a perception of efficiency … in 2014 the Garda Inspectorate was even more 
damning.  Apart from concerns in the reclassification of serious crimes at local level it 
found that 45% of complaints involving domestic violence were not recorded.”1298   
 
The article went on to note that “rather than a sinister conspiracy this succession of failure may 
reflect a poor Garda management and pressure from the top to do better.”1299 It is submitted 
that the scandal was of Garda managements own making.  The scandal spawned a 103-page 
report by Assistant Commissioner Michael O’Sullivan to explain what happened.1300  It is a 
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detailed, honest and well written report devoid of the language of managerialism.  He sums up 
the position well when he states: 
There was never a rationale given at any level in the organisation for the need to record 
breath tests of sober drivers and thus the experience of this examination was that the 
importance of such data was not apparent to individual members of AGS of any 
rank.1301 
 
Crowe Horwath in an independent investigation carried out on behalf of the Policing Authority 
into the scandal would say that they “have been surprised and disappointed at the general lack 
of recognition of the value of recording negative breath tests in being able to identify trend and 
attitudinal changes towards drink and driving.”1302 This view, it is submitted, is difficult to 
sustain.  There is no doubt that checkpoints are a substantial deterrent to drink driving and the 
more checkpoints may lead to more drink driving arrests or indeed maybe less.  Trend and 
attitudinal changes can only properly be measured by the amount of drink driving arrests.  An 
arrest will be made based on a positive breath test or on the observations of the Garda.  It is 
contended that the recording of a negative breath test is simply a meaningless measure and “a 
fetish for the quantifiable.”1303 The amount of people stopped and breathalysed at checkpoints 
depended on traffic volume at a particular time and place and the time and place of checkpoints 
were always fluid.  It is submitted therefore that the statistic is akin to asking the Gardaí – how 
long is a piece of string?  Meaningless. The breathalyser statistic took no account of drink 
driving arrests made where no breathalyser was used.       
 
Or perhaps as Garland says state agencies have “reacted to criticism by scaling down 
expectations, publicly redefining their aims and seeking to change criteria by which failure or 
success are judged.”1304 The whole area of compilation of the nation’s crime statistics provides 
strong support for what he asserts.  It is submitted that the main point of reference for judging 
police performance should be on how they perform in court. Where have they secured 
detections and what happened to these detections thereafter in court.  The police can explain 
how detections, convictions and acquittals have impacted on their security, crime, public order, 
traffic and immigration functions plainly set out in the Garda Síochána Act 2005.  This would 
                                               
1301 M. O’Sullivan supra at note 1294 at p.5. 
1302 Crowe Horwath, Final Report to the Policing Authority.  Review of Matters Related to Mandatory Intoxicant 
       Testing and the Issue of Summonses by the Garda Síochána, date October 2017 at p.45.  
1303 Kilcommins et al supra at note 120 at p.32. 





make more sense than reliance on the “outputs over outcomes” theme that is pervasive in Garda 
Policing Plans and Reports over the last decade or so.  A report by Sean O’Riordan in the Irish 
Examiner on the 2nd November 2012 highlights that fact. The report is headlined “State 
Solicitor: Gardaí being prevented from attending courts due to cutbacks.”1305 The State 
Solicitor from West Cork reportedly told the court that senior Garda Officers are prohibiting 
the attendance of Gardaí in court due to cutbacks.1306  He is reported to have said that this “has 
made prosecutorial work difficult.”  The “Audit Society”1307 manifestly to the fore in policing 
functions again.  It is at least questionable if the focus of Garda management on budgets can 
bring it into conflict with the organisation’s obligations under the Garda Síochána Act 2005 as 
set out under section 7.   It is also paradoxical when Garda managers seek robust detections 
and figures from rank and file members that the same rank and file members are not permitted 
to attend court because of overtime issues to prosecute these cases. 
 
Morris would investigate a series of arms finds that would commence in 1993 and go on for 
several years.  Morris would find that certain Gardaí broke up these arms finds and held them 
over for a ‘rainy day’ to enhance their professional standing and prospects.1308  To do so, certain 
Gardaí would use Adrienne McGlinchy who willingly portrayed herself as an informant.  
Morris would say that named Gardaí would “harness this most unusual person for their own 
ends.”1309 The breaking up of explosives was again a numbers game which prioritised “outputs 
over outcomes.”1310  Garda management it seemed looked only at the numbers i.e. the output.  
They made no enquiries into the outcome i.e. the quality of the investigation that was being 
carried out.  Morris would state this about Garda management and managers at the time: 
 
 What has been so serious about this inquiry has been the neglect of the fundamental 
duty of police management to ask questions and get answers.  This is shocking …  Chief 
Superintendent (named officer) failed to use the enquiring mind that is the hallmark of 
good police work.  This was negligence.1311 
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In 2014 the Garda Inspectorate would find: 
 
• Based on a sampling of 50 PULSE crime records the Inspectorate found 30% to be 
incorrectly classified and insufficient detail in 16% of cases to determine if 
classification was correct.1312 
• The Inspectorate disagreed with 32% of the classifications shown on PULSE.1313 
 
About the classification of crime, the Inspectorate investigated further.  It stated that it selected:  
 
Eight crime categories and examined 2372 crimes reclassified between January 2011 
and May 2012 in the seven divisions visited were marked to a lesser type of crime.  In 
83% of cases reclassifications resulted and crime being recorded to a less serious 
offence.1314 
 
Perhaps it goes back to the NYPD experience as noted earlier by Rayman that “crime statistics 
became inextricably linked to career trajectory.”1315  In the aftermath of stinging criticism of 
Garda management during the Morris Tribunal AGS set up a Performance Accountability 
Framework.   It is submitted that this is a form of CompStat by another name.  Weekly meetings 
were now held between Chief Superintendents and Superintendents and between a 
Superintendent and his Sergeants.  At these meetings all have to account for their respective 
areas of responsibility.  It is contended that whilst statistics are a useful means of assessing and 
measuring performance it should not be the sole way of doing so.  Consideration should also 
be given to good community relations, good administration and record keeping, good file 
handling and preparation, high visibility and good morale and work ethic amongst staff.    
Members of all ranks were assessed by statistics.  Poor statistics might chill promotion 
prospects.  The Inspectorate criticised “examples of Regular Unit Gardaí investigating serious 
crimes such as rape, threats to life, aggravated burglary and child sexual abuse.”1316 
 
Golding and Savage in 2008 use a headline from The Times newspaper in the U.K. dated 13th 
November 2009 it read, “Targets Let Dangerous Criminals Escape Net.”1317 Compare this 
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headline with an article by Jim Cusack in the Sunday Independent six years later on the 10th 
May 2015.  It reads, “Policing by Numbers lets Real Criminals off the Hook.”  Cusack’s article 
has a sub heading which reads, “Garda Managements Obsession with H.R. - Led Policing 
Policies is a Sham and a Nonsense.”1318  It is submitted that these two newspaper articles in 
two different jurisdictions are highlighting the same thing.   The Gardaí are obviously not alone 
in embracing the practices of the world of commerce.  It is worth quoting the Golding and 
Savage article further.  It is self-explanatory. 
 
In 2007 … the Chief Executive of the National Policing Improvement Agency, Peter 
Neyroud, challenged the ‘target culture’ surrounding the British police service on the 
basis that pursuit of particular government driven targets – in this case around the 
‘numbers of offences brought to justice’ – was becoming detrimental to the policing of 
serious violent crimes. … This was a significant intervention in the development of 
performance management within British policing because it signalled a concern 
amongst those clearly not unsympathetic to performance management per se that 
perhaps things had gone too far. … It seems performance management in the policy 
context is becoming a hotly contested issue.1319 
 
 
Jim Cusack in his article said the Gardaí owed a “debt of gratitude” to the Inspectorate for the 
work they have carried out for the report published in November 2014. He states that:  
 
 The Inspectorate’s report, the only such evaluation of the Garda Síochána by a body 
with reputable international credentials, provides the basis for a return to the core 
philosophies of policing where officers of ability and moral courage are allowed to do 
their jobs and not become slaves to a nonsense ‘human resource’ model initially 
designed for putting more widgets into gadgets on a factory floor.1320 
 
It is submitted that one of the core philosophies of policing is that policing is essentially reactive 
and as noted previously by The Irish Times it would appear the AGS was using and 
“massaging” figures to “create a perception of efficiency.”1321  It is submitted that this is a good 
example of Garland’s theme of outputs being preferred over outcomes.  Gardaí react to 
incidents that they are called to or come across while on patrol or that are reported to them.  
Individual Gardaí were compared and contrasted solely by numbers.  Their numbers of arrests, 
their numbers of summonses issued, their numbers of tickets issued, their numbers of crime 
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detected.  Individual sub- districts, districts and divisions were similarly assessed.  Garda 
management was anxious to show reductions in crime rates because of the focus on numbers.  
It is submitted that this was a malpractice that led in part to the scandals that have beset AGS 




In 1993 AGS would publish its first Corporate Strategy document for the period 1993 to 1997. 
In 2002 Garland stated that “police chiefs found that their new budgetary responsibilities and 
financial reporting duties made a difference in how they responded to their staffs, the public 
and their clients.”1322 This was cited at the very outset of the chapter and it is being contended 
now that what has been set out here is stark evidence of Garland’s theory. What has been 
highlighted in this part is compelling evidence of what he calls the “all-pervasive 
managerialism that affects every aspect of criminal justice”1323 of which AGS, in this 
jurisdiction, is the front line. 
 
To authenticate Garland’s theory, managerialism was broken into the component parts of 
language, efficiency, planning, resources, staffing and measurement. Insofar as language is 
concerned Garda parlance had very much remained the same up to the 1990s.  In the aftermath 
of SMI at that point, the language of managerialism began to fully permeate AGS.   Along with 
managerialism came so called economies and efficiencies.  The Garda policing structure had 
remained almost the same since the foundation of AGS but in the mid-1990s things changed.  
Superintendent’s now had budgetary responsibilities and resources were prioritised at District 
Headquarter stations to the detriment of the smaller stations.  In the late 1990s Garda planning 
was grounded on the PULSE system which was initially rolled out to the larger District 
Headquarter stations circa 1999.  All duties that the Gardaí now performed were to be 
pigeonholed as a PULSE record.  This reflected the recommendations of SMI.   A murder 
investigation would be recorded as one incident the same as a drunken disorderly incident 
notwithstanding the difference in effort and time to investigate this type of crime.   PULSE was 
supposed to effectively facilitate the audit of policing functions and was to decrease the amount 
of paper that the organisation generated.  PULSE had the opposite effect. AGS has been 
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scandalised in how it managed or didn’t manage it.  Senior Garda management simply made 
do with what resources they had even if this meant there was a shortage of Gardaí and 
supervisors and poor accommodation facilities.  Senior management became extremely 
vigilant in how their staff were employed to avoid extra costs.  In some cases, Gardaí were not 
going to court, and the most experienced investigators were not necessarily investigating 
serious crime.  In addition, senior Garda management were using PULSE as an instrument for 
measuring Garda performance.  Checkpoints and breathalyser tests were counted, and many 
crimes were incorrectly classified downwards.  Garda members were rated on detections 
notwithstanding that a Garda could spend months in properly preparing a file in a serious 
investigation while still ensuring he/she had a respectable number of fine on the spot notices 
issued with other summonses.   Notwithstanding the scandal and criticism that this brought 
from different Commissions of Inquiry the Gardaí continue with their managerialist ethos.  
AGS continues to be run as a business.   
 
It is submitted that what has been presented in this chapter strongly evinces Garland’s theory 
that the “emphasis upon the cost-effective management of risk and resources has produced a 
system that is increasingly selective in its responsiveness to crime and offending”1324 It also 
demonstrates   the “generalized cost consciousness in the allocation of criminal justice 
resources including investigative resources, court calendars …” 1325 Regrettably, the common 
thread in tracing transformation of AGS under these component benchmarks is scandal. In the 
end, what is being proposed here is that what Garland asserts in respect of his “managerialism 
index “is fully substantiated by what has been set out in this chapter.    
  
                                               







A Perpetual State of Crisis1326 
From Scandal to More Scandal 
 
 
When I go to bed at night, I say a special prayer for the safety of the city.  Then I say 
another special prayer of thanks that nothing bad happened in the police department.1327 
 





This chapter will examine Garland’s theory and specifically the index of change that he refers 
to as “a perpetual state of crisis.”  As in other chapters, his index will be cross referenced with 
the Garda Síochána to show in this case how crisis affected and transformed the organisation 
over a period of five decades.  It will be argued that for the most part it was always crisis that 
brought about change in the Garda Síochána and the perpetuity of crisis over the period in 
question brought about and continues to bring about fundamental and profound transformation 




Garland noted in 2001 that: 
 
(f)or much of the last two decades an unmistakable malaise and demoralisation have 
beset the field.  This is regularly expressed in talk of a ‘crisis’, though the term is clearly 
inappropriate for a situation that has now endured for several decades.  Since the 1970s 
those who work in criminal justice have experienced a period of unrelenting upheaval 
and reform that shows no sign of letting up.1328 
 
It will be argued in this chapter that Garland’s theory is strongly corroborated not only by what 
happened in AGS in the 1980s and 1990s but also in the years before and beyond.  In this 
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chapter, transformation in AGS will be looked at through the prism of scandal and for the 
purpose of this study these controversies will be looked at under four headings i.e. 
accountability, prisoners, intelligence and media.  For the most part, it is how Gardaí treated 
persons in their custody that has caused the organisation to be at the wrong end of Commissions 
of Inquiry and other investigations.  However, the Gardaí have also been criticised in how they 
handled and acquired criminal intelligence and the operations that would flow from such 
intelligence. The media played a key role in how they reported on these controversies and in 
how scandal would impact on the AGS.    
 
The Gardaí have also been controversial in how they handled and acquired warrants, grounded 
arrests and in how they managed themselves, but these are dealt with in separate chapters.  
Scandal has been an omni-present feature of Garda work and continues to be so.  It is submitted 
that the scandals both historical and current are indicative of what Garland says: “(t)here is a 
growing sense that the ‘modern’ arrangements for crime control – organized through the 
specialist agencies of the criminal state may no longer be adequate to the problem of crime and 
no longer coherent in themselves.”1329 
 
It is contended that this is true of AGS.  The perpetuity of scandal has seen Garda discretion 
substantially eroded notwithstanding the vast powers it received by statute over the years.  The 
Gardaí now carry out their work under continuous spotlight.  As noted by Fennell: 
 
Criminal justice today is the stuff of common parlance.  Long the preserve of the elite 
ruling class and its members comprised of the legal profession, it has entered the 
common domain.  Not only does every wag in a public house have a view on the latest 
criminal verdict or sentence but talk show hosts, journalists and ‘popular culture’ 
generally are awash with tales of crime and punishment … The role of the media in 
forming and feeding the tyranny of that ‘popular view’ is identified as crucial; 
facilitating political invocation of short-term responses and public acceptance 
thereof.1330 
 
This chapter sets out the evidence that the Gardaí operate in this world that Fennell describes.   
As noted by Garland: “(c)riminal justice is now less autonomous than it was three decades ago 
and more forcefully directed from the outside.  Criminal justice actors and agencies are now 
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less capable of directing their own fate and shaping their own policies and decisions.”1331  This 
chapter will show that AGS in its practices and duties has been seriously reined in over the past 




It is submitted that AGS is the most accountable organisation in the Republic of Ireland.  As 
observed by Walsh, “The Garda accountability requirement is discharged through a 
combination of: an action in tort, a judicial review, the criminal process, the Garda complaints 
procedure, the Garda disciplinary procedure and the democratic process.”1332  In reality for 
Gardaí on the ground this means that they are subject to the Garda internal disciplinary 
regulations and G.S.O.C.  They must also submit and stand up to audits by the Internal Audit 
Section (IAS) and the Professional Standards Unit (PSU).  The IAS carry out with and without 
notice audits of District and Stations in how they account for finance and public monies while 
the PSU will do likewise in respect of police standards, practices and records.  Both units will 
check how property and exhibits, and assets are accounted for. 
 
In the writer’s experience the PSU will audit investigation files and custody records and cross 
reference them with PULSE records.  Firearms and equipment will be checked in addition to 
cell accommodation, patrol cars and station premises.  The units will ensure that station and 
districts are compliant with Health and Safety legislation and make strong recommendations 
on good practice.  These audits are thorough.  Gardaí are also accountable to the Garda 
Inspectorate and the Policing Authority not to mention the new Commission on the Future of 
Policing in Ireland recently set up in 2017 to carry out a root and branch review of AGS and 
policing in this jurisdiction.  The Commission produced its report in September in 2018 and its 
recommendation have been accepted by the Irish Government.  In December 2018 the Minister 
for Justice, Charles Flanagan announced the implementation plan for the report.1333 
 
It is argued here that it has mostly been scandal that brought about change in how the Gardaí 
were made accountable and as acknowledged by Walsh it was the “findings of the Morris 
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Tribunal of Inquiry together with its subsequent reports from 2004 and 2008” that were “a 
major watershed in the history of the Garda Síochána and policing in Ireland.”1334  Walsh 
argues that from the establishment of AGS in 1922 to recent times AGS: 
 
 Had escaped the sort of comprehensive detailed and transparent critical scrutiny of its 
structures, powers, functions, operative management and accountability that had 
featured in some cases on several occasions in comparable police forces in most other 
common law liberal democracies.1335 
 
While this may be a valid argument, it is suggested that Conway is more forceful when she 
says that “circumstances and challenges faced by the force have contributed to the guards 
blindly receiving an exceptionally high level of public confidence.”1336 The “circumstances and 
challenges”1337 she refers to are those connected to the “emergence of the Northern Irish 
conflict which placed (the Gardaí) once again in the role of defending the State against 
subversives.”1338  In the year Morris issued its first report in 20041339 General de Chastelain1340 
also reported that subversives had placed their arms beyond use and Northern Ireland violence 
generally was receding from memory.  Notwithstanding high approval ratings, trust was 
eroding in AGS.  The words of Garland reflect that change, “Agencies like the police … that 
were once given statutory powers and responsibilities an annual budget and a degree of 
freedom to get on with it are now increasingly subject to state imposed standards and guidelines 
and are closely monitored and inspected to ensure they comply.”1341 These words are starkly 
evidenced in the words of Patten who in his report on policing in Northern Ireland stated: 
 
People need to know and understand what their police are doing and why.  This is 
important if the police are to command public confidence and active co-operation.  
Secretive policing arrangements run counter not only to the principles of democratic 
society but also to the achievement of full effective policing.1342 
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The landscape in which the Gardaí have operated has changed substantially.  Morris was an 
emphatic catalyst that brought about much of that change but there were other scandals in the 
last five decades which brought about fundamental changes in how AGS carried out its 
functions and one of these was again controversial in Morris and that was how Gardaí treated 




On the 30th May 1967 Liam O’Mahony died in Garda custody at the Bridewell Garda Station 
in Cork City.  He had been arrested some hours earlier outside the Long Valley Bar in Winthrop 
Street in Cork.  It was reported that he had ten broken ribs and when his brother arrived at the 
station having been contacted by Gardaí he did not immediately recognise the corpse of his 
brother.1343  He said “his face was all black and blue and marked.”1344  He noted some “dried 
blood under the nostrils”1345 and when he asked the Garda Inspector why he had not been 
contacted earlier he was told that his brother “was not a little boy who was lost, that his parents 
should have been contacted.”1346  The brother alleged that the “cell was like a pig sty, the floor 
was dirty and so was the toilet.”1347  A Coroner’s Inquest subsequently took place and proved 
controversial.  The Minister of the day set up a Tribunal of Inquiry to investigate the matter 
“due to public disquiet that had appeared since the holding of the Coroner’s Inquest on 
O’Mahony and which in part had been contributed to at least by newspaper articles and by 
letters to the newspapers.”1348 
 
The Tribunal would exonerate Gardaí of any wrongdoing and expressed the belief that, “it is 
probable that O’Mahony would have died as a result of the injuries that he had sustained in the 
Long Valley Bar, Winthrop Street, Cork even if medical attention had been procured for him 
in the Bridewell.”1349  However, it was critical of the Gardaí when it found that, “(i)t would 
however have saved a good deal of public disquiet if it so happened that a doctor had been 
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called to the Bridewell to examine him (O’Mahony).”1350 The Tribunal would also state that, 
“(t)he Garda authorities are commended for having amended regulations dealing with the 
procuring of medical attention for the prisoner since the incident.”1351 
 
It is contended that the O’Mahony case is a nascent example of public mistrust in the Garda 
account of events and where the media played a part in highlighting public disquiet regarding 
Liam O’Mahony’s death.  Garland states that “the criminal justice system has come to be a 
danger zone – a constant generator of risks and scandals and escalating costs.”1352  It is 
submitted that the O’Mahony case is an early example of Garland’s theory.  It is also contended 
that if such an Inquiry were to take place in more modern times it may have been be more vocal 
in its criticism the Gardaí.  
 
Dunne and Kerrigan in their work on the Sallins Mail Train Robbery1353 highlighted allegations 
of several suspects who were arrested, detained and charged in respect of the robbery.  The 
robbery occurred on the 31st March 1976.  One of the men was Nicky Kelly who was convicted 
but later received damages and a Presidential Pardon in the matter.  All suspects in this case 
made serious allegations of assault, malpractice and misconduct on the part of investigating 
Gardaí.  They all alleged they were ill-treated when they were interviewed. 
 
One of the controversial aspects of the case which, “defence counsel repeatedly referred to was 
the extent to which Garda statements matched very closely and also the way Garda witnesses 
gave evidence which was remarkably consistent with the wording of their statements.”1354  At 
one-point Mr. Seamus Sorohan, S.C. for one of the accused when cross examining a Detective 
Garda queries when he (the Detective) had last seen his statement of evidence.  His response 
was that he had seen his statement “about two months earlier.”1355  Mr. Sorohan noted that the 
Detective, while giving evidence kept fidgeting with his pockets and eventually queried the 
matter with the him.  He asked that he empty his pockets.  The Detective did so and included 
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in the contents was the Detective’s statement of evidence which he subsequently claimed under 
oath that he “hadn’t known it was there.”1356 
 
The Gardaí would claim in cross examination that their statements “were made individually 
and at separate times”1357 but as noted by Dunne and Kerrigan: 
 
One of the most remarkable elements of the case was the extent to which Garda 
statements concurred.  The statements again and again use the same phraseology.  Some 
statements are hundreds of words long yet where two or more Gardaí are describing 
events their statements concur almost word for word.1358 
 
Dunne and Kerrigan would opine that, “(t)here is a substantial body of evidence that a number 
of Gardaí committed crimes of assault during the investigation of the train robbery and that a 
number of Gardaí perjured themselves in the subsequent trial.”1359  When in opposition Fianna 
Fail T.D. Gerry Collins, “was vociferous about the need for an independent inquiry into the 
allegations being made.  Once in office he reneged on his own demands.  He subsequently 
presided over the promotion of most of those (Gardaí) involved in the Mail Train case.”1360  
The interview room tactics and techniques of investigating Gardaí would continue to come 
under robust scrutiny in court proceedings for many years to come and would not just be 
confined to this particular case. 
 
On the 14th February 1977 the Irish Times reported that “a heavy gang” was operating within 
AGS.  The headline ran “Garda using North-style Brutality in Interrogation Techniques”.1361  
In the same publication on the same date it was boldly stated that “Gardaí stand accused.”1362  
On the following day the 15th February 1977 another front-page headline heralded that “Heavy 
gang” “used new Act to Intensify Pressure on Suspects”.  The article alleged that: 
 
 Gardaí have used public ignorance about the provisions of the new Act (Emergency 
Powers Act 1976) to deceive suspects about their legal rights when in custody.  A 
number of people detained under the Act have told us that their interrogators said to 
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them “You have no rights under this Act”.  Suspects have been told that they must make 
statements and refusal to do so would result in imprisonment.  They have also been 
informed that they have no right to see solicitors or doctors.1363     
 
 
The Garda Press Office would respond with the following statement, “(b)rutal interrogation 
methods are not a routine practice at the moment, they never have been.  Such practices are not 
condoned by our present Commissioner, Mr. Garvey nor have they ever been encouraged or 
condoned by a previous Commissioner.”1364 
 
As noted by Dunne and Kerrigan this statement “is a model of careful language.”1365  Detective 
Superintendent John Courtney oversaw the murder squad at the time that these allegations were 
being made in the media.  He maintained that the “tag” of “heavy gang” emanated from Mr. 
Patrick McEntee S.C. during a murder trial.  Courtney would say that:  
 
 The tag came about in a very simple way.  In the course of a trial following the murder 
of Larry White in Cork City, Paddy McEntee S.C. arguing for the defence referred to 
the “heavy gang” coming down from Dublin.  The media immediately latched onto the 
label and it went from there.  The reality was that no one from the Commissioner down 
would stand for that and these allegations were scurrilous.1366  
 
 
It is submitted that the “danger zone”1367 of the criminal justice system referred to by Garland 
in the mid to late 1970s is very much in existence, so much so that the Government in response 
to concerns that a “heavy gang” was operating within AGS established the O’Briain Committee 
on the 6th October, 1977.1368  Its remit was “to recommend with all convenient speed whether 
and if so what additional safeguards are necessary and desirable for the protection against ill 
treatment of persons in custody.”1369 
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O’Briain noted that “upwards of 80%” of crimes were solved by confessions made by persons 
in Garda custody.1370  At the time the Gardaí had no power of investigative detention except 
under the provisions of Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and more 
belatedly under the Emergency Powers Act 1976.  If the crime being investigated – such as 
murder – was not related to subversive type crime, the Gardaí could not use the Section 30 
provision.  Although in Howley1371 and Quilligan1372 the Gardaí conducted murder 
investigations and invoked their Section 30 power of arrest and detention to investigate the 
offence of malicious damage under the Malicious Damage Act 1861 which was a scheduled 
offence under the Offences Against the State Act 1939.  In these cases, malicious damage was 
caused to some object in the course of the killing and the courts ultimately found it permissible 
for the Gardaí to investigate this damage and use the detention powers under the 1939 Act for 
that purpose. It was permissible notwithstanding that it was not the main crime they were 
investigating.  In other instances, a practice emerged over the years where the Gardaí would 
bring suspects to the station “to help police with their enquiries.” 
 
The case D.P.P. v. O’Loughlin1373 would put an end to this practice.  It was held that, “holding 
for questioning, taking into custody or detaining were merely different ways of describing the 
act of depriving a man of his liberty.  To do so without lawful authority is in open defiance of 
Article 40.4 of the Constitution.”1374 The O’Briain Committee also recommended the 
discontinuation of this practice.1375 O’Briain in an addendum to the final report would state: 
 
 I can think of no way in guaranteeing ill treatment of persons in Garda custody will not 
take place except by providing as far as practicable the surveillance of an independent 
eye witness throughout that custody … I would go somewhat further and question 
whether or not the time has come to change the law relating to the investigation of 
crime.1376 
 
O’Briain’s recommendations were later reflected in the Criminal Justice Act 1984.  The Gardaí 
would now have a six hour period of investigative detention which could be extended for 
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another period of six hours on the direction of a Superintendent.1377 The Act was enacted in 
1987 along with a set of Custody Regulations1378 and an independent complaints procedure.1379  
There would now be appointed a “custodial Garda” or “member in charge” for the purpose of 
overseeing the enforcement of the custody regulations.1380 Inferences could be drawn from a 
person’s silence1381 when questioned and provision was made for the electronic recording of 
interviews.1382  However the supporting regulations for the electronic recordings of same were 
not introduced until 1997. 
 
O’Briain believed that what was recommended would go a long way to protecting persons in 
Garda custody.  The O’Briain rationale was as follows: 
 
Notwithstanding this they (the Gardaí) are under extreme pressure from the whole 
community which is claimant that the police uncover and prevent crime and bring guilt 
home to the guilty parties.  Is it any wonder that the allegations which we have 
considered show a picture again and again of the Gardaí frustrated by their lack of legal 
power to question suspected persons in custody taking the law into their own hands by 
holding them for custodial interrogation and in doing so breaking the law if not indeed 
the Constitution? 
 
 This is so even apart from ill treatment.  But the allegations we have considered state 
that in a number of cases the Gardaí in their frustration have used physical violence or 
threats of violence to secure answers to their questioning.  If then the element of 
frustration can be eliminated or even reduced in some cases by a change of law, it seems 
to me that this change would afford persons some further safeguards against ill 
treatment.1383 
 
It is contended therefore that any further Garda empowerment was coming with a strong leash.  
While in the past Gardaí as noted by Garland “had a degree of freedom to get on with it”1384 
this “freedom” was no longer unqualified and without caveat.   
 
In 1982 Peter Matthews would die from injuries he allegedly received at Shercock Garda 
Station.  He had gone there voluntarily to meet Gardaí, who wanted to speak with him in 
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relation to a suspected stolen post office savings book that was reported to have been presented 
at a local post office.  Two Gardaí were later charged in connection with the death but were 
acquitted.  Three Gardaí were dismissed.  Matthews was not in good health and was an 
alcoholic.1385   
 
In 1984, Joanne Hayes and four members of her family confessed to the killing and disposal of 
a baby.  Later scientific evidence indicated that statistically they could not have committed the 
crime.  The circumstances became known as the Kerry Babies Case.1386  The government set 
up a tribunal under Mr. Justice Lynch who according to Conway “declined to find why the 
family had given false confessions regarding allegations of physical abuse of Ms. Hayes and 
her family”1387 at the hands of the Gardaí.   However, in the aftermath of the case the “Murder 
Squad” or the “Investigation Section” as it was formally known within AGS was disbanded.  
The independent complaints procedure outlined in the Garda Síochána (Complaints) Act 1986 
came shortly thereafter.   
 
Mr. Justice Lynch in the course of the Inquiry made a number of findings and remarks in respect 
of the Garda evidence.  He stated that, “(t)hey are not barefaced lies on the part of Gardaí (as 
regrettably is the case with the Hayes family) but they are an exaggeration over and above the 
true position or a ‘gilding of the lily’ or wishful thinking elevated to the state of hard fact.”1388 
 
The Tribunal Chairman would go on to explain: 
 
 For persons who take the witness Oath relatively frequently there is a danger that the 
Oath may become for them largely a matter of form.  This does not mean that such a 
person is likely to tell completely groundless lies on Oath, where ‘familiarity breeds 
contempt’ has affected a witness it will most often manifest itself in the elevation of 
honest beliefs or suspicious into positive facts.1389 
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Mr. Justice Lynch cited an example, the evidence of Detective Superintendent John Courtney 
of the ‘Murder Squad’ who led the investigation.  The Detective at one point in his evidence 
“sought to justify the searches he had directed”1390 of the Hayes family property.  These 
searches were an important issue in the course of the Inquiry.  The Detective stated that Garda 
Liam Moloney “knew every inch of that farm.”1391  Garda Moloney was the local uniformed 
Garda who would have had a knowledge of the Hayes family.  Garda Moloney would state in 
evidence to the Inquiry that “he was not really familiar with the Hayes farmlands at all.”1392  
Mr. Justice Lynch remarked in his report that “if there was ever an example of wishful thinking 
(on behalf of the Detective) then this was it!”1393 
 
The Chairman’s remarks relate to Garda evidence and its credibility.  He would exonerate 
Gardaí of any wrongdoing but as noted by Kerrigan and Brennan “some found that a somewhat 
large leap of faith was required if one was to agree fully with the judge’s findings.”1394  
Detective Superintendent Courtney (later Chief Superintendent) when retired remarked that: 
 
 I have never lost a night’s sleep over the case because I did not set out to do any injustice 
to Joanne Hayes or anyone else … During the course of the Tribunal, Nurse Bridie 
Fuller, an aunt of Joanne Hayes gave evidence of two babies being born in the house 
on the night in question.  I thought that would have brought the inquiry to a quick 
conclusion, but it dragged on for weeks.1395  
 
The retired Detective would also state, “What gave rise to a lot of publicity was the fact that 
the then Minister for Justice Michael Noonan took it on himself to set up a Tribunal of 
Inquiry.”1396  Insofar as this chapter is concerned the Kerry Babies case is further evidence that 
trust was continuing to erode in AGS in the eyes of the public and government.  The manner 
in which Gardaí carried out interviews with prisoners would continue to be controversial.   
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On the 27th February 1991 what was known as “the stag party murder case” collapsed at the 
Central Criminal Court.1397  Mr. Justice Barron dismissed all charges against Damien Marsh 
who was before the court for the stabbing and murder of Kieran Farmer on O’Connell Bridge, 
Dublin on St. Patrick’s Day, the 17th March 1990.  The Irish Times headline read “Questions 
raised over Interrogation.”1398 Mr. Patrick McEntee S.C. for Marsh “made allegations of 
serious misconduct against several Garda officers.”1399  One of the Gardaí who had interviewed 
Marsh stated in evidence that the statement taken from Marsh while in custody was taken down 
line by line as it was made.  The other interviewing Garda stated it was drawn up at the end of 
the interview.1400   
 
On the 16th May 1995 the Court of Criminal Appeal would order a retrial in the case of Peter 
Pringle.  Pringle had been convicted of capital murder and robbery at the Special Criminal 
Court.  On the 7th July 1980 an armed robbery had taken place at the Bank of Ireland, 
Ballaghaderreen, Co. Roscommon.  Garda Henry Byrne and Detective Garda John Morley 
were shot and killed by raiders when they were intercepted by the Gardaí as they sped from the 
scene.  When later arrested Pringle told interviewing Gardaí that “I know that you know I was 
involved, but on the advice of my solicitor I am saying nothing, and you will have to prove it 
all the way.”1401 This admission was one of the main pillars of evidence that resulted in 
Pringle’s conviction in the Special Criminal Court.  The Court of Appeal some fifteen years 
later would rationalise Pringle’s admission as follows: 
 
 What he in fact said amounted to an admission of his appreciation that those who were 
accusing him of the crimes of murder and armed robbery knew that he had committed 
them and his admission was accompanied by a statement that on the advice of his 
solicitor he was going to say nothing and an observation that the Gardaí were going to 
have to prove the case themselves.1402 
 
In view of the Court’s decision to order a retrial for Pringle, the D.P.P. subsequently entered a 
nolle prosequi and proceeded no further with the matter. 
 
                                               




1401 The People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle [1995] 2 I.R. at p.560. 





On the 16th October 1996 Paul Ward was arrested in connection with the murder of journalist 
Veronica Guerin.  He was later charged in connection with that murder.  The main pillar of the 
prosecution case was a particular admission he made to Gardaí while detained.  The Special 
Criminal Court would acknowledge that Ward was “an experienced Section 30 detainee”1403 
and who for “a total of 14½ hours of intense interrogation by a series of experienced police 
officers … firmly maintained his policy of silence.”1404  The Gardaí would also arrest his 
partner Vanessa Meehan and his mother Elizabeth Ward and would separately have each of 
them meet Paul Ward during his detention.  Paul Ward would eventually confess his 
involvement in the crime to the Gardaí.  Mr. Justice Barr would state that “the police were 
under severe pressure to bring charges in regard to that crime.  The coincidence that the 
accused’s capitulation after more than 14 hours of silence during interrogations had occurred 
immediately after the visit of Ms. Meehan is a remarkable volte face which gives rise to unease 
and raises a series of pertinent questions.”1405 
 
The Court would be satisfied in respect of the visit of Elizabeth Ward to the prisoner that: 
 
It was a deliberate ploy devised and orchestrated by the police in a final effort to prevail 
on the accused to disclose what he had done with the gun … the visit was not arranged 
for any humanitarian purpose but was a cynical ploy which it was hoped might break 
down the accused.1406 
 
The Court would add, “(a)s to the visit from Ms Vanessa Meehan to the accused the Court 
accepts her evidence that she was successfully subjected to grievous psychological pressure 
(by Gardaí) to assist police in breaking down the accused.”1407  The Court was also concerned 
that documents relating to the detention of Ward were at the time of trial “unaccountably 
missing.”1408  In the end the Court would find that the confession made by Ward when detained 
was “induced by grievous psychological pressure which emanated from his meeting with Ms. 
Meehan immediately prior thereto.”1409  It ruled it inadmissible.  The Court, notwithstanding 
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that Ward was charged with one of the most prolific crimes in the history of the State on the 
basis of his own confession – was not willing to accept the behaviour of Gardaí in how that 
confession was obtained.  Ultimately Ward was convicted of the murder of Veronica Guerin in 
the Special Criminal Court based on the supergrass evidence of Charles Bowden but on the 
22nd of March 2002 the Court of Criminal Appeal would quash the conviction.1410   
 
On the 22nd January 2002 Colm Murphy was convicted at the Special Criminal Court on 
charges connected to the Omagh Bombing that occurred on the 15th August 1988.  A car bomb 
was detonated and killed 29 people and injured in excess of 300 others.  Part of the prosecution 
case were admissions allegedly made by Murphy to the Gardaí when arrested and questioned 
by them.  There were a series of Garda interview teams.  The notes taken by Gardaí of these 
interviews were subsequently scientifically analysed on behalf of the defence legal team.  One 
of the interviews was recorded as follows: 
 
JF Could your wife have taken your mobile phone to Omagh? 
CM Definitely not. 
JF Getting back to the phones Colm, the matter will have to be clarified.  You have 
a big problem here. 
LD We’ll take a break now Colm.  Think about it.1411 
 
However, scientific examination would show “with reference to the indentations on the 
following page”1412 of notes “that what had been originally written” was as follows: 
 
 JF Could your wife have taken your mobile phone to Omagh? 
 CM Definitely not. 
 JF She’s Sheila McGrew’s sister isn’t (word indecipherable). 
 CM That’s right. 
JF Getting back to the phones Colm the matter will have to be clarified.  You have 
a big problem here. 
 LD  We’ll take a break now Colm.  Think about it.1413 
 
It was easily established by the defence that Sheila McGrew was not the sister of Colm 
Murphy’s wife.  She had strong republican connections and was known to be the girlfriend of 
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another man who had a similar background and was suspected by Gardaí to be involved in the 
Omagh Bombing. 
 
Senior Counsel for the accused submitted: 
 
 Why … would Colm Murphy say that Sheila McGrew was his wife’s sister when such 
was patently not the case.  There must, Mr. O’Higgins submitted be an almost 
inescapable inference that Murphy never said such a thing, that the question and answer 
were concocted and that the two officers on discovering the error set about altering the 
third page of that interview notes.1414 
 
Murphy would appeal his conviction and the Gardaí would face perjury charges.  Both Gardaí 
would be acquitted and one of them would die shortly after.  On the 21st January 2005 the Court 
of Criminal Appeal would order a retrial of the matter by the Special Criminal Court.  Murphy 
would be acquitted.  The Court of Appeal in its decision in 2005 would state: 
 
Going forward … there should be a marked reluctance to excuse failures to comply 
with the requirements of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of 
\Interviews) Regulations 1997 other than those circumstances specified in the 
Regulations themselves.  We feel therefore that in respect of the station interviews from 
this point onwards the court should only exercise its discretion under Section 27(4) for 
good reason. 1415  
 
 
As highlighted by Coonan and O’Toole, Kearns J, made it clear that the Court was not satisfied 
with the Garda excuse “concerning a chair in the interview room (that) was facing the wrong 
way”1416 or why there was no record to “explain the non- operation of the recording equipment 
in the Garda station.”1417  Since the court case, all Garda stations with recording equipment are 
ordered to have a record book to highlight inspections, use and problems with recording 
equipment and the maintenance of same.  It is difficult to comprehend why it took the State 
approximately thirteen years to give effect to the legislative provision for the electronic 
recording of interviews.  Maybe it was a straightforward budgeting or resource issue.  Perhaps 
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it was partly because each Government was awaiting the progress in the Northern Irish peace 
process which would ultimately lead to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. 
 
Dean Lyons admitted to two murders he did not commit.1418  The subsequent Inquiry into the 
matter held that Dean Lyons was “able to provide accurate details of the murders”1419 that he 
did not commit “due to the manner he was interviewed by Gardaí.”1420  “He readily agreed to 
leading questions that were asked of him”1421 by investigators.  The Inquiry held that the D.P.P. 
was given “a good overview”1422 of the case by a senior Garda and it found that Dean Lyons 
“was not abused or ill-treated in any way during his detention”1423 and that “there was no 
believable attempt to frame Dean Lyons.”1424  However the Inquiry also found that the D.P.P. 
was not told of “the existence of misgivings on the part of some key members of the 
investigation team including one of the principal interviewers to whom admissions were 
made.”1425  The Inquiry held that “the extent of the misgivings were not recognised and acted 
upon by those present including the senior officer leading the investigation.”1426  This theme 
of senior officers ignoring the valid and credible views of other members in particular those of 
lower rank who challenge the ‘group think’ would later permeate throughout other scandals 
that would besmirch AGS. 
 
Between 2004 and 2008 Morris would publish a series of reports of his investigations into 
certain Garda activity in the Donegal Division.  These reports would examine almost every 
aspect of Garda duties.  The incidents that were examined go back to 1993 – the same year that 
Garda management produced its first Corporate Strategy document.  These incidents flagged 
many important features of Garda duties and procedures and Morris would forensically 
examine and scrutinise them all.  These areas concerned essentially four elements; how the 
Gardaí treated people in custody, handled criminal intelligence, acquired warrants and 
managed and accounted for themselves.  The finding of the Tribunal in respect of all these 
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elements would make disturbing reading.  As regards persons in Garda custody Morris found 
the following in respect of a Garda custody officer, “(t)he task entrusted to him by the people 
of Ireland on that right was to ensure that the prisoner was properly treated.  He did nothing to 
fulfil his function as custodian of the rights of the prisoner.”1427 Morris also made the following 
observations in respect of the electronic recording of interviews: 
 
 (H)ad recording facilities been available in 1996 in Letterkenny Garda Station this 
Tribunal would have been saved months of evidence and those participating in 
wrongdoing might have been discouraged from their improper behaviour.  Those who 
exaggerated or made false allegations against members of An Garda Síochána might 
also have been discouraged from doing so.  Of course, this applies in a more general 
sense to all similar cases during the protracted period.1428   
 
There can be no other words that highlight the importance and necessity of electronically 
recording interviews at Garda stations.  It is even suggested here that persons voluntarily being 
interviewed in Garda stations should have their interviews recorded unless explicitly made 
clear on tape that they did not wish to have the interview so recorded.  As noted by Morris: 
 
 There should be a marked reluctance on the part of the courts who ultimately provide a 
benchmark for best practice in An Garda Síochána to accept anything less than the full 
implementation of these regulations “absent extraordinary excusing circumstances” 
clearly established in evidence by An Garda Síochána.1429 
 
All persons in custody are now interviewed on tape unless they state otherwise (on tape).  
Allegations of false confessions induced by threats and assaults will be substantially reduced.  
Similarly, false allegations of assault and wrong doing against Gardaí will also decrease.  Cases 
coming before the criminal court in recent times are rarely contested on these matters.  There 
may be fewer confessions made to Gardaí by persons in custody but those that are made will 
be acknowledged by the accused in court.  In addition, there are excellent examples of skilled 
Garda interview techniques on tape which can be used to enhance the interviewing skills of 
other Gardaí. 
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Historically Gardaí always had a wide discretion when it came to intelligence and informants.   
Information on criminal activity can come to Garda attention in several ways.  A concerned 
citizen might see or hear something suspicious and relay this information to a Garda known to 
him/her or by simply contacting a Garda at the local station.  The caller may or may not wish 
to disclose his or her identity.  Off duty Gardaí may also come across suspicious activity and 
pass it on to colleagues or seek the assistance of colleagues if imminent Garda action is 
necessary.  The most controversial intelligence very often comes from criminals or other police 
forces who similarly harness their own intelligence sources.  Most Gardaí during their service 
will receive intelligence from whatever source.  In the past the quality of the information 
received was assessed by the member’s supervisor or managers.  If necessary, a warrant was 
obtained.  Every Garda is disposed to protecting the identity of his or her source unless that 
same person has made it clear that identities could be disclosed to other Gardaí.  Difficulties 
arise if an informant observed or overheard something that might be material evidence in any 
court case.  A decision must be made by Gardaí which would ultimately lead to the informant 
becoming a witness and making a statement to Gardaí of what was seen or heard.  A dramatic 
example of this was the evidence of Charles Bowden in the Veronica Guerin murder case.  He 
turned State’s evidence that led to others being charged in connection with the murder of 
Veronica Guerin.  He gave this evidence on foot of assurances of ‘benign’ treatment by State 
irrespective of his own transgressions.  The courts ultimately found supergrass evidence to be 
unacceptable but what occurred was very controversial at the time as Gardaí were also 
criticised by the courts for their “oppressive” interview room tactics in acquiring a confession 
from Paul Ward in respect of the same murder.1430  It is shown here that the Gardaí have in the 
last half century been scandalised by the manner in which they might have acquired or acted 
on criminal intelligence.  It is also correct to say that AGS has been scandalised by the paucity 
or lack of its criminal intelligence at certain times. 
 
On the 9th July 1976 President O’Dálaigh accepted the credentials of the New British 
Ambassador to Ireland Mr. Christopher Ewart Biggs.1431 Three days later the Ambassador met 
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the Gardaí in respect of his own security.  He was not impressed.1432  He wrote in his diary, 
“(t)hey (the Gardaí) are not very reassuring … (t)hey thought for some reason that an attack on 
his car was unlikely.”1433 
 
Dunne and Kerrigan would write, “(I)t appears from the diary, that Ewart Biggs raised the 
possibility of an attack on his car and got the reply ‘it hasn’t happened yet.”1434 The 
Ambassador went on to write “it seems to be the department of ‘fingers crossed’.”1435  Some 
nine days after his meeting with the Gardaí the Ambassadors and his assistant would be 
murdered when the P.I.R.A. detonated a bomb under his vehicle as it proceeded about two 
hundred yards from the entrance to his residence in Dublin.  Dunne and Kerrigan would later 
observe: 
 
 The Cosgrave Coalition went berserk … clearly the killing of Ewart Biggs was a 
colossal security cock-up by the Gardaí and security ministers … the Cosgrave response 
was not security based it, was political.  A State of Emergency would be declared, tough 
new laws would be brought in, civil liberties would be suspended, the people would be 




No one was ever made amenable by the Gardaí for these killings.  In 2015 Crank would state, 
“(a)nd when we are at war complex issues are simplified.  Warriors don’t need to worry about 
all that due process stuff.  You’re with us or against us.”1437  It is submitted that what happened 
after the British Ambassadors assassination is an example of what Garland refers to as “a 
sovereign state strategy stressing enhanced control and expressive punishment … the criminal 
justice state was perceived as having failed to deliver adequate levels of security.”1438  
 
In 1989 two RUC Officers were ambushed and shot to death by the P.I.R.A. as they returned 
to Northern Ireland from Dundalk Garda Station.  Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and 
Superintendent Bob Buchanan had departed the Garda station consequent to a cross-border 
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policing meeting with their Garda counterparts.  There would later be allegations that members 
of AGS colluded in the murders. 
 
The Smithwick Tribunal1439 would inquire into these matters and report on same in 2013. The 
Inquiry would be conducted almost two decades after the murders and would examine the 
whole murky world of intelligence and collusion.  Smithwick would note: 
 
 Collusive acts are by their very nature surreptitious.  Absent a phone call or an 
incriminating bank transfer, if collusion has occurred the evidence of it will almost 
certainly be difficult to find … the Tribunal has not uncovered direct evidence of 
collusion.1440  
 
However, in the end Smithwick did reach “the conclusion that there was collusion.”1441 He 
based his finding on “circumstances” and “three strands of intelligence received by An Garda 
Síochána from the same source within a few years of the murders.”1442  He also took into 
consideration that the RUC and AGS had “both … received information from reliable sources 
that there was collusion.”1443 Smithwick would hold: 
 
I am satisfied that the I.R.A. required positive identification that Harry Breen in 
particular had arrived at Dundalk Garda Station.  Whilst his image was well known and 
therefore he may well have been recognised by a member of the Provisional I.R.A. 
observing the station, the optimum confirmation of his identity from the point of view 
of the Provisional I.R.A. would likely be a member of An Garda Síochána.  Given that 
I am satisfied that the evidence points to the fact that there was someone in the Garda 
station assisting the I.R.A. it also seems to me to be likely that the Provisional I.R.A. 
would seek to exploit that resource by having that individual or individuals confirm the 
arrival of the two officers.1444 
 
Smithwick would make no findings of collusion against individual Gardaí.  The Tribunal was 
critical of both the RUC and AGS in that at the time: 
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 It was particularly regrettable that both police services acted swiftly to dismiss 
speculation of the possibility of collusion rather than to deal with that by means of a 
thorough and credible investigation.  This was an example of prioritisation of political 
expediency in the short term without due regard to the rights of victims and the 
importance of placing justice at the centre of any policing system.1445  
 
 
It is contended that what Smithwick investigates is a good example of what Garland states that 
the “criminal justice system is a minefield.  It routinely deals with emotionally laden and high 
visibility cases that stretch the meaning of justice and provoke hostile reactions on one side or 
another.”1446 This case still creates bad feeling between authorities on both sides of the border. 
 
In 1995 a Garda tout set up a drug deal in Amsterdam.1447  A large consignment of cannabis 
was to be imported into the country.  Undercover Gardaí would use a trawler to collect the 
consignment at sea and bring it ashore.  The Gardaí would bring the same consignment by road 
for collection by a Dublin based gang.  When the gang would collect the illicit consignment, 
the undercover Gardaí would spring the trap.  Unfortunately, the gang never turned up for their 
illicit haul.  The Gardaí waited.  Nothing happened.  The Gardaí were now in possession of a 
large consignment of cannabis.  The story would go to press that the Gardaí had located the 
haul at Urlingford, Co. Kilkenny.  The street value of the cannabis was stated to be £130 
million.  The find was heralded as the largest drugs seizure ever in the State and a tribute to the 
skills and co-operation of the Gardaí, customs officers and naval service.  Obviously there had 
been no arrests.  The spin on the story was an effort by the Gardaí to put a “brave face” on an 
operation that had gone awry.  Customs officers were not involved.  The Minister for Justice 
Nora Owens later had to clarify that the exchequer did not have to foot the bill for the cannabis. 
 
As noted by Kerrigan and Brennan the scandal that followed, “Was not the fact that the 
operation went wrong, not even in the lack of co-operation between police and customs but in 
the attempt to portray the fiasco as a victory.”1448  It is submitted these remarks are valid but it 
might also be fair to say that Gardaí could have been endeavouring to protect the informants.  
Persons who are identified as informants by powerful criminal gangs do not have a long-life 
span thereafter.  It is submitted that this was an ugly and embarrassing case for AGS and a 
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good example of Garland’s argument that “the public is easily scandalized by many of the 
decisions that are routinely made.”1449  Undercover operations are dangerous and 
unpredictable.  There is no template practice for them and while many members of the public 
would be willing to give Gardaí the benefit of the doubt in these matters, many others would 
not.   
 
On the 1st May 1998 Ronan MacLochlainn was shot and killed by members of the Gardaí in 
the course of an attempted armed robbery of a Securicor van in Co. Wicklow.1450  It occurred 
on the day of the Garda ‘blue flu’ when most Gardaí of Garda rank reported ‘sick’ for work in 
a pay dispute with government.  On the day of the shooting the operation was reported to be 
intelligence led with the involvement of Garda surveillance units.  MacLochlainn’s partner 
would later take a case to the European Court of Human Rights because she alleged that there 
was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights because there was no independent 
investigation into the killing of her partner.  The State agreed to set up a Commission of 
Investigation and the European Court struck out the case on the basis of that commitment.  The 
Commission was set up in 2014 and presented its report in June 2018 to the Minister for Justice.  
The Commission report found that the killing was lawful. MacLochlainn’s partner believes that 
the Gardaí could have “prevented the robbery beforehand and made arrests but instead ‘went 
for the spectacular.’1451  The Commission had heard evidence that the Gardaí “believed there 
was going to be a kidnapping or high value robbery or explosives were to be transferred, and 
an officer realised the target was a cash in transit van on its way to the scene.  An issue arose 
whether action should have been taken at this stage to stop it perhaps by simply parking a police 
car on the opposite side of the road.”1452  However, “an attack was mounted”1453 by the Gardaí 
“with the National Surveillance Unit and Emergency Response Unit involved.”1454  
MacLochlainn was suspected by Gardaí to be a member of a dissident I.R.A.1455 group.  
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In the same year a “red Vauxhall Cavalier used in the Omagh Bombing was stolen in 
Carrickmacross, Co. Monaghan on the night of the 12th/13th August 1998.”1456  A Garda 
detective would later make a series of serious allegations regarding the mishandling of 
intelligence which would or could have prevented the Omagh Bombing and saved many lives.  
The most serious allegations were against a very senior officer in AGS.  The Nally1457 
investigation would subsequently hold that these allegations “were a direct consequence of and 
motivated solely by concerns arising from the difficulties in which (the complainant) found 
himself with his superiors in the Garda Síochána and with the criminal law.”1458  The member 
who made these allegations accused senior Gardaí and P.S.N.I. officers of being involved in 
criminal conspiracy in matters connected to the Omagh Bombing.  The same member was 
embattled with serious allegations being made against him which were subject to inquiry by 
both Morris and internally by AGS itself.   
 
The toxic world of criminal intelligence was again under the spotlight in July 2008 when Kieran 
Boylan walked free from court when the State did not proceed with six charges against him in 
connection with the seizure of €1.7 million worth of cocaine in Co. Louth.1459  At the time of 
that particular seizure he had been on bail in respect of other charges relating to the seizure of 
€700,000 worth of cocaine in both Dublin and Louth.  He received a five-year prison sentence 
in respect of the former charges.  GSOC would investigate the unexplained dropping of charges 
in the aftermath.  GSOC would inquire into Boylan’s relationship with the Gardaí and seek to 
establish if he was an informant.  An R.T.E. report would state: 
 
The Ombudsman investigated whether or not any Gardaí knew he was dealing drugs 
while acting as an informant; if he supplied drugs to other drug dealers and then gave 
information about those drugs to Gardaí; and whether or not a conviction secured on 
the basis of such information is now unsafe.1460 
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The D.P.P. would ultimately direct no charges in the matter against any Gardaí on the basis of 
the investigation file submitted by GSOC consequent to a four-year investigation by them.  
However, GSOC would complain that Gardaí delayed the GSOC investigation and “expressed 
serious concern about informant handling procedures.”1461  Garda Commissioner Martin 
Callinan would publicly reject these criticisms.  GSOC criticised “informant handling 
procedures, training and management and recommend changes.”1462  Tension between GSOC 
and AGS would again arise in 2014 when on the 9th February of that year: 
 
an article appeared in a weekend newspaper under the heading “GSOC under Hi-Tech 
Surveillance” asserting that the offices of GSOC had been ‘targeted as part of a 
sophisticated surveillance operation which used government level technology to hack 
into its e-mails, wifi and phone system.1463  
 
 
The newspaper concerned was the Irish Edition of the Sunday Times.  The government would 
appoint Retired Judge John D. Cooke to investigate the matter.  The Cooke Report would 
conclude: 
 
 It is impossible on the basis of the technical opinions and available information, 
categorically to rule out all possibility of covert surveillance … it is clear that the 
evidence does not support the proposition that actual surveillance of the kind asserted 
in the Sunday Times article took place and much less that it was carried out by members 
of the Garda Síochána.1464  
 
 
AGS remains under the spotlight right up to the present time in respect of how it handles and 
manages informants.  On the 10th October 2015 Garda Tony Golden was shot and murdered 
when dealing with a domestic incident involving Siobhan Philips and her partner Adrian 
Crevan Mackin.  Mackin shot Garda Golden dead and with the same firearm shot his partner 
causing her serious injury.  Ms. Philips and her family are now seeking a “full public 
inquiry”1465 into Mackin’s liaisons with Gardaí.  They suspect he may have been an informant 
and that there was a delay by Gardaí in investigating the complaint of Ms. Philips who allegedly 
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had been badly beaten by Mackin a short time before the shooting.  They suspect that Garda 
Golden’s death and Ms. Philips’ injury could have been prevented by prompt actions by the 
Gardaí and the reasons why the Gardaí did not move sooner was, they suspect, that Mackin 
was a Garda informant.  He was before the Courts on charges of membership of an illegal 
organisation notwithstanding that there was evidence to connect him with firearms.   He was 
on bail at the time of the shooting.  After shooting and murdering Garda Golden and attempting 
to murder Ms. Philips he ultimately turned the gun on himself and ended his own life.  The 
controversy remains live in early 2019. 
 
Morris was scathingly critical of Garda informants and intelligence handling.  Five telephone 
calls had been made to the home of Michael and Charlotte Peoples.  Morris would find that a 
Garda informant would make these calls from the home of a member of AGS1466 who in turn 
would deny that they had occurred, and the station duty detail would be altered to support the 
denial.  Nonetheless Morris would find that: 
 
 Certain members of Garda management in Donegal would condone the tactic … of 
allowing a police informant to make these type of bizarre telephone calls to the home 
of Michael Peoples for the purpose of illegitimately entrapping him and setting him up 
for arrest.1467  
 
Morris would criticise AGS on the “chaotic nature of informant handling.”1468  
 
In response to Morris, AGS produced what it called “a Code of Practice for the Management 
and Use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources”1469 (CHIS).  The organisation says that this 
policy “brings together current established best practice.”1470  AGS state: 
 
 Authority to recruit, handle and manage these CHIS will only be given by Assistant 
Commissioner at Crime and Security. These CHIS will be strictly managed in 
accordance with our Code of Practice. 
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 AGS has a duty to protect the identity of CHIS and as such (we) have a duty of care to 
these individuals.  This duty will necessitate that a risk assessment is conducted in 
respect of each CHIS.1471 
 
The organisation will appoint and train CHIS Handlers “to approved standards”1472 and where 
“authority is given to use a CHIS the use will be subject to appropriate review”1473 and “will 
also maintain records of our activities in the management and handling of CHIS.”1474 
 
The discretion of each member of AGS to engage and develop his or her own informants is 
now more or less set at zero.  Within the organisation the CHIS system must be used and failing 
to do so will generally lead to strong disciplinary sanction.  Informants should be registered.  
The advantage of such a system is to minimise the abuse of informants and criminal intelligence 
as was found by Morris.  It also protects younger members who could be compromised by 
informers.  The downside is that if an alert member of the public calls to the local station to 
report suspicious activity and Gardaí act on same and recover stolen property, drugs or 
firearms, then the first question now asked by management is where did the information come 
from?  The member of the public may have no wish to be identified or may not have even given 
his details.  The member of the public who now acts to assist Gardaí will now be expected to 
be a CHIS.  Gardaí might no longer be inclined to take the initiative and will choose to play 
safe and invoke the CHIS system.  Time is lost and windows of opportunity to recover stolen 
property, illicit drugs or firearms will be firmly closed but the Garda will face no disciplinary 
sanction.  As noted by Garland: 
 
 The changes that have occurred in the control field have mainly been a matter of 
redeploying and redirecting the practices of existing institutions.  It has been a process 
not of investigating new institutions or instituting new practices but redefining those 
that already exist giving them a different force and significance and putting them to 
different uses.1475 
 
The cultivating of informants and the gathering of good criminal intelligence remains 
recognised as an essential police skill, but the system is now strongly regulated to protect AGS 














Garda work is never black and white and Garda duties can be contentious and Gardaí are easily 
second guessed.  AGS is the most accountable and supervised organisation in this jurisdiction.  
Not only are Gardaí subject to both criminal and civil law like every other citizen they are also 
amenable to its internal disciplinary regulations and the decisions that Gardaí make in difficult 
situations on the spur of the moment can be legally challenged and exposed to scrutiny by 
judicial review and hindsight.    Since the 1960s the Gardaí now have custody regulations,1476 
custody records1477, custody officers1478, electronic interviewing of prisoner interviews1479, 
GSOC1480, the Inspectorate1481, and their own Professional Standards Unit (PSU)1482 including 
its Internal Audit Section (IAS)1483 and the Whistleblower’s Charter1484.   There is also now a 
Policing Authority1485 and a Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland1486.  It is 
submitted that this transformation on Garda oversight is evidence of what Garland states: 
 
 Criminal justice is now less autonomous than it was three decades ago and more 
forcefully directed from the outside.  Criminal justice actors and agencies are now less 
capable of directing their own force and shaping their own policies and decisions.1487 
 
The scrutiny and supervision of the Garda organisation is massive compared to what it was 
back in the 1960s and the decades before.  It is easy for persons outside the Garda organisation 
whether they be politicians, media commentators, academics or the public generally to find 
fault with AGS from its highest echelons right down to the Garda on the beat.  Garda duties, 
functions and work are massively diverse and fraught with risk and danger.  It is easy therefore 
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for politicians and others to highlight the real and perceived shortcomings of Gardaí in certain 
situations and politicise them.   
 
As noted by O’Donnell and O’Sullivan in 2001 in respect of ‘zero tolerance policing’ espoused 
by Michael O’Donoghue T.D. (later Minister for Justice) in the 1997 general election: 
  
Politicians, especially in Fianna Fail have used crime as a ‘wedge issue’ designed to 
separate voters from opposition parties.   Criminal justice policy is no longer a subject 
for practitioners and technocrats.  It is no longer an unglamorous core function of 
governments like public health, transport or communication.  It has become politicised 
and emotionally charged.1488 
 
It is submitted that much of the scandal pertaining to AGS over the decades was seriously 
politicised and emotionally charged particularly so in the last ten years.   As noted by 
O’Donnell and O’Sullivan “sound bite politics was the order of the day … while slogans and 
symbols may have some visceral appeal they did little to solve complex problems.”1489  
 
Opposition T.D.’s now find it easy to use AGS to score political points against the government 
of the day.   Garda work easily lends itself to sensationalism but as noted by O’Donnell and 
O’Sullivan: 
 
 To describe the nuances of a rational response to crime requires time and this is 
impossible to do in a ten second sound bite.  To some extent therefore the media agenda 
“especially television and radio” shapes the political discourse in the sense that it makes 
proper discussion a luxury.  To be heard above the crowd requires a mastery of catch 
phrases rather than detailed understanding. 1490   
 
It is submitted that the work of AGS lends itself easily to this political and media cynicism.  If 
the Gardaí are guilty of wrong doing, then those responsible should be held to account, however 
on many occasions Gardaí have to make decisions in the heat of the moment and many 
decisions can only be seen as wrong in the cold light of day and with plenty of hindsight and 
discussion.  It is one thing to hold Gardaí to account, it is another thing altogether to impugn 
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and damage them personally and professionally especially so without trial or some proper 
investigation and this can happen when T.D.’s highlight Garda matters under Dáil privilege. 
 
On the 10th February 2017 Garda Keith Harrison wrote to Minister Catherine Zappone T.D. 
making “allegations of the most serious kind … against the national police force and against 
the social services” which led in part to the setting up of what is now known as the Disclosures 
Tribunal.1491  A number of T.D.’s supported Garda Harrison.  In February 2017 Alan Kelly 
T.D. welcomed the fact that a number of Garda Harrison’s allegations would be looked at by 
the aforementioned Tribunal.  Kelly would state “there are similarities between his case and 
the others in the form of the role of TUSLA and how he (Garda Harrison), Marissa and their 
family were treated.”1492  It is assumed that Mr. Kelly was equating Garda Harrison’s 
allegations with that of Sergeant McCabe.  The same Tribunal was simultaneously inquiring 
into issues involving Sergeant McCabe’s Garda bosses and TUSLA.   In January 2017 Mick 
Wallace T.D. stated “as soon as Keith Harrison put his head above the parapet, he got barraged 
from all angles by the hierarchy of the force which had not changed its spots.”1493  In December 
2017 Claire Daly T.D. asked “Harrison, a member of the Garda?  Senior management pressured 
his girlfriend into making a complaint against him.  He had to go to the High Court to stop an 
action against him … who will be held to account for the breach of human rights of that whistle-
blower?”1494 
 
Having enquired into these matters the Tribunal fully exonerated the Gardaí and TUSLA 
personnel who dealt with Garda Harrison.  Judge Peter Charlton, the Tribunal Chairman would 
do so in the most emphatic and categoric of terms.  In the course of his report the Tribunal 
Chairman would comment on the nature of these type of allegations: 
 
 One of the earliest and bitterest experiences of almost every lawyer is that of meeting a 
client who has a tale of injustice to tell and setting about deploying the resources of 
litigation for the benefit of that client, to later realise that there is another side to the 
                                               
1491 P. Charlton, Second Interim Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Protected Disclosures made under the 
       Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and Certain Other Matters.  Established by the Minister for Justice and 
       Equality Under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts 1921-2004 on the 17th February 2017 by 
       instrument. Report on matters relating to Garda Keith Harrison pursuant to terms of reference (n) (o). 
1492 “The T.D.s who backed Keith Harrison” Irish Independent 2nd December 2017 accessed at www. 







story and that it is such that the court eventually resolves the case that is brought 
negatively.  It is fundamental to our system of justice that both sides should be heard 
because both have evidence and insights as to the issue put forward.  No case is 
resolvable without the consideration of the contrary case.  Just as a lawyer in an office 
may hear only one side of the case, that which the potential litigant wants to put forward, 
so, in terms of political representations, only one side will be heard and accepted in 
good faith.1495   
 
The Tribunal Chairman espouses the importance of hearing both sides.  T.D.’s however can 
use Dáil privilege to put forth only one side of a story in a very sensational way to presume 
wrongdoing on behalf of the party or parties being complained of. Notwithstanding the 
Tribunal’s findings Garda Harrison continues to pursue and litigate his issues. 
 
As Garland noted “the dynamics of the televised press conference or interview has made it 
more difficult for administrators and professionals to avoid the emotional forces of public 
opinion.”1496  It is submitted that the AGS at all levels would agree with what Garland states 
here.  Garland would further explore the impact of the media: 
 Televised news conveyed a sense of immediacy and intimacy bringing the viewer ‘face 
to face’ with the subject of the interview or presentation.  This led to a new emphasis 
upon the emotive and intimate aspects of events and the tendency to reveal more and 
more of the personalities involved.1497   
 
Over the years Garda Commissioners have become almost household names.  So too have other 
Garda members in the course of investigations and scandals.  As Garland states: 
 
 The media in the name of realism and candid reporting no longer respects the traditional 
demands of privacy and intimacy.  More backstage behaviour is routinely revealed as 
one of the failings of public figures and institutions.   Its self-serving and much abused 
– but nonetheless democratic – shibboleth is that the public has a right to know.1498   
 
It is submitted that this chapter has shown that “the central agencies of the modern criminal 
justice state have undergone quite radical shifts in their working practices and organizational 
missions.”1499  Garda discretion has almost been set at almost zero because of these changes.   
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This it is submitted is Garland’s theory as it relates to AGS.  He further observes that, 
“practitioners who were trained before the 1980s have seen their codes of conduct rendered 
obsolete, the distribution of power changed and the aims and objectives that had no place in 
old systems have become increasingly prominent.”1500  Gardaí trained in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s have seen the job revolutionised in ways they could not have imagined when they 
first passed through the gates of the Garda Training Centre in Templemore as it was then 
known.   It is now known as the Garda College.   
 
Amazingly, notwithstanding all the scandals that have engulfed AGS over the decades it has 
always maintained an elevated level of public support.  In 2002 86.6% of the public were said 
to be “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with Garda service.1501  In 2006 it was 79%1502 and in 2007 
it was back up to 81%.1503  In 2015 “high” to “medium” trust in AGS was never below 84% 
for each quarter of that year while persons “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with Gardaí was down 
to no less than 66% in each quarter of that year.1504  For the first quarter of 2017 74% were 
“satisfied” or “very satisfied” with Garda service and 92% had “high” to” medium” trust in 
AGS.1505  However, only 43% thought it was “well managed” and 38% thought that AGS 
provided a “world class police service”.1506 
 
It is submitted that the final two statistics are crucial.  The public differentiate between 
individual members of the Gardaí and the actual organisation itself and how it is managed.  
Perhaps an observation by retired Superintendent Tim Leahy helps to clarify this paradox: 
 
 It must be understood that the Garda Síochána is one of the largest single welfare 
agencies in the State … The welfare dimension is rarely seen in that light but rather to 
the public accept the service as a gesture of a person in authority with whom they 
happen to be dealing with in any given circumstances.  Indeed, the major element of a 
Garda’s job is of a nature which cannot strictly be defined as pure police work.  Each 
time a unit of the Garda Síochána attends to matters calling for attention such as a) a 
national disaster like a fire, flooding or drowning, b) a traffic accident, c) doing point 
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1505 Garda Public Attitude Survey 2017 at p.4. 





duty at a road junction, d) an event calling for crowd control, e) an emergency action 
to save life, the unit attends in the capacity of welfare officers.1507 
 
The public are satisfied that their contact with individual Gardaí but not so happy with how 
they manage and organise themselves. 
 
In any event it is being submitted that this chapter presents evidence of Garda history through 
the prism of scandal which supports what Garland says: 
 
 The public has increasingly lost confidence in criminal justice and politicians have 
become more unwilling to entrust decision making powers to criminological experts or 
criminal justice personnel.  From the political view point the criminal justice system 
has become a danger zone, a constant generation of risks and scandals and escalating 





This chapter has traced the impact of scandal and controversy in AGS from the 1960s to 2017.  
The controversies presented in this chapter are not exhaustive of what occurred within AGS, 
but it is strongly contended that they fully evince the validity of Garland’s theory insofar as it 
can be applied to the practices and procedures of AGS over the last fifty years.  Garland set out 
his theory in 2001.  It is submitted that it held true then and continues to hold true now. 
 
The salient transformation brought about because of scandal is the substantial erosion of Garda 
discretion. As one of Conway’s Garda sources noted in her recent publication: 
 
 Discretion has now gone because at the time you went to an incident you took out your 
notebook and you wrote down the details.  If you wanted to do something about it was 
up to you to come back and do up your files but now when you go to an incident you 
must put that on PULSE.  That is now a public record.1509 
 
 
This chapter has looked at Garda scandals under the headings Accountability, Prisoners and 
Intelligence Gathering.  It has also explored how the media and politicians highlighted these 
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scandals.  It is the view of this author that politicians used Dáil privilege to raise what were in 
some case unfounded allegations and in some ways exacerbated and sensationalised what had 
occurred.  The Gardaí have also been scandalised regarding their shortcomings on how they 
investigated or did not investigate crime and how they recorded crime statistics and detection 
rates.  The organisation also found itself in controversies in how it handled and dealt with 
‘whistle-blowers’ within its own ranks and generally speaking on how it managed itself.  These 
areas are covered in other chapters of this work. They show that there can be an overlap on the 
Garland indices.  It can be seen from this chapter that much has been done by respective 
governments to improve Garda accountability and ensure the protection of prisoners in Garda 
custody. The Government has committed itself to implementing the recommendations of the 
Report from the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland which is discussed in the next 
chapter. In authors view this can only strengthen AGS well into the future.   The Gardaí have 
also endeavoured to improve how they handle criminal intelligence but notwithstanding these 
improvements this area will always remain toxic and dangerous.   The Gardaí remain 
scandalised in part because of how they dealt with matters going back many years.  It is easy 
to pick an historical incident involving the Gardaí and retrofit today’s standards to impugn 
Garda efficacy and integrity.  It is not the focus of this chapter or indeed this thesis to challenge 
criticisms of the organisation.  This chapter simply sets out to demonstrate Garland’s theory is 





DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
 
 It is the only profession in this country where we ask people to dance a dance with 
Satan, to come face to face with evil, to play games or have games played on them with 
people of evil intent.1510 
 
This thesis set out to explore transformation in AGS over the last half century since the late 
1960s to 2018 and to establish if David Garland’s theory on the “culture of control” has any 
relevance to that transformation.  It is submitted that the evidence presented here is compelling 
proof that Garland’s theory is authenticated in what occurred in Irish policing in the period 
under review.  In Garland’s seminal publication in 2001, the 1980s and 1990s were examined 
inter alia, highlighting changes in the criminal justice systems of the U.S.A. and U.K. during 
those decades.  In that time, Garland argues that criminal justice in these large jurisdictions 
became more authoritarian, coercive and punitive.  He uses twelve benchmarks or what he calls 
“Indices of Change” to make out his case.  Six of these indices are examined in this work.  They 
were selected because they are easily applicable to policing and separate chapters focus on each 
of them.  To recap, these benchmarks were as follows:1511 
 
1. The Return of the Victim 
2. Above All, The Public Must be Protected. 
3. The Expanding Infrastructure of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. 
4. Civil Society and the Commercialization of Crime Control. 
5. New Management Styles and Working Practices. 
6. A Perpetual Sense of Crisis. 
 
Each chapter in this work presents substantial evidence of changes and renewal to AGS under 
these benchmarks.  That is not to say that there are not some pushbacks on Garland’s theory, 
but it is maintained that the evidence corroborating what he argues is very compelling.    In the 
first chapter it is shown that victims of crime have a new import and salience, but their rights 
continue to be trumped by due process rules in favour of the accused.  AGS can no longer rely 
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on immunity from civil wrongs perpetrated on victims because of their member’s neglect and 
the organisation has had to introduce and give effect to its Victims Policy and Charter.  Its 
PULSE system has been updated to ensure that its members attentiveness to victims can be 
recorded and verified.  Gardaí must now carry out call backs to crime victims after a crime has 
occurred and Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) are appointed to liaise with victims’ families in 
respect of more grave and heinous crimes.  While Gardaí retain some autonomy on 
prosecutorial decision making in respect of criminal matters their discretion has been eroded 
by the D.P.P. who now has specifically codified how and when the Gardaí can exercise 
prosecutorial decision making.  Essentially the D.P.P. will now make prosecutorial decisions 
in all serious matters.  Reasons for decisions not to prosecute must now be explained to victims 
of crime on their request in certain circumstances.   
 
In the second chapter on public protection what Gardaí were confronting on the streets is placed 
alongside the volume and velocity of legislation that delivered on massive Garda 
empowerment.   These powers covered every area of policing from traffic and casual trading 
to the seizure of criminal assets and crime investigation.  The chapter explains how internally 
Garda training could hardly keep abreast of legislative changes and their own empowerment 
and in-service training was limited.  This internal difficulty continues but there are plans to 
improve. As noted in 2018 by the Commission of the Future of Policing in Ireland (C.F.P.I) 
AGS did not “see training as a critical function but a disposable one”1512 as budget cuts after 
the financial crash in 2009 saw the monies allocated to in service training “reduced to almost 
zero”1513  While the Gardaí have received much empowerment, they have also been reined in 
with law and regulation in how they deal with prisoners1514 and investigations into AGS are 
now carried out under the independent auspices of GSOC1515.  A Garda Inspectorate oversees 
policing procedures1516 and internally the Gardaí have their own audit and professional 
standards units.    
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In the third chapter on crime prevention and community safety explores how the drugs 
epidemic in the mid-1980s escalated fears in AGS that the public was losing confidence in its 
ability to tackle the problem.  This led to AGS embarking on a charm offensive to restore public 
confidence in the organisation and its ability to tackle crime and in particular the drugs problem.  
Neighbourhood Watch (NW) schemes and their derivatives were set up around the country and 
were vehicles for local Gardaí and their more senior officers to formally and informally meet 
the public whom they police to address fears (both real and perceived) of criminal activity in 
their respective areas.  The chapter shows how the organisation’s community policing policy 
has remained important within the organisation up to the present day and while Garda 
management, mainly due to budgetary and resourcing issues might struggle to maintain 
adequate staffing of community policing units in their districts, the policy commitment never 
changed.  The various Garda reports are looked at from the 1980s in particular and some of the 
remarks of senior Gardaí at the time are strikingly similar with the vocabulary of Garland when 
describing his theory on the culture of control.  
 
In the fourth chapter the commercialisation of policing is discussed.  The Gardaí acknowledge 
that due to budgets and resourcing they cannot be everywhere, and private security interests 
willingly and profitably filled the vacuum. For many decades but particularly the 1970s private 
security personnel internally patrol and secure the assets of commercial enterprise and private 
property.  Private security command the doorways of and the internal space of nightclubs and 
bars.  Since the late 1990s the machinery and apparatus of private security is everywhere to be 
seen.  Alarm systems on and in buildings, CCTV systems in premises, the security and transit 
of cash, bodyguards and locks and fittings to windows and doors.  Not only has AGS receded 
from view it has also itself come to embrace and rely on private security interests to protect its 
Garda stations and members.  In the noughties AGS members now operate intricate radio 
systems that have features inbuilt for their safety.  Alarm systems are in place to deter break 
ins to rural Garda stations when they are unmanned, and CCTV systems are in place in Garda 
stations, in particular in prisoner reception and custody areas.  In addition, the Gardaí rely on 
the evidence of private security members in criminal prosecutions before the courts.   
 
In the mid-1990s managerialism arrives in AGS and this is discussed in the fifth chapter.   
Policing is now run like a business and the “fetish for the quantifiable” comes to the fore in 
how AGS accounts and manages itself.  The Irish government’s Strategic Management 




thousand tasks.  AGS introduced its initially much heralded PULSE system in the late 1990s. 
This system was very detailed but cumbersome It was primarily intended to ensure day to day 
policing activity was properly recorded and acted upon so that proper operational decisions 
could be made at management level, but it soon became an instrument for performance 
measurement.   Members, districts and divisions were compared and contrasted with each 
other.  Scandal would ultimately emanate from the organisation when the arithmetic and reality 
were examined and did not tally.  Some of what was contained in the glossy brochures 
emanating from the organisation since the mid-1990s did not pass muster.  AGS staffing, 
resourcing and budgeting all contributed to the difficulties of Garda management in one way 
or another and continue to do so.  As recent as 2018 the C.F.P.I. when it examined management 
in AGS would find that “the system as it is currently is set up to fail. Unless it is not merely 
reformed but transformed as we propose, changes in personnel will not turn the situation around 
and the litany of policing problems besetting the organisation its people and politicians will 
continue.”1517 The Garda Inspectorate also 2018 states that AGS “has a limited understanding 
of current and future demand and the absence of intelligence led strategy planning is a 
significant concern. It also said it concerned with “supervisory levels given the experience of 
Garda front line members.1518 Kathleen O’Toole the Chair of the C.F.P.I. in 2018 stated that 
“there are systemic problems related to structures, accountability mechanisms, management 
processes and culture.”1519 These matters contributed to Garda controversies in the last twenty 
years at least. This chapter therefore feeds into the sixth and concluding chapter which deals 
with crisis in AGS and policing generally.  The history of crisis in AGS is traced through five 
decades.  The toxic scent of scandal has permeated the organisation since the late 1960s and 
throughout the nascent northern troubles throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  The intensity of 
police scandal has increased substantially during the late 1990s up to the present time.   In the 
last half century AGS and policing generally in Ireland has been under the media and public 
spotlight like never before.  The Garda Press Office has been busy in the period under review.  
Since the 1980s three Commissioners and a Deputy Commissioner have stood down because 
of scandal.  AGS has been transformed by scandal in three areas such as prisoners, intelligence 
and managerialism.  Managerialism is dealt with in chapter five but changes to AGS because 
of how it dealt with its prisoners and how it dealt with intelligence is explored in chapter six.  
It is because of these scandals that the Gardaí are now subject to robust and independent 
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oversight.  Prisoner interviews are video recorded and a prisoner’s presence in the station is 
catalogued from his time of arrival there.  The Gardaí have also had to tighten up on their 
intelligence handling and introduced CHIS but the media spotlight continues to focus brightly 
on the organisation and AGS continues to be on the back foot.   
 
Notwithstanding all the scandal the C.P.F.I. acknowledge that AGS continues to enjoy the 
support of the “majority” of the public.1520 If that is the case, then it is contended that AGS 
must be doing something right. Tyler and Huo in 2002 examined “the role of outcomes, 
procedural justice, and trust in public willingness to defer to legal authorities.”1521 They argue 
that the public will be supportive of legal authorities when they perceive their handling of 
disputes “are in accord” with “fair process” and their “motives” are perceived “to be 
trustworthy.”1522 They go onto state that “people generalize from their personal experiences 
with police officers and judges to form the overall view about the legitimacy of the police and 
the courts.”1523 They add that if people experience fair procedure it helps “to shape more 
accepting views of societal authority.”1524 It is submitted therefore that AGS because of its 
consistent public support in the face of almost incessant controversy the public still trust 
members of AGS. Cormac O’Keeffe in the Irish Examiner on the 27th November 2018 
highlights an AGS survey carried out in July/September 2018 which shows public trust in AGS 
at 91%.1525 It would appear that the high public trust of AGS in the face continuing scandal 
strongly corroborates the work of Tyler and Huo. Perhaps that would be a matter suitable for 
further study   
 
 It is being contended here that the research grounded in each of these substantive chapters 
fully evinces Garland’s theory and its potent relevance to transformation in AGS.  Garland 
takes and overarching view of the criminal justice systems in the U.S.A. and U.K.  This 
research confines itself to AGS the Irish police force and what happened to it and within it 
during the last fifty years.   Garland’s thesis argues that watershed times of change were the 
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1980s and 1990s.  This thesis goes further back than that to the 1960s and extends almost right 
up to the end of the second decade of the 21st century.   It is contended that the research 
produced here demonstrates that Garland’s theory continues to hold true insofar as AGS is 
concerned.  The fear of crime has a prominence it never had before the 1970s amongst the Irish 
public and the politicians that they elect.  In 2001 Garland stated that “the future is not 
inevitable.”1526  The “culture of control” emanates from “a certain style of politics, a certain 
conjuncture of class forces, a particular historical trajectory.”1527  He goes on to state that “ 
(t)hey are the outcome of (partly planned and partly unintended) of political and cultural and 
policy choices – choices that could have been different and that could still be rethought and 
reversed.”1528 
 
It is argued here and the research in this thesis shows that insofar as Irish policing is concerned 
these “political and cultural and policy choices”1529 have not been “reversed” or “rethought.”  
However, the Report of the C.F.P.I. in late 2018 and the Irish Government’s commitment to 
implementing its recommendations may be the catalyst for reversion and rethinking that 
Garland refers to. In time further study would show whether or not that is the case. In addition 
to these “indices of change”1530 that have been examined in this work there are six others that 
he names that are certainly relevant but not directly applicable to policing and AGS.  It is 
suggested that they would be more of import to the Irish Prison Service, the Probation Service, 
TUSLA the Child Care Agency and the Department of Justice.  Garland references them as 
follows:1531 
 
1. The decline of the rehabilitative ideal. 
2. The Re-emergence of punitive sanctions and Expressive Justice. 
3. Changes in the emotional tone of crime policy. 
4. Politicization and the new populism. 
5. The reinvention of the prison. 
6. The transformation of criminological thought. 
 
                                               









There can be no doubt that these particular indices do “piggy-back” on the other six indices 
that have been examined in this work and certainly could be explored in separate research as it 
would appear that Garland’s theory also has relevance for other institutions and organisat ions 
in this jurisdiction over the last number of decades.     It would also seem that his theory will 
hold true for at least the immediate future, but positive change in the form of the 
recommendations of C.P.F.I may be on the way.    
 
This writer knew nothing of the “culture of control” or Garland until he belatedly read his 
publication while pursuing a course of legal study in 2011.  The writer was a serving Garda in 
the 1980s and 1990s – the focal period of change in Garland’s review.  The writer was also a 
serving Garda for almost two decades after Garland’s publication in 2001.   It was this writer’s 
view that he had lived, worked and experienced Garland’s theory at the policing ‘coalface’ for 
over three decades.  Consequently, the writer could produce tangible evidence verifying the 
authenticity of Garland’s theory and its role in explaining transformation in AGS. 
 
It is being argued here that the “political and cultural and policy choices” that have grounded 
Garland’s “culture of control” have not been “rethought” or “reversed”, at least not yet but the 
C.F.P.I brings a promise of change.  Neither has the media’s inflated preoccupation with 
criminal justice and policing receded and the public’s fear of crime continues to remain at large 
influencing what their elected politicians do when they come to power.  The “culture of control” 
it is submitted has seen AGS battered by scandal and has resulted in two Ministers for Justice 
and two Garda Commissioners step away from their positions in recent years because of 
policing matters.    Commissioner Drew Harris officially took the reins of AGS in September 
2018.   To succeed in his role, he will need the support and commitment of his rank and file 
membership, his officer- corps, his political bosses and the public generally.  However, it is 
submitted that Garland’s theory continues to be strongly relevant in this jurisdiction.  
Anecdotally it is said that Napoleon Bonaparte preferred that his generals be ‘lucky’ rather than 
clever.  If that is the case, then Commissioner Harris will also need to be lucky. However, it is 
contended that it is a massive step forward that the Irish Government has published its 
Implementation Plan and time scale to implement the recommendations C.F.P.I.  Report. In the 
writers view this will strengthen AGS at all levels for the better and rid the organisation of 
many of the ills that has caused it to be scandalised. Perhaps AGS can also take fortitude from 
the words of Kathleen O’Toole the Chair of the C.F.P.I who stated that in the course of the 




clear public confidence (in AGS) has been shaken in the wake of tribunal and news reports, yet 
the majority of people in Ireland continue to support the police and are eager to work in 
partnership with them to improve safety and the quality of life in their community”1532  
 
  
                                               










• B. Golding and S.P. Savage, Handbook of Policing 2nd Edition edited by Tim Newburn 
(Devon: Willen Publishing 2008). 
• Baker M., Cops: Their Lives in Their Own Words, (London Sphere Books Ltd. 1987).  
• Booth T. and Carrington K., “A Comparative Analysis of Victim Policies across the 
Anglo Speaking World in Sandra Walklate, ed., Handbook of Victim and Victimology 
(Devon: Willan Publishing, 2007). 
• Brady C., Guardians of the Peace (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan 1974). 
• Brady C., The Guarding of Ireland: The Garda Síochána and the Irish Free State 1960-
2014. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2014).   
• Bratton W., “Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn From New 
York’s Finest” (The Heritage Foundation 1997). 
• Breathnach S., The Irish Police from the Early Times to the Present Day, (Dublin: Anvil 
Books Ltd., 1974). 
• Coen R., Garda Powers, Law and Practice (Dublin: Clarus Press 2014). 
• Conway V., “The Blue Wall of Silence”, The Morris Tribunal and Public 
Accountability in Ireland. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press 2010). 
• Conway V., Daly Y., and Schwepp J., Irish Criminal Justice Theory, Process and 
Procedure (Dublin: Clarus Press 2010).   
• Conway V., Policing Twentieth Century Ireland, a History of An Garda Síochána 
(London: Routeledge 2014). 
• Coonan G. and O’Toole K., “Criminal Procedure in the District Court” (Dublin: Round 
Hall 2011).   
• Courtney J., It Was Murder! (Dublin: Blackwater Press 1996). 
• Crank J., Understanding Police Culture (New York: Routeledge 2015). 
• Dunne D. & Kerrigan G., Round Up the Usual Suspects: Nicky Kelly and The Cosgrave 
Coalition (Dublin: McGill Publications 1984).   
• Garland D., The Culture of Control, Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 
(Oxford O.U.P. 2001).   
• Jones T. and Newburn T., Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective edited by T. 
Jones and T. Newburn (London and New York Routeledge 2006). 
• Kennedy C., Historic Conversations on her Life with John F. Kennedy (Hachette UK 
2011). 
• Kerrigan G. and Brennan P. This Great Little Nation; The A-Z of Irish Scandals and 
Controversies (Dublin:  Gill & Macmillan 1999). 
• Kilcommins S., O’Donnell I., O’Sullivan E., Vaughan B., Crime Punishment and the 
Search for Order in Ireland (Dublin: I.P.A., 2004). 
• Lardner J. and Repetto T., NYPD: A City and its Police (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co. 2000).  
• Leahy T., Memoirs of a Garda Superintendent (Kilrush: Hero Press 1997). 
• Maguire M., “Crime Data and Statistics” (ed) Oxford Handbook in Criminology 4th 




• Mawby R., “Public Sector Services and Victims of Crime” in Sandra Walklate, ed., 
Handbook of Victims and Victimology (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2007).   
• McCullagh C., Crime in Ireland: A Sociological Introduction (Cork: Cork University 
Press 1996). 
• McKeown K. and Brosnan M., Police and Community: An Evaluation of 
Neighbourhood Watch and Community in Ireland (Dublin: Stationery Office 2001).   
• McNiffe. L., A History of the Garda Síochána (Dublin: Wolfhound Press 1997).  
• Newburn T. and Reiner R., Policing and the Police (eds) Oxford Handbook in 
Criminology 4th edition (Oxford:   Oxford University Press 2007]. 
• Newburn T., “Restorative Justice Victims and the Police” ed., Handbook of Policing 
2nd Edition (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2008).   
• O’Donnell I., & O’Sullivan E. Crime Control in Ireland: The Politics of Intolerance 
(Cork: Cork University Press 2001). 
• O’Malley T., “The Criminal Process” (Dublin: Round Hall 2009). 
• Orange G., Policing Powers in Ireland (Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional 2014).  
• Rayman G., The “NYPD Tapes” (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
• Regan N., Taken Down in Evidence: Ireland from the Back Seat of a Patrol Car 
(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan 1995. 
• Reiner R., The Politics of the Police (3rd Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2000).  
• Sanders A., “Victim Participation in the Exclusionary Criminal Justice System” in 
Caroline Hoyle and Richard Young, eds., New Visions of Crime Victims, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002). 
• Shapland J., Willmore J., Duff P., “Victims in the Criminal Justice System”, (Hants: 
Gower Publishing, 1985).   
• The Secret Barrister, The Secret Barrister: Stories of the Law and How It’s Broken 
(London: Macmillan, 2018). 
• Tyler, T.R. and Huo Y.J., Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Co-Operation with the 
Police and Courts. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 2002) 
• Vaughan B., Accounting for the Diversity of Policing in Ireland: Irish Journal of 
Sociology Vol. 13 (Dublin: I.P.A. 2004).   
• Waddington P.A.J., Policing Citizens Authority and Right, (London: UCL Press, 1999). 
• Walsh D., Human Rights and Policing in Ireland.  Law Policy and Practice.  (Dublin: 
Clarus Press, 2009. 
• Walsh D., The Irish Police Force (Dublin: Round hall, Sweet & Maxwell 1998). 
• Walsh L., The Final Beat (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 2001. 
• Williams P., Gangland (Dublin: O’Brien Press 1998).  
• Williams P., The Untouchables: Ireland’s Criminal Assets Bureau and its War on 
Organised Crime. (Dublin: Merlin Publishing 2006). 




• Braddish v. D.P.P. [2001] 3IR 127. 
• CC v Ireland The Attorney General and Another [2006] 4 IR 1. 
• Damache v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] IESC 11. 
• D.P.P. v. J. C. [2015] IESC 31 




• H. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2.IR 589. 
• Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] 2 A.L.C.E.R. 238. 
• Kelly v. Garda Commissioner [2013]. I.E.S.C. 47. 
• Lockwood v. Ireland [2010].  I.E.H.C., 450. 
• LM v. Garda Commissioner [2011]. I.E.H.C., 14. 
• LM v. Garda Commissioner [2015] I.E.S.C. 81. 
• Maguire v. Central Mental Hospital [1996] 3.I.R. 1 
• O’Leary v. The A.G. [1990] WJSC-HC2890. 
• S.H. v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] 3 IR 57. 
• Smyth v. Garda Commissioner [2014] I.E.H.C. 453. 
• People (Attorney General) v. O’Brien [1965] I.R.142. 
• People (A.G.) v. O’Callaghan [1966] 1I.R. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Cash [2010] 2.I.R. 609 SC; [2007] I.E.H.C. 108 (EC). 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Howley [1989] I.L.R.M.629. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Kenny [1990] 2 I.R.110. 
• People (D.P.P.) v Colm Murphy [2005] 2 IR 125. 
• People (DPP) v Colm Murphy [2005] 4 IR 504. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. McDonagh [1998] WJSC-HC5790. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Madden [1977] I.R. 336. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Mallon [2011] I.E.C.C.A. 29. 
• People (D.P.P.) v., John O’Loughlin [1979] 133 I.L.T.R. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle [1995] 2 I.R. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Quilligan [1993] 2 I.R. 305. 
• People (D.P.P.) v. Shaw [1982] 1I.R.    
• People (D.P.P.) v. Colm Murphy, The Court of Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2002 
Judgement of the Court delivered on the 21st January 2005. 
• People v. Paul Ward Judgement of the Special Criminal Court delivered by Mr. Justice 
Barr on the 27th day of November 1998.   
• People (D.P.P.) v. Paul Ward, Judgement of Court of Criminal Appeal delivered by 










• An Garda Síochána Victims Charter, Edition June 2010. 
• An Garda Síochána Victims Service.  
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1992. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1993. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1994. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1995. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1997. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 1998 and Crime Statistics Report for 1998. 




• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2000. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2001. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2002. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2003. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2005. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2006. 
• An Garda Síochána Annual Report Evaluation 2000. 
• An Garda Síochíána Corporate Strategy Document.  
• An Garda Síochána Strategic Management Initiative Booklet.  
• An Garda Síochána Victim Service Policy an Implementation Guideline March 2015. 
• Brady B., The Irish Security Industry Association – Maintaining and Improving Quality 
Standards.  Communiqué.  June 2002. 
• Clancy C., Community Relations Section: Current Status and Future Developments: A 
Discussion Paper.  Communiqué, June 2001.   
• Department of Justice Witness Expenses Schedule. 
• Dodd N., “Garda Commissioner becoming an Accounting Officer: Impact and 
Implications” Communiqué June 2006. 
• Editorial of Garda Review October 2015.   
• F.C.P.S. Examination.  Issues arising from Fixed Charge Notice Offence R0024 – 
Using Vehicle Without Valid Test Certificate (N.C.T.) carried out by Assistant 
Commissioner Michael O’Sullivan dated 11th August 2017. 
• Final Report of Garda SMI Implementation Steering Group February 2004. 
• Fitzgerald T.P., “The Morris Tribunal and the Garda Síochána.”  Communique March 
2008. 
• Lynch E., Crime and 1947.  Chocolates, Sweats, Irish Women.  Communiqué, June 
1997. 
• Mission Statement of An Garda Síochána 1991. 
• Murphy P.V., “Quality Service in An Garda Síochána, Communiqué, Sept. 1999.  
• P.V., Implementing Corporate Strategy.  How An Garda Síochána converts Murphy 
strategic plans into dynamic operational strategies tactics and actions. Communiqué 
September 2004.   
• OSullivan M., M.A.T./M.I.T. Checkpoint Examination.  Examination of the Recording 
of Breath Tests at Mandatory Alcohol/Intoxicant Testing (M.A.T./M.I.T.) Checkpoints 
11th August 2017. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1971. 
• Report from the Garda Commissioner on Crime 1970. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the An Garda Síochána on Crime 1972. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána on Crime 1973. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1976. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1973. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1975. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1981. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1982. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1985. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1991. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1996. 
• Annual Reports of An Garda Síochána 2000 to 2005 inclusive. 




• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2010. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2011. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2012. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2013. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2014. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2015. 
• Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2017. 
• Report of the Commissioner of An Gardaí Síochána on Crime for the Year 1947. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1968. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1969. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1971. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1973. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1974. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1977. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 1979. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1978. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1980. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1983. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1984. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1986. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1987. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1988. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1989. 
• Report of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána 1990. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2007. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2009. 
• Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána 2016. 
• An Garda Síochána Policing Plan 2009.   
• Public Statement by the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána on the Management and 
Use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources.   
 
 
GARDA INSPECTORATE REPORTS/REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF POLICING IN 
IRELAND 
 
• Report of the Commission on the Future of Policing In Ireland September 2018. 
• Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Crime Investigation 2014.   
• Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate in 2007.  Policing in Ireland: Looking 
Forward”. (August 2007). 
• Report of Garda Síochána Inspectorate: The Fixed Charge Processing System – A 21st 
Century Strategy. (February 2014).  
• Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate on Policing with Local Communities – 







REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 
 
• The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Account of the Public 
Service 2012. 
• The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Collection of Fines. 
December 2000. 
• The Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Purchase of Tyres by An 





• Air Navigation and Transport Act 1973. 
• Air Navigation and Transport Act 1975. 
• Garda Victims Charter 2009. 
• Bail Act 1997. 
• Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011. 
• Casual Trading Act 1980. 
• Casual Trading Act 1998. 
• Children’s Act 2001. 
• Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991. 
• Child Care Act 1991. 
• Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998. 
• Control of Dogs Act 1986. 
• Children First Act 2016. 
• Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000. 
• Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996. 
• Criminal Damage Act 1991. 
• Criminal Evidence Act 1992. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1984. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1990. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1993. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1994. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1999. 
• Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
• Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
• Criminal Justice Act 2011. 
• Criminal Justice Act 2013. 
• Criminal Justice Act 2017. 
• Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009. 
• Criminal Justice (Burglary of Dwellings) Act 2015. 
• Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996. 
• Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence) Act 1990. 
• Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence & DNA Data Based System) Act 2014. 
• Criminal Justice (Illicit Traffic by Sea) Act 2003. 
• Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004. 
• Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997. 




• Criminal Justice (Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing) Act 2010. 
• Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information Systems) Act 2017. 
• Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010. 
• Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994. 
• Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 2003. 
• Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 2011. 
• Criminal Justice (Search Warrants) Act 2012. 
• Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. 
• Criminal Justice (Suspended Sentences of Imprisonment) Act 2017.   
• Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. 
• Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015. 
• Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
• Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017.The Criminal Justice (Withholding of 
Information of Offences Against Children and Vulnerable Persons) Act 2012. 
• Criminal Law Act 1976. 
• Criminal Law Act 1997.  
• Criminal Law (Defensive Dwelling) Act 2011. 
• Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008. 
• Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013. 
• Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) Act 1998. 
• Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. 
• Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976. 
• Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981. 
• Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
• Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993. 
• Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006. 
• Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017. 
• Criminal Procedure Act 2010. 
• Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1988. 
• Data Protection Act 1988. 
• Domestic Violence Act 1996. 
• Emergency Powers Act 1976. 
• Extradition (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) Act 1987. 
• European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. 
• Finance Act 1925. 
• Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
• Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
• Garda Síochána (Complaints) Act 1986. 
• Garda Síochána (Policing Authority and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015. 
• Housing and (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997. 
• Housing and (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2002. 
• Immigration Act 1999. 
• Immigration Act 2003. 
• Immigration Act 2004. 
• Intoxicating Liquor Act 1988. 
• Intoxicating Liquor Act 2000.  




• Intoxicating Liquor Act 2004. 
• Intoxicating Liquor Act 2008.  
• Larceny Act 1990. 
• Licensing (Combating Drug Abuse) Act 1997. 
• Litter Act 1982. 
• Mental Health Act 2001. 
• Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  
• Misuse of Drugs Act 1984. 
• Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act 2016. 
• Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. 
• Noxious Weeds Act 1936. 
• Occupiers Liability Act 1995. 
• Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1972. 
• Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998.   
• Private Security Services Act 2004. 
• Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. 
• Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005. 
• Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2016. 
• Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989. 
• Prompt Payment of Accounts Act 1997. 
• Prosecution of Offences Act 1974. 
• Protection of Children’s Health (Tobacco Smoke in Mechanically Propelled Vehicles) 
Act 2014. 
• Road Act 1993. 
• Road Traffic Act 1961. 
• Road Traffic Act 1968. 
• Road Traffic Act 1994. 
• Road Traffic Act 1995. 
• Road Traffic Act 2002. 
• Road Traffic Act 2003. 
• Road Traffic Act 2004. 
• Road Traffic Act 2006. 
• Road Traffic Act 2010. 
• Road Traffic Act 2011. 
• Road Traffic Act 2014. 
• Road Traffic Act 2016. 
• Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1973. 
• Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1978. 
• Road Traffic and Transport Act 2006. 
• Road Traffic (No.2) Act 2011. 
• Road Traffic (No.2) Act 2014.   
• Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. 
• Sexual Offences (Jurisdiction) Act 1996. 
• Sex Offenders Act 2001.  














• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2003 into certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division, Terms of 
Reference (g): Report on the Garda Investigation of an Arson Attack on Property 
situated on the Site of the Telecommunications Mast at Ardara, Co. Donegal in October 
and November 1996. (Dublin: The Stationary Office, 2006). 
• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1931 –2003 into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Terms of 
Reference (i): Report on the Arrest and Detention of Seven Persons at Burnfoot, Co. 
Donegal on the 23rd of May 1998 and the Investigation Relating to Same. (Dublin: The 
Stationery Office, 2006).   
• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2002 into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Report on the 
Detention of ‘Suspects’ Following the Death of the Late Richard Barron on the 14th 
October 1996 and Related Detentions And Issue.  Terms of Reference (b), (d) and (f). 
Volume 1. 
• F Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2002 into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Report on the 
Detention of ‘Suspects’ Following the Death of the Late Richard Barron on the 14th 
October 1996 and Related Detentions and Issue.  Terms of Reference (b), (d) and (f).  
Volume 2. 
• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2003 into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Terms of 
Reference (b) (d) and (f): Report on the Detention of ‘Suspects’ Following the Death of 
the Late Richard Barron on the 14th October 1996 and Related Detentions and Issues 
Vol. 3. 
• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2002 into Certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Report on the 
Garda Investigation into the Death of Richard Baron and the Extortion caused to 
Michael and Charlotte Peoples.  Terms of Reference (a) and (b).   
• F. Morris, Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Acts 1921-2003 into certain Gardaí in the Donegal Division: Term of 






• “Five Refused Bail in Arms Trawler Case” Irish Times 24th October 1984. 
• “Garda Delay in “Giving Special Rapporteur on Child Protection Details of Training” 




• “Irish Citizen Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges in US.”  The Irish Times. (24th July 
2018). 
• “Kieran Boylan” – R.T.E. Report 9th May 2013 accessed at www.r.t.e.ie at 4.15 p.m. 
on the 22nd of October 2017. 
• “New Garda Chief criticises Rules of Evidence” Irish Times on 13th January 1978. 
• Brosnan Pat, “Decent Citizens Stand Defiant” Cork Examiner (17th April 1995).  
• Buckley D. and O’Flynn S., “O’Grady is Freed After City Gunfight” Irish Times 6th 
November 1987.   
• Buckley D., Joyce J. & Holohan R. “Heavy Gang Use New Act to Intensive Pressure 
on Suspects” Irish Times 15th February 1977. 
• Clifford M., “Victim:  Whistleblower Inquiry a Whitewash.”  Irish Examiner at   
www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/victim - whistleblowerinquiry.    
• Colley Declan, “Gardaí Close to Crinnion Probe Break but Reject ‘Insider’ Claims” 
The Cork Examiner (26th October 1995).  
• Court Report, Irish Times, (19th December 2014). 
• Cusack J., “Gardaí Massaging Crime Statistics for Years” Sunday Independent (27th 
April 2008).   
• Cusack J., “Policing by Numbers Lets Real Criminals Off The Hook: Garda 
Management Obsession with H.R. Led Policing Policies is a Sham and a Nonsense.” 
Sunday Independent (10th May 2015).   
• Devane, Michelle “Pair Charged in Connection with Aidan O’Driscoll Murder” 
@www.independent.ie. 
•  Dooley C., “Garda Procedures in Waterford Defended” Irish Times (15th February 
2002).   
• Duggan, Barry, “Criminal Who Ordered Bouncers Death a Year Ago Arrested” Irish 
Independent (14th February 2013). 
• Dwyer Ryle, “Time to Put Drug Barons Out of Business” The Cork Examiner (5th April 
1995). 
• Editorial The Irish Examiner 20th April, 2015) End Political Gagging of Gardaí. 
• Flynn S. and Buckley D., “O’Grady is Freed After City Gun Fight” Irish Times (6th 
November 1987). 
• Flynn S., “Senior Gardaí Defend O’Grady Kidnap Inquiry” Irish Times on the (11th 
January 1988). 
• Flynn S., “Wren Praises Gardaí in Guinness Case” Irish Times (23rd April 1986).  
• Gartland F. and Holland K., “Support for Victims in Court Urgent” Irish Times on 22nd 
August 2012. 
• Gartland F. and Holland K., “Victims Views” Irish Times on 22nd August 2012. 
• Gartland F., “Garda PULSE System Audits to go Ahead” The Irish Times (23rd 
February 2012). 
• Gartland F., “Opaque Laws on Policing Highlighted”, Irish Times 26th June 2014. 
• Hogan D. and Yeates P., “Car Tried to Smash Through Roadblock” Irish Times (28th 
November 1987). 
• Hogan D., “McGlinchy Ties Up Two Gardaí and Escapes” Irish Times (3rd December 
1983). 
• Holland K., “Family of Killer’s Partner Urge Inquiry into Garda’s Murder” (10th 
October 2017).  
• Horan N., “We’re all to Blame for Points Mess in Nod ‘n Wink World” Sunday 




• Kerrigan G., “No More Room for Eejits in Police Force” Sunday Independent (1st June 
2014). 
• Lally C., “Gardaí concerned at Shortage of Specialist Investigators” The Irish Times 
(14th May 2018). 
• Lally C., “Laws Take Effect to Help Gardaí Tackle White Collar Crime”, Irish Times 
9th August 2011. 
• Lally C., “Purcell No Stranger to ‘Interesting Times’” Irish Times (3rd April 2014). 
• Lally C., “Regency Hotel Shooting: Man Killed in Gangland Attack Named” Irish 
Times (5th February 2016). 
• Lally C., Humphries J., McGee H., Garda Commissioner Takes Legal Advice on Garda 
Speeding to PAC – Callinan Consults A.G. as He Seeks to Prevent Whistle-blower 
Testifying on Alleged Wrongdoing. Irish Times (24th June 2014) at 
www.irishtimes.co/Gardacommissionertakeslegaladviceon Garda speaking to PAC. 
• Loughlin E., “Concerns over Lack of Training as Half of Gardaí can’t give chase or use 
Siren” The Irish Examiner (14th May 2018).  
• Maher J. and Cleary C., “Garda Will Need New Ethos Says Culligan” Irish Times 
(18th June 1996).  
• Mannering B., “Bail Crime and Garda’s Duty of Care”, Irish Times, (25th May 2015).   
• McKittrick David, “Ireland Outraged at Acquitted Youth Signals Contempt” The 
Independent Newspaper (10th November 2003).  
• Nugent R., “Man (27) charged with the Murder of Detective Garda Adrian 
O’Donoghue” Irish Independent (5th March 2018). 
• O’Keeffe C., “Garda Criticise Cut to Training Funds” The Irish Examiner (dated 12th 
October 2017). 
• O’Keeffe C., “Garda Members Issued with Gag Orders over Station Closures” Irish 
Examiner (6th July 2012). 
• O’Keeffe C., “Gardaí Call for End to Political Gagging” Irish Examiner (20th April 
2015). 
• C. O’Keeffe, “Survey Shows Trust in An Garda Síochána High But Less Reporting of 
Cases” Irish Examiner@www.irishexaminer.com 27th November 2018. 
• O’Loughlin E., “Questions Raised Over Interrogation” Irish Times 9th March 1991. 
• O’Riordan S., “Crime Victim Support Group Forced to Beg for Funding” Irish 
Examiner, (7th August 2015).  
• O’Riordan S., “State Solicitor: Gardaí Prevented from Attending Court due to 
Cutbacks” Irish Examiner (2nd November 2012). 
• O’Riordan S., “Watchdog to Discipline Pepper Spray Gardaí” Irish Examiner, (23rd 
January 2014). 
• Obituary Gertie Shields, Irish Times, (22ndAugust 2015).   
• R.T.E. Series “Love /Hate” Season 5 Episode 2. 
• Rafter K. and Coulter C., “Absence of Treatment for Sex Offenders Criticised” Irish 
Times (13th January 2000). 
• Retired Assistant Garda Commissioner Tony Hickey in - Veronica Guerin - Legacy – 
Broadcast on R.T.E. on the 2nd of August 2017. 
• Retired Garda Chief Superintendent Felix McKenna, Veronica Guerin – Legacy 
Broadcast on R.T.E. on the 2nd August 2017.   
• Riegel R, “Suspect in Three Brutal Murders Took Own Life at Farm” The Irish 




• Roche B., “Former Chief of Staff in Real I.R.A. Shot and Killed in Cork City” Irish 
Times 7th December 2016. 
• Ryan P., “Gardaí want Freedom to Criticise Government Decision” Sunday 
Independent 22nd October 2017. 
• Sheehan M., “Pressure on D.P.P. to Appeal Leniency of Rapist’s Sentence” Sunday 
Independent (19th July 2015).    
• Smith J., “Gardaí Arrested 177 Under Aggressive Begging Law” Irish Times, 1st April 
2011.   
• Stack S., “Force Used by Armed Garda in P.O. Raid Proportionate”, Irish Independent 
(19th October 2011) 
• Taylor C., “Big Rise in Speeding Arrests as Cameras Deployed” Irish Times (24th 
March 2011).   
• Williams P., “All in a Day’s Work Says Tenacious Young Garda” Irish Independent 
(28th March 2015). 
• Woulfe J., “Limerick Gang War Marks Its 10th Year” Irish Examiner (11th November 
2010).  
• Yeats Padraig, “Robinson Faces Four Charges, Gets £10,000 Bail” Irish Times (9th 
August 1986). 
• “21 Gangland Murders in 2006” accessed at wordpress.com. 
• “Accused has no future in this country when his time is served”, Irish Times, (11th 
October 2007). 
• “Anger Grows Over Rugby Player’s Murder”, Evening Herald (11th November 2008). 
• “Call for Action Over Witness Intimidation” Irish Times (14th November 2005). 
• “Can Garda Management Get Anything Right” Irish Times 22nd February 2017. 
• “Five Refused Bail in Arms Trawler Case” Irish Times (24th October 1984). 
• “Gardaí Demand Spike Inquiry” Irish Times (14th September 1985). 
• “Gardaí Using North-Style Brutality in Interrogation Techniques”, Irish Times (14th 
February 1977).  
• “Legal Challenge Over Case of Man Shot Dead by Gardaí” R.T.E. Report 17th January 
2017 accessed at www.r.t.e.ie on the 21st October 2017. 
• “Man Denies Capital Murder Charge” Irish Times 22nd June 2001. 
• “Man Shot Dead in Cork City” Irish Times (11th June 29175). 
• “Search for Boy Continues” Irish Times (27th October 1986). 
• “The Mentality of the Barrack Room”, Editorial Sunday Independent (24th November 
2013).   
• “The T.D.s who backed Keith Harrison” Irish Independent (2nd December 2017). 
• “Three Jailed for Attack on R.T.E. Crew at Funeral” Irish Times (23rd January 1996). 
• 48% of Drivers Not Tested for Drink or Drugs Following Serious Collisions (11th 
June 2018). 





• The Private Security Authority @www.psa.gov.ie. 
• Supporting the Gardaí Supporting the Public, Business 2000 / Irish Times 3rd Edition 
1999/2000 at www.business2000.ie.    








• The Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997. 
• Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Stations) 
Regulations 1987. 





• Campbell L., From Due Process to Crime Control – The Decline of Liberalism in the 
Irish Criminal Justice System (2007) 25 ILT 281. 
• Carney P., The Role of Victims in the Irish Criminal Process (2007) J.S.I.J. 7. 
• Kilcommins S., “Crime Control, The Security of the State and Constitutional Justice in 
Ireland: Discounting Legal Liberalism and Deontological Principles. The International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof Vol. 20, Issue: 4 20 pp-326-342. (1st October 2016). 
Accessed at www.journals.sagepub.com/doi date accessed 4th September 2018 at 8.05 
pm  
• Kilcommins S., “Risk In Irish Society”: Moving to a Crime Control Model of Criminal 
Justice.  Conference Paper [2005] Irish Probation Journal Vol.2 Issue 1. 






• A New Beginning in Northern Ireland.  The Report of the Independent Commission on 
Policing for Northern Ireland. (London: HMSO 1999). 
• Annual Report of the Irish Prison Service 2017   
• A Programme for a Partnership Government May 2016. 
• Advisory Group and Garda Management Leadership Development – Final Report to 
the Garda Commissioner, May 2007. 
• Bacik, L. Heffernan, P. Brazil, M. Woods, Report on Services and Legislation 
providing Support for Victims of Crime (December 2007).  
• Barr J., Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding 
the Fatal Shooting of John Carthy at Abbeylara, Co. Longford on the 20th April 2000 
(Government Publications Office, 2006).   
• C. Fennell, Pamphlet on “Crime and Crisis in Ireland: Justice by Illusion” October 
1993. 
• Charlton P., Second Interim Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Protected 
Disclosures made under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and Certain Other 
Matters.  Established by the Minister for Justice and Equality Under the Tribunals of 
Inquiry (Evidence) Acts 1921-2004 on the 17th February 2017 by instrument. Report on 
matters relating to Garda Keith Harrison pursuant to terms of reference (n) (o). 
• Conroy Report on Pay and Conditions 1970. 
• Cooke J., Inquiry into Reports of Unlawful Surveillance of the Garda Síochána 




• Crowe Horwath, Final Report to the Policing Authority.  Review of Matters Related to 
Mandatory Intoxicant Testing and the Issue of Summonses by the Garda Síochána, date 
October 2017. 
• Death of Liam O’Mahony: Report of the Tribunal Appointed by the Minister (1967, Pr 
9790).  “Dead Man Had 10 Broken Ribs” Irish Times 17th June 1967.    
• Delivering Better Government 2nd Report to the Government of the Co-Ordinating 
Secretaries.  A Programme of Change for the Irish Civil Service 1996.  
• Final Report of Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, March 2007. 
• Kilcommins S., Edwards C., O’Sullivan T., “An International Review of Legal 
Provisions and Supports for People with Disabilities as Victims of Crime”.  A 
Comparative Report produced by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (I.C.C.L.) on 
behalf of the Equality Authority.  (Dublin: 2013). 
• Kilcommins S., Leane M., Donson F., Fennell C., Kingston A., “The Needs and 
Concerns of Victims of Crime In Ireland” Report prepared for the Commission for 
Support of Victims of Crime.  (Dublin: 2010).   
• Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Search Warrants and Bench 
Warrants December 2009.  
• Lynch K., Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the ‘Kerry Babies Case’ (Dublin: The 
Stationery Office 1985). 
• Commission of An Gardaí Síochána: Report on Remuneration and Conditions of 
Service.  Presented to the Minister of Justice, January 1970. 
• Commission of Investigation (Certain Matters Relating to the Cavan/Monaghan 
Division of An Garda Síochána) Final Report 25th April 2016. 
• The Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland at www.policereform.ie. 
• Dáil Public Accounts Committee Debate on the 23rd January 2014 in respect of Chapter 
7 of the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report on the Management of the Fixed 
Charge Notice System at www.oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debated%20authority. 
• McAleese M., Police and People, Dublin University Law Journal (1987). 
• The Irish Prison System Vision Values Reality. Report of the Jesuit Centre for Faith and 
Justice. March 2012.  
• Report of the Commission of Investigation (Dean Lyons Case) set up Pursuant to the 
Commission of Investigation Act 2004. 
• Report of the Committee to Recommend Certain Safeguards for Persons in Custody 
and for Members of An Garda Síochána (Prl 7158 Dublin 1978).   
• Report of the Group Established by the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform 
to Examine matters arising from the “Report Raising Concerns of the Activity of An 
Garda Síochána Officers during 1998 dated 22nd March 2002 prepared by the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland for the Minister. 
• Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning I.I.C.D. 26 
Sept. 2005.   
• Report of Ms Emily Logan under Garda Síochána Act 2005 (Section 42) (Special 
Inquiries relating to Garda Síochána Order 2013), July 2014. 
• Report of An Taoiseach Enda Kenny on a Review of the Action Taken by An Garda 
Síochána pertaining to Certain Allegations Made by Sergeant Maurice McCabe. (Sean 
Guerin S.C. 6th May 2014. 
• Rose N., Government and Control, Brit.J. Criminol (2000). 
•  “Seaman Died from Injuries received in Public House: Judicial Tribunal Report on 




• Smithwick P., Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into Suggestions that Members of An 
Garda Síochána or Other Employees Of the State Colluded in the Fatal Shootings of 
RUC Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and RUC Superintendent Robert Buchannan 
on the 20th March 1989: Set up Pursuant to the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 
1921-2004. 
• Spotlight, Issue No. 7 of 2012.  Community Policing in Ireland, Oireachtas Library and 
Research. 
• Tribunal of Inquiry into the Murders of Chief Superintendent Breen and Superintendent 
Buchanan (Smithwick Report, 2013). 
 
STATISTICS/SURVEY 
• Expert Group on Crime Statistics 2004 Minority Report at 
http://www.crimecouncil.gov.ie/statistics 
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2002.   
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2006.   
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2007.   
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2008.   
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2015.   
• Garda Public Attitudes Survey 2017.  
• Garda Recorded Crime Statistics 2006 to 2009 inclusive. 
• Selected Recorded Garda Crime Statistics 2010 to 2016 inclusive.   
• Report of the Expert Group on Crime Statistics (2004).  
http://www.crimecouncil.gov.ie/statistics   
 
 
 
 
